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ABSTRACT
This thesis provides a global political economy of the postwar period, with special reference 
to Zimbabwe. The conceptual aim is to connect the agrarian question with contemporary 
democratic theory, by inquiring into the global sources of ‘civil society’ and relating it to the 
phenomenon of semi-proletarianisation.
There are three basic arguments. First, civil society cannot be understood in isolation 
from imperialism. The onset of the Cold War produced an ultra-imperial order under US 
leadership, with a ‘global development’ project crafted to its needs and a mode of rule 
preoccupied with the definition and enforcement of ‘civil society’. Second, capital 
accumulation in the postwar period has continued to operate in accordance with the laws of 
motion of the centre-periphery relationship; the main alteration has consisted in the closer 
integration of central-state economies with each other, along with a small number of 
industrial satellites. The periphery has remained in a disarticulated pattern of accumulation, 
whose corollary is the reproduction of semi-proletarianisation on a grand scale. Third, under 
ultra-imperialism, ‘civil society’ has been defined in accordance with the requirements of 
disarticulated accumulation, while semi-proletarian politics have all too often been relegated 
to the ‘uncivil’ domain.
The thesis focuses on the relationship between the civil and uncivil politics o f the 
semi-proletariat. During ‘nation-building’, which dovetailed with the Cold War, uncivil 
politics comprised of ‘property unfriendly’ forces, the radical nationalist and socialist seeking 
to nationalise industry and redistribute land (i.e., to alter the pattern of accumulation). With 
the onset of ‘structural adjustment’ and the end of the Cold War, the uncivil net was cast 
wider to the ‘market unfriendly’, including radical trade unionisms and land occupation 
movements. It is argued that in the postwar period uncivil politics have occasionally obtained 
social revolution; or extensive agrarian reforms and capitalist development; or, most 
commonly, limited agrarian reforms within a persisting pattern of disarticulated accumulation 
(Zimbabwe being the case in point). The latter outcome owes to the systematic ‘civilisation’ 
of oppositional politics by means of cooptation tactics -  not least within international trade 
unionism -  and outright repression. The thesis demonstrates these arguments with a detailed 
account of Zimbabwe’s experience, and concludes with reflections on the prospects of a post­
liberal civilisation.
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Waiting for the Barbarians
Why did our emperor get up so early,
and why is he sitting enthroned at the city’s main gate,
in state, wearing the crown?
Because the barbarians are coming today 
and the emperor’s waiting to receive their leader.
He’s even got a scroll to give him, 
loaded with titles, with imposing names.
Why have our consuls and praetors come out today 
wearing their embroidered, their scarlet togas?
Why have they put on bracelets with so many amethysts, 
rings sparkling with magnificent emeralds?
Why are they carrying elegant canes 
beautifully worked in silver and gold?
Because the barbarians are coming today 
and things like that dazzle the barbarians.
Why this sudden bewilderment, this confusion?
(How serious people’s faces have become.)
Why are the streets and squares emptying so rapidly, 
everyone going home lost in thought?
Because night has fallen and the barbarians haven’t come. 
And some of our men just in from the border say 
there are no barbarians any longer.
Now what’s going to happen to us without barbarians? 
They were, those people, a kind of solution.
Constantine P. Cavafy
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INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1 
Of Citizens and Subjects
The end of the Cold War witnessed a resurgence of debate over the meaning of ‘civilisation’, its 
origins, substance, and future. Perhaps the most provocative of statements was penned by Francis 
Fukuyama who posited a universal civilisation that had, at last, resolved its contradictions and 
arrived at no less than ‘the end of history’.1 Others eschewed universality, seeking either to 
articulate the essence of ‘the modem West’,2 or foretell a new era in which a number of different 
civilisations would ‘clash’.3 A third position, as by Samir Amin, rejected both, on the one hand 
affirming universality but, on the other, insisting on its unresolved contradictions.4 The present 
thesis belongs to the latter camp.
The founding premise is that universality does indeed exist, its essence being a 
historically evolved humanist consciousness, whose intrinsic demand is the abolition of human 
hierarchies, or citizenship. I understand citizenship not as a status that resides within the state, as 
would the liberal convention, but as a social relation of global magnitude. This relation is lived 
through everyday notions of ‘civility’ and ‘incivility’, which in turn are rooted in the 
organisation of economic life. As Amin has shown, it was through the emergence and expansion 
of the capitalist mode of production that a truly global dialogue of civilisation began. By virtue 
of its emergence in Western Europe, it also established its civilisational centre there and 
unfolded in the Eurocentric terms of ‘the civilised’ and ‘the backward’.
These moral dimensions of capitalist expansion have received closer attention in the 
1990s, most notably by Mahmood Mamdani in his study entitled Citizen and Subject.5 This has 
become a landmark in the democratisation debate, particularly for bringing the agrarian question 
back into perspective. Mamdani’s basic argument is that, in the late colonial African context, the 
moral dichotomies pertaining to the ‘civilised European’ and the ‘tribal native’ were 
institutionalised into a unique ‘mode of rule’. This consisted in a bifurcation of the colonial state 
between rights-bearing colons (civil society) and a tribalised peasantry. Mamdani has argued for 
the particularity of the African experience on this basis, and he has gone further to suggest that
1 Fukuyama (1989).
2 Taylor (1989).
3 Huntington (1993).
4 Amin (1989); see also Halliday (1996).
5 Mamdani (1996).
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Africa’s late colonial mode of rule and its post-colonial adaptations are the sources of the 
continent’s democratisation troubles.
While appreciating Mamdani’s conceptual innovations, I take issue with two central 
aspects of his work. One is the confinement of Africa to a continental unit of analysis. This does 
not adequately illuminate Africa’s experience within global modes of rule. The bifurcated late- 
colonial state was created under the auspices of a global political order whose founding principle 
was that of race. The era following World War II saw the abolition of de jure imperialism, the 
rise of a US-led transatlantic w//ra-imperialism, and ultimately new global modes of rule 
corresponding to it. The legacies of the late colonial state need to be understood within the 
context of this changing global order. The second and related issue is the primacy that Mamdani 
assigns to moral economy over political economy. By focusing exclusively on the moral- 
institutional aspects of capitalism, Mamdani loses sight of the underlying laws of motion of 
capitalism and their specificity in the periphery. What this also means is that citizenship is in 
effect detached from the globality of capitalism and seen ultimately as confinable, in liberal 
fashion, to the state. Mamdani’s approach contrasts sharply with a previous generation of theory 
concerned with the agrarian question, namely the underdevelopment school, whose ambitions 
were both global and political-economic in essence.
This thesis seeks to reconcile -the concerns of contemporary democratic theory with 
insights provided by the underdevelopment school. It provides a political economy of the 
‘development dialogue’ in the postwar period, with an interest in its agrarian and labour relations 
and particular reference to the experience of Zimbabwe. The postwar era has consisted in two 
sub-periods, the nationalist and the liberal, each of which has defined its citizens and subjects on 
a global scale. While the legacies of late colonialism have not been displaced in the process, they 
cannot be understood in isolation, for the racial, nationalist, and liberal modes of rule have all 
been concerned with the same thing, controlling the world’s semi-proletarianised masses. In turn, 
any inquiry into this process must begin where the underdevelopment school left off, for no other 
tradition in International Political Economy since then has recognised that there is something 
unique about the location of the semi-proletariat under contemporary capitalism. This neglect is 
truly regrettable, for as Amin aptly put it some time ago, while capital ‘exploits the proletariat 
everywhere, at the centre and the periphery.. .it exploits the proletariat of the periphery even 
more brutally’.6
6 Amin (1976), p. 196.
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This chapter will begin with a series of conceptual issues pertaining to the semi- 
proletariat and its politics, contemporary imperialism and the agrarian question, civil society and 
civilisation.
1.1 What is Semi-proletarianisation?
When we speak of ‘peasants’ we are in fact speaking of petty-commodity producers firmly 
located in the generalised system of commodity production that is capitalism. Much has been 
written in the past about peasants as operating by a different economic logic, or under a different 
‘mode of production’ that is ‘articulated’ to the capitalist in a non-contradictory way. On this 
basis, various claims have been made as to an ‘essential’ political behaviour pertaining to 
peasants, or to specific classes within the peasantry.7 In more recent years, there has been a 
return to the classics, in particular the works of Karl Kautsky and V.I. Lenin.8 Their point of 
departure, which I adopt, is that for capitalism to ‘really exist’, there need not exist a full 
commoditisation of all elements of production. There are bound to be phenomena -  feudal-like 
relations, for example, or petty-commodity production, or household relations, or even 
contemporary forms of human bondage -  which do not conform to the essential features of pure 
capitalism (capital and wage-labour) but are nonetheless subject to their contradictions in the 
larger capitalist society.
Following classical insights, the peasantry does not constitute a class in itself, for 
inherent in it are the antagonistic tendencies characteristic of the proletarian and proprietor. Nor 
is the combination of capital and labour spread evenly within the peasantry. The peasantry is 
differentiated between rich, middle, and poor households, a spectrum that ranges from the 
capitalist that employs labour-power to the semi-proletarian that sells it. The middle category is, 
in fact, the only one that embodies the ideal-type of petty-commodity production, managing 
neither to hire nor sell labour-power. To be sure, the combination of capital and labour is not 
spread evenly within a single household either; differentiated by gender and generation, 
patriarchs will control the means of production, women and children will provide unwaged 
labour.
That which does not follow from these formulations is any historical determinism, such 
as was envisioned by Karl Marx, or more cautiously by Lenin and Kautsky, whether via
7 For a rounded presentation of positions, see Shanin ed. (1987).
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enclosures or rural differentiation. The inherent contradictory tendencies within this petty- 
bourgeoisie produce a state of flux between the two poles of rich and poor. But, historically, this 
has led both to proletarianisation and ‘re-peasantisation’. Indeed, it has been pointed out 
convincingly that even on purely economic grounds petty-commodity production is quite a 
normal aspect of capitalism, even if an unstable one.9
Yet, it is also true that semi-proletarianisation, and not the ‘middle peasant’ ideal-type, 
is the pervasive phenomenon in the countryside. In Zimbabwe, for example, it was estimated in 
the early 1990s that up to 75 percent of households maintain dual (rural/urban) homes.10 Semi­
proletarianisation was first acknowledged by Kautsky and Lenin, who theorised its persistence in 
functional terms.11 Clearly, there are capitalist classes in specific contexts that benefit from semi­
proletarianisation: since a labourer’s costs of reproduction can be subsidised by the family farm, 
semi-proletarianisation enables the employer to reward labour below the cost of subsistence. 
Kautsky thus called small farms ‘production sites for new labour-power’. But semi- 
proletarianisation was also understood by both Kautsky and Lenin as a mere delay, a transient 
functionalism, not a permanent one.
As the dominant reality, semi-proletarianisation has been interpreted in several further 
ways. In the postwar period it was the underdevelopment school that dwelled on it the most. One 
approach, led by Andre Gunder Frank, de-emphasised the peasant aspect of this reality, seeking 
instead to demonstrate its ‘residual’ and ‘commercially determined’ nature.12 A Southern African 
variant, known as the ‘labour pool’ thesis, followed suit. In a seminal article, Giovanni Arrighi 
argued that, by the 1930s in Southern Rhodesia, the Native Reserves that had been engineered by 
the colonial authorities had come to function solely as labour reserves for the Rhodesian 
economy, and that petty-commodity production had been relegated to insignificance.13 The 
implication of these emphases was that capitalism in the periphery was ‘mature’ (and ripe for 
socialism); the further implication in the Southern African case was the conceptual conflation of 
class and nation.
Others disagreed with the mature capitalism thesis. Samir Amin, for example, saw semi­
proletarianisation in functional and static terms. On the one hand, he ascribed to the peasantry a
8 Kautsky (1988) and Lenin (1964). For the more recent statements along these lines, see Gibbon and 
Neocosmos (1985) and Bernstein (2000).
9 Gibbon and Neocosmos (1985).
10 See Peta et al. (1991).
11 Kautsky (1988), ch. 7, and Lenin (1964), ch. 3.
12 Frank (1967).
13 Arrighi (1973a).
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mode of production onto itself; but on the other, he saw the persistence of semi-proletarianisation 
as inhering in the particularity of the peripheral economy.14 Amin observed that the peripheral 
economy was extroverted in nature -  unlike the ‘autocentric’ economies of the centre -  
producing goods for export (mining and agricultural) and not for domestic consumption; thus he 
understood the peripheral economy as devoid of the objective relation between the rewarding of 
labour and the development of the productive forces that held among the autocentric. A modified 
version of this was subsequently put forth by Alain de Janvry.15 Informed by Amin’s notion of 
extroversion, but remaining faithful to classical formulations he saw a ‘functional dualism’ 
peculiar to the peripheral economy as holding the day. But de Janvry also saw this functionalism 
as a ‘structural possibility’, not a determinate condition; as subject to domestic inter-capitalist 
and class struggles; and, ultimately, as transient, on account of ongoing land alienation to 
capitalist agriculture. De Janvry added that functional dualism would not disappear with the 
peasantry but would relocate to the informal urban sector (where it would become even more 
‘stubborn’); and that the extended period of functional dualism, which by its very nature sustains 
rapid capital accumulation, could still be properly labelled ‘the development of 
underdevelopment ’.
More recently, in the 1990s, Mamdani and Michael Neocosmos have affirmed the 
politically and historically contingent aspects of functional dualism.16 But they have also shifted 
the focus of attention to the peasant side of the semi-proletarian story. They have argued that 
proletarianisation and petty-commodity production are not mutually exclusive; and that rural 
differentiation and accumulation strategies ‘from below’ are possible and, indeed, have always 
been in progress.17 To be sure, these new perspectives have a historical context of their own: the 
failure of African nationalism to acknowledge class differences among Africans; the conflation 
of ‘the state’ and ‘the people’; the denial of economic and political initiative to the masses; and 
the pursuit of statist models of development. In what follows, I will focus on the work of the 
latter two theorists, and while I will concur with many of their path-breaking formulations, I will 
argue that they have swung the pendulum too far in the opposite direction.
The most important insight is that, historically, the condition of semi-proletarianisation 
resulted from a mode of rule, and as such, from a political need in the first instance, not a directly
14 Amin (1976).
15 De Janvry (1981).
16 Mamdani (1996) and Neocosmos (1993).
17 This flaw in Arrighi’s u nderstanding of the early colonial period specifically was demonstrated 
empirically in Ranger (1985).
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economic one; capitalism did not ‘need’ cheap labour. Neocosmos has argued that ‘explicit state 
policy was not always motivated by a “desire” to proletarianise. Rather, this policy often 
alternated between “proletarianisation” and “peasantisation”, as the state attempted to regulate 
economic fluctuations’.18 Moreover, certain factions of capital, the extroverted ones in particular 
(whether in mining or agriculture), tended to reproduce petty-commodity production, while 
introverted capital (whether agrarian or manufacturing) sought to dissolve it.19 Just as well, 
policy was by no means unambiguous and often pursued both goals simultaneously. Importantly, 
at the heart of this mode of rule was the definition of civil society and its enforcement against the 
uncivil. As Mamdani has demonstrated at length, Africans were organised into ‘tribes’, each with 
its own ‘customary law’, placed under the despotism of chiefs, and made subject to 
administrative justice. This instance of ‘indirect rule’ was reshaped by incoming post-colonial 
governments in veriable ways; while its historical product is neither pure proletarianisation nor 
pure petty-commodity production, but a combination of the two, embodied in the ‘peasant- 
worker’.
The conceptual emphasis by Mamdani and Neocosmos to the peasant side of the story, 
however, has had several implications. The first is that the shift has been accompanied by a 
scaling down of the global-theoretical ambitions of the underdevelopment school, which has 
compromised interpretation. For, as we will see, in the post-colonial period, ‘indirect rule’ 
interacted with the new global modes of rule of bourgeois nationalism and liberalism, which 
proscribed on a global scale the forms and contents of political organisation that contradicted the 
transatlantic politics of productivity and liquidity alike. The enforcement of civil society against 
the uncivil has played out in both labour and agrarian relations, and in their globality, via the 
undermining, cooptation, and repression of anti-systemic forces within and without trade 
unionism. Suffice it to point out here that, while the repression pill has been meted out by the 
security forces of neo-colonial states and their imperial patrons, the undermining and cooptation 
ones have been the job largely of Western trade unions and donor agencies.
The second implication of the shift away form global theory is the inability to theorise 
adequately the global political sources of petty-commodity production, which have rendered 
petty-commodity production under capitalism ‘normal’ in this further sense. Support for petty- 
commodity production has taken a variety of counter-revolutionary forms, such as ‘community
18 Neocosmos (1993), p. 54, emphasis added.
19 For a classic study of the relationship between inter-capitalist conflict and proletarianisation, see 
Arrighi (1973b).
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development’, ‘agricultural development’, ‘integrated rural development’, and land reform.20 
This support has emanated not only from peripheral states but also their imperial patrons and 
multilateral agencies, including the World Bank and the UN system -  sometimes even in 
contradiction with the desires of peripheral ruling classes. Whether these strategies have 
succeeded in regulating the process of proletarianisation is, of course, another story.
The third implication is the inability to grapple adequately with the support that peasants 
might give to ruling parties, despite the oppression of ‘indirect rule’. By focusing exclusively on 
the persisting subordination of local government to central government in post-colonial Africa, 
Mamdani and Neocosmos have arrived at the conclusion that the democratisation project has 
gone amiss because single-party states did not allow ‘independent popular democratic politics 
[to] flower’.21 Yet, in global light, we see that there is hardly such a thing as an alternative source 
of ‘independent’ self-expression; trade unions, the largest of civic organisations within states, 
have had historically to opt either for the patronage of nationalist movements and neo-colonial 
states, or international labour and donors. Likewise, peasant organisations that have sought 
freedom from states, such as under structural adjustment, have typically fallen into the open arms 
of donors and become objects of new forms of ‘indirect rule’.22 And in this closer light, peasant- 
state relations beg to be re-interpreted. For, in the absence of ‘independent’ civic action, it is 
possible in particular historical moments for the state to become the only vehicle available to 
peasants, a point that has been made by Sam Moyo with reference to contemporary Zimbabwe.23
But even if we disregard the global dimensions of the problem, one final shortcoming is 
notable. This again relates to the exclusive focus by Mamdani and Neocosmos on peasant-state 
relations; it might be called ‘rainbow nation idealism’, and has operated in the added, post­
apartheid historical dimension of Southern Africa. Specifically, Mamdani’s attempt to theorise 
the peculiarity of peasant-state relations in colonial Africa has obscured the white-settler 
phenomenon. If Arrighi had overemphasised the proletarianisation experience arising from settler 
capitalism in Southern Africa, Mamdani underemphasised it, reducing democratisation to the 
transformation of peasant-state relations, at the expense of the relations between peasants and the 
large-scale commercial farming (LSCF) sector. Neocosmos has followed suit, supporting his own 
argument by invoking Lenin’s insights, claiming that ‘landlordism’ is of a secondary order in
20 For Latin America and South Asia, see, respectively, de Janvry (1981), ch. 7, and Harriss (1987).
21 Neocosmos (1993), p. 72.
22 Moyo (forthcoming).
23 Moyo (2001a).
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Southern Africa, and again submerging the land question in the regional agrarian question.24 A 
closer look at Lenin’s argument here and its inapplicability would be useful.
In his discussion of functional dualism in tum-of-the-century Russia, Lenin noted a 
lingering ‘personal dependence’ as existing on the part of the ‘semi-free’ labourer vis-a-vis the 
landlord, a dependence that manifested itself in a quasi-feudal labour-service and upheld by 
extra-economic coercion (‘a certain lack of civic rights’).25 Here we must inquire into Lenin’s 
specific assumptions regarding the sources of ‘personal dependence’. Lenin attributed 
dependence to extra-economic exploitation, an understanding which accorded with his belief that 
the peasant, once fully dispossessed, would gain ‘freedom’ by virtue of his/her ability to migrate 
and sell labour-power to the highest bidder; in this sense, he believed that the ‘dull compulsion’ 
of market forces would not generate ‘personal dependence’. But Lenin here also envisaged a 
different kind of home market in Russia, the kind that Amin would call ‘autocentric’, not the 
peripheral one devoid of the objective relation between the rewarding of labour and the 
development of the productive forces. And in the absence of this objective relation, the dull 
compulsion of market forces does generate relations of dependence. These manifest themselves 
in intense paternalisms, both racial and gendered, and get played out over the use of natural 
resources and at the place of employment, whether urban or rural. The predicament of farm 
workers in particular is notorious, warranting the label of ‘human bondage’ under capitalism.26 
The case of outright land alienation generates paternalisms of no less intensity; these get played 
out over the pervasive ‘squatting’ phenomenon, for squatters often come to depend upon 
services, such as schooling for children, that are provided on farms, or upon natural resources 
and seasonal employment, all of which are controlled by landowners.27
Taken together, these comments suggest that semi-proletarianisation in Southern Africa 
continues to require theoretical attention. Specifically, Mamdani’s notion of ‘indirect rule’ 
requires modification. Under peripheral accumulation, the semi-proletariat has been subject (a) to 
‘direct’ forms of rule, whether at the place of employment, in town and country, or at the 
‘squatting’ site; and (b) to global modes of rule, not just the late-colonial leftovers. It follows that
24 Neocosmos (1993), p. 24.
25 Lenin (1964), pp. 204-06.
26 This will be discussed further in Chapter 6. For extensive studies regarding the flourishing of racial 
and gender hierarchies in a variety of work settings, see Rutherford (2001) and Sylvester (2000).
27 To be clear, these forms of ‘personal dependence’ are not to be slotted into easy ‘non-capitalist’ 
categories. Frank’ s judgement in this regard remains relevant: ‘the various “ feudal” and “ personal” 
forms of relations and obligations serve at best to personalize and mask this dog-eat-dog capitalist 
world’ ; Frank (1967), p. 274.
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the land question has a very significant bearing on the democratisation question, as it does on the 
question of ‘accumulation from below’; and that the agrarian question is not an ‘African’ 
problem but a global one.
1.2 Understanding Peasant-worker Politics
Several of the above authors have emphasised the contingency of neo-colonial capitalism and, in 
this regard, the significance of class struggle. The emphasis is correct, and it gives rise to a set of 
questions concerning the political forms that semi-proletarianisation throws up. In the context of 
Africa, the study of peasant politics has historically lagged behind other peripheral regions of the 
world economy, emerging only in the 1970s on the heels of a number of rural-based struggles. 
Much of this debate was informed theoretically by research conducted elsewhere. A number of 
interpretations were thus put forth to attribute to peasants an ‘essential’ political behaviour. The 
phraseology was new and old, designating peasants as ‘profit maximising’ or ‘risk averse’, as 
being ‘uncaptured’, or as having a ‘subsistence ethic’, ‘exit options’, etc.2* However, the 
approach that has had the most durable impact was in the ‘moral economy’ tradition and penned 
by James Scott, a Southeast-Asianist, who suggested that, ‘normally’, peasant politics conform to 
‘everyday forms of resistance’.29 The approach went on to cross-fertilise with theories of ‘social 
movements’ and ‘identity politics’.
Scott acknowledged in the outset that a focus on everyday forms of resistance -  to 
include such tactics as foot-dragging at work, or poaching and encroaching on land -  are not the 
only forms of peasant politics, and he acknowledged also that the approach is limiting in its focus 
on ‘local class struggles’. Yet, such an exclusive focus has far-reaching interpretive implications. 
First, it does not illuminate the relationship between civil (formal) and uncivil (informal) politics, 
nor between the covert (‘everyday’) and the overt (land occupations, armed struggle, ‘complex 
emergencies’); peasants engage in all of these, either simultaneously or over time. Second, its 
‘local moral economy’ approach does not illuminate the globality of the agrarian question; nor 
does it historicise the human subject adequately; rather, it presents peasants as inhabiting a 
separate dialectic of consciousness. Consequently, class struggles in the countryside appear as 
interpretively unconnected and politically unconnectable.30
28 For a more rounded discussion, see Isaacman (1993).
29 Scott (1985); see also his prior study, Scott (1976).
30 This, in turn, is the reason why Scott’s approach has made common cause with relativistic and populist 
theories in the 1990s. For a critical discussion, see Brass (1991), pp. 173-205.
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We have already discussed the dynamics of differentiation among the peasantry. That 
which requires further comment here is the moral-historical location of peasant-workers. Contra 
relativism, peasant-workers are firmly located in the humanist dialectic of consciousness and the 
moral languages that historically have been constitutive of it, from liberalism and nationalism to 
socialism, feminism, and beyond. These languages infuse the ‘public’ and ‘hidden’ transcripts (to 
use Scott’s terminology); hybridise with local moral languages; gain particular expression in 
local notions of ‘dignity’ and ‘reason’; and form the moral basis of social protest. The first to 
pursue this line of inquiry was E.P. Thompson, with reference to the English working class of the 
eighteenth century. He made the important observation that the proletarian of the time 
experienced and acted against notions of injustice understood within the terms of the Glorious 
Revolution; the ‘common Englishman’, Thompson wrote, ‘felt that the Glorious Revolution 
afforded a constitutional precedent for the right to riot in resistance to oppression’.31 More 
recently, Neil Harvey has similarly observed that the public transcript in post-revolutionary 
Mexico has incorporated the ideals of the revolution, and it has served in the same way to 
legitimise public contestation of the feudal-like legacies of the Porfirian regime.32 In a broader 
survey of the continent in the 1990s, James Petras has pointed out that indigenous traditions in 
Latin American countrysides have hybridised with socialist language to give substance to 
contemporary social struggles.33 While one should note that the ‘moral economy’ tradition has, 
more often than not, failed to notice the global dimensions of local moral languages, such 
insights are generalisable. For it is not only capitalism that has achieved global reach in the 
twentieth century, but also conceptions of justice. Accordingly, one cannot understand 
contemporary rural struggles in Africa either, without recognising the nationalist promise and its 
failure.34
It is also important to recognise, however, the ambiguities peculiar to peasant-worker 
consciousness and, relatedly, the problems of political organisation that pertain to them and the 
diversity of their politics. Significantly, contemporary theories of ‘global social movements’ and 
‘new internationalisms’ have treaded on this terrain virtually blind-folded.35 Semi­
proletarianisation yields a workforce in motion, within the rural areas, across the rural-urban 
divide, and across international boundaries. This workforce is also poor and abundant, relatively
31 Thompson (1980), p. 87. The significance of the revolution across the channel is, of course, arguable.
32 Harvey (1998).
33 Petras (1997).
34 Moyo (2001a).
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unhealthy and illiterate, and devoid of bargaining power; and it has grievances that arise from 
both the family farm (land shortage, insecurity of tenure) and the workplace (wages and 
conditions of employment). Neither pure peasants nor settled industrial proletarians, their 
political languages are often (but not exclusively) ‘ethnic’ or ‘national’.36 In turn, the totality of 
this situation presents vast organisational challenges to anyone who wishes to speak for the 
‘masses’. As argued earlier, the sources of ‘independent’ self expression are limited indeed. 
Trade unions, other civic organisations, and political parties have a ‘line’ which is determined by 
factors ranging from the class, gender, ethnic, and racial make-up of the membership and the 
leadership; to their sources of funding, whether state or foreign; to the prevailing industrial 
relations convention in the global political economy; to the prevailing ‘development’ paradigm; 
and to the constellation of national and international alliances at a given point in time. In the 
1970s, it was estimated in connection with the ‘tripartite’ model of industrial relations 
specifically, that 91 per cent of the world’s workers were being denied participation.37 This 
referred, by and large, to the semi-proletariat, and continues to be the case.
Their forms of participation in the ‘development dialogue’ are thus variegated, spanning 
the spectrum of civil and uncivil. In the civil realm, peasant-workers participate in local mutual- 
help groups, national peasant unions, trade unions, political parties -  and recently an 
international organisation.38 They vote in local and national elections, and they also abstain from 
voting. In the uncivil realm, they resort to land occupations, ‘squatting’, poaching, stealing, and 
encroaching. They also participate in rebellions and revolutions, as well as in ‘complex 
emergencies’. Needless to say, their politics may be progressive or regressive. And they ought to 
be neither idealised nor underestimated.
1.3 Imperialism and the Agrarian Question
Agrarian relations have always been a fundamental dimension of imperialism. This connection 
has generally been undertheorised by students of imperialism, with the prominent exception of 
the underdevelopment school. In what follows, I will provide a brief survey of theories of
35 Rupert (1995), Cox (1999), Munck and Waterman eds. (1999), O’ Brien et al. (2000), O’ Brien 
(2000).
36 The ambiguities of peasant-workers consciousness has been discussed in First (1983), Ranger (1985), 
and Mamdani (1996).
37 Cox (1977), p. 411.
38 The latter case is discussed by Petras (1997).
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imperialism and the agrarian question, simply flagging the main currents, before moving on to 
elaborate on the present contribution.
With regards to the study of imperialism, there have been five notable phases in it: from 
the classical Marxist debates concerned with the sources of capital export, inter-imperialist 
rivalry, war and peace;39 to two varieties in the early post-World War II period: the liberal 
‘English school’ concerned with the expansion and transformation of the ‘international society’40 
and the neo-Marxist underdevelopment school concerned largely with the mechanisms of South- 
North surplus value transfer and agrarian crisis;41 to two further varieties thereafter, the ‘cultural’ 
and the ‘ecological’;42 and finally a reinvigorated Marxist debate among theorists of 
contemporary inter- and ultra-imperialism (transnationalism), who are more or less silent on the 
agrarian question.43 With regards to the agrarian question itself, there have been six notable shifts 
in its terms, though they have not always carried the ‘AQ’ label. Three of these have been 
discussed by Terry Byres,44 and they comprise of the first by Marx and Engels, who raised the 
question in terms of the political insignificance of the peasantry; the second by Kautsky and 
Lenin, who were concerned with both the socio-economic aspects of rural capitalist development 
as well as its political (in)significance; and the third, after the Bolshevik Revolution, which took 
a managerial turn and concerned itself with the ways and means of surplus extraction from the 
peasantry for the purpose of industrialisation -  or ‘socialist primitive accumulation’. A fourth 
phase was also managerial and also concerned with surplus extraction, but was conducted among 
bourgeois theorists; the seminal exponents of this school were Arthur Lewis and T.W. Schultz.45 
The fifth phase departed from managerialism to become once again radicalised in the 
underdevelopment school.46 And the most recent phase of the debate might be termed the 
‘globalisation’ one, and has been conducted mainly by theorists of petty-commodity production 
and the global food system -  but not of imperialism.47
Both imperialism and the agrarian question will be understood here as an integrated 
whole, in the spirit of the underdevelopment school. The approach is quite eclectic, however,
39 For a general overview of the last century, see Sutcliffe (1999); for a detailed discussion of classical 
theories, see Brewer (1990), chs. 2-6.
40 For its prominent representatives, see Bull and Watson eds. (1984), Jackson (1990), and May all 
(1990).
41 See the discussion in de Janvry (1981), ch. 1.
42 For representatives, see Said (1979) and Crosby (1986).
43 See Cox (1987), van der Pijl (1998), and Gowan (1999).
44 See Byres (1991), pp. 3-76.
45 Lewis (1958) and Schultz (1964).
46 See the discussions in Brewer (1990), chs. 7-10, and de Janvry (1981), ch. 1.
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incorporating insights furnished by a number of the above schools. The point of departure is that 
the problem is to be understood in all its dimensions, economic, political, and moral. The 
relationship between the economics and politics of imperialism were perceived most astutely by 
Lenin. For Lenin observed that imperialism, whatever its ‘over-ripeness’, required the consent of 
metropolitan labour movements. These, in turn, he called the ‘social prop’ of the bourgeoisie at 
the centre, and as will be demonstrated in this thesis, his indictment of organised metropolitan 
labour has never lost its relevance.48 What Lenin did not theorise at the time was that imperialism 
required social props in the colonial (and post-colonial) territories as well. These were given 
particular emphasis in the late 1920s by the Third International, which framed the issue in terms 
of a ‘feudal-imperialist’ alliance that, contra classical Marxism, inhibited the development of 
capitalism49 The theory of peripheral social props then experienced a revival in the postwar 
period, first by Paul Baran and then by what became known as the underdevelopment school.50 
The neo-Marxist argument for the staticity of peripheral capitalism (whether in ‘feudal’ or ‘non- 
feudal’ terms) has been proven false, of course, for capitalism did continue to transform the 
social relations of production worldwide, as well as to produce industrialisation (even if 
insufficiently).
Yet, the requirement of peripheral social props for the conduct of imperialism has never 
lost its relevance. The logic of ‘neo-colonialism’, by which colonial powers sought to nurture 
small indigenous and extroverted bourgeoisies to defend the status quo after ‘decolonisation’, 
persists to this day, and continues to reproduce disarticulated accumulation. The most insightful 
statement in this regard has been provided by de Janvry who has sought to demonstrate the 
reproduction of neo-colonialism in systemic terms, that is, within a ‘centre-periphery structure’ 
that exhibits a mutual need of alliances between centres and peripheries for the reproduction of 
disarticulated accumulation, but that also consists in dynamic and contingent alliances. As we 
will see in the next section, the centre-periphery relationship is animated by inter-capitalist 
conflict and class struggle within a generalised project of ‘civilisation’; this, in turn, tends to 
transform oppositional politics as well, such that organised labour in the periphery may itself 
become a social prop of imperialism.
The question that requires clarification thus remains: what do we mean by imperialism? 
Lenin and his contemporaries were preoccupied with the unprecedented contradictions within the
47 See Friedmann (1993), McMichael (1997), Raikes and Gibbon (2000), Bernstein (2000).
48 See Lenin (1996).
49 See Kuusinen (1961).
50 Baran (1957).
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capitalist states of their time and their external manifestations: on the one hand, the concentration 
of capitals (‘monopoly’) and their subordination to a ‘financial oligarchy’; on the other, the 
intensification of inter-imperialist rivalry and militarism, the export of capital, and the carving up 
of the world into ‘spheres of influence’. This, however, cannot be the whole story, for it does not 
satisfy the question of what was being ‘exported’, why, and how? To this end, I argue that we 
must re-consider both the politics and economics of imperialism, as well as its ‘civilisational’ 
dimensions. What was being exported was not simply capital, but more precisely, social 
contradictions themselves, arising from the imperative by capital to deny power from the 
working class. For, theoretically, capital could have reinvested at home, as Brewer has argued,51 
but this would have empowered labour, at a time when it had already gained significant 
organisational ground. The export of capital held out the prospect of an expansion of import and 
export markets for domestic industry, as well as the repatriation of profits and the rewarding of 
labour at home on capital’s own terms -  all of which held out the prospect of domestic social 
peace. Driving this export of social contradictions, furthermore, was a competitive state system 
within which the national oligarchies had emerged. Its competitiveness derived not from any 
attribute ‘intrinsic’ to the state system, but by the specifically national organisation of capitals, 
the uneven levels of industrial development among the states involved, and the bankruptcy of the 
liberal principle that had hitherto held among states. These circumstances bred a cut-throat inter­
imperial rivalry which by nature cancelled any Kautskian ‘optimism’ in ultra-imperialism (what 
he called ‘a holy alliance of the imperialists’).52
Yet, even in an environment of such intense rivalry, there were points of consensus. For, 
enabling the whole ‘export’ exercise were deep-seated civilisational assumptions that denied 
moral worth to non-Europeans en masse and legitimated the exporting of domestic problems to 
them. This was after all the era of globally institutionalised racism. And perhaps there is no 
better evidence of both the logic of export and its civilisational assumptions than in the words of 
Cecil Rhodes, himself a financier and renowned ‘pioneer’, who reckoned as follows:
My cherished idea is a solution for the social problem, i.e., in order to save the 
40m inhabitants of the United Kingdom from a bloody civil war, we colonial 
statesmen must acquire new lands to settle the surplus population, to provide 
new markets for the goods produced by them in the factories and mines. The
51 For a critique of explanations that refer directly to the falling rate of profit or 
‘underconsumptionism’ , see Brewer (1990).
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Empire, as I have always said, is a bread-and-butter question. If you want to 
avoid civil war, you must become imperialists.53
This reasoning was in broad currency, and in the midst of intense rivalry it flowered in inter- 
imperial diplomatic conventions and conferences, such as in Berlin in 1884—85, so as to carve up 
the world in a ‘civilised’ manner. The First World War did not change the underlying consensus, 
only the spheres of influence among the ‘civilised’.
Imperialism thereafter became an ongoing political project to secure strategically the 
future ability to export domestic contradictions. This was recognised and theorised most 
systematically in the postwar period by the underdevelopment school. Thus, one of its most 
insightful exponents observed that, while there is a mutual need for alliances between the centre 
and the periphery, the centre is the dominant structure, and its principal concern is ‘to subject the 
other structure to the requirements of the resolution of its own contradictions. That is, the center 
attempts to mould the dominated periphery so that the internal contradictions of accumulation in 
the periphery will create the external relationships that are consistent with the necessities of the 
center’.54 What was not theorised so well by the underdevelopment school was precisely this 
political process.
1.4 The Centre-Periphery Structure at the Millennium
In these times of ‘globalisation’, there is a belief that the global economy has undergone 
fundamental changes, such that we may no longer speak of a ‘centre’ and a ‘periphery’. It is 
undeniable that the global economy has undergone multiple changes in the postwar period, most 
notably in the re-orientation of transatlantic manufacturing capital towards the periphery from 
the late 1960s onwards. Indeed, so spectacular were these shifts in productions patterns at the 
time that early commentators claimed that a ‘new international division of labour’ was in the 
making.55 Others later questioned the magnitude of these changes, pointing out that only a 
handful of peripheral states were being touched, and that this amounted to a ‘changing’ but not a 
‘new’ international division of labour.56 But even so, from the 1980s onwards, we also witnessed
52 By this, Kautsky (1970) meant the collective management of global capitalism.
53 Quoted in Lenin (1996), p. 80.
54 De Janvry (1981), p. 25.
55 See Frobel et al. (1980).
56 See Southall (1988) and Cohen (1991).
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something of an explosion in ‘foreign direct investment’, and even more spectacularly, the rise of 
‘global financial markets’ to a status unseen since before World War I. Then we also witnessed 
the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the universalisation of membership in the capitalist monetary and 
trading orders (the IMF and WTO), an ‘information revolution’, even the rise of ‘global social 
movements’. What are we to make of these changes? Is the centre-periphery structure obsolete? 
Or is it the case that the ‘end of history’ has managed to elevate ‘globalisation’ to theological 
status?
I argue that both the nationalist and liberal periods of the postwar era have been 
underpinned by the same basic laws of motion that hold between ‘articulated’ (central) and 
‘disarticulated’ (peripheral) economies. The most important change to this framework is that the 
ideal-typical ‘articulated’ state of the centre has undergone partial ‘disarticulation’ but also ‘re­
articulation ’ on the regional, transatlantic, and ‘triadic’ levels, amounting to what Paul Hirst and 
Grahame Thompson have called a ‘regionalized triadic bloc structure’.571 will first sketch the 
centre-periphery model, drawing heavily on Alain de Janvry, and then consider the modifications 
to it.58
The model begins with Marx’s original formulations regarding the self-contradictory 
nature of bourgeois society.59 The first of its basic contradictions pertains to the conflict between 
capital and labour over general distributional matters; the second lies in the relationship between 
production and circulation, whereby the drive to expand profits undermines the ability of the 
system to consume its social product. These contradictions produce a tendency for the rate of 
profit to fall and a crisis of accumulation to occur, and they operate on a unified global scale. 
However, these tendencies are not context free; they operate through a state system which makes 
capitalism structurally heterogeneous. Thus, some states are socially and sectorally articulated 
(the centre), while others are socially and sectorally disarticulated (the periphery). The difference 
lies in that the latter is devoid of an internal relationship between return to capital and return to 
labour (social disarticulation); and devoid also of an internal relationship between primary and 
secondary sectors (sectoral disarticulation). This holds even for semi-industrialised economies 
that either produce goods for elite consumption at home or for export back to the centre.
The relationship between centre and periphery is one of ‘interdependence’. The two 
sides are in a necessary relationship in a capitalist system that is articulated on a global scale; but
57 Hirst and Thompson (1999), p. 60.
58 De Janvry (1981); this is a refinement of Amin’ s formulations pertaining to ‘autocentric’ an d 
‘extroverted’ eco nomies.
59 Marx (1976).
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more to the point, they need each other to overcome their own social contradictions and barriers 
to accumulation. And in this latter sense, it is clear that ‘interdependence’ is not equally 
weighted; it is characterised by the dominance of the centre over the periphery. The periphery 
relies on primary commodity exports (agricultural and mineral), faces fluctuating and generally 
declining terms of trade, and is subject to severe balance of payments constraints; while the 
centre enjoys monopoly control over key resources, ranging from capital goods, finance, 
technology, and commodity markets, to security and the value of international currencies (which 
are typically central state currencies).60 This structural dominance ‘molds the external necessities 
of the periphery into possibilities for the center to overcome its barriers of accumulation and 
growth’;61 and it plays out in the form of inter-capitalist conflict and class struggle along the 
centre-periphery axis. But relations of ‘interdependence’ between centres may also be unequally 
weighted with regards to the above key resources.62 It is currently the case that one centre, the 
United States, currently derives preponderant privileges over its unique military capacity and the 
key international status of its currency. Centres may exercise their powers unilaterally, even 
against each other, or collectively, in ultra-imperial fashion.
This centre-periphery structure, along with its inter-imperial dimensions, produces a 
global dispute over the allocation of responsibility for adjustment to payments imbalances among 
states. As the following chapters will show, much of the everyday exporting of social 
contradictions takes place through the adjustment debate. This naturally intensifies in times of 
crisis, and is in turn experienced differentially between centre and periphery. Historically, the 
centre has been able to displace crisis by exporting labour (emigration), exporting capital, 
investing in ‘social capital’, as well as in arms production; in the crisis of the last quarter-century 
specifically, it has succeeded in shifting the burden of adjustment onto the shoulders of non-oil 
producing peripheral states -  in the form of the ‘structural adjustment programme’ -  and it has 
also enforced financial liberalisation so that excess capital can search for quick returns 
worldwide. In the periphery, crisis obviously occurs in times of global crisis but also in its 
absence. It is in the nature of the disarticulated economy to tend more frequently to crisis, for the 
internal market is chronically constrained. What is more, the peripheral economy does not enjoy
60 It is notable that only a minority of international political economists do not compartmentalise relations 
of power into separate ‘issue areas’; es pecially important are the connections between economic and 
security issues. For prominent exceptions, see Strange (1988), Gowan (1999), and Amin (1997).
61 De Janvry (1981), p. 26.
62 Consideration of inter-imperial relations is absent in de Janvry’ s model, and in the underdevelopment 
school more generally.
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the same range of displacement options as the centre; economic crisis inevitably results in large- 
scale devaluation and social crisis.
Having described the basic centre-periphery structure, we may now relate it to the 
changes of the postwar decades. Following the thrust of Hirst and Thompson’s thesis, what goes 
as ‘globalisation’ does not amount to fundamental change, but to modified relations between 
central economies, entailing their partial integration amongst themselves into a ‘regionalised 
triadic bloc structure’, along with a handful of their industrial satellites, mainly in East Asia. 
There are three basic trends that are generally invoked by the ‘globalisation’ camp. The first is 
the growth of aggregate world trade in relation to world output: between 1950 and 1994 world 
exports grew fourteen times, while world output grew five times.63 Yet, this does not reflect 
fundamental structural change. Manufacturing activity has remained highly concentrated, with 80 
per cent being located in North America, Western Europe, and Japan (the latter having grown at 
spectacular rates in the postwar period); while the remaining 20 per cent is heavily weighted 
towards East Asia. In other words, in the bulk of the ‘developing’ world, manufacturing remains 
relatively unimportant. Extractive industries and agricultural production continue to carry the 
day. The same geographic concentration holds for the trade of manufactures; 77 per cent of this 
is generated at the centre, of which 60 per cent is intra-core, and in large part also intra- 
regional.64 One significant change in trade in manufactures is again the growth of imports from 
the NICs into the OECD; between 1970 and 1992, the trade share of NIC goods in the OECD 
grew from 4.6 to 15.8.65 Taken together, these manufacturing and trade figures suggest that (a) 
the central economies have become more integrated industrially on regional, transatlantic, and 
triadic levels, entailing a partial disarticulation of the central state and its re-articulation on a 
larger level; and (b) that the bulk of the rest of the world remains effectively disarticulated.
The second, and related, trend is the rapid growth of ‘foreign direct investment’. This 
outstripped the rate of growth in world exports by 40 per cent during the 1960s, levelled down to 
a parallel rate in the 1970s and early 1980s, and then accelerated twice as fast from 1985 to 1990. 
The first point here is that about 50 per cent of what goes as ‘global FDI’ today actually 
comprises of cross-border mergers and acquisitions, which do not alter the asset structures of 
acquired enterprises; this activity is related to the generalised movement towards privatisation.66
The second point is that 92 per cent of FDI originates in the triad and three-fourths of it is
63 See Dicken (1998), p. 24.
64 Dicken (1998), pp. 26-37.
65 Hirst and Thompson (1999), p. 98.
66 Hirst and Thompson (1999), p. 79.
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destined for the triad, entailing a significant degree of cross-investment. By the mid-1990s, only 
one-fourth o f FDI left the centre and a good deal of it went from Japan to Eastern Asia.67 Another 
set of estimates suggests that if we were to exclude the triad along with the ten most important 
developing country recipients of FDI, including China, we would find that in the period 1991-96, 
perhaps as much as 70 per cent of the world’s population was in receipt of 16 per cent of global 
FDI -  ‘virtually written off the map’.68 Finally, it is also notable that, despite the increase of 
capital flows within the triad, production among them still remains, to a very significant degree, 
‘nationally embedded’ -  foreign-owned productive activity in each case amounts to no more than 
10 per cent -  while TNCs continue to remain largely ‘home centred’.69 These figures again 
suggest a partial disarticulation of central states combined with their re-articulation on a larger 
level; and a persisting disarticulation of peripheral states.
This, o f course, does not also mean that Northern-based TNCs do not have a stake in 
those states written off the map. Transnational mining and agro-industrial capital is firmly 
established in the periphery. With respect to agro-industry in particular, the postwar period has 
witnessed the incremental integration of national agricultures into global markets for new 
agricultural technologies (including biotechnology), equipment, and chemical inputs, controlled 
by handful of centrally-based firms.70 This process has seen also the adoption of ‘non-traditional’ 
export activities, such as horticulture, within new commodity chains organised by centrally-based 
capital.71
The third trend is in the growth of ‘global financial markets’, the most significant change 
in the global political economy over the last quarter-century. This has also failed to alter the 
basic centre-periphery structure. What it has done is make enormous use of it, in particular the 
chronic balance of payments constraints of peripheral economies. The so-called ‘emerging 
markets’ have been routinely pried open in a balance of payments crunch;72 while ‘non­
emerging’ economies that have not been subject to private capital flows have come under the 
tutelage of multilateral sources of finance. With respect to the economies of the centre, the rise of 
global financial markets has had more ambiguous results. On the one hand, the connection
67 Africa’s share of total developing country intake declined (to 8.6 per cent); Dicken (1998), pp. 42-48. A 
new wave of Export Processing Zones (EPZs) arrived in the 1990s, but still to a limited extent (25 EPZs on 
the whole continent at the millennium); Kooijmans et al. (1996), ch. 2.
68 Hirst and Thompson (1999), pp. 72-74.
69 Hirst and Thompson (1999), p. 76-77.
70 See Friedmann (1993), McMichael and Myrhe (1991), Bernstein (1990), Buttel (1990), and Watts 
(1990).
71 See Raikes and Gibbon (2000).
72 See Gowan (1999) and Haggard and Maxfield (1996).
29
between savings and investment in the OECD remains largely domestic; Hirst and Thompson 
point out that in the period 1990-95, in the main OECD countries, about two-thirds of domestic 
savings were still being re-invested domestically, while even this figure was greatly affected by 
the collapse of the savings ratio in one country, the United States, and its reliance on the savings 
mainly of its partners.73 Moreover, in the biggest central economies (US, Japan, Germany, and 
UK), corporate equity stake held by foreigners has remained less than 11 per cent.74 On the other 
hand, short-term international lending has truly exploded -  a 2,000-fold increase between the late 
1970s and late 1990s -  entailing the displacement of conventional bank lending by ‘securities’ 
(marketable bonds and other facilities ), and accompanied by a vast ‘derivative’ market.75 This 
market activity is largely concentrated in the triad, centred in Wall Street, and conducted in 
dollars. In turn, as Peter Gowan and others have shown, this has enabled one state in particular, 
the United States, to exert enormous political control first over its European and Asian allies, in 
the course of becoming industrially integrated with them, and over ‘emerging’ and ‘non’- 
emerging economies.
Beyond these trends, there are further changes that require attention. The postwar period 
has been shaped by an ultra-imperial project that has managed to prevent inter-imperial rivalries 
from puncturing it. This ultra-imperialism has required the harmonisation of state-society 
relations across the Atlantic in pursuit of a common ‘social purpose’. Such a project was 
successfully pursued with the onset of the Cold War in the late 1940s on the basis of a ‘politics 
of productivity’, entailing a social compact between capital and labour, and by means of the 
Marshall Plan.76 In turn, it was this centrally-based ‘social purpose’ that sustained the state-led 
‘nation-building’ project in the periphery. But from the 1960s onwards, the capital-labour 
compromises across the members of the ultra-imperial alliance began to come under intense 
pressure by transnational capital and finance. The interests of the latter were carried forward by 
US initiative in the first instance, by unleashing competitive deregulation dynamics and leading 
ultimately to the break-down of the postwar compromises and to a new ‘politics of liquidity’. 
This change in the transatlantic class balance shifted the priorities of global order, drawing 
nation-building to a close and replacing it with structural adjustment.77 The changing class 
balance within the alliance, therefore, changed the external demands exerted on the national
73 Hirst and Thompson (1999), pp. 38-41.
74 Hirst and Thompson (1999), pp. 44-45.
75 Hirst and Thompson (1999), pp. 48-51.
76 See Maier (1977) and van der Pijl (1984); the term ‘social purpose’ co mes from Ruggie (1982), who 
imbues it with liberal benevolence.
30
politics of the periphery, affected state-society relations within peripheral states, and reinforced 
the disarticulated pattern of accumulation.
Change has also taken place in the security structure of world politics, which has also 
affected the centre-periphery relationship. Indeed, the nationalist period was galvanised by the 
Cold War and cannot be understood without it. Discipline within the ultra-imperial alliance was 
effectively maintained through Cold War rivalry; while East Asian industrialisation found its 
momentum through the US strategy to create a Cold War pillar in the East. A ‘miracle’ in the 
centre-periphery structure would not have been possible without a whole series of affirmative 
actions that other neo-colonies were denied, including large-scale land reform, financial aid, 
technology transfer, access to commodity markets, military cover, and investment guarantee. The 
Cold War also affected the politics of opposition in the periphery, within trade unionism and 
outside it, as the Soviet Union (and China to a lesser extent) provided selective support to trade 
unions and popular national movements, while also producing ‘non-aligned’ trade unionisms. 
The end of the Cold War, in turn, withdrew the primary threat to the transatlantic alliance, 
loosened discipline within it, and weakened the hand of oppositional politics worldwide. In fact, 
the most important inter-imperial rivalry took place at this juncture between the United States 
and Japan in Eastern Asia, only to be resolved by the financial crisis of 1998 and the dismantling 
of the developmental state which had outlived its Cold War purpose. An effective post-Cold War 
security structure by which to maintain discipline within the alliance seems only now to be 
taking shape, through the ‘war on terror’.
Finally, sovereignty has undergone notable changes in the postwar period, both formal 
and substantive. The abolition of race as a principle of political order was succeeded by the 
universalisation of the principle of national self-determination; in turn, this principle founded a 
universalised ‘multilateralism’ that had been in gestation since the League of Nations.78 To be 
sure, who the ‘se lf was and how it was to be ‘determined’ remained subject to the contradictions 
of capitalism and the course of Cold War rivalry; just as well, the substance of multilateralism 
itself remained disputed. Nonetheless, the period as a whole witnessed the consolidation of 
multilateral institutions, encompassing the United Nations -  which bridged the bi-polar world -  
and the IMF, World Bank, and the WTO -  the ‘multilateral economic institutions’ (MEIs) 
presiding over the capitalist economy specifically. In the wake of the Cold War, the three MEIs 
have gone on to attain universal membership; moreover, they have constructed formal and
77 The connections are well made in Leys (1996), ch. 1.
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informal institutional linkages between them, in particular employing each other’s enforcement 
mechanisms. The evolution of multilateralism over the whole of the period has consisted in a 
global institutional consolidation of unprecedented scale, which can now be seen as a 
rudimentary form of global government, centred on the MEIs. Paradoxically, this evolution has 
not displaced the principle of national self-determination: it has woven it into its fabric at the 
same time as it has emasculated its ends and means; after all, at the crux of the ‘global 
governance’ language that shrouds global government is a re-affirmation of national sovereignty. 
Alongside these changes, the ‘regionalised triadic bloc structure’ that now underpins the postwar 
alliance has produced one notable supra-national, regional form of sovereignty, that of the 
European Union, and no other equivalent on the triadic level. However, it is effectively 
coordinated by the United States, that is, led and disciplined by its security umbrella and what 
Gowan has called the ‘Dollar-Wall Street Regime’;79 moreover, it has found expression in the G7 
forum, a halfway house in the contemporary structure of sovereignty that deliberates on monetary 
and other global affairs in circumvention of the multilateral form.
In conclusion, responsibility for ‘globalisation’ continues to be wedged in the sacrosanct 
nation-state -  and the political-economic circle of the centre-periphery relationship is thus 
morally squared.
1.5 What is Civil Society?
Any discussion of political community cannot be detached from the manner in which global 
economic life is organised. Nor, however, can global economic life be understood and 
transformed without closer examination of its modes of rule. It is clear that the centre-periphery 
relationship has an in-built mode of rule of its own; it is also clear that the principle of national 
self-determination has been bent backwards and constituted as a mode of rule in itself. Yet, these 
remain parts of a whole; they must be incorporated into a more holistic understanding of 
historical modes of rule that considers the definition and enforcement of good citizenship in its 
totality. In this section, I seek to clarify conceptually the notion of civil society, along with the 
notion of political community with which it dovetails. The basic dispute remains between Marx 
and Hegel. At its heart is the humanist demand for reason, the transcendence of political society 
and the attainment of civility.
78 Among liberals, this new form is seen as having replaced imperialism in substance, which is 
understood to exist only in its juridical form; see Ruggie (1993).
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Hegel’s philosophy was revolutionary in many respects. From his early writings, he 
rejected the epistemological dichotomy between knower and known, reason and feeling, and 
thought and action. In the process, he reconceptualised the social context as consisting not in 
atomised, self-referential minds but in dialogical relations of recognition. And all this he did 
while maintaining a commitment to universalism and reason: he reconceptualised reason as 
public, historical, contestable, and changeable, whose movement entailed a struggle for 
recognition.80 As his thought matured, he went on to abstract reason from a human-centred social 
process and to derive it from the movement of a self-positing Spirit;81 and later to conceive of a 
telos of reason as embodied in the national state (a constitutional monarchy in particular) and 
founded in large part on a ‘civil society’ of private property.82 It was against reason thus posited 
that young Marx reacted, and on two grounds. The first was Hegel’s ‘mystification’ of the state 
by deriving it from a self-positing Spirit, that is, by conceptualising the state as the object of the 
universal rather than its predicate. The second and related point was Hegel’s relegation of class 
distinctions within civil society to mere ‘social differences’ devoid of political significance; in 
this sense, post-feudal, civil society for Marx remained political society, not a reflection of 
reason. On these two grounds, Marx indicted Hegel for equating the ‘real human being’ with the 
‘private human being’, at the exclusion of non-property holders, and legitimating existing social 
relations by means of abstract logic.83
As Marx’s own thought matured he was to leave the concerns of moral philosophy 
behind and engage with political economy, to elaborate ‘the anatomy of this civil society’.84 This 
enabled him to articulate the organic tendencies of a society founded on private property and 
driven by accumulation.85 By this means, he was also to demonstrate more clearly that the 
‘human’ bourgeoisie and ‘unhuman’ proletariat were in a mutually constitutive relation. The 
latter is an insight—a reapplication of Hegelian dialectics, to be sure—that remains 
indispensable to the theory of civil society. It contrasts sharply with liberal thinking on the 
matter, which continues to posit a formal not substantive definition of civil society, by counter- 
posing the ‘civil’ to ‘the state’, not to the ‘uncivil’, and peddling the abrogation of links with the 
state as the sine qua non of civil status and independent self-expression.
79 Gowan (1999). Although Gowan does not see this as a case of ultra-imperialism, I will argue that it is.
80 See Hegel (1975).
81 Hegel (1977).
82 Hegel (1952).
83 Marx (1975); quotes from p. 148.
84 Marx (1970), p. 20.
85 Marx (1976).
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Marx departed from Hegel’s explicitly dialogical framework to depict phenomena of 
social conflict not as struggles over moral meaning within an instersubjective relation, but as a 
competition between economic ends, in quasi-Hobbesian fashion.86 A Hegelian-Marxist 
reconciliation on these grounds was later pursued by the so-called ‘cultural Marxists’. Antonio 
Gramsci was one of the earliest, positing civil society once again as explicitly moral terrain, but 
doing so in ambiguous terms. He conceived of civil society as an instrument of the state in the 
reproduction of moral order (‘hegemony’); as well as the location in which the struggle over 
moral meaning has to be won before the capture of state power.87 A few decades on, Thompson 
was to introduce the concept of ‘moral economy’ to locate class politics in its moral-historical 
context and, moreover, to demonstrate that emancipatory politics may take many forms, 
including the less visible and more spontaneous.88 This here amounts to the second indispensable 
insight for the theory of civil society; it contrasts with liberal thinking again, but also with the 
‘critical theory’ of Jurgen Habermas insofar as he has been concerned with the overt, organised, 
and polite forms of politics.89 Mamdani’s work can be seen as an innovation of Thompson’s, one 
that sets out explicitly to theorise civil society in relation to its oppressed antithesis.90
That which remains under-theorised (or poorly theorised) is the relationship between 
civil society and political community. Hegel, of course, mastered this in his time and place, but 
contemporary theory leaves much to be desired. In the twentieth century, and in the postwar 
period in particular, the notion of community has largely continued to be understood as somehow 
bounded and demarcated -  mainly in ‘national’, but also in ‘ethnic’ and even ‘civilisational’ 
terms.91 Yet, moral consciousness is of a vagabond nature: moral languages cross imaginary 
frontiers and hybridise with ‘local’ moral languages to gain particular expression in context, 
while also expanding geographically the common field of meaning.92 As we will see in the next 
section, this is the historical process of moral hybridisation and globalisation, which has seen the 
humanist consciousness conquer the globe on the heels of capitalist expansion to provide a 
common global dialogical foundation animated by the demand for citizenship. The demand has 
manifested itself in the terms of liberalism, nationalism, socialism, feminism, and
86 Honneth (1995).
87 Gramsci (1971).
88 Thompson (1980).
89 See Habermas (1989). See also the critique of Habermas by Eley (1994).
90 Mamdani (1996).
91 This understanding transcends disciplines. For some influential theorists of each ‘level’ of 
community, see Barth ed. (1969), Smith (1986), Miller (1995), Taylor (1989).
92 A longer discussion with specific reference to ethnicity is provided in Yeros (1999).
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environmentalism, in virtually every comer of the earth, and in a multiplicity of local colours. 
Suffice it here to note that the notion of ‘hybridity’ was introduced in reaction to Hegel and his 
own national-organic understanding of community; it has served in particular to undermine his 
conflation o f ‘community’ and ‘nationality’.93
A second point follows from this: the ontology of the state as the pre-eminent location of 
community and its ‘development’—shared as much by liberal and communitarian political 
theorists as by the modernisation, underdevelopment, and neoliberal schools—is false. The state 
is an institutional expression—and only one—of a much larger dialogical relation. The discipline 
of International Relations, and particularly its ‘normative’ tributary, has been the one most 
preoccupied with conceptualising community beyond the state, and here the ‘English school’ has 
led the way. Yet, it has done so not by dislodging the state from the centre of its formulations, 
but by conceiving of global community as a ‘society of states’.94 Critical theorists and 
poststructuralists later dislodged the state from its pedestal, but other problems now raised their 
heads. Andrew Linklater, for example, sought to make a case for ‘breaking the nexus between 
sovereignty, territoriality, nationality and citizenship by promoting wider communities of 
discourse’, but failed to recognise that dialogical relations of global dimensions have long 
existed and do not need to be ‘widened’ but transformed.95 Rob Walker, in turn, recognised that 
global dialogical relations do exist, but failed to acknowledge their common humanist foundation 
(as well as his own).96
The most compelling of statements in the discipline has been penned by Robert Cox who 
sought to theorise global order and global change in neo-Gramscian terms.97 Thus he conceived 
of global order in terms of a ‘hegemony’ founded on transnational state-society relations; and 
global change in terms of the propagation of a counter-hegemonic vision. Yet, hegemony remains 
a problematic concept in the conceptualisation of community, insofar as it conflates community 
with hegemony/consensus. Community is a realm of moral debate, including consensus, conflict, 
and violence. Consensus would be an historical oddity, and in any case, it can easily be 
overstated. It is relative not only to alienation but also to the degree of organisation among the
93 The notion of hybridity was introduced by Russian linguist Mikhail Bakhtin in the early twentieth 
century; see Bakhtin (1984). For an introduction to his thought, see Todorov (1984). It is important to 
note, however, that Bakhtin also claimed to be able to escape the Hegelian dialectical system, in the 
manner of our contemporary post-structuralists; this aspect of his thought, of course, need not be taken 
on board.
94 See, for example, Bull (1995).
95 Linklater (1998); quote from p. 60.
96 Walker (1988).
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alienated: high alienation and high disorganisation would not warrant the term ‘hegemony’. It is 
also relative to the type and amount of direct force employed against the alienated: violence does 
not need to be high profile, or between ‘great powers’, in order for ‘hegemony’ to give way to 
‘dominance’; ‘complex emergencies’ and the everyday violence of the neo-colonial state must 
also be taken into account. To be sure, hegemony is the object of imperial politics; but theory 
does not have to make it its own.98 Theory is better off exploring the dialectic of civilisation 
‘from below’, the various forms of uncivil politics and their relationship to the civil.99
I argue that a ‘political economy of civilisation’ is an historical materialism that does 
precisely that. As an historical materialism, it refers to both a method for the study of global 
economic life and a process of struggle over the meaning of civilisation.
1.6 The Global Civilisation
That which remains here is, first, to sketch the moral constitution of global civilisation and, 
second, to outline the dialectic of civilisation in the postwar period as it is presented in this 
thesis.
Humanism and Citizenship
That which founds contemporary moral debate is the humanist moral framework. To explicate 
this we must turn to the work of Charles Taylor, a neo-Hegelian, and engage with him critically. 
In Sources o f the Self his most comprehensive statement, Taylor explains that beneath any moral 
reactions and demands that we feel, there lies a particular ontology of the human.100 Ontologies 
of the human consist in qualitative distinctions regarding the status and worth of human beings, 
and they constitute the ‘background language’ in which all moral obligations that we 
acknowledge are set. These distinctions are not normally explicit, and it is for this reason that 
they are ‘background’ or ‘intuitive’. Taylor continues that, while ontologies of the human have 
varied in history, a peculiarly universalist ontology emerged over the last half-millennium in 
Europe. And this has had two notable features: first, inherent in it is a moral demand to respect
97 Cox (1987).
98 The point is also made by Amin (1997), p. 3.
99 The difficulties and shortcomings of Cox’s ap proach are not resolved in a more recent essay 
addressed to the present predicament; see Cox (1999), pp. 3-28.
100 Taylor (1989).
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the ‘life, integrity, and well-being, even flourishing’ o f all human beings; second, this demand of 
respect is formulated in the new language o f ‘rights’, as opposed to privileges, by connecting the 
notion of respect with a new notion o f autonomy, as well as a historically unique sensitivity to 
suffering and valuation of ‘ordinary life’. This last connection is important in that it has made the 
life of production and the family (or reproduction) morally relevant to well-being and the good 
life. As Taylor writes,
I believe that this affirmation o f ordinary life, although not uncontested and 
frequently appearing in secularised form, has become one o f the most powerful 
ideas in modem civilisation. It underlies our contemporary ‘bourgeois’ politics, 
so much concerned with issues of welfare, and at the same time powers the most 
influential revolutionary ideology o f our century, Marxism, with its apotheosis 
o f man the producer.101
What these moral-ontological transformations amount to is a radical new consciousness 
that gives life to a demand for the abolition o f human hierarchies, or citizenship, with potential 
application to all spheres of social life, contingent upon social struggle. And this universalism 
differs from previous universalisms in its scope. Christianity, for example, as a prior 
universalism did not contain this kind o f radical egalitarian dynamic. As Tzvetan Todorov 
reminds us, at the time of the conquistadores Christianity could declare that ‘God belongs to all, 
and all belong to God’ without problematising the inequalities of ordinary life: thus ‘the master 
will remain a master, the slave a slave, as if this were a difference quite as natural as that 
between man and woman’.102 In this sense, the new humanism is unique in that it has permanent 
revolution built into it.
The problem with Taylor’s formulation is that he has sought to articulate this moral- 
ontological transformation in the selfsame act of articulating civilisational difference; and this 
not merely in the (necessary) temporal sense, but also in relation to simultaneously existing and 
antithetical ‘civilisations’. This is nowhere explicitly theorised but follows from the way in 
which he has situated the development o f ‘the modem se lf  within a ‘West’ monologically 
understood. And in this sense, Taylor conforms to an age-old Eurocentric convention that 
presumes that ‘the W est’ has an Archimedean starting-point (‘classical Greece’), a continuity and
101 Taylor (1989), p. 14.
102 Todorov (1984), pp. 106-07.
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unity in history (‘from Plato to NATO’), and an insulation from ‘extra-Westem’ dialogical 
relations and borrowings. As Amin has shown, this is a convention that has its origins in the 
post-Renaissance period, in the rise of European capitalism and its turbulent expansion around 
the globe, at which time it served to celebrate the ‘uniqueness’ of European ingenuity, relegate 
‘the backwardness’ of the non-Europeans to unique traits of ‘their’ own, and legitimate Europe’s 
superiority and ‘civilising’ mission.103 As Martin Bernal has further shown, the Eurocentric 
convention reached its apogee in the nineteenth century -  Hegel and Marx being important 
transitional figures themselves -  with the maturation of the claim that ‘Europe’ derives from 
‘Greece’ and that the latter was itself ‘pure’, not in any way ‘African’ or ‘Oriental’.104 The claim 
to Western purity, singularity, and insularity has continued to have as its corollary a civilising 
mission beyond the colonial period, whereby the idea of ‘the West’ has been propagated as 
‘universal’ and apex of the trajectory of the ‘non-West’, manifest in an endless development 
project of ‘imitation’ instead of global democratisation.
To de-racialise Taylor’s narrative requires that we seek a general theory of historical 
development, such as Amin has suggested. The founding acknowledgement should be that ‘the 
West’ is an instance of a much larger dialogical relation and, moreover, that the radical 
humanism of the last half-millennium has not been a ‘Western affair’. The contemporary 
meaning of humanity owes much to the dialogical relations of the coloniser and colonised, the 
struggles against slavery, colonialism, and the global capitalist dispensation, and against 
patriarchy and environmental destruction (the robbing of the well-being of future generations).
Peasant-workers in the Development Dialogue
The ‘development dialogue’ of the postwar period must be understood as an ongoing struggle 
over the meaning of civilisation. At its heart has been the national question -  the ends and means 
of national self-determination -  in the aftermath of formal imperialism. As we have seen, two 
visions prevailed in this period, one bourgeois nationalist (‘nation-building’), the other liberal 
(‘structural adjustment’), both reflecting the needs of the new imperialism, both objectifying the 
semi-proletariat, and both seeking to control it on a global scale. In the ‘realised’ nations of the 
transatlantic alliance, the nationalist vision found its embodiment in the welfare state 
compromise, within an international monetary order that ostensibly prioritised national welfare.
103 Amin (1989).
104 Bernal (1987).
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In the de jure  but not de facto nations of the post-colonial world, the nationalist vision found its 
form in a ‘development’ project. This held that ‘peasants’, through industrialisation and 
‘modernisation’, would themselves one day become ‘nationals’ and proper members of the 
human community; for the time being, they were ‘drifters’ between town and country, as Arthur 
Lewis put it, Tiv[ing] in quite other worlds’, and in ‘unlimited supply’ waiting to be put to 
work.105 In this bourgeois nationalist vision, the semi-proletariat was acknowledged as different 
but not equal. The liberal claim overturned all this, as all peoples of the world were now 
proclaimed equal but not different, that is, identical on the basis of a universal economic 
rationality. As such, they were also assimilable into the new order of market freedom, and therein 
perfectly capable, in the words of Samuel Popkin, ‘[of] bargaining] with others to achieve 
mutually acceptable outcomes’.106 The liberal vision, however, did not sweep the national 
question aside; it instrumentalised it in the interest of liberalisation, thereby emasculated its ends 
and means.
The history of the semi-proletariat remains to be told in all its ‘barbarism’, its struggles 
against bourgeois nationalism and liberalism, but also against its subordination to its working 
class ‘brothers’ in the North. Chapters 2 and 3 interpret the semi-proletarian experience in the 
nationalist and liberal periods, respectively. First, they trace the evolution of ‘development 
theory’ in each period, focusing on the way in which it has framed and sought to make use of the 
semi-proletariat. Development theory here appeared as the handmaiden of political economy, 
with orthodoxies emerging in the service of prevailing class interests to claim ‘intellectual 
victories’. Second, these chapters turn to political economy itself, focusing on the rise of ultra­
imperialism, through the Cold War and in its aftermath. Specifically, they address the changing 
needs of ultra-imperialism, from productivity to liquidity, and the prevailing model of good 
citizenship corresponding to both, consisting in advocacy of extroverted capitalist development.
Third, these chapters trace the relationship between civil and uncivil working class 
politics on a global scale. Although the ideal of good citizenship has been trans-historical, the 
terrain of the ‘uncivil’ has broadened: from the various ‘property unfriendly’ forces, the socialist 
and mass nationalist seeking to nationalise industry, redistribute land, and overcome 
disarticulated accumulation; to the ‘market unfriendly’, in all their diversity, the mral and urban 
working class, gender and racial equity, and environmental movements. The focus first turns on 
the victories and defeats of the semi-proletariat in obtaining agrarian reform in the context of
105 Lewis (1958), p. 408.
106 Popkin (1979), p. ix.
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shifting geopolitics. This is followed by an inquiry into the formal politics of the semi­
proletariat, that of the trade union movement. This inquiry demonstrates the problems of 
organising and articulating a specifically semi-proletarian ‘voice’ within a globally 
institutionalised debate over ‘worker participation’ centred at the ILO and dominated by Western 
organised labour. The combined inquiry into civil and uncivil politics bears out the process by 
which anti-systemic politics over half a century have been subjected to a systematic project of 
‘civilisation’, by a mixture of cooptation tactics and outright repression.
Chapters 4-7 turn to Zimbabwe to demonstrate the above argument in detail. Zimbabwe 
has particularities of its own, deriving form its white settler colonial experience (spearheaded by 
Cecil Rhodes himself), but it remains a typical semi-proletarianised, socially and sectorally 
distarticulated, neo-colonial country. Chapter 4 traces Zimbabwe’s long transition from 
colonialism to neo-colonialism -  obtained in 1980 despite armed liberation struggle -  to 
‘structural adjustment’ in the 1990s, and ultimately to the re-radicalisation of nationalism at 
decade’s end. The remaining chapters provide a detailed account of peasant-worker politics 
under structural adjustment. Chapters 5 and 6 address urban-based peasant-worker politics in 
both their nationalist and internationalist expressions, as articulated by the Zimbabwe Congress 
of Trade Unions. Particular attention here is given to the ZCTU’s ‘civil’ trasformation, brought 
to fruition by the liberalisation of the economy and state repression, on the one hand, and the 
social democratic internationalism, on the other, propagated by the ICFTU. Chapter 7 addresses 
rural-based, uncivil peasant-worker nationalism focusing on land occupations in particular. 
Chapter 8 offers some concluding thoughts on Zimbabwe, semi-proletarian politics, and the 
prospects for a post-liberal civilisation.
The view has been put forth in certain quarters that it is time to go ‘beyond’ the agrarian 
question, in the sense that we must seek ‘particularities’ in rural social relations and eschew 
‘universal history’.107 A more coherent position is de Janvry’s who has remarked that, with the 
complete development of capitalism in agriculture, ‘the agrarian question has become 
increasingly less agrarian’.108 The position maintained in this thesis is that the agrarian question 
must now focus on the subject status of the world’s semi-proletariat under ultra-imperialism.
107 Roseberry (1993).
108 De Janvry (1981), p. 223.
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PARTI:
PEASANT-WORKERS IN THE DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE
CHAPTER 2 
The Nationalist Claim in the Cold War
The principle of national self-determination has animated international politics since the French 
revolution, but it did not attain universality until the postwar period, when anti-colonial 
movements succeeded in abolishing formal imperialism. In the first two decades after World War 
n, the bulk of the colonial world gained juridical independence, starting with India, while the 
colonial regimes that remained, as in Southern Africa, found themselves steering against the 
‘winds of change’. This was the nationalist period, founded on the notion that all human beings 
are national beings in essence, that all nations are equal, and that relations between them would 
be conducted multilaterally. Yet, it was also widely recognised that not all nations were equal in 
fact, that national self-determination remained to be actualised. ‘Nation-building’ was its natural 
corollary, a project undisputed in form but fiercely contested in substance. Who was the ‘self? 
And how was it to be ‘determined’? The national question was fought on the new terrain of a bi­
polar, Cold War world, and conducted as the ‘development dialogue’.
This chapter will begin by tracing the trajectory of the development orthodoxy, from its 
initial concerns with industrialisation to its ‘rural development’ turn in the 1970s, taking special 
interest in its objectification of the semi-proletariat and elision of the land question. The 
subsequent sections will then address the political economy that sustained the development 
orthodoxy. Section 2.2 will start by looking at the creation of a transatlantic ‘politics of 
productivity’. This did not extinguish inter-imperial rivalry but managed to contain it in the 
course of the Cold War. Alliance politics played out over the question of adjustment to payments 
imbalances, while the political process entailed the propping of East Asia and the development of 
underdevelopment in the rest of the periphery.
These events are more or less well known, but they cannot be properly understood unless 
the politics of the semi-proletariat are brought into perspective. For Cold War rivalry was not 
self-referential; it was driven by the contradictions of capitalism, and not least the agency of the 
‘anti-systemic’. Section 2.3 will focus on the uncivil side of the story, the rural political forms -  
namely rebellions and revolutions -  that contradicted the productivity needs of the alliance and 
endangered the extroverted pattern of accumulation in the periphery. Uncivil politics of this sort 
obtained a series of agrarian reforms, first in East Asia and then, in a much more limited fashion, 
in Latin America and Africa; and they also propelled two types of reformist politics in the 1970s 
-  the ‘rural development’ turn of development orthodoxy and demands for a New International 
Economic Order. Section 2.4 turns to the organised working class politics of the period. This will
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inquire into the institutionalised side of the semi-proletarian story, the debate over ‘worker 
participation’ as conducted within the ILO and international trade unionism. Particular interest 
here will be taken in the systematic ‘civilisation’ of opposition, the process by which semi­
proletarian politics have been undermined and co-opted both by nation-builders and international 
labour.
2.1 From Industrialisation to Rural Development
The use of ‘development’ language has a pre-history in the colonial period. Recall that colonial 
powers in Africa had resolved ‘the native question’ from the 1920s onwards by implementing a 
policy of ‘separate development’; and that in 1940, Britain had been compelled by anti-colonial 
agitation to pass the Colonial Development and Welfare Act; this exported to its dependencies a 
modified version of its own ‘purposeful state’.1 What was new in the postwar years was that 
development had been shifted onto a new moral foundation, that of the national question. What 
was also new was the creation of an academic discipline devoted to the study of ‘third world 
poverty’, or ‘underdevelopment’.
If economic theory in the central economies, under the stewardship of J.M. Keynes, was 
concerned at this time with demand management and state intervention in the savings, 
investment, and growth relation, new demands were now being placed on the discipline by the 
rise of mass politics in the colonial world. These demands gained urgency with the onset of the 
Cold War, culminating in the Truman Doctrine of 1947 and the announcement of new global 
development project for the third world. The following decade witnessed the institutionalisation 
of ‘development economics’ and the emergence of ‘development’ orthodoxy.
The Idea o f  Neo-colonial Industrialisation
The new discipline proceeded to frame poverty as a mere economic disparity. As Arturo Escobar 
has put it, ‘[i]f within market societies the poor were defined as lacking what the rich had in terms 
of money and material possessions, poor countries came to be similarly defined in relation to the 
standards of wealth of the more economically advanced nations’.2 In these terms, the rich and 
poor were not understood as existing in a relationship of power, nor, by implication, was
1 See Low and Lonsdale (1976), pp. 1-63.
2 Escobar (1995), p. 23.
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development understood in dialectical terms. Development was to be a matter of imitation of ‘the 
developed’ by the ‘underdeveloped’, not a transformation of the relationship between the two.
In turn, if the ‘developed’ were the nations of the West, development was to be identified 
with the features considered to be the essence of the West: on the one hand, the systematic 
application of technology to industrial production; on the other, the social dynamism and moral 
universalism associated with this nationally integrative process. By contrast, the essence of 
‘underdevelopment’, was said to consist in agrarian, parochial, and static social conditions. In this 
sense, not everyone was yet properly national in this new world of nations; there still existed a 
large mass of people who lacked developed self-hood and that needed to be nationalised -  and 
thereby modernised. In effect, modernisation envisioned the double transformation of peasants 
into workers and natives into nationals.
These dichotomies pervaded the thinking of the development economists of the time, 
prominent among who were Arthur W. Lewis and W.W. Rostow. In their hands, the civilising 
mission gained academic sophistication. For Rostow, civilisation proceeded in five ‘stages of 
economic growth’: it began with the ‘pre-Newtonian’ traditional society of ‘limited production 
functions’, ‘regionally based political institutions’, and ‘an hierarchical social structure’, and it 
culminated in ‘the age of high mass consumption’ with its scientific outlook, regular industrial 
growth, urban population, national institutions, and welfare state.3 These were understood as 
secular, non-dialectical changes: despite historical hiccups and national particularities, ‘the 
economic history of growing societies’, wrote Rostow, ‘takes a part of its rude shape from the 
effort of growing societies to approximate the optimum sectoral paths’.4 For Lewis, the sequence 
of industrial stages was less important than the dynamics of the original transition from 
‘subsistence’ to ‘capitalist’ production. The latter was characterised in the first instance by 
‘reproducible capital’, whether in state or private hands; but more than this, it was characterised 
by ‘modem towns, with the finest architecture, water supplies, communications and the like, into 
which people drift from other towns or villages which might almost belong to another planet’. 
The people themselves differed: ‘between the few highly westernized, trousered, natives, 
educated in western universities, speaking western languages, and glorying in Beethoven, Mill, 
Marx or Einstein, and the great mass of their countrymen who live in quite other worlds’.5
The specific means of civilisation were most rigorously articulated by Lewis. For him, 
semi-proletarianisation and the nondescript people ‘drifting’ became a virtue; for large labour
3 Rostow (1990).
4 Rostow (1990), p. 14.
5 Lewis (1958), p. 408.
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reserves rendered a ‘negligible, zero, or even negative’ marginal productivity of labour, such that 
‘new industries can be created, or old industries expanded without limit at the existing wage’.6 
Labour could thus be removed from the countryside Without affecting production there, while 
also providing near subsistence wages to industry. Thus, the ‘unlimited supplies of labour’ in the 
subsistence sector were not theorised as integral (in functional terms) to the historical emergence 
and reproduction of capitalist accumulation. Save for brief mention of ‘primitive accumulation’, 
this was the ‘dual economy’ whose sectors ‘might almost belong to another planet’ and which 
needed to be stitched together by state planners. In fact, peasants became central to 
industrialisation in more ways than one. Besides their labour, their productivity in agriculture was 
sought, as was their surplus, and not least their acquiescence: ‘if  the capitalist sector depends 
upon the peasants for food, it is essential to get the peasants to produce more, while if at the same 
time they can be prevented from enjoying the full fruit of their extra production, wages can be 
reduced relatively to the capitalist surplus’.7 Rostow had comparable, if less rigorously 
articulated, visions for the peasants. And in both models, attention was focused on the ‘leading 
sectors’, on the one hand, and the productivity and surplus of the drifters, on the other.
These particular visions resonated strongly in the periphery, where disarticulated 
accumulation remained essentially in place but entered a period of conflict with mass politics and 
ascendant inward-looking manufacturing interests nurtured in the ‘hothouse’ of Depression and 
war. This was the case in Latin America, which had gained juridical independence in the previous 
century, but also elsewhere, not least the ‘self governing’ colony of Southern Rhodesia. 
Generally, what Lewis thought of as ‘the few highly westernized trousered natives’ comprised of 
bourgeois and petty-bourgeois modernisers, who sought either accommodation or reform, 
depending on the class balances and external constraints. They thus interacted with the 
development orthodoxy, sometimes challenging it, other times modifying it or implementing it. In 
Latin America, most notably, the new capitalist classes arrived equipped with a ‘structuralist’ 
critique of modernisation theory, which rejected its ‘dual economy’ and ‘stages of growth’ 
assumptions.8 Nonetheless, they retained the emphasis on industrialisation, pursued nation- 
building without undoing functional dualism, and over time even acquired land for themselves.9 
Post-colonial nation-builders in Africa proceeded without an indigenous capitalist class of similar 
stature: they presided over economies wholly dominated by foreign capital; acquired land of their 
own through the state or expanded state enterprises under their control; faced the typical
6 Lewis (1958), pp. 402 and 403, respectively.
7 Lewis (1958), p. 434.
8 For its preeminent exponent, see Prebisch (1959), pp. 251-73.
9 De Janvry (1981).
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peripheral constraints to accumulation; and retained functional dualism in its new ‘indirect rule’ 
forms.10 East Asia, by contrast, departed form the development orthodoxy insofar as the 
agricultural sector was taken seriously, broken up and redistributed early on, under US auspices.11 
The internal market was thereby expanded, while state-led nation-building was spared of its 
external obstacles (as we will see in more detail).
The agricultural sector received much less theoretical attention in the early years of 
nation-building, as it became an instrument of industrialisation. Previously, there had indeed been 
significant concerns with the ‘modernisation’ of ‘traditional’ agriculture per se. In colonial 
Zimbabwe, for example, this concern stretched back to the 1920s, when ‘separate development’ 
was accompanied by a conservationist ‘development of the reserves’. Then during the 
Depression, agricultural policy across the continent was stepped up by the establishment of 
‘marketing boards’ to squeeze farmers more effectively; while in the postwar years, the British 
colonial authorities implemented the ‘colonial development’ Act and sought in the name of 
‘efficiency’ to raise African agricultural productivity, integrate producers further into the market, 
and conserve land -  known infamously as the ‘second colonial occupation’.12 Yet, in the nation- 
building world of the 1950s, agricultural policy found itself firmly subordinated to industrial 
priorities. The policy became one of maintaining cheap food in the interest of industry, to the 
point even of destroying domestic production of staple foods by accepting dumped US wheat, or 
‘food aid’.13 The consequences were to be seen in an intensified process of proletarianisation, 
haphazard urbanisation, and rural and urban social strife and political conflict.
These consequences ultimately combined with the foreign exchange crunch, accentuated 
by ISI, to call agriculture to the rescue. Just as well, critics of longer standing, such as Theodore 
W. Schultz, now took centre stage to re-frame the semi-proletariat. If until recently ‘peasants’ had 
been ‘surplus labour’ waiting to be put to work, in the 1960s they were to re-defined as 
‘traditional farmers’, ‘poor but efficient’, waiting to be ‘transformed’ by science.14 Schultz argued 
that agriculture and not industry ought to be ‘the engine of growth’, and that, with the right 
application of scientific knowledge, traditional farmers could ‘turn sand into gold’.15 Importantly, 
he also argued that large-scale farming was not necessarily more efficient than family farming, 
but nevertheless concluded that access to land was ‘least important’ to productivity, that is, 
secondary to investment in ‘human and material capital’.
10 Mamdani (1996).
11 Olson (1974).
12 Low and Lonsdale (1976).
13 See Friedmann (1993) and de Janvry (1981).
14 Schultz (1964).
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What this amounted to was a new theoretical justification for the technical upgrading of 
agriculture as a means of raising productivity, gaining foreign exchange, and overcoming food 
shortages. It became known as the ‘Green Revolution’ and encompassed a wide range of changes 
in production, including new tenure systems and mechanisation, but most importantly the 
introduction of new, high-yielding varieties of ‘hybrid’ seed. While seeking to replicate the US 
agricultural transformation, it also contradicted this by making national agricultures dependent on 
global markets for new seed technologies, equipment, and chemical inputs, controlled by US 
firms.16 The consequences again were grave. The case of India, often touted as the model of the 
green revolution, is instructive. By the 1970s, ‘self-sufficiency’ was indeed obtained, but only 
insofar as food imports were no longer required. For the ‘excess supply’ implied by ‘self- 
sufficiency’ rested on the pillars of low ‘effective demand’ -  that is, mass poverty. A closer look 
shows that growth was highly uneven in terms of crop, region, and class, and accompanied by 
growing income inequality and, on average, decline of nutritional standards.17 The major 
exception to these trends was again East Asia which replicated the US agricultural model without 
becoming integrated into markets controlled by foreign capital.18
More generally, the new agricultural strategy for ‘development’ did not appease the 
grievances of the semi-proletariat, which generally failed to command the resources necessary for 
the management of the new seed varieties and conceded further land to large-scale commercial 
farming. Proletarianisation, urbanisation, and poverty dovetailed with radical politics in the 1950s 
and 1960s throughout the periphery, as well as with the new ‘dependency’ theories emanating 
from Latin America.19 In the latter case, as we will see, the convulsions of these decades, 
especially after the Cuban Revolution, produced a wave of counter-revolutionary, controlled land 
reforms. Yet, it was clear by the 1970s that mainstream development thinking itself had to be 
reformed if it was going to stave off crisis of potentially larger magnitude.
Crisis and the Rural Development Turn
The reality of increasing poverty was acknowledged at the level of the World Bank and 
articulated with a sense of urgency in the mid-1970s. This was the time of generalised economic
15 Schultz (1964), pp. 4-7.
16 Friedmann (1993).
17 Patnaik (1990).
18 Friedmann (1993), pp. 42-45.
19 The school is diverse, but the most influential approach proved to be Andre Gunder Frank’s. This broke 
with Marxist conventions generally and the ‘two stage’ line of the communist left in particular. See Frank 
(1967). For a more pliant approach, see Cardoso and Faletto (1979).
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crisis. And it was also the time in which the social crisis in the periphery was finding new 
expression in ruling class demands for a New International Economic Order. The totality of 
economic, social, and political crises compelled a reconsideration of inter-sectoral dynamics 
among official circles and, ultimately, a concerted shift in development theory towards ‘rural 
development’ in its own right. Led by the World Bank and the ILO, the previously ‘drifting’ and 
‘traditional farmers’ were now relabelled ‘target groups’ and placed in a number of 
compartments: ‘small farmers’, ‘submarginal farmers’, ‘landless labourers’, ‘working poor’, 
‘urban unemployed’ and ‘urban underemployed’. The ILO focused mainly on employment and 
income generation among the working poor and the newly conceived urban ‘informal sector’, 
while the Bank mainly on ‘integrated rural development’ among the rural poor; the latter 
programmes encompassed educational, health, housing, and agricultural issues.20
The World Bank, especially, gained new vigour in the 1970s under the Presidency of 
Robert McNamara, former US Secretary of Defence (architect of counter-insurgency in Latin 
America and bombing policy in Indochina). Under his leadership, the Bank announced an ‘assault 
on poverty’, cultivated a ‘redistribution with growth’ approach, and by 1975 shifted the bulk of 
its lending to rural development.21 In this decade, the assumptions of the ‘dual economy’ model 
were set aside and agrarian land relations gained significance of their own. However, these 
relations were still not seen as integral to capital accumulation; the poor were still understood as 
somewhat ‘outside the organised market economy’, with ‘weak links’ to it.22 Accordingly, the 
problem of poverty was again understood mainly in economic terms: the poor lacked access to 
the ‘land, capital and other public facilities’ that the rich had, not their political power. Likewise, 
landlessness was understood mainly as an income constraint, not a political one. The task then 
was to redistribute resources to the poor in ways that were ‘politically plausible’.23 In effect, the 
rural development turn was an exercise in subsidising the social reproduction of the semi- 
proletarian household in a period of crisis.24
The most notable change was that, for the first time in the postwar period, land reform 
began to enter the official development dialogue as a legitimate item of discussion. Previously, 
land reform had retained a marginal status, kept alive as an issue mainly at the United Nations. 
The UN had launched a series of periodic reports on Progress in Land Reform, publishing six 
between 1956 and 1976, while the FAO had been formally recognised in 1962 as the agency with
20 For a detailed discussion of the debate of the 1970s, see Oman and Wignaraja (1991), ch. 4.
21 World Bank (1975).
22 Chenery (1974), p. xv.
23 See Bell (1974).
24 See de Janvry (1981), ch. 7.
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the leading role in land reform. Yet, in this period, as Dimitrios Christodoulou has argued, ‘[t]oo 
much UN “action”...proved to be no more than campaigns on paper’, due not only to the 
intergovernmental nature of the organisation, but also the bourgeois values of Secretariat staff.25 
In the early 1970s, land reform appeared to gain real international policy status, as the World 
Bank began to speak ‘boldly’. However, by 1975, and the publication of a ‘land reform policy 
paper’, the Bank was pulling back, re-emphasising productivity and advocating reform on the 
basis of land markets and ‘modem’ freehold titling. In effect, the Bank was now planning the 
grand sequel to the green revolution, what Ernest Feder called ‘the self-liquidation of the third 
world peasantry’.26 At the same time, the ELO, more so than the Bank, saw redistribution of 
assets, including land, as more urgent measures. Even here, however, its main rationale for land 
reform was the redistribution of income, not pohtical power; in any case, the ILO was not 
amenable to a redefinition of its own industrial relations convention to accommodate the semi­
proletariat in formal channels of dialogue (to be discussed). The land reform debate culminated in 
1979 in the World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development, held at the FAO in 
Rome, where, despite lofty declarations about formulating programmes ‘with the full 
understanding and participation of rural people’, the diagnosis of the problem remained 
‘superficial’.27
The final change in the reformist trajectory of the dialogue consisted in the synthesis of 
the ILO and Bank approaches into a ‘basic needs’ strategy, which stressed a more urgent 
redistribution of resources than the incremental ‘redistribution with growth’ approach.28 
However, these were the waning years of the nationalist period. The global order was undergoing 
restructuring under the weight of transnational capital and finance. Moreover, the postwar 
structure of global food production was also changing.29 Competition was changing at the top, as 
the US was joined by Western Europe and several ‘new agricultural countries’ from the 
periphery. At the bottom, the rest of the periphery was being caught in a bind: its tropical export 
crops, like sugar cane and vegetable oil, were being technically substituted in central markets and 
obtaining declining foreign exchange; much of it remained dependent on food and technology 
imports; and it faced protection in the agricultural markets of the centre. The ‘structural 
adjustment programme’ was then to be proclaimed under these circumstances.
25 Christodoulou (1989), p. 182 and passim; see also Powelson (1984).
26 Feder (1976), pp. 343—54; see also the discussion in Christodoulou (1989), pp. 189-92.
27 Christodoulou (1989), Appendix.
28 See Oman and Wignaraja (1991), ch. 4.
29 Friedmann (1993).
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2.2 The Rise of Ultra-Imperialism
To understand the nationalist period we must examine more closely some of the underlying 
changes in its political economy. This section is concerned with the making of the new 
imperialism and the international politics of adjustment, growth, and underdevelopment.
Constructing the Politics o f Productivity
When national delegates met at Bretton Woods in 1944 to chart a new course for the global 
economy, colonial peoples were not represented in their own right, save for some ‘observers’. 
The talks were dominated by the US and British delegations, led by Harry Dexter White and J.M. 
Keynes, respectively. And they were haunted by the dramatic events of the interwar period, the 
rise of mass politics, social upheavals, and economic collapse. Immediate circumstances were 
more imposing still. The ‘great powers’ of Western Europe lay destroyed, demoralised, and 
vulnerable; the Soviet Union, though technically still an ally, claimed a ‘realised’ socialism and 
made no secret of its global ambitions; while the US had been spared of physical destruction, held 
the largest production capacity in the world, the bulk of the world’s gold reserves, and 
expansionist ambitions of its own.
Contra Ruggie, the new multilateralism of the postwar period has not been conceptually 
separable from imperialism.30 In the few short years following Bretton Woods, a new imperialism 
was forged to protect the capitalist system as a whole from radical scenarios. Its novelty was to be 
found in an alliance between central states, principally the United States, Britain, France, and 
occupied Germany and Japan; and in a compromise between capital and labour, modelled on the 
post-New Deal dispensation of the United States. The ‘politics of productivity’ consisted in an 
understanding that capital, led by an internationalist bourgeoisie, would deliver a new era of 
investment and growth that would obviate ‘the harsh questions of allocation’, while labour would 
temper its own distributional demands to facilitate this growth.31 Central to this understanding 
was a linking of wages to productivity at home -  facilitated by a correspondence between 
production and consumption along Fordist lines -  and collaboration on the interests of capital 
abroad.
This politics of productivity did not yet stand on a proper social foundation across the 
alliance at the end of the war. But as Kees van der Pijl has shown, successive US foreign policy
30 See Ruggie (1993), p. 11.
31 Maier(1977), pp. 607-33.
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offensives, beginning with the Marshall Plan, universalised the foundation; they did so by 
‘mobilis[ing] the elements least tied to specifically national class configurations and most 
susceptible to opportunities engendered by mass production and consumption in a highly 
internationalized context’.32 The threat of the Soviet Union, which was reconfiguring Eastern 
Europe to its own liking, bred urgency to the unification project, providing legitimacy to the 
offensives as well as to the circumvention of Bretton Woods itself. In the specificity of European 
class politics, the US initiatives soon crystallised into a social democratic compromise, entailing a 
commitment to full employment, the expansion of the welfare state, and exclusion of ‘anti- 
systemic’, communist forces from government. The Marshall Plan was the crucial instrument of 
this cooptation strategy; another was the deployment of US labour federations to split 
oppositional politics abroad.
A series of transatlantic social compacts thus came to form the metropolitan social basis 
of the international economic order envisaged at Bretton Woods. As we will see, rival 
imperialisms did persist in practice, especially over the questions of adjustment and 
decolonisation. However, none of these bones of contention managed to puncture the transatlantic 
unification project. The central states, led by the US, collectively crafted a ‘multilateral’ order 
with new institutions and privileges enshrined in them, and dominated the adjustment process; at 
the same time, they propped up extroverted peripheral alliances that served their productivity 
needs, while deploying organised transatlantic labour against ‘anti-systemic’ politics throughout 
the periphery.
The multilateralism of the postwar period was institutionalised in the IMF, World Bank, 
GATT, and the United Nations -  the latter being the only institution bridging the bi-polar world. 
The institutional epicentre of the capitalist world was designed to be the IMF, with a mandate to 
monitor international payments, including orderly currency adjustments, and to provide short­
term finance. Conversely, signatories to the Articles of Agreement were to collaborate with the 
IMF in disclosing their economic state of affairs and observing the spirit of the gold-exchange 
standard.33 A stable monetary order, in turn, was to facilitate the operation and liberalisation of 
the trading order. This was to be codified in the GATT, founded on the principles of non­
discrimination and reciprocity, and transformed by successive rounds of negotiations. Finance for 
reconstruction and development was to be provided by the World Bank, as well as by commercial 
banks themselves in the long run and by foreign direct investment.
32 Van derPijl (1984), p. 138.
33 See the discussion in Pauly (1997).
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The ‘social purpose’ of this multilateralism was ostensibly the preservation of national 
policy autonomy. In monetary affairs, this was founded on an agreement to regulate capital flows 
and observe the ‘adjustable peg’. In trade, various safeguards and exemptions were granted to 
deficit states in order to facilitate payments. The same logic extended to industrial policy as well: 
state promotion of strategic sectors or infant industries in the interest of reconstruction and 
nation-building was considered legitimate. Yet, in practice, the new multilateralism assumed 
specific juridical forms which reflected hierarchies among nations seeking to exercise or realise 
policy autonomy. The IMF and World Bank enshrined a system of weighted voting based on the 
size of the national economy, while the United States enjoyed unofficial privileges by virtue of its 
monopoly over the key currency. The two M s also exercised differential power over their 
members: they could exact policy changes only over debtors. For its part, the GATT did not 
codify hierarchy but remained unofficially driven by US-led transatlantic initiatives. Finally, 
these institutions were complemented by the United Nations, which enshrined a contradiction: the 
principle of one-nation-one-vote and a ‘security council’ with permanent seats for the ‘great 
powers’.
Adjustment under ‘Bretton Woods ’
The hierarchies among nations played out over the question of adjustment. The debate revolved 
around the notion of ‘fundamental disequilibrium’, a notoriously vague term reflecting an Anglo- 
American compromise: on the one hand, a rejection of Keynes’ proposal for a Clearing Union, 
which would have committed surplus countries (i.e., the United States) to the compensation of 
deficit countries; on the other, a concession to the principle of sovereignty (i.e., Britain’s) by 
falling short of committing deficit countries to automatic adjustment (such as there existed under 
the gold standard). Beyond this compromise, the meaning of the term remained unspecified and 
determined by politics. In this important sense, Bretton Woods was never a ‘system’.
In the first decade after Bretton Woods, even its original design was set aside. The new 
institutions were incapable of remedying the gross trade imbalances of the postwar years: the IMF 
remained deliberately underfunded by the US, while the World Bank was unable to raise money 
on frail postwar capital markets. In the midst of a payments crisis and under the threat of losing 
Europe to radical forces, the United States took on the unilateral role of lender-of-last-resort on 
conditions of its own choosing. Through the Marshall Plan, the United States filled the liquidity 
vacuum vis-a-vis strategic allies; and in the interest of accelerated European recovery, the United 
States promoted a regional substitute to the IMF, the European Payments Union (EPU), dropped
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its opposition to imperial trade preferences, allowed discriminatory European trade policy, and 
resisted reckless agricultural dumping.34 Policies of this sort succeeded in resurrecting Western 
European economies, such that, by 1958, the EPU was dissolved and Western Europeans lifted 
restrictions on their current accounts.
The adjustment controversy, however, did not relent. By the close of the 1950s, the US 
payments surplus was eroding, due to the manufacturing power of reconstructed allies and the 
relocation of US transnational firms to Europe -  partly to bypass discriminatory integration 
policy and partly by a managed integration of a transatlantic agro-industrial complex.35 
Confidence in the convertibility of the dollar began consequently to erode as well, laying bare 
once again the deficiencies of Bretton Woods: there was still no system to sanction the running of 
a surplus (now among Europeans), or to sanction the key currency country. After a final initiative 
for transatlantic consensus under President Kennedy, the United States returned to its unilateral 
course, while the members of the alliance remained hemmed in by its security umbrella. Under 
President Johnson, the Unites States pressed ahead with military spending abroad and social 
spending at home -  the war in Vietnam and the Great Society programme -  in what has been 
aptly called a ‘social-imperialist’ strategy.36 In turn, these brought about a rapid deterioration in 
the US payments position, an overvalued dollar, and ultimately the financing of US social- 
imperialism by members of the alliance by virtue of their retention of dollars. Thus, the 
‘adjustment system’ remained the Cold War.
Nonetheless, the 1960s were a time of change. Relations between Eastern and Western 
Europe were beginning to thaw, thereby threatening US security influence. A plethora of new 
nations were decolonising and entering the multilateral order. And European imperialisms were 
growing resentful over the incremental ceding of influence to the US in Indochina and Central 
Africa. At the same time, European social compacts were being undermined by a series of events: 
the attainment of currency convertibility; the consolidation and reorganisation of national 
capitals; the rise of transnational production; the rise of Eurodollar markets for their financing 
needs; the gradual resurrection of a transatlantic financial circuit; and not least the onset of new 
class confrontations.37 Together, these made the exercise of national autonomy as conceived at 
Bretton Woods more difficult, at the same time as the transatlantic consensus over its meaning 
was coming under strain, and as decolonising nations were making new claims on it.
34 For a concise statement on the circumvention of Bretton Woods, see Wyatt-Walter (1996); on 
agriculture, see Friedmann (1993).
35 See van der Pijl (1984), pp. 236-37, and Friedmann (1993).
36 Van der Pijl (1984), pp. 233-35.
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These contradictions played out in both the monetary and trading orders. In response to 
the dollar glut, France demanded curbs on the dollar monopoly -  even threatening to convert 
dollars -  and was joined by peripheral states. But the US could not be compelled to concede such 
power. Instead, it offered to create a limited amount of new IMF money, in the form of SDRs, 
which were indeed established in 1967 by amendment of the Articles of Agreement, but 
nonetheless superseded by subsequent unilateral moves by the US, namely the abandonment of 
dollar-gold convertibility in 1971. In the realm of trade, a number of equally superficial 
concessions were made, in particular to the periphery.38 At the IMF, low conditionality facilities 
were made available, the Compensatory Financing Facility (1963) and the Buffer Stock Facility 
(1969); while at the World Bank, the International Development Agency was created (1960), 
following the International Finance Corporation a few years earlier (1956). In the realm of trade, 
Article XVDI was amended in 1957, allowing more flexibility in the use of escape provisions. 
UNCTAD was established in 1964 to oversee trade and development issues; headed by Raul 
Prebisch, this articulated a nationalist counter-position to the GATT, but without the status or the 
enforcement mechanisms of the Bretton Woods institutions. And Part IV was introduced in the 
General Agreement in the same year, by which non-industrialised states were exempted from the 
principle of reciprocity in trade negotiations; this paved the way for the Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP). Nonetheless, commitment to preferential treatment was skin deep by any 
standard. Liberals have noted that the exemptions were not costly to the industrialised countries, 
given the low level of participation by the periphery in the trade of manufactures.39 While the 
sectors and issues that did matter were not subject to negotiation; on the contrary, industrialised 
countries granted exemptions from GATT discipline to themselves. This was as much the case for 
agriculture and textiles, as for the European integration project as a whole.40
Growth under ‘Bretton Woods ’
The liberal convention now has it that the postwar economic boom is attributable to trade 
liberalisation. As the argument goes, the growth rate of world trade more than doubled that of 
world production, and trade led production. The remarkable growth rates animated the adjustment
37 See van der Pijl (1984), chs. 8 and 9, and Cox (1987), ch. 7. Liberal accounts of these changes are 
provided by Walter (1991), ch. 6, Eichengreen (1996), ch. 4, and Pauly (1997), ch. 5.
38 For concise discussions, see Bhagwati (1984) and Ruggie (1984).
39 Bhagwati (1977), p. 4.
40 See Bhagwati (1988), ch. 1.
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debate itself. But causations cannot be derived from correlations. We need to take a closer look at 
the make-up of this growth and the conditions of its existence.
The postwar boom saw annual rates of growth in world trade of 6.7 to 8.6 per cent in the 
period 1948-68.41 As has been pointed out, however, the situation in agriculture was 
characterised by US dominance in the production and export of food grains, the maturation of 
Western Europe (under the CAP) and a handful of ‘new agricultural countries’, and the 
marginalisation of the bulk of the periphery in a state of food dependence, coupled with declining 
terms of trade in tropical cash crops.42 In manufacturing, activity was highly concentrated in the 
core triad of the US, Western Europe, and Japan -  the latter, in particular, averaging very high 
manufacturing growth rates of 13.6 per cent in the 1960s, twice the US rate.43 Similarly, the 
growth rate of foreign direct investment was both rapid, outstripping world output in the 1960s by 
a factor of two and trade by 40 per cent, and highly concentrated among the core triad.44 From the 
mid-1960s onwards, industrial growth began to shift beyond the core triad to the periphery within 
the framework and logic of Export Processing Zones (EPZs).45 The production shift was most 
significant in the East Asian ‘tigers’, which experienced growth rates of 8 per cent, and began to 
make significant inroads into OECD markets in a wide range of products.46 Overall, trade in 
manufactures was exhibiting new intra-sectoral and intra-firm trends, reflecting a process of 
industrial integration in a ‘regionalised triadic bloc structure’ 47
How to interpret these events? John Ruggie, employing Polanyian insights, suggested 
that the robust growth experience across the Atlantic is attributable to the particular class 
compromises of the time -  a situation he termed ‘embedded liberalism’ -  and the emerging 
transatlantic economic articulation.48 In this sense, both liberalisation and growth had domestic 
and transnational political foundations. Susan Strange pursued this line of argument further. She 
argued, first, that trade was derivative of growth (‘prosperity permitted liberalisation’); second, 
that growth was derivative of liquidity (‘trade liberalization in the 1950s, the 1960s, and the 
1970s continued just as long as the credit system was expanding’); and third, that liquidity 
derived from Cold War rivalry itself She pointed out that in the postwar period, the US 
government ‘injected large doses of purchasing power into the system’, and it was impelled to do
41 Dicken (1998), p. 24.
42 Friedmann (1993).
43 Dicken (1998), p. 28.
44 Dicken (1998), p. 42.
45 See Frobel et al. (1980).
46 See Wade (1990), ch. 2.
47 Hirst and Thompson (1999), p. 60.
48 Ruggie (1982).
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so by ‘a perceived national interest in holding the line against Soviet expansion, in Europe and 
elsewhere’ -  in other words, the argument that monetary ‘system’ was the Cold War.49
Much more can be said, however, about the international politics of growth -  and 
equally, of underdevelopment. With regards to East Asia specifically, Alvin So and Stephen Chiu 
have pointed out that ‘US interests in East Asia, from the late 1940s to the 1970s, had been 
political and strategic rather than economic’.50 They have demonstrated how the onset of the Cold 
War produced a new containment strategy, with Japan as the main bulwark against the spread of 
communism in the region. The new geopolitics ‘were instrumental in forging Japan’s domestic 
conditions for high-speed growth’, conditions that included the redistribution of land, the 
breaking up of industrial monopolies, coordinating a trans-Pacific circuit of trade, pouring in 
massive aid ($500 million per anum in 1950-70), and relieving the burden of military defence 
spending (limited to 1 per cent of GNP).51 Similarly, the ‘miracles’ of South Korea and Taiwan 
were launched by extensive land reforms and massive foreign aid. In South Korea in 1953-61, 
aid averaged 9.4 per cent of GNP, 39.7 per cent of the government budget, 65 per cent of total 
investment, 70 per cent of imports, and some 80 per cent of total fixed capital. In Taiwan, aid 
financed 95 per cent of its trade deficit, while foreign savings totalled 40 per cent of gross 
domestic capital formation.52 ‘Nearly all US aid before 1964’, as So and Chiu indicate, was 
provided on a grant basis, thus making it possible for South Korea and Taiwan to begin export- 
led growth in the 1960s without a backlog of debt’.53 In turn, the US opened its markets to the 
East Asian economies to become their largest single market.
This was not a mere case of ‘governing the market’, as Robert Wade has argued, but of 
establishing strategically the conditions for sustainable state-led industrialisation in the 
periphery.54 The same conditions were not cultivated in the nearby Philippines, as we will see, or 
in Latin America, or Africa. On the contrary, the military might of the United States and Europe 
was used to impede, streamline, and reverse land reforms; the political conditions of semi­
proletarianisation and super-exploitation were actively engendered; the foreign exchange and 
technology gaps were exploited for the purpose of order maintenance; the key central markets 
remained protected; and ‘food aid’ was deployed to foster dependence. Thus, ‘free trade’ growth 
was, in fact, Cold War growth standing on the pillars of underdevelopment.
49 Strange (1985), p. 241.
50 So and Chiu (1995), p. 194.
51 So and Chiu (1995), ch. 7; quote on p. 160.
52 So and Chiu (1995), ch. 8.
53 So and Chiu (1995), p. 194.
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Crisis and Structural Adjustment
The contradictions of the capitalist order came to a head in the 1970s when a period of sustained 
crisis set in.55 Class balances had been changing within the alliance throughout the 1960s. 
Transatlantic capitals had consolidated their postwar positions in a changing order characterised 
by transnational production, ‘off shore’ capital markets, and currency convertibility. By the end 
of the decade, class compromise was thus giving way to explosive confrontations. Alliance 
politics were also changing. Germany and Japan were now outcompeting their US patron; the 
latter was in deficit and persisting with inflationary spending at home (the ‘Great Society’ 
programme) and abroad (the war in Vietnam); and the Cold War was in detente. Beyond the 
alliance, the broken promises of ‘nation-building’ were producing radicalisms throughout the 
periphery, which in turn were translating into demands by peripheral ruling classes for a new 
global economic dispensation. A peculiar peripheral rebellion at this time came from OPEC in the 
form of coordinated oil price hikes.
The adjustment debate entered a critical phase marked by grievances all around, but also 
continued dependence on the dollar. In the event, the grievances were confronted by a reassertion 
of US power and the unilateral abandonment of whatever remained of Bretton Woods.56 In 1971, 
under President Nixon, the United States delinked the dollar from gold, thereby formally 
relieving itself of prior commitments; in 1973, West Germany floated its currency, thereby 
abandoning the Bretton Woods fixed exchange-rate design; in 1974, the US began to deregulate 
Wall Street, thereby setting off a competitive cycle of financial liberalisation; in 1975, a floating 
exchange-rate system was grudgingly endorsed at a ‘G6’ meeting (G7 minus Japan); and by 
1976, a floating exchange rate system was legalised by second amendment of the IMF’s Articles 
of Agreement.57 Through these policies, a new order of de-controlled exchange rates and capital 
flows was brought about. This was an order of currency instability and economic volatility, but 
also one in which the United States had gained its long-coveted license to pursue a unilateral 
fiscal and monetary course. Over time, the US was to consolidate its position by strategic use of 
the dollar and Wall Street -  in what has been termed the ‘Dollar-Wall Street Regime’ -  to re­
wedge itself at the centre of global capitalism, to discipline its allies, and to exploit systemic
54 See Wade (1990).
55 The crisis had diverse origins, organic and conjunctural, which manifested themselves in global inflation; 
see Cox (1987).
56 Apologists have construed the events of the 1970s as deriving from ‘hegemonic decline’; see Keohane 
(1984).
57 For detailed discussions, see Gowan (1999), Walter (1991), and Pauly (1997), chs. 5 and 6.
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disorder.58 The circumstances saw Japan float its own currency, Western Europeans peg their 
currencies to each other, and peripheral states left with little option but to peg to their major 
trading partners in the North.59
The vulnerability of the new order was tested immediately by a conjunctural 
amplification of the crisis. Several months after the abandonment fixed exchange rates, OPEC 
quadrupled the price of oil, ostensibly in protest against US foreign policy in the Middle East. 
This sent the global economy into a tailspin, raised the stakes on adjustment, and even tested the 
centre-periphery balance of power. The immediate conflict played out over the principles of 
monetary order, pitting once again France against the United States. The US prevailed, as above, 
in a settlement that relegated adjustment responsibility to individual states, but that also 
reaffirmed ‘multilateralism’ by agreement to expand the mandate of the IMF so that it could 
exercise ‘surveillance’. By 1977, and its ‘first surveillance decision’, the new order of 
decontrolled currencies and capital was formally underwritten by the principle of ‘surveillance’, 
and its scope now expanded to a broader range of national economic policies relevant to 
international payments, such as capital accounts, fiscal interventions, and interest-rate policies. In 
other words, the crisis was being resolved by formally relegating adjustment responsibility to the 
political process, while also expanding the functions of the Northern-dominated IMF.
This occurred despite an initiative by peripheral nation-builders to reform the global 
order. Inspired by the ‘commodity power’ asserted by OPEC, official peripheral demands for 
reform became vehement and, under the leadership of UNCTAD, succeeded in widening the 
substance of the development dialogue. Alongside the ‘rural development’ turn of the orthodoxy, 
the debate came to include an ‘integrated stabilisation programme’ for commodities, as well aid 
flows for debt relief, a managed shift of industries to the periphery, and reform of international 
institutions to reflect the post-colonial realities. No less than a ‘new international economic order’ 
was demanded, which was even embraced as an ideal at a special session of the UN General 
Assembly in 1974.60
Yet, such hopes were dashed by the unfolding crisis. With recession in the West, prices 
of primary commodities plummeted, laying bare the myth of commodity power beyond oil. 
Moreover, OPEC proceeded to deposit petrodollars in Western financial institutions, the 
unregulated Eurodollar markets, which were then recycled to peripheral states to fill their new 
inflation-induced foreign-exchange gap. In other words, peripheral states expended resources on
58 Gowan (1999).
59 See discussion in Eichengreen (1996), ch. 5.
60 For a number of interpretations of the NIEO, see Bhagwati (1977), Bhagwati (1984), Rothstein (1979), 
Krasner (1985), and Augelli and Murphy (1988), ch. 7.
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oil only to see these return to them as Eurodollar loans. What is more, the interest rates were on 
variable terms, such that the debtor states were incurring the risk of paying more debt service in 
the future in the event of a curb on inflation. The second oil shock of 1979 (now on account of the 
Iranian revolution) and the sudden change in US monetary policy under President Reagan 
realised precisely this scenario. The US Federal Reserve rolled back money, forced the world 
economy into recession, and sent real interest rates soaring.
Meanwhile, the IMF was realising its ultra-imperial potential. If in the postwar years its 
enforcement mechanism -  ‘conditionality’ -  was blunt due to the IMF’s lack of funds and general 
marginality in monetary affairs, in the context of burgeoning debt and gross disequilibria the IMF 
gained new teeth. The crunch came at the end of the decade when the hard questions of 
adjustment demanded a concrete answer. For international payments had been thrown in disarray: 
in 1973-81 non-oil producing peripheral states had incurred aggregate current account deficits of 
$439 billion, against deficits of $16 billion among the industrial countries and surpluses of $440 
billion among the major oil exporters.61 As before, the adjustment question required the precise 
definition of ‘fundamental disequilibrium’; unlike before, finance was now firmly in command 
and enforcing national responsibility for global monetary problems. Thus, the disequilibria faced 
by peripheral states were national problems warranting national solutions; moreover, they were 
judged ‘fundamental’, requiring devaluation and demand suppression, plus structural changes 
geared towards the earning of foreign exchange for the sole purpose of meeting external financial 
obligations. ‘Tutelage’, wrote Susan Strange, ‘was called a Structural Adjustment Programme’.62 
This amounted to a systemic re-affirmation of the disarticulated pattern of accumulation in the 
periphery and the quintessential exercise of ultra-imperial power. The bulk of the burden of the 
1970s crisis was displaced unto the shoulders of the world’s semi-proletariat.
Adjustments were also made within the alliance, and these were also borne by labour. At 
a time when the central economies were undergoing partial disarticulations of their own, labour 
was already on the defensive by virtue of having to compete with super-exploited labour in the 
EPZs of the periphery. The advent of oil shocks, inflation, and unemployment tipped the class 
balances resolutely in favour of capital: governments under fiscal pressure sided with corporate 
interests, dissolved the postwar compromises, and threatened to undo the welfare state.63 The 
combination of crisis and industrial restructuring put nationally-oriented industries on the 
defensive as well. They pressed for the new protections (beyond textiles and agriculture) to which
61 See Killick and Sharpley (1984), p. 21.
62 Strange(1988), p. 111.
63 See van der Pijl (1984), ch. 9, Cox (1987), pp. 262-63 and 279-85, and Hyman (1999).
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their governments responded. Non-tariff barriers were imposed across industries as diverse as 
steel, automobiles, footwear, motorcycles, machine tools, and consumer electronics. A wholesale 
reversal of the liberal order was averted only by the political power that transnational firms now 
exercised.64
Yet, the central economies could not avoid a ‘mutation’ of sorts in the Fordist structure of 
accumulation. Under heightened international competition in a stagnant world economy, firms cut 
costs by replacing labour by equipment and by the more systematic use of cheap labour. ‘The 
cumulative consequences of these strategies’, wrote Cox, ‘can be observed in a declining 
proportion of securely employed, relatively highly paid, and enterprise-integrated workers, 
together with a growing proportion of less securely employed, low-paid, peripheral workers [in 
the industrialised world] segmented into several distinctive groups bearing little cohesion with 
one another’.65 Meanwhile, the exclusions required moral cover, which was sought in ‘traditional 
values’ and associated internal (racial) and external (communist) ‘evils’. The latter culminated in 
a renewal of the Cold War in 1979 when, under the pretext of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
alliance heads of state agreed to install US strategic nuclear missiles in Western Europe. Given 
the decade’s strains between and within alliance members, focus on the East-West military 
relationship ‘proved a much more viable format for imperialist unity’.66
2.3 Revolution, Rebellion and Agrarian Reform
The main argument thus far is that the national question was the moral basis of postwar order, but 
the organising principle of postwar politics was the productivity needs of the alliance in a Cold 
War context. What is not yet clear is the question of political agency. To say that the Cold War 
‘organised’ politics is to say that the contradictions inherent in capitalism were (a) posing 
profound threats to the prevailing pattern of accumulation, or the system itself; and (b) producing 
a civil/uncivil dichotomy designed to defend the existing order. In this regard, the mere existence 
of a superpower professing social revolution, however derailed its own may have been, provided 
a significant degree of political leverage to working class politics worldwide. This means that we 
cannot understand European reconstruction and integration, or the East Asian ‘miracle’, or the 
dissolution of feudal-like relations in Latin America, or the defeat of white-minority rule in
64 See Bhagwati (1988) and Milner (1988).
65 Cox (1987), p. 323; see also van der Pijl (1984), ch. 9.
66 Van der Pijl (1984), p. 276; see also Cox (1987), pp. 288-99.
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Southern Africa, or the ‘rural development’ turn, unless we understand working class agency in 
this Cold War context.
The present section will explore uncivil semi-proletarian politics and their struggle 
against imperialism. It is suggested that the fate of agrarian reform was contingent on this 
struggle, flaring up in different places of the periphery as the geopolitics of the Cold War shifted. 
The focus will be mainly on rural struggles within the ultra-imperial sphere of influence.67
The Geopolitics o f Agrarian Reform 1:1945-59
The first series of agrarian reforms in the US sphere of influence were undertaken in East Asia in 
the half-decade following the war, in the midst of revolutionary upheaval, led by Chinese 
communists. Under the circumstances, as Gary Olson has shown, it was not long before US 
officials in occupied Japan reached the conclusion that unless the feudal-like relations of the 
Japanese countryside were altered, peasant grievances could lead, if  not to a resurgence of fascist 
militarism, to a possible pro-communist movement that would destabilise US influence in Asia.68 
The same logic soon prevailed in South Korea, which had been colonised by Japan since 1910. 
But in this case, an anti-colonial movement with a leftist orientation and a land reform agenda 
had established itself as a provisional government in the countryside by the time of US 
occupation in 1945. The US response was to outlaw the provisional government and take control 
of the land reform movement that was underway. In both cases, ‘suppression of popular demands 
for land redistribution was instituted until that reform could be effectively managed’.69 In Taiwan, 
the influx of one million refugees from mainland China in 1949 required the transformation of 
agrarian tenure systems. This resulted in the forced sale of land by the landlord class and the 
financing of the land purchases by the US government. In all cases, land reform was implemented 
to disarm social unrest and prevent what came to be perceived as an otherwise inevitable loss of 
political influence. Importantly, in all cases, land redistribution was implemented without the 
political marginalisation of the landed oligarchies; these were compensated, induced toward 
industrial development, and transformed into a political class with allegiance to the United States.
These cases contrast sharply with those of the Philippines and Guatemala, in which land 
reforms were obstructed and even reversed.70 In the Philippines, the Huh, the rural guerrilla army
67 The discussion omits important struggles in Southern Europe, China, and South Asia. It also omits 
discussion of the landmark agrarian reforms of the pre-World War II period, those of Mexico and Russia.
68 Olson (1974).
69 Olson (1974), p. 49.
70 Olson (1974), ch. 5 and 6.
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that had emerged under Japanese occupation between 1942 and 1944, took partial control of the 
countryside and instituted land reforms in the liberated zones. With the return of the United States 
in 1944 and the establishment of a neo-colonial government in 1946, a counterinsurgency 
campaign was launched which decimated the guerrilla forces, obviated the need for land reform, 
and restored pre-war tenure relations. In Guatemala, the popular government of Arbenz abolished 
semifeudal relations after assuming power in 1952, expropriated uncultivated land from the US- 
based transnational, United Fruit Company (UFC), and distributed 1.5 million acres to 100,000 
landless households. These actions precipitated resolute US response: CIA-trained, -equipped, 
and -assisted forces overthrew Arbenz in 1954, restored UFC holdings, and returned the 1.5 
million acres of land to the landlords.
The 1950s were a turbulent period more generally, marked by a number of further 
struggles against imperialism, including victories and defeats. In 1952, the National 
Revolutionary Movement of Bolivia assumed power after a popular revolt. A large-scale land 
redistribution programme followed which diffused rural grievances. However, this did not 
manage to displace the ruling elite, while over the following decade the momentum of the 
revolution was streamlined by massive US aid that succeeded in controlling the direction of 
internal change.71 In the previous year, the Mau Mau rebellion erupted in colonial Kenya, led by 
landless peasants and urban poor. This elicited imperial military mobilisation; Britain crushed the 
rebellion and, upon decolonisation at the end of the decade, proceeded to implement a land 
reform aimed at creating a black capitalist class -  the classic neo-colonial strategy -  that would 
defend the regime of private property in the national debate of post-colonial Kenya. In 1954, the 
Viet Minh in north Viet Nam defeated France and established government north of the 
seventeenth parallel. A violent period ensued in the countryside, led by the higher echelons of the 
Party, which provoked rural revolts and which ultimately gave way in the late 1950s to a 
‘semisocialist’ model of collectives and individual holdings.72 Also in 1954, rural grievances of 
long standing in the French settler colony of Algeria culminated in armed struggle; as in Kenya 
under the British, this was first crushed by imperial forces, then followed by a negotiated 
independence, and the ‘embourgeoisement’ of the national debate -  in this case, accompanied by 
a ‘Jacobin Islam’.73
71 Olson (1974), ch. 6.
72 See Wolf (1969), ch. 4.
73 Wolf (1969), ch. 5.
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The Geopolitics o f Agrarian Reform II: 1959-80
If the Chinese revolution had been the first major challenge to western imperialism, the second 
revolution with far-reaching consequences was the Cuban in 1959. This fuelled a new wave of 
militancy in Latin America, and stoked revolutionary fires far beyond. In Latin America 
specifically, it set off a new phase of agrarian reforms, based on the tried-and-tested strategy of 
‘containment of peasant political pressures both through direct control of peasant organizations 
and through the legislation of mild land reform projects aimed at eradicating semifeudal estates 
from the agrarian structure’.74 The strategy was led by the United States. In 1961, at the Punta del 
Este conference of the OAS, the Kennedy administration launched the Alliance for Progress, the 
centrepiece of which was a land reform charter. Meanwhile, alongside institutional and social 
reforms, the Department of Defence, under Robert McNamara, advanced a large military aid 
programme for unconventional warfare, seeking to boost counterinsurgency drastically and 
increase the size of US anti-guerrilla forces.75 Once again, the object was a ‘controlled’ land 
reform strategy of cooptation and repression: cooptation entailed the creation of a conservative 
agrarian petty-bourgeoisie; repression was aimed at those excluded from the reform.76 Counter­
revolution witnessed, inter alia, the installation of General Pinochet in Chile in 1973 and the 
partial reversal of the land reform of the Frei and Allende governments; here, 30 per cent of the 
land was restored to previous owners, 20 per cent was sold to private investors, and the rest 
allocated to smallholders on the basis of freehold titling.77 By the latter 1960s, in any case, this 
period of reformism was being superseded by the green revolution, which had the combined 
effect of abolishing feudal remnants and completing capitalist transition, while maintaining 
functional dualism, mass poverty, and migration.
The 1960s also witnessed incremental escalation of violence in Indochina, now under US 
auspices, resulting in a bitter war of attrition and, ultimately, the defeat of US forces there in the 
early 1970s. The latter defeat had the effect of shifting the geopolitical centre of gravity to 
Southern Africa. While in much of Africa, the 1960s was a decade of nation-building -  ruling- 
class consolidation, de-racialisation of the public sector, adaptation of ‘indirect rule’, and the 
nurturing of indigenous bourgeoisies and state enterprises with interests in agriculture -  Southern 
Africa remained in the grasp of white supremacism. Angola and Mozambique were in the midst 
of armed struggle against Portuguese forces, South Africa remained under apartheid, Namibia
74 De Janvry (1981), p. 199 and ch. 6.
75 Olson (1974), pp. 108-109.
76 De Janvry (1981), ch. 6.
77 See de JanvTy, Sadoulet, and Wolford (2001).
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under South African occupation, and Zimbabwe under the Rhodesian Front. By the 1970s, 
virtually the whole of the region was in the grip of rural-based national liberation struggles, 
supported selectively by the Soviet Union and China. By 1980, white supremacism remained 
formally at the helm only in South Africa and Namibia.
Yet, despite the attainment of statehood, no post-colonial state implemented significant 
democratisation of rural institutions and land policy, or land redistribution.78 Zambia and Malawi 
had already negotiated property-friendly settlements since the early 1960s. Mozambique in the 
mid-1970s embarked on nationalised, large-scale production, but it returned to war, along with 
Angola, as the South African campaign of destabilisation was stepped up. And Zimbabwe, as we 
will see, embarked on limited redistribution after 1980, within the general framework of racial 
‘reconciliation’ under the auspices of ultra-imperialism. This was accompanied by adaptation of 
‘indirect rule’ and rural development spending, as well as ongoing, if generally low profile, land 
occupations.
Finally, as a cease-fire was being negotiated in Zimbabwe, the geopolitical centre of 
gravity was shifting back across the Atlantic, to Central America. While counter-revolutionary 
strategies had succeeded in streamlining the radical thrust of the 1960s, Nicaragua broke the rule 
to stage the final revolution of the nationalist period in 1979. This was accompanied by radical 
agrarian reforms, plus sustained counter-revolution, funded and trained by the United States. 
Neighbouring El Salvador witnessed its own rural rebellion in 1980 to embark on a protracted 
civil war, alongside the three-decade long civil wars in Guatemala -  all sustained by US 
involvement.
2.4 Labour Imperialism
Uncivil peasant-worker politics of the above sort have interacted dynamically with civil working 
class politics. As was mentioned earlier, peasant-workers oscillate between civil and uncivil 
politics, resorting to the latter on account of the closures in the former, and struggling to 
transform the civil meaning of ‘worker participation’. The epicentres of the civil debate have 
been the arenas of international trade unionism and the ILO. This section will examine the 
‘tripartite’ model of worker participation that prevailed in global labour relations, corresponding 
to the particular postwar compromises of the transatlantic alliance. The establishment and 
enforcement of tripartism will then be traced, highlighting the role of Western organised labour in 
the undermining and coopting of non-conformist working class politics, but demonstrating also
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inter-imperial labour rivalries. Besides informal responses to the closures of labour imperialism, 
there also emerged nationalist trade unionisms, those sponsored by nation-building states, to 
challenge the tripartite mode; during the Cold War, the most important dilemma facing Southern 
trade unions was that between ‘alignment’ and ‘non-alignment’. The final part examines the 
transformation of labour imperialism in the 1970s; as the social compacts in the transatlantic 
alliance were breaking down in the midst of crisis, a genuine labour solidarity did not emerge. On 
the contrary, a new labour imperialism was forged, based on a reinvented ‘social democratic’ 
identity, and seeking a global ‘social clause’ to protect transatlantic labour against industrial 
restructuring.
The Civility o f Tripartism
Tripartism was bom in the aftermath of World War I and the Bolshevik revolution. This was the 
time of ‘the socialisation of the nation and nationalisation of society’, as E.H. Carr put it, as well 
as a time of fear of a more generalised revolution in the West.79 The ILO was founded in 1919 to 
cultivate conciliatory industrial relations within the capitalist system; while Western 
governments, national trade union centres, and national employers’ associations banded together 
in ‘tripartite’ spirit to institutionalise dialogue over social and industrial reform. Implied in this 
was the notion that the working people naturally existed as members of nations and properly 
organised alongside their respective governments and employers. The tripartite model remained 
under constant challenge, however, by its Soviet-led nemesis worldwide, except for a brief spell 
of unity against fascism. Tripartism was then resurrected after World War II and placed on a 
firmer footing. The war effort had been a watershed for state-labour relations in the West, as 
states and trade unions had learned to cooperate closely. Trade unionists played a vital role in the 
provision of intelligence on rail and transport, weapons production, and bottlenecks in the labour 
markets of enemy camps. In the United State, specifically, the AFL became intricately involved 
in the operations of the Office of Strategic Services, the forerunner of the CIA. A similar 
government-trade union nexus was forged throughout the alliance.80
This nexus was not abrogated in the postwar period, but was adapted in accordance with 
the reconfigured social relations which now united state, capital, and labour in a politics of 
productivity. If the corporatist relationship mutated across the Atlantic, one tripartite model
78 See Moyo (2000b).
79 Carr (1945), pp. 17-26.
80 See Busch (1983).
65
prevailed at the ILO, under the leadership of the United States.81 Henceforth, tripartism would 
mean the participation of free trade unions in the management of the economy -  where ‘free’ 
denoted organised labour that is formally independent of Party and state and which, in effect, 
represents the upper half of the work force. So long as the postwar accommodations within and 
between alliance member-states engendered social peace, the ELO’s tripartite model operated with 
relative ease within the alliance.
Yet, problems lurked in the background, given that the lower half of the work force in the 
alliance had no secure, institutionalised status. ‘In good times’, wrote Cox, ‘the upper half 
supports social welfare to provide some solace for the most vulnerable among the lower half 
while at the same time keeping an eye on them. But in time of crisis, the social programs are 
pared according to the exigencies of an economy conceived in terms of the interests of the 
dominant groups’.82 Beyond the industrialised worlds, the limitations of this tripartite formula 
were much more transparent. The concerns of the semi-proletarianised peasantry, such as land 
reform, would never see the light of day, nor would the concerns of the burgeoning masses of 
urban marginals -  unemployed, underemployed, informally employed. Indeed, a study initiated in 
1970 by the ILO’s International Institute for Labour Studies under the directorship of Robert Cox 
found that the prevailing formula of worker participation covered a mere nine percent of the 
world’s labour force.83
Nonetheless, throughout the nationalist period, tripartism laid an imposing claim on the 
meaning of ‘civility’ in labour relations, attributing ‘uncivil’ status to non-conformist and radical 
movements seeking to articulate issues that laid outside the industrial relations convention. The 
dialogue was conducted in this fashion not only within the ILO but perhaps more so within 
international trade unionism, and it was refracted through the debates on decolonisation and East- 
West relations. The two debates converged early in the postwar period, as Western European 
imperial states sought to impede decolonisation, while the two superpowers (USA and USSR) 
agreed on decolonisation but vied for the re-apportionment of influence in the process. Thus, 
imperial governments proceeded to legislate the realm of the civic to exclude nationalist trade 
unionisms, while metropolitan trade unionists were dispatched to the colonies to ‘educate’ union 
leaders in the proper articulation of workers’ interests. The United States and its labour surrogates 
allied themselves to nationalist, anti-communist politics and, given US predominance in the 
alliance, exercised the option of a unilateral labour foreign policy. The Soviet Union in turn allied
81 See Cox (1977).
82 Cox (1977), pp. 393-94.
83 Cox (1977), p. 411.
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itself to nationalist politics that were under the control of indigenous communist parties or 
communist-led trade unions.84
Labour Imperialisms in Action
The first battle over the meaning of worker participation was fought in Europe and occupied 
Japan. In 1945, the first postwar international trade union body was founded, the World 
Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), building on the wartime coalition of the British Trade 
Union Congress (TUC) and the Soviet All-Union Central Confederation of Trade Unions 
(AUCCTU), and now bringing into the fold the CIO and the French Communist-affiliated 
Confederation Generate du Travail (CGT). The colonial question was immediately prompted by 
the British invitation to unions in its own dependencies to attend, thereby bringing the number of 
TUC-influenced unions to fifteen out of the total of thirty-five that founded the WFTU. Both the 
AFL -  which did not join due to the communist presence -  and the AUCCTU condemned the 
TUC for pursuing its imperialist policy within international labour. By 1947, WFTU was being 
paralysed by crisis, now over the launch of the Marshall Plan. As we have seen, central to the 
transatlantic project was the exclusion of communist parties from government and the splitting of 
labour centres that incorporated elements contrary to the politics of productivity. The AFL 
spearheaded the project in the labour front, channelling as much as $2 million of CIA funds to 
reformist elements.85 By 1949, the Marshall offensive had succeeded in welding together 
reformist trade unions across the alliance, including Japan, and the isolation of communist or 
class-conscious socialist elements.86 The AFL also convened a conference on the formation of an 
international body to include Marshall countries, and this bore in 1949 the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), which was now joined by the TUC and CIO, the 
latter having purged its own communist elements in the process. Thereafter, WFTU was relocated 
to Prague, affiliated communist national centres of Eastern and Western Europe, and competed 
with the ICFTU for the loyalty of national centres in the third world. Significantly also, the 
International Trade Secretariats (ITSs), dominated by US labour, reached an agreement in 1951 to 
cooperate with the ICFTU while maintaining formal independence.
Matters of ideology animated both internationals. The WFTU was subordinated to Soviet 
geopolitical strategy early on, though Soviet crackdowns in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia
84 See Busch (1983), ch. 5.
85 See Thomson and Larson (1978), p. 13.
86 See van der Pijl (1984), pp. 150-56, and Maier (1977).
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in 1968 precipitated splinters in the communist movement, manifest first in the assertion of an 
independent line by China in the late 1950s and second in the rise of Eurocommunism and 
Eurounionism in the 1960s. Moreover, the question of ‘socialist imperialism’ was not absent, 
especially in post-colonial Asia where China appealed for a more ‘indigenous’ communism and 
competed with the Soviet Union for the loyalty of trade unions.87 The two powers came to 
compete in Africa as well, vying for influence over nationalist movements, and blessing as 
‘genuine’ those whose loyalty they secured.
The problems plaguing the ICFTU were even more profound. In one dimension, they 
pertained to the AFL’s fierce anti-communism, its channelling of CIA funds, and its refusal to 
cease unilateral action in the p e r ip h e ry , in an other, they pertained to the ICFTU’s own 
imperialism, with or without US labour. The AFL and CIO had merged in 1955, and although 
differences between them persisted, the AFL’s priorities prevailed in the new organisation. From 
the mid-1950s onwards, the role of US labour in foreign policy was increasingly institutionalised, 
culminating in the establishment of regional foundations in the periphery—the American Institute 
for Free Labour Development (AIFLD) in Latin America in 1961, the African-American Labour 
Centre (AALC) in 1964, and the Asian-American Free Labour Institute (AAFLI) in 1968. These 
were funded by government agencies (such as USAID) and transnational corporations officially, 
as well as unofficially by the CIA. A well-endowed AFL-CIO maintained a strong financial 
presence in the ICFTU itself, and through this it sought to mould the ICFTU in its own image, 
specifically over the pressing questions of colonialism and communism. The European affiliates 
of the ICFTU espoused a reformism that reflected the specificity of the European social 
compacts, as well as a less committed line on decolonisation. There was a constant source of 
tension therefore over the ideological basis of unity within the ICFTU, and this translated into the 
realm of funding policy in the periphery. The AFL-CIO insisted that the ICFTU stake out a
stronger stance on decolonisation and fund only anti-communist unions at the exclusion of more
reformist or non-aligned unions, while the ICFTU voiced resentment over the AFL-CIO’s CIA 
connections. Inter-imperialist labour conflict intensified over a series of events in the 1950s and 
1960s, in particular the onset of the Suez crisis, the proliferation of anti-systemic threats in the 
wake the Cuban revolution, and the growing relations between Eastern and Western European 
unions, hi the absence of consensus, the AFL-CIO persisted with bilateral funding relations of its 
own, ultimately disaffiliating from the ICFTU in 1969.88 Thereafter, the ICFTU, deprived of 
AFL-CIO funding, altered its own funding practices. Its European affiliates embarked on the
87 See Busch (1983), chs. 7 and 9.
88 See Thomson and Larson (1978) and Busch (1983).
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institutionalisation of relations with their own governments, even establishing foundations of their 
own, such as the Friedrich Ebert, Konrad Adenauer, and Nuemann in Germany.89
The Cold War Dilemma in the Periphery: Alignment vs. Non-Alignment
The ground for labour interference was fertile in the third world. Semi-proletarianisation yielded 
an impoverished, migrant, and illiterate workforce which posed serious impediments to 
organisation. First, the unionisation of peasant-workers was confronted with the difficult task of 
articulating a programme of relevance to their specific workplace and wider political conditions, 
gaining sustained loyalty, and raising sufficient resources from the membership base to undertake 
systematic education and political action. Second, the double, rural/urban work setting of the 
semi-proletarian household disaggregated the totality of workplace grievances, such that a holistic 
strategy of labour organisation required the establishment of both rural/peasant and urban/worker 
political structures and their articulation into a unified peasant-worker political project. Third, the 
absence of a settled, industrial workforce, and its migrant corollary, all too often presented union 
leaders with the problem/opportunity of reconciling/exploiting social cleavages (e.g., ethnic and 
racial) -  while the gendered dimensions of semi-proletarianisation remained largely 
unrecognised. And fourth, union leadership was typically in the hands of the educated, middle 
strata of society with political ambitions of their own in nationalist and elite politics. The 
composite of these predicaments rendered a financially dependent labour movement with 
problems of political articulation; poorly prepared to resist repression on its own; eager for 
sources of funding, whether national or international; subject to jostling for power among union 
leaders; and vulnerable to splitting and cooptation by nationalist movements, states, and 
international labour. Peripheral labour movements needed non-member support as much as states, 
the AFL-CIO, ICFTU, and WFTU needed peripheral labour movements; while the resulting 
dearth of adequate, democratic channels of expression engendered a variety of ‘uncivil’ politics, 
from the ‘everyday’ forms of resistance to outbreaks of violence and armed liberation struggle.
The option of an ‘independent’ labour movement in the periphery was highly 
circumscribed. Despite claims and counterclaims on the meaning of ‘free’ trade unionism, the 
choice in effect was between dependencies of different sorts: reliance on the funds and political 
programmes of international labour, nationalist movements, or nation-building states.90
89 See Thomson and Larson (1978), ch. 4.
90 This dilemma does not emerge in Busch’s otherwise excellent study of international labour; implicit in 
Busch is an endorsement of the ICFTU definition of ‘independence’, as opposed to that of the AFL-CIO, 
WFTU, and corporatist non-alignment.
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International labour became embroiled in third world labour politics from their inception. Latin 
American labour has the longest history of trade union and political organisation, stretching back 
to the latter decades of the nineteenth century.91 In the interwar years, left unionisms proliferated 
under the leadership of the Comintern and later the CIO, and notably, entailed the mobilisation of 
peasants and workers alike. These unionisms competed with the AFL and its advocacy of an 
‘apolitical’, workerist unionism. The postwar period witnessed the establishment of competing 
regional labour centres, the CIO-sponsored Confederation de Trabajadores de America Latino 
(CTAL) and the AFL-sponsored Organization Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores 
(ORIT), of which the former became the regional branch of the WFTU and the latter of the 
ICFTU. This period also saw the establishment of a non-aligned nationalist unionism under the 
patronage of states, and military regimes in particular. The archetype emerged under General 
Peron in Argentina, who created a ‘centrally-planned welfare populism’, drove opposition 
underground, and spearheaded an indigenous corporatist unionism via the Agrupacion de 
Trabajadores Latino Americanos Sindicalistas (ATLAS), to rival ORIT and CTAL.
In Africa and Asia, trade unionism proliferated in the interwar years and became the 
matrix of nationalist politics. As such, trade unionism was ‘political’ -  concerned with issues 
beyond wages and conditions of employment -  from its inception. In Asia, Cold War politics got 
an early start with the revolution in China and the active role that the latter undertook in the 
nationalist struggles of the region.92 The WFTU established itself first and was followed by the 
ICFTU’s regional branch, the Asian Regional Organisation (ARO) in 1951, though the unilateral 
politics of the AFL-CIO gradually supplanted Western European post-colonial patronage. 
However, the most notable feature of labour politics was the transformation of nationalist trade 
unionism into a corporatist trade unionism under the nation-building state.
Trade unionism in Africa went through similar trajectories.93 Independence saw the 
corporatisation of labour movements, though the rivalry between state nationalism and 
international labour did not end. Before independence, and after the walk-out of colonial powers 
from the WFTU, most international trade union activity was conducted within the ICFTU. The 
latter established a presence in West Africa as early as 1951 and began affiliating unions. 
Nonetheless, a non-aligned movement, affiliated with nationalist movements or post-colonial 
states, emerged to articulate a specifically ‘African’ voice, and this competed with the ICFTU for 
loyalty. The latter established a regional branch in 1959, the African Regional Organisation
91 See Busch (1983), chs. 5 and 8.
92 See Busch (1983), chs. 5 and 7.
93 See Busch (1983), chs. 5 and 6.
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(AFRO), the former established the All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF) in 1961, while 
shortly after a second African lobby emerged, the African Trade Union Confederation (ATUC), 
to promote ‘independent’ trade unionism, i.e. not subordinate to post-colonial states. Thereafter, 
the main rivalry revolved around alignment or non-alignment. States sought to maintain labour 
loyalty to the national development promise by various means, including the non-recognition of 
disloyal unions and repression of ‘foreign stooges’. The WFTU, which had supported nationalist 
struggles but which had been largely marginalised on the labour front after the colonial powers 
defected to the ICFTU, supported disaffiliation to cut its losses and used the disaffiliation issue as 
a measure of Pan-Africanist credentials. The ICFTU, on the other hand, called for ‘freedom of 
choice’ on affiliation, denying that Pan-Africanism and international labour were mutually 
exclusive. In the event, the differences between ATUC and AATUF were incompletely 
transcended when, by initiative of the OAU, a unitary continental organisation, the Organisation 
of African Trade Union Unity (OATUU), was established in 1973. This involved the holding of 
sham elections for leadership positions and the postponement of the disaffiliation issue. The latter 
was taken up again in 1976, when it was decided that membership in OATUU required 
disaffiliation from international labour; even then, however, the rule was not fully observed.
The role of the AFL-CIO on all three continents was enhanced with the establishment of 
its regional foundations, following on the heels of the Cuban revolution and decolonisation and 
the stepping up of the war in Vietnam. Prior to these, US labour activity was most influential in 
Latin America and the Asian countries under US influence. The tactics here involved the splitting 
of trade unions by the funding of friendly elements and the repression of the anti-systemic. In 
Japan, for example, the land reforms that were carried out were done so along with the exclusion 
of leftist elements in the trade union movement. A general strike in 1948 was banned and 
followed by a ‘Red Purge’, the implementation of a restrictive labour relations act, and, 
ultimately, the ‘civilising’ of labour opposition.94 In the Philippines, the national trade union 
centre, which had a large peasant following, was allied to the Hut, repression of the latter and 
reversal of its land reforms was accompanied by the banning of the national centre and peasant 
unions. Thereafter, recognition was extended to unions that confined their activities to collective 
bargaining over the immediate ‘bread and butter’ issues.95 In Guatemala, the CIA’s campaign 
against Arbenz was coordinated among the military, transnational corporations, and AFL- 
supported trade unions. The latter were exiled by Arbenz, only to return with the insurgent forces
94 For details, see Busch (1983), pp. 125-30.
95 See Busch (1983), p. 120-22.
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of Castillo Armas. With the installation of Armas as head of state and the reversal of land 
reforms, leaders of peasant unions and the WFTU-affiliated national centre were executed.96
The rise of revolutionism was a turning point in the development dialogue. Under 
President Kennedy, there was a new initiative for transatlantic unity, as we have seen, but this 
was short-lived and followed by enhanced unilateral action on the part of the United States. The 
AFL-CIO led on the labour front by engaging trade unions bilaterally and through the regional 
labour foundations.97 In Latin America, despite disaffiliation, the AFL-CIO continued to 
dominate ORIT and to channel funds to it from the AIFLD and business overtly and from the 
CIA covertly. The AIFLD also funded the regional activities of the ITSs. Anti-systemic activity 
was continued vigorously, as in Chile, where AIFLD-supported unions played a vital role in the 
overthrow of Salvador Allende and the installation of General Pinochet; the sequence was the 
familiar one: opposition trade unions were banned, leftists were imprisoned, killed, or 
‘disappeared’, and AIFLD unions were allowed to continue to operate.
In Asia the AFL-CIO increasingly supplanted the ICFTU after decolonisation, while in 
Africa the two competed against each other, and both against anti-imperialist politics. The case of 
colonial Zimbabwe is telling. The ICFTU made its debut in Southern Rhodesia in the early 1950s, 
and there it pursued a number of tactics.98 It affiliated the white-dominated Federal Trade Union 
Congress; played the leaders of black trade unions against each other; crafted personalised links 
with them; favoured those who sought trade union independence from nationalist politics; and 
thereby impeded the bridging of the rural-urban political gap that nationalist trade unionists 
sought to overcome. In 1960, the Southern Rhodesia Trade Union Council (SRTUC), the African 
trade union centre, applied for membership in the ICFTU; the ICFTU denied membership, 
ostensibly on the grounds that SRTUC was not sufficiently representative, while at the same time 
admonishing the latter over ‘political’ currents within it. Nonetheless, the ICFTU did extend 
funding (without membership) to the SRTUC, in knowledge of the fact that, by this time, the 
SRTUC’s largest source of funding derived from the AFL-CIO. Soon after, grievances over the 
unaccountability of the ICFTU-supported leadership combined with political differences -  mainly 
over the substance of trade unionism -  to split the SRTUC and produce the African Trade Union 
Congress (ATUC) alongside it. Then, after the banning of nationalist parties in 1963, the ICFTU 
changed its strategy by funding individual trade unions (SRTUC and ATUC affiliates alike), but 
not the trade unions centres. But by this time, unions had become marginalised from the
96 See Busch (1983), chs. 14^48.
97 See Busch (1983), chs. 158-75, Thomson and Larson (1978), chs. 3 and 7, and Spalding (1988), ch. 10.
98 Raftopoulos (1996).
72
nationalist struggle and their leaders susceptible to the continued interventions and financial 
patronage of the ICFTU. In the 1970s, the ICFTU withdrew from its Rhodesian 
operations—maintaining only eight affiliates in the whole of Africa—while the nationalist 
struggle moved on to the countryside, took up arms, and relegated the labour movement to a 
subordinate role. International labour tactics such as the above stripped both the ICFTU and the 
AFL-CIO of credibility on the continent." The potency of nationalism and the generalised 
subordination of labour to post-colonial states had altered trade union politics and given a leading 
role to OATUU.
Crisis and the New Tripartism
Yet, the 1970s were a period of flux. OATUU’s leadership was tentative, for the centre was by no 
means ‘free’. It was chronically underfunded, subordinate to the OAU (which provided 61 
percent of total funding), and subject also to the deep political divisions within the latter; notably, 
the crucial issue of disaffiliation from the internationals was resolved only on paper.100 At the 
same time, the ICFTU embarked on a process of reinvention, now having been released from 
AFL-CIO pressure but also stripped of crucial funding. Thus, the ICFTU began clarifying its 
social democratic identity and turning to other sources of funding, ranging from national 
governments and foundations to like-minded international organisations, such as the ILO and 
UNESCO. By the late 1970s, the politics between OATUU and the ICFTU entered a new phase: 
while maintaining their rivalry at the level of rhetoric, the two began to cooperate. Chief among 
the reasons was OATUU’s chronic insolvency, on the one hand, and the ICFTU’s new-found 
status, on the other. The ICFTU was making a comeback on the continent via South Africa and 
the anti-apartheid movement. The ICFTU was becoming an increasingly important player by 
virtue of the funding it was extending to democratic unions in South Africa and the coordinating 
role it was playing in international trade union circles.101 Indeed, as we will see in the next 
chapter, the ICFTU had gained such importance in the anti-apartheid movement that when the 
AFL-CIO attempted to get involved on its own in the early 1980s, it was rebuffed by South 
African unions and forced to engage through the ICFTU’s Programme of Action.
The 1970s were years of flux for international trade unionism more generally. The 
previous decade had seen the thawing of relations between Western and Eastern European
99 For the AFL-CIO, see Weir (1986a).
100 See Southall (1995), ch. 3.
101 Southall (1995), part II.
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governments, and this was matched by increasing interaction between Western and Eastern trade 
unions as well. A conjuncture of events, from the reorganisation of European capital and its 
impingement on the social compacts, to the Soviet crackdown in Czechoslovakia, had 
precipitated the proliferation of radical grass-roots activism and non-Soviet Marxisms. The rise of 
Eurocommunism coincided and interacted with the rise of Eurounionism, transcending East and 
West. These developments all contributed to the softening of Western European trade unionism to 
its communist rival and, by extension, to the further disaffection of the AFL-CIO.102 Moreover, 
the transformation and expansion of transnational firms, to both Europe and East Asia, presented 
new problems to international labour, giving rise to a new structural unemployment in the West 
and super-exploitation in the industrialising periphery. These problems were compounded, as we 
have seen, by the oil shock of 1973 and stagflation thereafter. They resulted not only in the 
breakdown of social compacts in the West and the abandonment of nation-building in the 
periphery, but the diminution of the status and influence of workers in the development dialogue 
world-wide.103
Just as nations were being called upon to resolve the adjustment question, so was 
international labour called upon to formulate a new internationalism. In the event, the dialogue 
within the labour movement was mediated through the centre-periphery hierarchies crafted in the 
postwar era. The changing international division of labour saw Western trade unions calling upon 
their governments to protect industries and jobs, and on international institutions, such as the ILO 
and the GATT, to enact a ‘Social Clause’ to impede the expansion of transnational corporations 
to the periphery.104 Thus, as we will see, the politics of productivity began to give way to the 
politics of the ‘global social clause’.
The composite of developments, finally, translated into a crisis of the tripartite industrial 
relations convention as a whole. Detente and the breakdown of social compacts had cast doubt 
over the postwar industrial relations model in the capitalist world. As Cox wrote at the time, ‘the 
ILO lies under a cloud because the erstwhile hegemonic consensus seems to have come 
undone’.105 The debate over the meaning of worker participation gained renewed vigour. 
Previously, in 1954, the ILO had extended membership to the Soviet Union under the banner of 
‘universality’, but without transforming the tripartite convention. The reinvigorated debate in the 
mid-1970s returned to the question of the Soviet Union’s membership, and by extension, its own 
model of state-labour relations. Western employers and the AFL-CIO rallied behind the banner of
102 See Busch (1983), ch. 9.
103 See Southall (1988) and Thomas (1995).
104 See Frobel et al. (1980), ch. 8, and Wangel (1988).
105 Cox (1977), p. 387.
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tripartism, while other Western trade unionists adopted a more nuanced approach, endorsing the 
universality of the ILO and Soviet membership. In the event, ‘[b]oth parties won and lost 
something. Universality was accepted as the rule for membership, while tripartism was ever more 
emphatically reasserted as the official ideology of the ILO’.106 The United States subsequently 
withdrew from the ILO. Alongside this debate, as we have seen, the ILO was promoting a ‘basic 
needs’ approach to development, with a concern now to appease that ninety-one percent of the 
world’s work force that it excluded from its convention.
To sum up, this chapter has argued that, with the end of formal imperialism, the fate of the 
national question -  who the ‘self is and how it is to be ‘determined’ -  was subject to the class 
compromises established across the new ultra-imperial alliance under US leadership, as well as to 
the ongoing inter-capitalist conflicts and class struggles in the ‘nation-building’ periphery. From 
early on, this period was galvanised by Cold War rivalry, compelling the United States to provide 
liquidity to its partners, nurture European reconstruction, and prop up East Asian nation-building. 
It also served as a ‘higher’ moral source to justify a crusade against forces that threatened, in the 
first instance, the productivity compromises at home. Central to this project was the civilisation of 
opposition. The civil domain was defined in terms of ‘property friendly’ politics, reflected in a 
resilient tripartism; while the ‘uncivil’ comprised of the radical nationalist and socialist forces 
seeking to nationalise industry and redistribute land -  those, in other words, seeking to 
endogenise capital accumulation or transform the relations of production fundamentally. The 
enforcement of civil society against the uncivil was pursued systematically by the cooptation of 
oppositional politics -  especially in the undermining of rural-urban class alliances and ‘political’ 
unionism -  and outright repression; organised metropolitan labour assumed a leading role in the 
undermining of uncivil politics abroad. Nation-building states themselves sought to patronise 
opposition, often in a tense relationship with international capital; while in the case of Africa, the 
late-colonial mode of ‘indirect rule’ was adapted to the requirements of neo-colonial nation- 
building. The agency of the ‘uncivil’ obtained revolution in a few cases (notably China and 
Cuba), extracted far-reaching agrarian reform and capitalist development in others (East Asia), 
but most commonly it gained limited concessions in agrarian reform within a persisting pattern of 
disarticulated accumulation. This pattern -  with functional dualism as its corollaiy -  was 
reinforced with the onset of crisis and liberalisation.
106 Cox (1977), p. 401.
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CHAPTER 3 
The Liberal Claim in the Cold War and After
The restructuring of global order under the weight of transnational capital and finance required a 
new ‘global development’ project. A liberal civilisational vision began to be articulated from the 
1970s onwards, invoking the ‘invisible hand’ of the market as its guiding principle but without 
displacing the principle of national self-determination. What the new vision did was to strip the 
national question of the eminence it once had and subordinate its ends and means to the 
requirements of adjustment. Accordingly, it did not abandon multilateralism either, but reinforced 
its institutional framework under the banner of ‘global governance’. The liberal period spans the 
final decade of the Cold War and its aftermath: while the Cold War continued to organise world 
politics, its aftermath has been characterised by renewed conviction in the liberal project, but also 
a search for a new organising principle adequate to the task of brigading the world behind the 
new civilisational claims. The notion of an ‘irreversible globalisation’ has been deployed to 
significant, but not sufficient, effect, while the ‘war on terror’ has been the most recent expression 
of this need.
This chapter will begin by tracing the trajectory of the new development orthodoxy. In 
the 1980s, development theory proceeded with the motto of ‘getting the prices right’ to apply the 
market principle to hitherto nation-building states. Particular urgency was assigned to the reform 
of agriculture, in terms of efficiency and foreign-exchange earning potential, while land reform 
was submerged resolutely. In the 1990s, the liberal vision adapted to new circumstances to re­
launch itself with an emphasis on ‘getting the politics right’, in what I call the ‘governance 
synthesis’; it also brought land reform back on the agenda, but in terms that did not diverge from 
the governance synthesis. The second section will address the underlying dynamics of the liberal 
period, specifically the establishment and conduct of the new ‘politics of liquidity’ within the 
alliance. This has emanated from the US in the first instance and has enabled it to remain 
dominant. The new politics has been subject to contestation from diverse sources, including from 
members of the alliance. Most notably, after the Cold War the US and Japan squared up in a bid 
for control over East Asia and its ‘development model’; this rivalry was resolved in the course of 
the financial crisis of 1997-98 when ultra-imperial discipline was re-imposed. The politics of 
liquidity has also dovetailed with the consolidation and expansion of global institutions in what 
may now be seen as a rudimentary form of global government.
The third and fourth sections will inquire into the contradictions of liberalism in the 
realms of agrarian and labour relations. It will be argued that the application of the market
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principle in these realms has been contradicted by a variety of political forms among peasant- 
workers, most notably strategic land occupations, but also involvement in post-Cold War 
‘complex emergencies’. It will also be shown that, as in the past, the semi-proletariat has 
remained subject to a process of ‘civilisation’, now liberal in character but nonetheless conducted 
by the same tried-and-tested tactics of cooptation and repression. This process has been facilitated 
by the changing political balances within international trade unionism after the end of the Cold 
War, characterised by the dominance of a ‘social democratic’ ideology crafted to the needs of a 
global labour aristocracy.
3.1 From the Right Prices to the Right Politics
The resolution of the 1970s crisis was displaced largely onto the periphery and borne by the semi­
proletariat. By this time, the basic framework of the new monetary order had taken shape, marked 
by floating exchange rates, liberalising finance, and national responsibility for adjustment. 
Indebted peripheral states were thus called upon to honour their ‘international obligations’. The 
turn of events required new development theory.
Getting the Prices Right
In the service of finance, development theory made three simultaneous moves. First, it sought to 
demonstrate that the nation-building state had hitherto ‘abused’ its power, that it had been 
‘captured’ by particular domestic interests. The Marxian interpretation of the state had always 
propounded such a view, but what was different about the liberal version at this time was its 
second move: the pitting of ‘urban interests’ against ‘rural interests’, not capital against labour. 
What this amounted to was the splitting of the semi-proletariat into two ‘interest groups’, 
consisting of ‘workers’ on the one hand and ‘peasants’ on the other, and holding the former 
responsible for the poverty of the latter. The third move was the refutation of any ‘special’ 
economic traits among peripheral states, such as had been claimed by development economics 
and had justified state intervention; all economies now conformed to the same assumptions of 
neo-classical economic theory. Associated with the third move was the claim that what defines 
human beings, developed and developing, rural and urban, is a universal economic rationality, 
and that this must not be transgressed by state intervention.
Such ideas were not new, but they had been marginal whilst the balance of social forces 
had kept the welfare and nation-building states afloat. Critics of state intervention, such as P.T.
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Bauer, had been voicing their ‘dissent’ against the development orthodoxy for some time.1 In the 
1970s a steady stream of writing picked the developmental state apart in terms of its 
‘distortionary’ and ‘rent-seeking’ political economy. This line of criticism then met the theory of 
‘urban bias’ proposed by Michael Lipton in 1976, who put forth the view that ‘[t]he most 
important class conflict in the poor countries of the world today is not between labour and capital. 
Nor is it between foreign and national interests. It is between the rural classes and the urban 
classes’.2 By 1979, the liberal theory of the ‘behaviour’ of peasants gained new rigour in Samuel 
Popkin’s The Rational Peasant, a study of agrarian change in Vietnam; responding to James 
Scott’s ‘moral economy’, Popkin proposed ‘a view of the peasant as a rational problem-solver, 
with a sense both of his own interests and of the need to bargain with others to achieve mutually 
acceptable outcomes’.3 These various streams of thinking were finally synthesised in a highly 
influential study by Robert Bates on agricultural policy in Africa.4
It is worth dwelling on this, for it encompasses the various moves and justifications for 
structural adjustment. Bates identified peasants as an ‘interest group’ of farmers, whose single 
relevant source of livelihood is the income they derive from the sale of agricultural commodities. 
The first problem with this conception is that it did not distinguish between farmers of different 
status in relation to the means of production, thereby class and other (gender, racial) cleavages in 
the countryside, which, in turn, dispense differential access to land, security of tenure, quality of 
soils, credit, irrigation, and other infrastructure. Second, Bates overlooked the centrality of land 
and its resources in the reproduction of the rural household. He concerned himself solely with the 
politics of agricultural pricing, not of land. Third, Bates did not take account of the semi- 
proletarianised nature of the peasantry, the fact that peasant households also derive revenue from 
the sale of labour in town and country. He held ‘peasant interests’ and ‘workers’ interests’ 
conceptually distinct, and dichotomised the ‘rural’ economy and the ‘urban’, in familiar fashion. 
By implication, Bates failed to problematise functional dualism, as well as the location of the 
peasant-worker in the global economy. Finally, Bates depicted ‘workers’ as a privileged class, 
riding roughshod over the ‘peasantry’; the climax of the argument was in the depiction of 
‘workers’ interests’ as convergent with those of industry and as complicit in the reproduction of 
rural poverty.
1 See Bauer (1972). For a review of the critics of ‘development policy in the shadow of Keynes’, see Toye 
(1987), ch. 2.
2 Lipton (1976), p. 13.
3 Popkin (1979), p. ix; see also Scott (1976).
4 Bates (1981).
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Bates sought to qualify his findings by stating that ‘none of the materials used come from 
the “settler territories” of Southern Africa’.5 Even so, he did not refrain from offering policy 
advice for the ‘export crop’ economies of Southern Africa, the package of trade liberalisation and 
‘repressive labour laws’, all in the interests of ‘the peasantry’.6 Such thinking was endorsed in the 
1980s by more general statements regarding the merits of the market and the necessity of political 
repression. In 1983, in an equally influential study, Deepak Lai proclaimed the virtue of ‘getting 
the prices right’; celebrated the East Asian ‘example’ of ‘free trade’; forewarned that ‘the political 
difficulties on the path to more efficient domestic policies should not be minimised’; and affirmed 
that ‘[a] courageous, ruthless and perhaps undemocratic government is required to ride roughshod 
over these newly-created special interest groups’.7 The ‘counter-revolution’ was accompanied by 
a sense of academic triumphalism; Lai depicted the demise of ‘development economics’ as a case 
of intellectual ‘persuasion’, rather than a class struggle lost to international capital.
The new vision of civilisation conformed to the normative assumptions of neo-classical 
economic theory. The previous image of the semi-proletariat as ‘drifters’ waiting to be 
nationalised/modernised was disparaged as ‘patronising’, and replaced by an image of 
undiversified individuals, devoid of social context and history, subject to no relations of power, 
and sharing in a generic ‘rationality’. Thus, the CEO of General Motors no longer needed to be 
distinguished from the landless labourer in Vietnam. Both were capable of ‘a sense of their own 
interests and of the need to bargain with others to achieve mutually acceptable outcomes’. 
Qualifying this vision was only a spatial disaggregation of human beings along state lines, along 
with a demotion of the state as the agent of their advancement; the new subjects of development 
would be transnational and domestic capital.
In the course of the decade, the IMF and the World Bank gained unprecedented power 
over the development project. Alongside the IMF’s pronouncement on ‘fundamental 
disequilibria’, the World Bank, now shorn of its ‘basic needs’ reformism, announced a ‘structural 
crisis’ in African economies. The Berg Report, published in 1981, noted that the international 
environment had had ‘adverse’ consequences on them but that ultimately ‘domestic policy 
inadequacies’ were critical.8 Therefore, a new set of domestic priorities, geared towards 
accelerated production, with special reference to agriculture, were required to meet 
developmental objectives. In the following years, this new development wisdom was to take the
5 Bates (1981), p. 8.
6 Bates (1981), p. 131
7 Lai (1997), p. 33.
8 World Bank (1981).
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shape of ‘stabilisation’ and ‘adjustment’ policies administered and monitored by the IMF and the 
World Bank. Together, they constituted the SAP package of fiscal cut-backs, control of domestic 
credit, restraint on real wages, exchange rate reform and devaluation (overseen mainly by the 
Fund); and longer-term institutional restructuring involving trade liberalisation, reform of the 
financial sector, deregulation of economic sectors, commercialisation and privatisation of public 
enterprises, and reform of social service provision (overseen by the Bank). Monitoring 
stabilisation and adjustment was not unproblematic, and implementation was not complete.9 Yet, 
by 1991, ninety-nine operations were implemented.10
Agriculture became the leading sector in the new policy framework, with new demands 
being placed on its productivity and foreign-exchange earning capacity. The ‘modernisation’ 
drives of the past were thus accelerated, furthering technical change and commoditisation, as 
before, and deepening the process of specialisation, standardisation, and integration into national 
and international markets.11 Just as well, land redistribution became a dead policy issue. This was 
replaced by a new global land policy, consisting of privatisation of state farms, freehold titling, 
and market-based land transfers. Meanwhile, the global agro-food system was itself changing. 
While agriculture in the centre remained protected, traditional tropical exporters {e.g., cotton, 
coffee, cocoa) found themselves producing higher volumes but also saturating markets and 
witnessing declining terms of trade. In all, the share of Africa’s total export values accounted for 
by traditional export crops fell; for most crops real prices fell by over 35 per cent.12 This decline 
was compensated marginally by the ‘non-traditional’, horticultural exports, led by large-scale 
farmers. The period of liberalisation also witnessed the concentration of power over the 
production and distribution process in a handful of firms; the emergence of new commodity 
chains in horticulture (especially ‘exotic fruits’ and cut flowers), organised by supermarkets and 
linking Northern consumers with large-scale commercial farmers; and the reinforcement of the 
North-South divide in applied agricultural research and technological development, including 
biotechnology.13 The combined effect has been the drastic alteration of the conditions of 
smallholder farming and social reproduction: fiscal cut-backs, marketing deregulation, and 
currency devaluations have increased the costs of production; new land policies have expanded 
land markets and intensified alienation and differentiation; while new export crops, technologies, 
and contracting arrangements have also marginalised the poorer petty-commodity producers. The
9 Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye (1995).
10 Toye (1994), p. 27.
11 Bernstein (1990).
12 Raikes and Gibbon (2000).
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final effect has been the creation of a new international division of labour in agriculture whereby 
the centre, along with a handful of newcomers, specialises in the production of grains, while the 
bulk of the periphery specialises in traditional and non-traditional exports destined for luxury 
markets.
Heterodox Interventions
While liberal theory was pushing confidently ahead, the larger field of development studies 
entered an ‘impasse’, characterised by soul searching and self-criticism. This impasse had several 
sources and was most marked among Marxists, neo-Marxists, and reformists. The single most 
important source of the impasse was the restructuring of the state society relations that had 
sustained the politics of productivity in the centre and nation-building in the periphery.14 With the 
predominance of transnational capital and finance, the state was stripped of its agency, and 
development economics of its agent. Another source was the implosion of the Soviet bloc, the 
loss of faith in the socialist project, and the rise of new intellectual currents, most notably post- 
structuralism; not only the state but also the proletariat was losing its legitimacy. The Pandora’s 
Box of meta-theory was thus pried open.15
In time, a domain of ‘critical’ development theory was to be borne out of the impasse. As 
Bob Sutcliffe has observed, three processes have tended to coincide and overlap: ‘the growth of 
the attainability and desirability critiques of the standard development model; the displacement of 
economics from the centre of the development debate by ecology, sociology and cultural studies, 
as well as social movements; and the relative decline of discussions of economic imperialism 
along with the rise of discussions of ecological imperialism and cultural imperialism’.16 The 
‘attainability’ critique emerged out of the rising concern with environmental degradation, the 
depletion of the ozone layer, and the greenhouse effect; and on that basis, it questioned the 
sustainability of a development project premised on output growth and the goal of ‘high mass 
consumption’. The ‘desirability’ critique, partly dovetailing with the former, was carried by ‘new’ 
social movements -  comprising of gender and other identities -  that questioned the validity of the 
ends posited by the growth model; they offered an immanent critique of ‘the West’ as the locale
13 Raikes and Gibbon (2000); see also McMichael and Myrhe (1991), Watts (1990), and Buttel (1990).
14 See also Leys (1996), ch. 1.
15 See Booth (1985), Sklair (1988), Corbridge (1990), and Schuurman ed. (1993).
16 Sutcliffe (1999), p. 150.
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of ‘advancement’.17 In the event, the two streams of thinking on gender and ecology infused 
development theory and proliferated within it, witnessing the development of diverse political 
positions, among ecologists and feminists alike, and syncretisms, as in ecofeminism. The 
desirability critique also dovetailed with a new stream of ‘cultural’ thinking, which established 
itself as ‘cultural studies’. This was traced back to Edward Said, but acquired new inflections, 
such as a focus on ‘post-colonial identities’ and social change ‘from below’.18
By the second half of the 1980s, the reformist thinking of the 1970s also began to reassert 
itself. It was by now becoming clear, even among official circles, that structural adjustment had 
not rectified the ‘structural crisis’, and moreover that the costs to human welfare had been grave. 
The leading role was taken by UNICEF in 1987. In its report entitled Adjustment with a Human 
Face, UNICEF stated the grim facts: that ‘[s]ome two-thirds of developing countries registered 
negative or negligible growth from 1980-85, and many indicators of human welfare showed 
marked deterioration, including, in a number of countries, nutrition levels of the under-5s, the age 
group most vulnerable to permanent damage’.19 The bulk of this human tragedy was bome in 
Africa and Latin America. On the other hand, UNICEF accepted the validity of SAPs, seeking 
only to integrate into them a ‘poverty alleviation dimension’ so as to ‘target’ and ‘protect the 
vulnerable’, in the spirit of the ‘basic needs’ approach of the previous decade. In the same year, 
the World Bank launched the ‘Social Dimensions of Adjustment’ (SDA) initiative, and in 
response to environmental concerns, adopted ‘sustainable development’ as an organisational 
priority.20
The latter moves by the Bank were significant insofar as the Bank began to demonstrate 
its political adeptness in responding to social criticism, and coopting it. As one of the authors of 
the UNICEF report later observed, poverty alleviation was not the overriding objective of the 
Social Funds. The securing of political support was, as was the placating of those affected by 
adjustment (although even here there was a high failure to reach target groups), while the 
macroeconomic characteristics of the adjustment programmes remained unchanged.21 The 
cooptation skills of the Bank were to become one of its most significant assets.
17 Sutcliffe (1999).
18 Said (1979), Chatteijee (1993), and Scott (1985).
19 Comia, Jolly, and Stewart eds. (1987), p. 1.
20 See Gibbon (1993).
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Getting the Politics Right
By the end of the 1980s, social protest was proliferating and being channelled towards national 
leaderships. The economic and social crisis of ‘the lost decade’ was translating into demands for 
democratisation, not of global economic life, but of the state along the ‘mutli-party’ formula. In 
turn, this received enthusiastic response from Western governments and global institutions. 
Indeed, it was celebrated as ‘the second revolution’, following ‘decolonisation’. The movement 
swept across the continent in fact, witnessing the formal abandonment of the one-party state 
model. By 1994, thirty-five states had experienced ‘regime transitions’, in the form of multi-party 
elections: ‘opposition’ parties entered parliaments; fourteen presidents were replaced in elections; 
fifteen were re-elected; and no de jure  one-party states remained on the continent.22 The ‘second 
revolution’ was flanked by human catastrophies in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Rwanda, 
Congo, and elsewhere.
The breadth of the transition could not be ignored, however, and under the circumstances 
a new formula was conceived for integrating grievances into the liberal project. If ‘getting the 
prices right’ was the motto of the 1980s, ‘getting the politics right’ was to be that of the 1990s. 
From 1989 onwards, transatlantic leaders, reaching for the moral high ground, began to announce 
that, hereafter, multi-partyism, respect for the rule of law, human rights, and market principles 
would all form the basis of aid and lending; gradually, a new tier of political conditionality was to 
be added to the previous economic ones.23 But this entailed a departure from the prior 
understanding of the state as ‘captured’, as well as from the policy of explicit support for political 
repression in carrying out the liberal project. Clearly, a new theory of the state required 
articulation, and to this end, liberal development theorists went back to work. The answer lay in 
defining ‘good’ and ‘bad’ domestic politics, with reference to adjustment requirements.
In the course of the 1980s, ‘urban bias’ theory evolved in the hands of the ‘new political 
economists’, under the eminent stewardship of Robert Bates and Douglass North. The two 
positioned themselves against the ‘neoclassical orthodoxy’, pointing out that the state, or other 
‘community level’ institutions, had a crucial role to play in the development of markets.24 
Although with variations between them, together they agreed on the importance of institutions in 
reducing ‘transaction costs’, in preventing ‘market failure’, and transcending ‘social dilemmas’
21 Stewart and van der Geest (1995).
22 See Bratton and van de Walle (1997).
23 Gibbon (1992) and Gibbon (1993).
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between private and public interests. In 1987, this ‘neo-institutionalist’ theory of the state went on 
to meet the theory of the ‘corrupt’ state in the hands of Larry Diamond -  and in the 1990s the 
‘politics-of-the-belly’ and ‘neopatrimonial’ states.25 Together they sufficed to replace the theory 
of the ‘the captured’ state and enabled liberal development theory to ‘bring the state back in’ and 
to focus on ways of making it ‘better’.26
The theory was made more accessible to the development community by the World Bank 
in a series of publications. In the late 1980s, the Bank had taken ‘sustainable development’ on 
board, as we have seen, but it was also articulating the need for an ‘enabling environment’ for 
growth and development within states. What this meant was to be elaborated in the next few 
years. In 1989, it published a report entitled Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable 
Growth, in which it now asserted the position that ‘[a] root of weak economic performance in the 
past has been the failure of public institutions’. It continued that ‘[p]rivate sector initiative and 
market mechanisms are important, but they must go hand-in-hand with good governance’ -  by 
which it meant ‘a public service that is efficient, a juridical system that is reliable, and an 
administration that is accountable to its public’.27 These terms were applied in its 1990 World 
Development Report on poverty alleviation specifically, where it took on board UNICEF’s call 
for ‘adjustment with human face’, and thereby also formally re-oriented itself to the poverty 
agenda of the 1970s.28 Then, in its 1991 report, The Challenge o f Development, the Bank clarified 
its understanding of the ‘market friendly’ state, by which it sought, in part, to respond to the 
Japanese challenge being launched against US leadership (to be discussed).29 This latter challenge 
culminated in 1993 in the report entitled The East Asian Miracle, by which the Bank managed to 
emphasise the importance of markets in the growth of East Asia.30 Finally, the notion of ‘good 
governance’ was clarified in a 1992 pamphlet on Governance and Development.31
What emerges from the above statements is what might be termed the ‘governance 
synthesis’ of the 1990s. It consists in the re-launching of liberalism in response to the whole mass 
of heterodox theory and political agitation, and under the circumstances of an imploding Soviet
24 North (1981), North (1990), Bates ed. (1988), Bates (1989), Bates (1995). For useful critique, see Leys 
(1996), ch. 4.
25 Diamond (1987), Bayart (1993), and Bratton and van de Walle (1997).
26 See also the discussion in Bangura and Gibbon (1992).
27 World Bank (1989), p. xii.
28 World Bank (1990).
29 World Bank (1991a).
30 World Bank (1993). For an insightful account of the politics of the report, see Wade (1996), pp. 3-36.
31 World Bank (1992); for a critical discussion of the concept of governance, see Gibbon (1993) and 
Beckman (1992).
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bloc. Liberal development theory could thus distance itself from the ‘neoclassical orthodoxy’, 
‘bring the state back in’, accommodate NGOs, ‘the grassroots’, ‘civil society’, and ‘the poor’, 
raise the flag of civilisation, even win a Nobel Prize. The adoption of the term ‘governance’ as 
opposed to ‘government’ was crucial; for the Bank could by-pass all the substantive issues that 
are associated with the word ‘government’, reducing politics to a technocratic practice, concerned 
with procedural matters alone; the only valuable end that remained was that of ‘efficiency’, as 
determined by ‘the market’. Notably, a strategic concession was made to the principle of national 
self-determination, on the basis of which a call was made for the nurturing of ‘ownership of 
adjustment’, to be achieved through the inclusion of ‘civic organisations’ in ‘national dialogue’. 
Other, bilateral donors with more ‘freedom’ than the Bank to be ‘political’, added multi-partyism 
to good governance, by which they meant the advocacy of ‘competitive’ elections among two or 
more political parties, regardless of the homogeneity of their ‘market friendly’ substance. Liberal 
development theorists rushed to fill the conceptual void here as well, conceiving of 
‘democratisation’ as ‘regime transition’, by which was meant respect for the rules of competitive 
multi-partyism, plus a ‘free press’, ‘independent judiciary’, ‘rule of law’, etc?2
Both the theory and the practice of the governance synthesis have defined and reproduced 
the ‘uncivil’ society. Whereas a decade earlier, peasant-workers had been presumed to be rational 
problem-solvers capable of improving their lot in the market, under the governance synthesis they 
could voice their difference and thereby join the civilised world. But on one condition. That they 
accepted and pursued neo-colonial multi-party politics, form ‘civic organisations’, engage in 
‘national dialogue’, gain ‘ownership’ of their adjustment package, and respect the ‘rule of law’. 
Thus, the plethora of political demands and forms inconsistent with the logic of the governance 
synthesis were rendered ‘uncivil’, once again subject to sanction, cooptation, or repression. 
Liberal theory has followed practice, turning a blind eye to uncivil forms, focusing instead on 
political parties, trade unions, and NGOs.33 Besides its bias towards civil society, and partly 
because of it, liberal theory and the whole ‘democratisation’ debate which it has carried have also 
been highly ‘urban biased’. Land politics, for example, has not entered into the equation, nor has 
a systematic ‘democratisation’ literature been produced in the liberal tradition to account for rural 
politics.
32 See Hyden and Bratton eds. (1992) and Bratton and van de Walle (1997).
33 See, for example, Bratton (1994), where he applied his ‘neopatrimonial’ model of ‘African’ politics to 
the ‘micro’ scale of civic organisations in Zimbabwe.
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The Return o f Land Reform
These political vacuums did not go unnoticed, especially by the Bank. Indeed, rural-based civil 
wars in Central America, mass land occupations in Brazil, a new uprising in Mexico, genocide in 
Rwanda -  these could hardly be overlooked; nor could mounting evidence of a ‘second lost 
decade’. By the mid-1990s, the semi-proletariat was creeping back onto the agenda, in a manner 
reminiscent of the rural development turn of the 1970s. In 1993, Bank staff published a working 
paper entitled ‘Power, Distortions, Revolt, and Reform in Agricultural Land Relations’, which 
was to become the conceptual basis for a new global land policy framework;34 and in 1995, the 
Bank devoted its annual report to Workers in an Integrating World?5 Workers were worthy of 
something other than repression, after all; and land was relevant to the livelihood of the rural 
household.
The working paper made a number of concessions. It acknowledged that ‘[m]ost of the 
work on the relationship between farm size and productivity strongly suggests that farms that rely 
mostly on family labor have higher productivity levels than large farms operated primarily with 
hired labor’.36 It also conceded that ‘the great variations in land relations found across the world 
and over time cannot be understood in a single property rights and markets paradigm’. The 
reasons for the variations are to be found in ‘power relationships’: ‘land owning groups used 
coercion and distortions in land, labor, credit, and commodity markets’.37 It also recognised that 
land reform has historically been accomplished through rebellion, revolution, and other uncivil 
means.
Yet, the ‘power relationships’ to which the paper alluded were understood as ‘local’. 
And, in any case, the policy framework that emerged did not contravene the market paradigm. 
For the method of reform that the Bank went on to propagate was ‘community initiated, market 
assisted’ (CIMA), enshrining the ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ principle of redistribution -  as 
opposed to state-led and compulsory methods of acquisition -  thereby ‘keeping the state out’ and 
effectively fitting land reform into its world of private, voluntary agents interacting harmoniously 
in the market. Notwithstanding ‘power relationships’, CIMA has called upon peasants to 
‘negotiate’ with land owners for the transfer of land.
34 Binswanger, Deininger and Feder (1993).
35 World Bank (1995).
36 Binswanger, Deininger and Feder (1993), p. 3.
37 Binswanger, Deininger and Feder (1993), p. 3.
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The Report on workers did not redeem the working paper on land. Roughly one page was 
devoted to land reform, which restated the virtues of CIMA, attributed the initiative for land 
reform in East Asia to the ‘good states’ there, and the absence of adequate reform in Latin 
America to ‘half-hearted’ state policy!38 Even more fundamentally, the Report did not theorise 
the problem of unemployment as related to patterns of land ownership, nor the power relations 
governing those patterns. Specifically, it associated ‘structural unemployment’ with what amount 
to symptoms, such as ‘economic stagnation’, or tautologically with the ‘malfunctioning of labour 
markets’, or simply with ‘policy failure’; then from these associations, causation was inferred.39 
In turn, income inequality was attributed to gender, ethnicity, and geography.40 The Report also 
employed the increasingly popular post-Cold War language of ‘globalisation’, which it termed 
‘unavoidable’.41 The policy prescriptions amounted to a call for national initiatives for the 
implementation of ILO conventions and investment in health, skills, and education.
The decade ended with two notable instances of reformist dissent, one emanating from 
within the bureaucracy of the World Bank, the other from the UN system. In 1998, Joseph 
Stiglitz, the Bank’s Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, made a call for a ‘post- 
Washington consensus’.42 In the midst of the financial crisis in East Asia, he acknowledged the 
positive role of the state there and cautioned against holding the developmental state responsible 
for the crisis: ‘the Washington consensus does not offer answers to every important question in 
development’. He went on to outline what a ‘post-Washington’ consensus might look like, 
drawing on East Asian insights on how not to view ‘liberalisation as an end in itself and on ‘how 
to make markets better’. This amounted to a call for state involvement in financial regulation (to 
curb ‘excessive risk-taking’), competition (which is ‘often imperfect’), and the building o f ‘social 
capital’. For its part, the UNDP issued its end-of-the-century tally on the human condition. It 
marshalled a world of evidence on global inequalities and used this to renew its call for a 
‘globalisation with a human face’.43
38 World Bank (1995), pp. 33-34.
39 World Bank (1995), pp. 26-30.
40 World Bank (1995), p. 4.
41 World Bank (1995), p. 54.
42 Stiglitz (1998).
43 UNDP (1999).
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3.2 The Recasting of Ultra-Imperialism
The era of the ‘structural adjustment programme’ was borne out of the political struggle lost to 
transnational capital and finance from the mid-1960s onwards. We have seen that the 
deregulation of financial markets was pulled through the US legislature by increasingly mobile 
firms; as the 1970s stumbled on, finance capital was to gain political leverage unseen since before 
World War I. The 1970s saw the delinking of the dollar from gold, the oil price hike, the removal 
of capital controls in the United States, and the recycling of petrodollars through London and 
New York. This chain of events -  with deliberate links -  had two immediate consequences. The 
first was the emergence of great volatility in the world economy -  fluctuating currencies and 
prices -  which in turn gave rise to a new breed of markets for the management of risk (including, 
on the one side, those seeking to avoid risk and, on the other, those seeking to profit from the 
provision of security). Together they gave impetus to a financial revolution in fact, for over the 
following years wild speculative trading in currencies, securities, and derivatives was to surpass 
world trade many times over, in what began to look like a ‘casino capitalism’.44 The second 
consequence was a renewal of the power of the US government in the first instance. If the US 
economy could not restore its competitive edge with respect to West Germany and Japan, the 
United States emerged from the 1970s as the key currency country without formal 
macroeconomic commitments to ally or foe, and with by far the largest financial market in the 
world conducted in its currency and within its jurisdiction. As Peter Gowan has demonstrated, 
post-1970s capitalism was not a mere casino: it gained a geopolitical logic over time, in the form 
of the ‘Dollar-Wall Street Regime’ (hereafter, DWSR or new financial regime), through which 
the United States, and soon its junior partners, was to renew its bid for world dominance.45
The New Financial Regime
Over the 1980s and 1990s, the new financial regime evolved into a powerful instrument of 
statecraft. With its advent also, the politics of productivity that characterised the postwar period 
gave way to a ‘politics of liquidity’, embracing both capital and labour. Securely employed 
workers in the industrialised states of the West might have lost the informal status they had once 
attained in the working of the postwar state, but they gradually acquired a stake in the politics of
44 Strange (1986).
45 Gowan (1999).
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liquidity via their savings and pension schemes, especially in the United States.46 Meanwhile, 
organised labour retained its dominance over the international labour movement, and through this 
it sought to curb industrial restructuring in the course of a changing international division of 
labour by advocating the implementation of a ‘social clause’. In the 1990s ultimately, the demand 
for a global Social Clause was accommodated at the centre, as the US and EU pushed (albeit 
unsuccessfully) for the inclusion of the Social Clause in the WTO system as a policy matter 
pertaining to trade.
The new financial regime was a political creature in its essence, erected by a series of 
political commissions and omissions. The US government deregulated capital flows in 1974 and 
the UK in 1979. Li 1981, the US government also enacted the International Banking Facilities 
law, which put Wall Street on an equal legal footing with the unregulated City of London, thereby 
shifting international financial activity decisively to the former. Under the volatility of the new 
system, the value of trading in unregulated financial markets exploded. In 1986, the London 
Eurodollar market alone was estimated to turn over about $300 billion per day, or $75 trillion 
annually: about twenty-five times the value of world trade; eighteen times the value of the annual 
output of the US economy; and largely (90%) unrelated to current account flows.47 In a 
subsequent development, in the realm of ‘derivatives’, by March 1995 the value of outstanding 
derivatives contracts in twenty-six countries was twice the value of world economic output, or 
$47.5 trillion, of which just 2% was accounted for by contracts in currencies or interest rates 48 
The significance of these figures is to be found in the following: the decisive shift away from 
long-term productive investment to short-term speculative transactions, or ‘hot money’;49 the 
outstripping of the volume of trade and output and the real flows between countries; and the 
displacement of the power of central banks to protect currencies, since, for example, the 
aggregate value of reserves held by central banks in the mid-1990s stood at $800 billion, less than 
two-days’ turnover in the world’s foreign exchange markets.50 Herein also lay the definitive 
demise of nation-building as a principle of development and the onset of structural adjustment 
under the aegis of a project now crafted to the liquidity needs of the United States and its junior 
partners.
46 Gowan has rightly observed that workers do not relate to capital only via the wage relation but also via 
the savings relation, such that ‘if the savings relation is in the direct control of private financial markets, 
then workers themselves acquire a rentier interest’; see Gowan (1999), p. 56.
47 Walter (1991), pp. 196-97.
48 Strange (1998), p. 29.
49 Gowan (1999), ch. 2.
50 Walter (1991), p. 198.
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The alliance was not unified on the deregulation of capital and the new monetary order 
from the beginning. On the one hand, broad consensus did develop over the ‘fundamental’ nature 
of peripheral disequilibria and the structural adjustment ‘imperative’ flowing from them. On the 
other hand, inter-imperial rivalries persisted, and these pertained to the distribution of the 
remaining adjustment responsibilities among the members of the alliance in a post-Bretton 
Woods monetary order. This inter-imperial dispute was to be in large part resolved by a recasting 
of social relations in Western Europe, in a social-transformational project as historically 
significant as the Marshall Plan, seeking now to produce consensus not on the ‘politics of 
productivity’ but on the virtues of deregulated capital. The difference lay in the method of the 
transformation: whereas the Marshall Plan had employed cooptation and repression tactics 
against anti-systemic trade unions and political parties, the new project relied on the competitive 
deregulation dynamics of financial markets, whose epicentre was Wall Street.
As Eric Helleiner has shown, the deregulation dilemma was first presented to the Labour 
government of Britain in 1976; it was at this time {i.e., before the arrival of Margaret Thatcher) 
that the decision was taken not to reign in the burgeoning activity of the City and to accept the 
discipline of international financial markets. The second to fall was France in 1983 under 
Francois Mitterand, again a social democratic government. Thereafter, the unravelling of postwar 
social coalitions gradually obtained among all the major European partners. Indeed, a flurry of 
capital account deregulations swept through the continent and far beyond, such that by the end of 
the decade, an almost fully liberal order had prevailed across the OECD, including Japan. As 
Helleiner has argued, ‘[ujnless [the rest of the OECD] matched the liberal and deregulated nature 
of the British and US financial systems, foreign financial authorities could not hope to attract new 
financial business and capital from abroad or even maintain the financial business and capital of 
their own multinational corporations or international banks’.51 Importantly, the competitive 
deregulation dynamic was complemented in domestic political contests by the forces that stood to 
benefit from it; typically, they sought legitimacy for themselves by reference to the growing 
‘common sense’ of deregulation globally, and its ‘inevitability’. By decade’s end, and despite 
national social struggles, the liberal project came to be underpinned by a series of national social 
relations of production that accorded to it, constituting thereby a transnational class of 
internationally-minded capital and finance across the OECD.
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Ultra-imperialism in Action
This class committed itself to the further expansion of the liberal order. And here the methods of 
social transformation differed again. With respect to the indebted states of the periphery, the 
method was not premised on competitive deregulation dynamics as such, but generally on the 
balance-of-payments crisis.52 Given the relative insignificance of their financial systems for the 
attraction of private capital, the initial prying open of these economies was attained by 
multilateral, policy-based lending in the context of a payments crisis. Thereafter, some graduated 
to ‘emerging market’ status, led by Mexico, to join the new financial regime. Other peripheral 
states, such as Zimbabwe, did not face a payments crisis but were nonetheless converted to 
liberalisation by cooptation of their domestic capitals; in the early 1990s, Zimbabwe itself fell 
into the grasp of New York and London-based speculators.53 Yet others, the East Asian allies in 
particular, went to pose a particularly grave threat to liquidity politics upon the end of the Cold 
War; in this case, they were re-subordinated to ultra-imperial discipline by means of a staged 
financial crisis, with hedge funds at the forefront.
The latter case is of particular interest, because it was the most important instance of 
inter-imperial rivalry in the liberal period. Gowan has referred to this case in support of his 
argument that the basic character of world order today is inter-imperialist. The point that emerges 
from this experience, however, is to the contrary: once again, rivalry did not manage to puncture 
the US-led ultra-imperial alliance. When pushed to the brink, the members of the alliance 
ultimately recognised that they still shared fundamental economic and security interests. It is 
worth retelling the story of how the United States learned to use Wall Street to maintain its 
position within the alliance, and how the alliance as a whole maintained its dominance vis-a-vis 
the periphery. The story starts with the Mexican debt crisis and is traced through the strengths and 
weaknesses of the US and its partners.
The debt crisis was precipitated in an ‘unplanned’ manner, as Gowan has put it. When the 
Federal Reserve unexpectedly raised interest rates in 1980, it sent the world economy into a 
downward spiral and induced a series of financial blow-outs, die first of which was Mexico’s in 
1982. The prospect of default by a debtor as big as Mexico threatened to bring the US banking 
system to its knees and, by extension, the international financial system as a whole. The IMF 
emerged at this time as the multilateral front for international finance and coordinator of rescue
51 Helleiner (1995), p. 330.
52 See Haggard and Maxfield (1996).
53 Bond (1998), ch. 8.
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missions. It mediated between creditor and debtor, provided multilateral legitimacy for structural 
adjustment, mustered a rescue package for Mexico composed of US energy and commodity 
credits and BIS resources (half of which derived from the US Federal Reserve), and stamped the 
deal with the guarantee of surveillance. Thereafter, the US government, along with the IMF, 
sought to steer commercial banks back into lending to Mexico and elsewhere via the Baker Plan 
of 1985. But it was the Brady Plan of 1988 that succeeded in doing so, by devising ‘debt for 
equity swaps’. This allowed Wall Street operators to acquire shares in enterprises of indebted 
states at bargain prices, while also restructuring the social relations of Mexico and opening the 
floodgates for hot money. It also set the stage for the second Mexican blow-out of 1995, and the 
now typical process of capital flight to New York. Meanwhile, a similar exercise was being 
conducted in Eastern Europe; and the IMF was becoming comfortable with its new roles, even 
creating new ‘systemic transformation’ and ‘crisis’ facilities. The allies may have raised their 
eyebrows at US machinations, but they tolerated it.54
The recession of the early 1980s perpetuated the decline in productivity among 
industrialised countries that had begun in the previous decade. The rise of financial markets 
compensated for this decline, by providing new investment opportunities in speculative trading. 
The United States in particular had lost its competitive edge in manufacturing, so the new 
financial markets provided it with a life line. Alongside this, however, and despite the 
‘monetarist’ facade, the US government under President Reagan embarked on a new investment 
strategy, to include defence spending. This had various international implications. Besides re- 
igniting the Cold War, defence spending created a massive budget deficit which put the US-Japan 
relationship on a new footing. For Japanese surpluses became one of the prime sources of finance 
for the US economy: private Japanese capital served the ongoing US trade deficit, while reserves 
were invested in US Treasury bills and served the fiscal deficit. Deregulating OECD countries 
contributed as well.55
In the next few years, high interest rates in the United States and an appreciating dollar 
induced an export-led recovery among the European partners and the NICs of East Asia. Indeed, 
the trade deficit doubled between 1982 and 1983, only to double again by 1984, while the US 
economy was restructuring towards high technology and services.56 By the recovery of the mid- 
1980s, the question of adjustment responsibility was re-imposing itself among the major
54 See Gowan (1999), ch. 4, Pauly (1997), pp. 117-126, Helleiner (1995), pp. 331-34, and Strange (1988), 
pp. 113-14.
55 See Gowan (1999), ch. 4, and Strange (1998), ch. 3.
56 See Augelli and Murphy (1988), pp. 165-66.
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industrial powers. In the Plaza Agreement of 1985, it was resolved that currencies would be 
drastically realigned by coordinated central bank interventions in the currency markets, but 
without any commitments to domestic monetary and fiscal changes. The agreement succeeded to 
realign currencies. By 1986, the dollar had lost 40 percent of its value against the yen. But it 
continued to lose value for the rest of the decade, despite a second attempted policy coordination 
in the Louvre Accord of 1987.57 Clearly, the United States was using its control over the dollar as 
an instrument of statecraft against is trading partners, and especially Japan whose success had 
become dangerously important, by virtue of making American capitalism dependent on it.
But the United States was not winning the battle by means of the currency war. For after 
the Plaza Agreement, Japanese capital changed its investment strategy to relocate labour- 
intensive production to dollar-pegged Southeast Asian economies and export from there to itself 
and the United States. In fact, as Walden Bello has noted, ‘the [Plaza] agreement did not do 
wonders for the US trade deficit, but...it did do wonders for South-East Asia’.58 More than this, 
the whole of Eastern Asia recorded remarkable growth: between 1985 to 1990, some $15 billion 
worth of Japanese direct investments (as opposed to hot money) flowed into the region, followed 
by bilateral aid and loans, and compounded by massive direct investment from the traditional 
NICs as well.59 By the end of the decade, the region was the most important growth centre in the 
world. Trans-Pacific trade surpassed transatlantic trade, while Japan’s largest export destination 
shifted from the United States to Asia.60
This turn of events had several consequences. One was that by the early 1990s, private 
Japanese capital was no longer compensating the US trade deficit; it was borrowing dollars to 
invest elsewhere. Thus, the US government came to depend on official Japanese flows alone, 
thereby bestowing new leverage to the government of Japan; in 1995, the Bank of Japan was 
buying dollars and investing in US government securities at the tune of $200 billion.61 A second 
consequence was that the world’s largest growth centre was now only partially in the control of 
American capital; the United States was losing market shares in Eastern Asia, sharing it and 
competing over it with Japan.62 Indeed, besides the currency war, the United States was in a trade 
war with both Japan and South Korea from the mid-1980s onwards. The US launched a ‘fair 
trade’ campaign against East Asian neo-mercantilism, which saw the US trade war arsenal
57 See So and Chiu (1995), ch. 9; see also Eichengreen (1996), pp. 149-52.
58 Bello (1998), p. 426.
59 Bello (1998), pp. 426-27.
60 See So and Chiu (1995), ch. 9.
61 Strange (1998), p. 49.
62 See So and Chiu (1995), pp. 220-21.
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expand to include the Super 301 provision for unilateral action, as well as ‘voluntary export 
restraints’, ‘voluntary import expansions’, and ‘market-oriented, sector-specific’ approaches, 
applicable in diverse industries, including telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, and electronics. 
Importantly, through this trade war, Korea saw its 1987 surplus of $9.6 billion with the United 
States turned into a deficit of $4 billion by 1996!63 A third consequence was that Japan was 
making a bid for regional hegemony and global influence on a new ideological front. Japan was 
now challenging the Washington consensus with the ‘Asian model’ of development, questioning 
in particular the ‘appropriate’ mode of credit creation for development. The Japanese claim for 
government-directed credit, as opposed to deregulated capital, resonated loudly among the 
Eastern Asian beneficiaries of productive Japanese investment. The Japanese claim carried 
further afield as well, for Japan was now also the largest donor in the world and equal to 
Germany in voting power in the IMF. The intellectual climax of the dispute was in the ‘Miracle 
study’ conducted by the World Bank, coinciding with the ‘human face’ critiques of structural 
adjustment and wide-spread social protests around the structurally adjusting world.64
Yet, there was another aspect to the US-Japan relationship. Inter-imperial rivalry was in 
tension with the ultra-imperial tendencies arising out of the ongoing cross-investment between the 
two capitalisms; moreover, Japan remained under the US security umbrella. The coincident end 
of the Cold War might have altered the Cold War significance of security, but other security 
concerns specific to Eastern Asia (China, North Korea) persisted. The ongoing influence of the 
United States over Japan in this realm made itself apparent with the Japanese decision to finance 
a large portion of the Gulf War.65
Nonetheless, the Japanese geopolitical position and ideological claim struck at the heart 
of the politics of liquidity; the Asian threat was too significant to the US position. And at this 
point, the Mexican debt story met the US deficit story. Enabled by the collapse of the Cold War 
‘evils’ which had sustained the ‘Asian model’, and with the realisation that the US trade deficit 
was ‘structural’, the United States under the Clinton Administration devised a new, post-Cold 
War doctrine.66 Central to the ‘Clinton doctrine’ was the redefinition of security along economic 
lines, entailing the concerted adoption of the dollar and Wall Street as instruments of statecraft. 
As Gowan has pointed out, President Clinton established a National Economic Council (NEC) at 
the White House to match the National Security Council, a cold-warrior. Moreover, he appointed
63 Bello (1998), p. 431.
64 See Wade (1996).
65 See So and Chiu (1995), pp. 237-40, Strange (1998), ch. 3, and Johnson (1993).
66 See Gowan (1998), ch. 5, and Cumings (1998), pp. 43-72.
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an experienced hedge fund operator (Robert Rubin, former senior partner at Goldman Sachs) to 
head the NEC. From 1995 onwards, the United States started pushing up the dollar against the 
yen, thereby putting pressure on the dollar-pegged economies of East Asia. Meanwhile, hot 
money was already pouring into South East Asia, by virtue of the deregulation of their capital 
accounts in the 1990s and falling interest rates in the United States. Shorn of the details, by 1997 
currencies began to come under pressure, and the financial bubbles of Thailand, the Philippines, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia began to burst. So did the trade-war crippled economy of South Korea. 
Had the Cold War not ended, South Korea and its development model might have been supported 
against collapse. But under the new circumstances, the opposite occurred. The United States, 
through the IMF, demanded the total dismantling of the developmental state, including 
deregulation of the capital account, financial restructuring, trade liberalisation, and labour market 
reform, plus recessionary monetary policy. In return, the IMF, World Bank, the United States, 
Japan, and others would provide a bail-out package worth $57 billion, plus ‘foreign direct 
investment’ from US, European, and Japanese transnationals. And in the process, the United 
States formed an alliance with domestic forces in South Korea that had always been critical of 
state-industry collaboration.67
The result was a resounding success for ultra-imperialism. Not only did Asian assets 
concentrate in the hands of transatlantic capital (as well as Japanese), in what appears to have 
been ‘the biggest peacetime transfer of assets from domestic to foreign owners in the past fifty 
years’;68 the single most important post-Cold War challenge to liquidity politics suffered a severe 
setback. In the process, the institutions of global government expanded their reach once again, 
while a US plan began to move through Congress to enhance cross-conditionality among the 
WTO, Bank, and Fund, with the latter as the institutional epicentre.69
Following East Asia, the financial crisis spread to Russia and Brazil, and was 
accompanied by new debate over reform of the world’s ‘financial architecture’. In effect, this was 
a futile attempt to insulate the new financial regime from the chaos on which it thrives. Needless 
to say, issues of adjustment responsibility remained unaddressed, to the benefit of the ultra­
imperial alliance. Instead, the idea that was floated was that of ‘humanising globalisation’; the 
idea was then considered at the World Economic Forum, the ‘International of capital’.70
67 For details of the crisis, see Gowan (1999), ch. 6, Cumings (1998), Bello (1998), Wade and Veneroso 
(1998a). It is worth noting that the geopolitics of investment described here contrasts sharply with the 
‘triangular diplomacy’ theory espoused in Stopford and Strange (1991).
68 Wade and Veneroso (1998a), p. 20.
69 Wade and Veneroso (1998b), p. 39.
70 See van der Pijl (1998), 132-35.
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Towards Global Government?
This ultra-imperial order, with all its contradictions, is embodied in the contemporary institutions 
of multilateralism. It is often argued that the world is ‘anarchical’, in the sense that there is no 
global government with functions equivalent to those of the nation-state. Yet, the multilateralism 
of the postwar period has continued to evolve towards an institutional consolidation that may be 
understood as a global state in rudimentary form. This has not displaced the principle of national 
self-determination, but has sought to weave it into its fabric. The institutional result remains 
deliberately ill-defined and shrouded in the language of ‘global governance’.
Alongside the governance synthesis in development theory, international theory set out to 
define ‘governance without government’. James Rosenau argued, for example, that we need a 
term such as ‘governance’ to enable us to theorise the ‘modicum of order’ that exists in the 
absence of world government.71 In an echo of Ruggie, he went on to associate ‘governance’ with 
‘informal authority’ and ‘shared goals’, which function in the interest of ‘systemic persistence’. 
In turn, ‘government’ he associated with ‘formal authority’, backed by ‘police powers’, and 
present even when it Tack[s] the regulatory mechanism to function effectively’. This consists in a 
conceptual evasion. A claim to authority -  whether formal or otherwise, whether at the nation­
state or the IMF -  is redeemable in today’s world only with reference to a democratic principle. It 
is no coincidence that the contemporary standard of legitimacy is ‘one person, one vote’ in 
national arenas and ‘one country, one vote’ at the UN and the WTO, no matter how manipulated 
and violated they are. It is for the same reason that the structure of the UN’s Security Council and 
the weighted voting systems of the IMF and World Bank are so resented. To introduce to the 
debate a new concept that makes no claim on the democratic principle and instead posits 
‘systemic persistence’ as the moral basis for concept building is simply to defend the imperial 
status quo. Ultimately, that which distinguishes ‘governance’ from ‘government’ is the ability to 
maintain order. The concept that will concern us therefore is government, and the democratic 
demand inherent in it. What remains here is to outline how the institutions of global government 
have evolved in the liberal period, their enforcement mechanisms (superior to any ‘police 
powers’), and the use they have made of the principle of national self-determination.
The central multilateral institution is the IMF. Under the new financial regime, the IMF 
has undergone several reinventions. As noted previously, upon the abandonment of fixed 
exchange rates by the second amendment of its Articles of Agreement in 1976, the IMF was
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mandated with the monitoring of flexible exchange rates within a liberalising financial 
environment. The continuity in its role lay in the First Surveillance Decision of 1977. This 
reaffirmed the principle of surveillance -  that member states remain accountable to each other for 
the external consequences of their economic policies. It also made consultation with the Fund 
involuntary and routine, and expanded the range of policies relevant to balance of payments to 
fiscal and interest rate policies and, as financial liberalisation proceeded, to capital accounts. The 
balance of payments crises and rescue missions of the 1980s and 1990s brought capital accounts 
more firmly into the Fund’s focus, such that by 1995 the first surveillance decision called for 
amendment, hereafter mandating the Fund with explicit powers of oversight in the realm of 
financial markets. The climax of this expansion was reached in 1997, on the eve of the East Asian 
crisis, when the Articles of Agreement were placed under review for re-amendment so as to 
commit the IMF to the complete liberalisation of the capital accounts of member states. By the 
end of the century, the IMF had powers of surveillance over current and capital accounts; had 
enforcement power, by means of conditionality, over indebted peripheral states; had expanded its 
reach also to the ‘transitional’ economies of Eastern Europe; and was mass producing cadres, 
some ten thousand of them from around the world, with technical economic expertise.72
The expansion to new issue areas and geographic regions was accompanied by the 
creation of new loan facilities. The principles applied to the use of the Fund’s resources had been 
decided in 1979 by the Executive Board with the issuing of the Guidelines on Conditionality. 
Thereafter, with the changing circumstances, a series of facilities were created, some with ‘hard 
conditionality’, others with ‘soft’. As the IMF moved from short- to medium-term balance-of- 
payments lending in the 1980s, the ‘hard’ conditionalities of stand-by and extended arrangements 
were appended with ‘soft’ conditionalities for members that were not creditworthy of capital 
markets. Thus, the Structural Adjustment Facility was created in 1986, followed by the Enhanced 
Structural Adjustment Facility in 1987, renamed as the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility in 
1999. Other, ‘special’ and ‘accelerated’ facilities were added to the Oil Facility of 1974, 
comprising of the Systemic Transformation Facility of 1993 for Eastern Europe; the Emergency 
Financing Mechanism of 1995, in the wake of the Mexican bail-out and applied to Eastern Asia; 
followed by the Supplemental Reserve Facility in 1997, for states with sudden crises on the 
capital account; and finally the Contingent Credit Line in 1999 for member states vulnerable to 
crisis contagion.73
71 Rosen au (1992).
72 See Pauly (1997), ch. 6, Gowan (1999), pp. 85-86, and Sholte (2000), ch. 4.
73 See Lastra (2001).
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The shift of the IMF to medium-term balance-of-payments lending towards peripheral 
states coincided with the shift by the World Bank to balance-of-payments lending to the same in 
its own right. This convergence was in the making since the 1970s. Previously, the Fund had been 
preoccupied with the monetary relations of the reconstructing industrialised states, while 
peripheral states could still avoid the Fund and access loans from commercial banks directly, 
while also obtaining project loans from the Bank. With the onset of the debt crisis, the IFIs 
converged on the macroeconomic management of indebted peripheral states exclusively. Both 
began to lend to the same states, for the same purpose, and with similar interest rates and 
maturities. Likewise, indebted peripheral converged on the Fund and Bank, while industrialised 
states moved exclusively to commercial borrowing (no industrialised country has borrowed from 
the Fund since 1976). The convergence produced an informal ‘cross-conditionality’, which 
included the presumption of Bank lending on the back of an IMF programme, but also 
acrimonious disputes over bureaucratic turf, for the Bank was now asserting its own identity. 
Upon a US initiative towards the improvement of collaboration, the two institutions devised the 
Policy Framework Paper in 1986, by which staff from the two institutions would jointly delineate 
country programmes and financing needs. Misunderstandings continued, however, and the 
collaboration was elaborated in a joint paper in 1989. In the 1990s, the basic framework remained 
in place, though the two institutions went on to gain further specialisations of their own.74 The 
Bank has clearly emerged as the intellectual leader of ‘development’, publishing on a vast array 
of issues and engaging non-state actors in research and project implementation.
If the United Nations had been the main multilateral institution that bridged the poles of 
the Cold War, the end of the Cold War saw the ‘globalisation’ of the multilateral institutions that 
had hitherto presided solely over the capitalist economy. The IMF now has near total 
membership; such is the case with the WTO as well. Nonetheless, it is only the latter that has 
pretended to UN-type ‘universality’ by means of the institutionalisation of the ‘one country, one 
vote’ formula. Moreover, by conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994, it engaged its members in 
a ‘single undertaking’, by which is meant the universal submission to a single set of rules and 
disciplines of international trade. This has been accompanied by the adoption of IMF-like 
surveillance practices, by which all member states are required to submit schedules of their tariff 
concessions and wider liberalisation commitments to the WTO secretariat in Geneva. Yet, despite 
claims to ‘universality’, it is also clear that the trade agenda has been sector-specific, driven by 
the particular concerns of transnational firms (represented by their states in the OECD) seeking to 
secure their niche in the course of the shifting international division of labour. Thus, one of the
74 See Polak (1994).
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touted accomplishments of the WTO has been the expansion of the purview of the trade agenda to 
‘trade-related’ matters, i.e., beyond commodities. These matters include intellectual property 
rights (dear to the pharmaceutical industry), trade in services (banking and insurance), and 
investment measures (transnational capital generally). Meanwhile, industrialised-state practices of 
long standing against competitors, such as protection of agriculture and quantitative trade 
restrictions (anti-dumping, counter-veiling duties, ‘voluntary export restraints’, ‘voluntary import 
expansions’) have been given either long phase-out periods or have come under unenforceable 
promises to ‘refrain’.75
The second touted accomplishment of the WTO has been the new ‘dispute settlement 
understanding’, by which rules, courts, and ‘automaticity’ have ostensibly replaced diplomacy, 
power, and contingency.76 There are two aspects to dispute settlement, namely adjudication and 
implementation. And as Yash Tandon has indicated, neither of these redeems its claim to 
universality.77 First, the lodging of a complaint does remain contingent on power -  economic and 
political. For the legal and technical expertise required to bring a case before a panel is purchased 
at an exorbitant price, placing it effectively beyond the capacity of a cash-strapped state; while 
fears of industrialised country reprisals in other realms, such as in security and aid, is in no way 
allayed. It is no surprise, therefore, that the majority of cases that have been brought before 
dispute settlement panels since their creation have been by industrialised countries. Second, there 
exists no universal mechanism for disciplining a state found guilty of a trade violation. A trade 
sanction may become ‘multilaterally authorised’ after adjudication, but implementation of a 
sanction is relegated to aggrieved states individually, by means of retaliation across economic 
sectors (cross-retaliation). What this means is that the enforcement mechanism is accessible to the 
countries that are industrially diversified and with significant trade market shares in the offending 
party. Mozambique, as Tandon points out, cannot enforce a verdict found against the EU. The 
existence of the new enforcement mechanism has been, unsurprisingly, the main reason for the 
intensive lobbying in favour of defining new ‘trade related’ issues and the desire to incorporate 
them under WTO discipline.78 With regards to such issues as intellectual property rights and 
labour standards, for example, the institutions to which these have pertained, the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation and the ELO, respectively, have been seen as lacking effective 
enforcement mechanisms.
75 For the details, see Lai Das (1999) and Tandon (1999a).
76 See Jackson (1998).
77 Tandon (1999a), pp. 11-12.
78 Blackhurst (1998).
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At present, the Fund-Bank-WTO triad is collectively ‘authorised’ with the making and 
administering of global policy in the domains of trade, adjustment, and development. Broken 
down in terms of nation-state functions, these domains encompass monetary, fiscal, trade, 
investment, social, environmental, and labour policy. And the triad has inter-locking enforcement 
mechanisms. The cross-conditionality of the Fund and Bank has already been mentioned. The 
WTO has now joined in this cross-conditionality, both formally and informally. Its new mandate 
calls upon it to ‘cooperate with the IMF and the World Bank with a view to achieving greater 
coherence in global economic policymaking’.79 In the two years following its creation, the WTO 
signed formal agreements with the IMF and World Bank to grant reciprocal observer status to 
attend each other’s meetings and to consult on matters of mutual interest. With respect to the 
IMF, this mutuality pertains to balance of payments; with the Bank, to trade policy. While the 
way forward is under ongoing investigation, the basis for a collaborative framework is already in 
place, either institutionally or in terms of an informal policy consensus and use of each other’s 
enforcement mechanisms. It is worth recalling that the link between trade and payments had 
already existed under Bretton Woods, as contracting parties to the GATT were permitted to 
employ trade policy instruments to safeguard their external financial positions. Under the new 
GATT of 1994, safeguard clauses remain in the WTO but they fall formally under the jurisdiction 
of the IMF. The IMF has been acknowledged by the GATT as the institution with authority to 
pronounce on how to deal with payments problems.80 What this also means is that these ‘rights’ 
won in the WTO negotiation framework can be overridden afterwards by the IMF. On the other 
hand, if measures dear to transnational firms fail to become global policy -  such as the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investments -  they can still be imposed on a more ad hoc basis 
through the IMF fa9ade on the states trapped in the new financial regime. Likewise, in the realm 
of trade policy proper, the trade liberalisation project vis-a-vis indebted peripheral states has been 
underway by means of the policy-based lending practices of the Bank. The WTO does not rely on 
the Bank formally. In this case, liberalisation happens outside the WTO negotiation framework, 
on unilateral terms.81 Finally, if the global Social Clause fails at the WTO, this does not exactly 
mean that there is no global labour policy. For the deregulation of labour relations has 
accompanied the structural adjustment programme, while the process has also been ongoing in 
the OECD under competitive dynamics.
79 Blackhurst (1998), p. 46.
80 See Roessler (1998).
81 See the discussions in Vines (1998) and Nogues (1998).
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Certainly, global government remains in rudimentary form. There is much duplication -  
as in research and policy. There is much inefficiency -  as in the bureaucratic turf wars of policy 
coordination. The global public incurs this tax, non-progressively. There are also functions that 
are more or less dispersed. Most notably, the world central bank function of lender-of-last-resort 
is in the hands of the nation state whose currency dominates international trade, as well as in the 
hands of the IMF and the Bank for International Settlements, both of which are, in any case, 
ultimately subordinate to the key currency country. However, there are very significant ‘police 
powers’ in this global state. These manifest themselves mainly in the sanitised form of economic 
sanctions (conditionality and cross-retaliation) and when combined with conventional and nuclear 
fire-power they approximate the Weberian ‘monopoly of violence’ -  oligopoly if you like. To be 
sure, the fact that the Mozambiquan state retains an army does not, in substance, negate the global 
state any more than the Mafia negates the Italian state, Chechen rebels the Russian state, and drug 
cartels the Colombian state. What emerges from all this is a rudimentary but firmly ‘captured’ 
global state, currently subservient to a transnational capitalist class, international finance, and the 
global labour aristocracy, whose interests are effectively protected by the transatlantic alliance, its 
politics of liquidity, and the military capacity which it is increasingly deploying.
That the global state remains in rudimentary form is deliberate; it is not a function of a 
‘natural’ state of ‘anarchy’. We saw in Chapter 2 how the United States rejected Keynes’ 
proposal for a Clearing Union so as to avoid committing to the compensation of trade partners in 
deficit; and how it under-funded the IMF so as to avoid relinquishing central bank functions to a 
supra-state authority. We have also seen how the principle of state sovereignty was invoked in the 
crisis of the 1970s to apportion responsibility for adjustment to indebted peripheral states. 
Thereafter, the IMF and World Bank served as a ‘multilateral’ front for the implementation of 
policy-based lending. And as the new financial regime began to take shape, the language of state 
sovereignty became its most cherished moral weapon. As states began to be pried open, financial 
blow-outs induced, social relations recast, the political responsibility remained firmly lodged in 
the nation-state. Likewise, in the 1990s, as the ‘state was brought back in’, it was renamed 
‘corrupt’ and ‘authoritarian’, requiring ‘multi-party democracy’ and ‘good governance’. National 
self-determination remains a pillar of multilateralism, justifying the formal shift of policy-making 
power to global institutions across an array of functions that have conventionally been understood 
to belong to the nation-state -  paradoxical as it may be.
The rudimentary nature of the global state serves its ultra-imperial bifurcation, for there is 
an oligopoly that drives the making of law, and where the law does not serve its interests, the 
oligopoly circumvents it. For example, when the functions of the IMF were expanded by the first
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and second surveillance decisions, there was no legislated expansion of political authority 
equivalent to the new functions.82 The same can be said of the World Bank. Both IFIs have 
retained legally bifurcated enforcement mechanisms, applying solely to debtor states, not 
creditors. The WTO claims ‘one-country-one-vote’ universality, though the dispute settlement 
process belies this claim. Essentially, global government is legally and/or effectively controlled 
by the centre to make policy in the periphery. On the other hand, the IMF, as the multilateral 
institution authorised to deliberate on monetary affairs, is routinely by-passed on substantive 
matters of ‘policy coordination’. Since 1975, policy coordination has been discussed at the 
G6/G7, outside the authorised multilateral framework. With similar flair, the G7 has routinely 
ignored the advice of the IMF when the latter has called for fiscal prudence among the group’s 
members. Pauly has observed that, since the first surveillance decision, the G7 has consistently 
turned a deaf ear to the IMF’s calls for fiscal cut-backs; instead, cumulative G7 deficits over the 
two decades grew from 36 to 67 percent of the group’s aggregate GDP, while the adjusting states 
were implementing austerity programmes.83 These deficits were financed by international capital 
markets, while tight monetary policy drove down inflation -  in accordance with the politics of 
liquidity.
Civilising Opposition
The politics of liquidity seeks moral authority for all this not only by means of the principle of 
national self-determination. In the post-Cold War period, it has also sought legitimacy by 
reference to ‘international law’ (Gulf War) and ‘human rights’ (Bosnia, Kosovo). But these moral 
references have been less effective than their ‘anti-communist’ predecessor in brigading the world 
behind a common ‘good’ against a clear and present danger. On the other hand, the idea of an 
‘irreversible globalisation’, along with its ‘governance’ module, has mustered significant 
compliance. The idea that ‘there is no alternative’ has been bolstered by the competitive 
deregulation ‘realities’ unleashed by financial liberalisation, but also upon the tumultuous 
collapse of Soviet-led ‘socialism’. The latter, in particular, has had the effect of altering the 
politics of opposition world-wide, most notably within international trade unionism, by reducing 
the ‘reasonable’ realm of politics. Thus, anti-imperialist, socialist, and interventionist languages 
found themselves deep in ‘uncivil’ terrain, now safely broadened beyond the ‘property
82 Pauly (1997), ch. 6.
83 Pauly (1997), p. 128.
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unfriendly’ to the ‘market unfriendly’ and subjected to the age-old tactics of cooptation and 
repression.
The art of cooptation is manifest within what has recently been called ‘complex 
multilateralism’.84 With the displacement of the developmental state in the 1980s and the 
concomitant rise of new social movements, organised politics expanded beyond the state to the 
level of multilateral institutions. At the forefront of this expansion have been both old and new 
social movements (labour, gender, and ecological). These social movements have seen measured 
success, concentrated mainly at the Bank and mostly on issues of transparency and environment 
(the Bank has become the largest global environmental fund in the 1990s). And it has sought 
legitimacy for its conduct by various means, such as inclusion of NGOs in project 
implementation and research. By 1994 the Bank involved NGOs in up to 50 percent of its 
projects; and since 1996 it has engaged NGOs at country-level in the assessment of its 
programmes, within the framework of the Structural Adjustment Programme Review Initiative 
(SAPRI). Yet, the differentiation between the civil and uncivil at this level has remained crystal 
clear. The Bank has identified ‘civil society’ with pliant NGOs, rather than, for example, the 
more ‘ideological’ gender equity advocates; while the latter have had to either ‘civilise’ their 
voice by conforming it to ‘efficiency’ criteria and making a ‘business case for gender’, or remain 
excluded from ‘social dialogue’. The environmental movement has seen its diverse demands 
streamlined through the dialogue as well: ‘success’, such as in the form of a Vice-Presidency for 
Environmentally Sustainable Development, has been won at a price; social movements have 
gained no institutionalised voice and access to enforcement mechanisms in their own right. It is 
also clear that factions of social movements have taken advantage of the civil status attributed to 
them to prevail over rivals in the movement. Thus, the AFL-CIO had its own voice heard at the 
1996 Singapore Ministerial of the WTO via the US Trade Representative, and it spoke for the 
global Social Clause. In sum, that which has emerged in response to the global state is a ‘global 
civil society’ that is weighted in favour of central-state actors, and US-based ones in particular; it 
is also committed to ‘market friendly’ politics.
To demonstrate better the process of ‘civilisation’, the following sections provide an 
overview of the relationship between the civil and uncivil politics of the semi-proletariat.
84 O’Brien et al. (2000).
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3.3 Rural Violence, Rebellion and the Return of Land Reform
The 1980s witnessed the emergence of a new globally standardised land policy, consisting of 
privatisation of land tenure and freehold titling, with application to state farms, 
communal/indigenous lands, previously reformed sectors, and collectives. On this basis, land 
reform was abdicated to the market on a willing-buyer-willing-seller basis. This period also 
witnessed the deepening of global agricultural market integration and the evolution of 
biotechnology under the aegis of transnational forms, which further transformed the conditions of 
farming among smallholders. While structural adjustment was implemented ostensibly to 
‘liberate’ peasant agriculture from ‘urban interests’, in fact it raised the costs of production for 
peasants via currency devaluations and fiscal cutbacks and it locked smallholders into input 
markets and distribution channels dominated by agroindustry. The following two decades 
accentuated land alienation and rural differentiation, ushering in a new period of rural violence 
and rebellion. In the mid-1990s, land reform returned to the global development agenda, now 
with the World Bank at the forefront.
In Latin America, the new land policy followed SAPs across the continent.85 The 
exception to the rule occurred in Nicaragua which in 1979 attempted the final Cold War 
revolution; this was accompanied by radical agrarian reform measures and counter-revolution 
funded and trained by the United States. Meanwhile, in neighbouring El Salvador, a peasant 
rebellion in 1980 gave way to a protracted civil war, alongside the three-decade-long civil war in 
Guatemala, similarly sustained by US involvement. In the 1990s, and with the end of the Cold 
War, all three Central American states signed peace accords, at the centre of which have been 
land reform plans; these have variously combined state-led redistribution approaches with 
individual freehold titles, and have been accompanied by ongoing rural violence.86 But the era of 
land reform that had begun with the Mexican revolution early in the century was brought to a 
symbolic end with the formal abandonment of land reform in Mexico in 1992.
The tally on the land question of the continent remains grim. On the one hand, the 
number of family farms has doubled as a result of the various phases of redistribution and titling. 
On the other hand, 26% of the total number of farms still control 90% of the total arable land, 
which is extensively used and oftentimes lies idle; while the 50% smallest farms control only 2% 
of the land, which is used intensively and depleted of resources. The several decades of reform 
have also been accompanied by ongoing rural differentiation, with the emergence of a middle-
85 See de Janvry and Sadoulet (1989), pp. 1397-1407, and Kay (1998).
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farming sector. Together with the large-scale sector, middle- and large-scale farming have been 
well-placed to benefit from the liberalisation of agriculture, in contrast to the smallholder sector. 
The middle- and large-scale sectors have also enjoyed the benefits of cheap labour provided by 
the semi-proletarianised household (functional dualism). In this regard, it is estimated that 
smallholder households on average derive only 40% of their income from their own farming, the 
rest being gained by their sale of labour. It is also estimated that 52% of rural households 
remained in poverty in 1995, along with 33% of urban households.87
The liberal period submerged land reform and smallholder agriculture in Africa as well. 
Here, too, agrarian reform was replaced by trade liberalisation and fiscal retreat from peasant 
agriculture, expansion to non-traditional foreign-exchange earning agricultural commodities, 
accessed largely by large-scale commercial farming, and privatisation of the state sector and, to a 
lesser extent, communal agriculture. The first experience in market-led reform occurred in 
Zimbabwe, following armed struggle. The struggle ended in a negotiated settlement, which 
established a new constitution protecting private property and the market as the formal instrument 
of land reform. In this case, the state was attributed a mediating role as land purchaser and 
selector of beneficiaries, and communal forms of tenure were retained in the smallholder sector. 
The decade saw the resettlement of 58,000 families (out of a targeted 162,000) on 3 million 
hectares, financed by both the state and the former colonial power. However, the market method 
demonstrated its first failure, for it yielded only a small portion of prime agricultural land (19% of 
total land redistributed), and tied land reform to the fiscal health of the peripheral state and the 
political priorities of the donor community.88 Meanwhile, Kenya, Cote d’Ivoire, Malawi, and 
Uganda, implemented a privatisation of communal land tenure. This process has invariably led to 
new land bidding opportunities and the further concentration of land ownership. Together with 
the fiscal retreat from the smallholder sector, the liberal formula has accentuated the combined 
processes of differentiation, proletarianisation, and pauperisation, with women carrying the 
heavier of burdens of functional dualism. Across Africa under structural adjustment, privatisation 
was extended to state lands as well. These were acquired either by emergent national bourgeoisies 
close to the state or by transnational agroindustrial capital. In the process, commercial farming 
retained its privileges and also shifted production to non-traditional foreign-exchange earning 
land uses, like horticulture, ostrich husbandry, and wildlife management.89
86 Kay (2000) and de Janvry et al (2001).
87 See de Janvry and Sadoulet (1989), de Janvry et al. (2001), and Kay (1998).
88 See Moyo (1995), chs. 3 and 4.
89 See El-Ghonemy (1999), Bernstein (2000), Moyo (2000b), and Moyo (2000a).
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The new land policy extended to other parts of the world, as in the Philippines in the 
post-Marcos period, but perhaps most spectacularly in Central and Eastern European economies 
in ‘transition’. As elsewhere, large-scale privatisation, decollectivisation, and freehold titling 
ensued, as well as restitution to the land owners of the pre-collectivisation era. The principle of 
restitution has been applied mainly in the Baltics and Central Europe, while in the Ukraine and 
Russia state and collective farms have been transferred to farm workers and managers. 
Privatisation has been uneven. In Albania, for example, as much as 95% of the land has been 
transferred to small private farmers.90 Meanwhile, in Russia, Bulgaria, and Hungary, land and 
other means of production have concentrated in the hands of the agricultural technocracy (as 
much as 70% of land), and given rise to East European forms of functional dualism. Privatisation 
also contributed to perhaps ‘the most severe economic crisis in modem history’, deeper and wider 
than the Great Depression, including the massive collapse of agricultural production.91 In this 
regard, Ivan Szelenyi has commented that, while it is ‘premature to judge’ the ultimate direction 
of agrarian change, one possible scenario is the sliding down of the ‘second’ world to the ‘third’: 
‘the growth of post-communist ‘latifundia’, oriented in the long run to extensive production based 
on cheap labour, limited domestic markets, and export orientation’.92
Amongst peasant-workers, there have been various ‘economic’ responses to 
liberalisation, such as the formation of self-help organisations to fill the economic vacuum of the 
retreating state. This has been witnessed throughout Latin America and Africa.93 A recent study 
by Sam Moyo on Africa has found that these rural organisations have proliferated over the 
structural adjustment period.94 However, the political effects of these organisations have been 
limited, serving rather as new ‘welfare agents’ in the global market. They have served also as new 
instruments of ‘indirect rule’, as they ‘seem to increasingly substitute the local state and 
traditional authority in organising community infrastructure building and maintenance, in 
exacting local taxes in the form of labour contributions and cash charges for the delivery of 
services provided such as water, land administration and so forth, and in the co-management of 
state initiated projects’.95 Moreover, these organisations do not overcome class and gender 
hierarchies, but tend to reproduce them; they also do not offer alternative development strategies, 
but are linked to state and donor funding and political priorities.
90 See Swinnen (2001).
91 Szelenyi (1998), p. 12.
92 Szelenyi (1998), p. 16.
93 With respect to Latin America, see Veltmeyer, Petras, and Vieux (1997), chs. 2 and 3.
94 Moyo and Romadhane eds. (forthcoming).
95 Moyo (forthcoming), manuscript p. 22.
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Another economic response is of a far more intractable nature. Peasant-workers are not 
only, or any longer, petty-commodity producers and wage labourers but also soldiers in the new 
phenomenon of ‘complex emergencies’. For many, especially male youth, participation in war 
has been an economic ‘solution’, and one that establishes vested interests in the perpetuation of 
war rather than in its resolution, at the expense not least o f those caught in the crossfire. If armed 
liberation struggle had been hallmark of the colonial and nationalist periods, this has given way 
in the wake of the Cold War to wars that serve purely economic functions. From Angola, Sierra 
Leone, and Congo, to Latin America and Asia, ‘war economies’ have emerged, based on the 
production and trade of diamonds and other high-value products destined for Western markets, 
giving rise also to a demand for modem mercenary forces supplied by such firms as Executive 
Outcomes.96 These wars are all too often rendered in ‘ethnic’, ‘tribal’, or ‘warlord’ terms by 
media and academic interpreters, though they have their roots in the unresolved agrarian 
questions of the century past. And they have been exacerbated by the imposition of structural 
adjustment programmes, as in the cases of Rwanda and Somalia specifically, where adjustment 
submerged existing agrarian problems, undermined food systems and living standards, and even 
demanded ‘shock therapy’ on the eve of civil war!97 Yet another economic ‘solution’ by peasants, 
back in their petty-commodity producing roles, is the production of coca leaves for export to US 
and European markets. In Bolivia, Pem, and Colombia, coca production has been adopted in the 
course of agrarian crisis and the rise in the demand for cocaine in the West. This has elicited an 
extroverted strategy of repression by the United States at the point of coca production, and again 
involved some and caught others in the crossfire between government security forces, 
narcomilitias, and revolutionary guerrilla forces variably involved in the coca industry.98 
Contemporary non-emancipatory wars, whatever the term used to describe them, all have 
deleterious effects for the democratic process -  a phenomenon that is routinely and conveniently 
slotted into the category of ‘corruption’.
The liberal period has accentuated the violence that is endemic in the countryside, 
whether revolutionary, counter-, or non-revolutionary. It has also exacerbated unemployment, 
poverty, and natural resource depletion. Together, these phenomena have perpetuated a fourth 
type of economic ‘solution’, which is migration, rural to rural, rural to urban, and international. 
Peasant-workers thus become also ‘ethnic’ and ‘foreigners’, sometimes within their own states, 
and also ‘illegal aliens’ facing ‘xenophobia’. In the Southern African context, as Lloyd
96 Berdal and Keen (1997).
97 See Chossudovsky (1998), chs. 4 and 5, on Somalia and Rwanda, respectively.
98 See Kay (2000), Leons and Sanabria (1997), and Petras (1997).
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Sachikonye indicates, the regional pool of labour supplies has swollen in the 1990s; if during the 
early colonial period all sorts of state-administered coercive mechanisms had to be employed to 
extract labour, this is certainly no longer the case." Contemporary migration takes various, 
including gendered forms. Women themselves become involved in informal, cross-border 
trade.100 But they also remain in the countryside and shoulder the increasing burdens of social 
reproduction, for men continue to be the primary source of wage labour to the regional economy. 
This impacts gender relations in veriable ways, producing polygynous family arrangements, and 
also rendering the population as a whole susceptible to HIV/AIDS to an ever greater extent.101
Besides the above economic solutions, there have also been notable political responses. 
On the one hand, there are now the formal, civil politics defined by the parameters of the 
governance synthesis. Civic organisations, NGOs, trade unions, and ‘opposition’ parties have 
embraced ‘good governance’ language propagated by the donor community and domestic 
bourgeoisies. These alliances have tapped widespread popular grievances, but have given them 
reformist leadership, channelling them towards the state. They have typically sought the 
realisation of existing constitutional rights, espoused multi-party democracy, ‘social clauses’, and 
‘safety nets’, and abided by ‘the rule of law’. The collapse of Soviet-led socialism in the late 
1980s has been the crucial turning point in this ‘civilisation* of oppositional politics, while the 
transformation has been pervasive.102 The result has been the creation of a gaping political void: 
the inability of formal politics to deliver to the working classes beyond temporary and measured 
respite.
It is no surprise then that, in the 1990s, there has been a ‘resurgence of the left’ outside of 
formal politics. This resurgence has been both organised and spontaneous, from street 
demonstrations and land occupations to armed struggle. The most organised of ‘uncivil’ politics 
has been witnessed in Latin America. As James Petras has observed, there has been a 
proliferation of oppositional organisations across the continent whose stronghold is in the 
countryside and whose primary tactic has been the occupation of land.103 The most notable is the 
Landless Rural Workers’ Movement (MST) in Brazil, boasting some 500,000 members, the 
largest peasant movement on the continent. Another is the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion 
Nacional (EZLN) in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas, which formed in 1983 and opted for 
armed struggle upon the launching of NAFTA. Along with continental counterparts, they have
99 Sachikonye (1998).
100 Gaidzanwa (1998).
101 Gwaunza(1998).
102 See Petras (1997) and Moyo (2001a).
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forced national debates to address a breadth of issues, such as land reform, indigenous and 
women’s rights; have cultivated class consciousness, fusing Marxism with local moral languages; 
have laid emphasis on the democratic principle within the movements; have remained politically 
autonomous while building alliances among the urban poor; and have cultivated an 
internationalist consciousness and practice, resulting in the establishment of a regional 
organisation.104 While it is early to judge the future direction of these movements, it is clear that 
the obstacles are enormous. Repression by security forces, as well as the hired guns of 
landowners, has resulted in some 1,000 killings in Brazil since 1985 and many more in Mexico. 
In the wake of the Cold War, such repression renders peasant politics more vulnerable to 
ideological dilution and cooptation by civil society and the state, which indeed has already 
occurred with respect to the Zapatistas in Mexico.105
Rural movements have emerged in Asia and Africa as well. In the Philippines, for 
example, a long tradition of peasant militancy persists to this day. In the post-Cold War period, it 
has abandoned the military option, has concentrated on political organisation and alliance- 
building, and has relied on the occupation of land as its primary tactic.106 In Africa, as we will 
see, the leading role in this regard has been played in Zimbabwe, with reverberations across the 
sub-continent. Although the African movements remain less organised and articulate (in terms of 
socialist politics), they have significant following and pose fundamental challenges to the liberal 
project in the region.
One immediate effect of land occupations in all the above cases is to be found in the 
realm of land reform. We saw earlier that, in the 1990s, land reform returned to the global 
development agenda, under the auspices of the World Bank. In a tacit acknowledgement of the 
failure of structural adjustment to serve the ‘rural poor’, the Bank has began to search for various 
mechanisms to make the market deliver land, without abandoning the essence of the market 
principle. Despite the proclamations of the governance synthesis regarding the ‘bringing back’ of 
the state, the new internationally standardised model of reform has removed the state from this 
crucial process. Under the label of ‘community initiated, market assisted’ reform (CIMA), the 
Bank has sought to by-pass the state, soliciting instead the willing services of NGOs and 
academic institutions with the purpose of providing ‘aid’ to the landless and landshort to 
organise, identify land, negotiate its price, and purchase it.
103 Petras (1997).
104 Petras (1997).
105 On repression, see Kay (2000); on the ideological shift of the EZLN, see Petras (1997), pp. 37-39.
106 Borras (1998).
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While market-assisted land reform has a longer history, as in Zimbabwe, the state has in 
the past played a central role as purchaser and selector of beneficiaries. And in the Zimbabwean 
case, we have seen that even the involvement of the state in market-assisted reform failed to 
deliver land of sufficient acreage and quality. This experience has been reproduced in the 1990s 
under CIMA. The model has been applied in Colombia, Brazil, and South Africa; and it has been 
found that ‘the poor’ remain disadvantaged in the process of organisation, negotiation, and 
purchase, as well as in the setting up of viable farming in the face of adverse macroeconomic 
conditions and competition from the privileged commercial farming sectors. Among the results 
also has been the ‘mis-targeting’ of redistribution towards rural and urban bourgeoisies with the 
wherewithal to farm.107 The Bank has sought to remedy the model’s failures by experimenting, 
via ongoing ‘pilot’ projects and the assistance of client NGOs, with yet new instruments of 
intervention in the market.
The Bank’s model has not been the only model of land reform in application in the 
1990s, however. In fact, it co-exists with the principle of restitution in post-apartheid South 
Africa, for example; and it interacts dynamically with state-led models, both sanctioned (post- 
civil war Nicaragua and El Salvador) and non-sanctioned (Zimbabwe’s compulsory acquisition 
attempts in the 1990s), as well as with the land occupation model itself, which is both pervasive 
and non-sanctioned.108 Indeed, whatever progress on land reform has occurred in the CIMA 
period cannot be understood in isolation from the two non-sanctioned models. Zimbabwe’s 
experience will be discussed in detail in the chapters that follow. Suffice it to note here that land 
occupations movements, besides forcing a variety of censored issues onto national debates, have 
also driven the market. In Brazil, for example, when the government began ‘studying’ market- 
based reform in 1985, the MST compelled it to study fast. Between 1990 and 1996, the MST 
carried out 518 occupations on land that it designated as unproductive; reportedly, over half of the 
settlements in Brazil have received land as a direct result of social pressure; in all, the MST has 
helped establish over 1,000 land reform settlements by mobilising 145,000 families to occupy.109 
Similar interaction between the market and militant peasants is recorded in the Philippines,110 and 
indeed was a major impetus to the ‘state-led, market-assisted’ reform of Zimbabwe in the early 
1980s, where the few prime lands that were acquired by the government were lands that belonged 
to white farmers chased off during the war.
107 See Carter and Salgado (2001), Deininger (2001), El-Ghonemy (1999), Levin and Weiner (1996), and 
Moyo (2000b).
108 See Moyo (2001b) and de Janvry et al. (2001), pp. 290-93.
109 Wolford (2001).
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3.4 Labour Solidarity or Imperialism?
The above forms of participation in the development dialogue have continued to interact with the 
formal and more institutionalised debate over the meaning of worker participation conducted 
within international trade unionism and the ILO. We saw in Chapter 2 that the debate in this latter 
context played out in the nationalist period through the conjuncture of Cold War, anti-colonial, 
and postcolonial nationalist politics. The 1970s were a period of generalised crisis in the global 
economy, and this translated into a period of flux within international trade unionism as well. The 
changing international division of labour, the resolution of the adjustment question by means of 
SAPs, and the new politics of liquidity had the combined effect of weakening labour movements 
world-wide. International trade unionism thus began to seek new sources of ‘solidarity’ and a 
new mission, while two issues emerged to focus the debate: the idea of a global Social Clause and 
the anti-apartheid struggle. With regards to the ICFTU, the two issues, both thorny and complex, 
proved central to process of reinvention (on which the centre had embarked since the departure of 
the AFL-CIO). The precise meaning of a ‘social democratic’ internationalism began to be 
articulated more clearly and debated over the next two decades, until gaining a monopoly in 
international trade unionism with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fading away of the 
WFTU.
The conjuncture of a changing international division of labour and the rise of finance 
impacted adversely on Western labour. It spelled the end of national social compacts founded in 
the politics of productivity, at a time when the global labour market for industrial labour was 
expanding beyond the northern Atlantic. Thus, workers’ wages in the alliance would no longer 
trail increases in productivity, nor could workers rest assured that US and European capitals 
would not opt for foreign labour over domestic. The generalised restructuring of the period saw a 
growing labour force in the West unemployed, employed insecurely, or under ‘flexible’ 
arrangements, while average real wages went into protracted decline. Just as well, the welfare 
state began to come under sustained assault, which, together with the breaching of the 
productivity compromise, put labour on a collision course with state and capital. If in the past the 
realm of Western European industrial relations had been a positive-sum game, from the 1970s 
onwards it became ‘a process of concession bargaining’; as Richard Hyman has noted, 
governments and employers’ organisations were increasingly prepared to enter into ‘social 
dialogue’ with trade unions ‘only to the extent that they endorse, and thus help legitimise, 
deflationary macroeconomic policies and the dismantling of significant elements in the post-war
1,0 See Borras (1998).
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edifice of state welfare’.111 In turn, the increasing inability of trade unions to deliver to their 
memberships jobs, income, and social security brought about disaffection among the rank and 
file, which combined with growing unemployment to bring about a decline in union membership 
and a further weakening of trade unionism in national politics. As the new liquidity politics 
gained momentum, the predicament of Western labour soon translated into a new and extroverted 
trade union mission whose aim was the establishment of a global Social Clause to cushion the 
effects of restructuring. This idea was first articulated within ITS circles in the early 1970s, and 
over the following decade gained the crucial support of the AFL-CIO upon the launching of the 
NAFTA debate.112
For labour movements in the periphery, the changing international division of labour 
presented a series of new challenges. First, there was now a new and growing differentiation in 
international labour between a high-skill Western worker, partially adapting to new technology 
industries, and a low-skill Southern worker, increasingly female, in labour-intensive industries. 
Pitting Northern and Southern workers against each other in a global labour market, this 
differentiation sharpened divisions within international labour and reduced the sources of 
solidarity. Second, the onset of rapid industrialisation for some and structural adjustment for the 
rest of the periphery was accompanied by intensified state repression in both cases. Labour 
movements had now to refocus and intensify their struggles at the national level. But, third, the 
SAP package of labour market deregulation, privatisation, and liberalisation weakened further the 
basis of trade unionism. Retrenchments, informalisation of work, and migration all struck a blow 
to union membership at a crucial historical juncture.113
Third world trade unions therefore were forced to adjust and respond to new realities, and 
ultimately to search for new internationalisms of their own. In Africa, a primary concern over the 
last two decades has been with the mobilisation of previously neglected constituencies, such as 
among women and rural workers, as well as among the burgeoning ranks of informal sector and 
unemployed workers. The realisation soon set in that if trade unions were to gain industrial and 
political strength to challenge liberalism by effective strike action, they would have to expand 
beyond the conventional ‘industrial relations’ parameters. In turn, this placed new demands on 
trade unions to democratise their own internal structures so as to provide a legitimate channel of 
expression to the grievances of existing and prospective members, not least women.114 Alongside
1,1 Hyman (1999), p. 126.
112 See Frobel, Heinrichs, and Kreye (1980), ch. 8, and Rupert (1995), pp. 658-92.
113 See Southall (1988) and Thomas (1995).
114 See Mihyo and Schiphorst (1995).
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the twin mobilisation-democratisation project, trade unions have sought to conscientise members 
on the new realities by educational initiatives aiming to raise economic literacy skills on SAP 
matters. This has combined with parallel initiatives by trade unions to develop their own research 
capacity and upgrade their technical skills so as to gain an independent ability to evaluate 
changing labour market conditions, and even articulate rigorous alternative macroeconomic 
policy frameworks (as in Zimbabwe), from a ‘labour perspective’.
The twin strategy of mobilisation and democratisation has also been accompanied by the 
(re)consideration of old and new trade union models. One has been that of ‘political unionism’, 
by no means a new model in the periphery. It might be recalled that throughout the periphery, 
trade unionism has dovetailed with nationalism, and indeed was often the matrix of nationalist 
politics. With the onset of structural adjustment, political trade unionism was rekindled and 
directed towards the authoritarian implementation of structural adjustment. A second, and closely 
associated, model of trade unionism has been that of ‘social unionism’, by which trade unions 
have sought to build alliances with ‘labour supporting’ groups, such as among students, 
academics, churches, and NGOs. Undoubtedly, the champion of this model has been the South 
African labour movement in the closing decade of apartheid, when it forged alliances with a 
plethora of groups, including township activists, unemployed youth, and students.115 A third 
model has come to be known as ‘strategic unionism’. This has assumed different substantive 
forms in different contexts, but what unites them is a willingness to engage in ‘pragmatic’ 
dialogue with state and capital in order to achieve ‘realistic’ gains on specific issues. In apartheid 
South Africa, ‘radical reformism’ was an instance of this approach.116 Under structural 
adjustment more generally, strategic unionism has taken the form of ‘concession bargaining’, 
such as in the privatisation process, or initiatives to strike a deal on issues of wages, productivity, 
and efficiency.
Perhaps the biggest challenge, however, has been in the broadening of the focus of 
politics beyond the national level and the search for a new basis of international trade union 
solidarity on contemporary regional and global matters. This new focus has found impetus in the 
upgrading of research capacity, which has increasingly enabled the articulation of global visions 
and the formulation of policy positions on issues related inter alia to trade, EPZs, labour 
standards, and regional cooperation. But it has also found impetus in the incipient rise of global 
government, which itself has begged for new responses. In Southern Africa, moreover, the search 
for a new internationalism has been bolstered by the experience of the anti-apartheid struggle and
115 Lambert and Webster (1988).
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the rise of a powerful trade union movement in South Africa seeking to redefine its relations with 
international trade unions centres in a non-subordinate way. The Southern African debate has 
raised the age-old issues of paternalism practised by Northern trade unions towards their Southern 
counterparts, as well as of the welfarist understandings of global development of the former and 
their lack of accountability to their memberships, especially on international work.117
It is worth dwelling on the apartheid context of international labour politics, for in the 
midst of the multiple transformations of the world economy and the demand for a Social Clause 
by international labour, the anti-apartheid struggle forced itself onto the world stage, compelling 
Northern national centres and internationals to take a stand, and rethink and clarify their 
international policies. In this regard, the valid observation has been made by Roger Southall that 
‘perhaps no other internationalist cause has so aroused the enduring commitment of the post-war 
international labour movement’;118 and that, while ‘the Internationals [still] have much to answer 
for’, we need to acknowledge that they are not homogenous and monolithic, and that the 
accusation of imperialism needs to be qualified (even if  cautiously).119 Yet, the lesson that 
emerges from this experience is a more sombre one: it takes a gross violation of liberal values to 
mobilise trade union solidarity across centre and periphery. Moreover, it is clear also that the kind 
of solidarity extended and the practices of Northern centres on a more global scale were not the 
kind aiming to dent ultra-imperialism and preventing South Africa’s quick slide from apartheid to 
neoliberalism.120
It remains therefore pertinent to outline the dynamics of international labour on the 
continent and beyond over the last quarter-century and to demonstrate that the context of anti­
apartheid labour solidarity was pregnant with labour imperialism. We saw in Chapter 2 that, with 
the departure of the AFL-CIO in 1969, the ICFTU entered a process of reinvention. It began to 
clarify the meaning of a ‘social democratic’ internationalism, whose essence was not a 
‘Keynesian welfare state for all*, but a much more emasculated project consisting of advocacy for 
trade union rights, liberal democratic rights more generally, and a welfarist developmentalism. 
This redefinition was facilitated by the turn of the ICFTU and Northern affiliates for funding to 
their own governments, national political parties of various shades, and international 
organisations, such as the ILO and UNESCO. It was in this context that white minority rule in 
South Africa, persisting two decades after the abolition of race as a principle of global order,
116 Adler and Webster (1999).
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struck a moral chord in the consciousness of organised metropolitan labour and could no longer 
be brushed aside. The ICFTU could simply not claim legitimacy in these times of transition 
unless it faced up to the problem. This it did, of course, to become an important international 
actor in the anti-apartheid movement and the labour politics of the continent.
Southall provides a detailed account of the considerable support offered, from 
educational programmes, trade union capacity building, and community development projects, to 
crucial legal aid.121 Most notably, solidarity was extended by Northern workers at the grassroots, 
employed in firms whose subsidiaries operated in South Africa.122 But, as Southall also notes, the 
ICFTU as an institution discriminated against radical trade unionism: on the one hand, it 
provided international legitimacy to the new democratic unions; on the other, it steered away 
from SAAWU or centres like the WFTU-inclined SACTU.123 It is such persisting practices that 
led COSATU in the 1980s to eschew affiliation with the ICFTU and accept its funding only 
indirectly, via the ‘fraternal’ national centres in the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and 
Norway.124 It is such tactics, furthermore, that form the labour internationalist backdrop to the 
‘radical reformism’ opted for by COSATU. Imperialist practices were witnessed on the rest of the 
continent as well. Having made a comeback in Africa via South Africa, the ICFTU began to 
compete with OATUU for the loyalty of African trade unions. Although there was a 
rapprochement between the two in the late 1970s (by virtue of OATUU’s own resort to 
international donor funding) the issue of imperialism was kept alive by OATTU as well, if only 
rhetorically. The anti-imperialist position was then bolstered in 1983 by the formation of 
SATUCC (Southern African Trade Union Coordinating Council) as the regional branch of 
OATUU, but both OATUU and SATUCC continued to be plagued by financial dependence on 
states and donors which detracted from their own capacity and legitimacy in continental trade 
unions politics.125 Ultimately, OATUU had a crisis of its own in the mid-1980s, resulting in a 
split within its ranks, one dimension of which was the unresolved issue of non-alignment, and 
another the exploitation of this issue by the ICFTU and the AFL-CIO by means of economic 
incentives offered to break-away centres.126
120 See Bond (2000).
121 See Southall (1995), chs. 4-7.
122 Southall (1995), ch. 10.
123 Southall (1995), pp. 143-57.
124 Southall (1995), ch. 13.
125 See Southall (1995), pp. 113-14.
126 Weir (1986b).
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The AFL-CIO, for its part, rejoined both the ILO and the ICFTU in the early 1980s, but 
continued to pursue bilateral relations with African trade unions. In South Africa its efforts to act 
unilaterally were rebuffed by trade unions, forcing it instead to operate within the terms of the 
ICFTU’s Programme of Action. It did, however, continue to pursue its own brand of ‘business 
unionism’ and to channel funds to smaller unions, thereby hoping to subvert other trade 
unionisms and to disrupt the emerging liaison between COSATU and the liberation movement in 
exile.127 By the mid-1980s, its programmes in Africa expanded drastically via its regional branch, 
the AALC, ninety percent of whose activities were being funded by the US government.128
The end of the Cold War, finally, brought about the transformation of international trade 
unionism, when the ICFTU and its own brand of internationalism became ‘the only game in 
town’. Indeed, with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, there was a marked shift in the available 
sources of oppositional politics and international solidarity, both moral and material. Almost 
overnight, socialist and interventionist politics lost respectability nearly everywhere, while calls 
for liberalisation found themselves triumphant by default. The realm of oppositional politics 
shrunk to fit the governance synthesis; while the ICFTU’s own emphasis on trade union rights 
and liberal democratic procedures found much common ground. Any political differences that 
remained were to be articulated within the evolving framework of civility.
The ICFTU’s civil vision has had national, regional, and global manifestations, though 
there is a basic principle underlying all. This is that worker participation in economic life should 
seek ‘independence’ by breaking away from states but not donors; accept capitalist relations of 
production; limit itself to the tripartite formula; and seek ‘social dialogue’. Significantly, the 
ICFTU’s vision of opposition at the national level accords with the governance synthesis on such 
issues as ‘the rule of law’ and ‘multi-party democracy’. At the global level, the primary objective 
is to enforce the seven basic ILO conventions (together comprising Social Clause) ostensibly to 
temper the excesses of liberalism.129
Inherent in this vision is a typology of the ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ kinds of trade unionism. 
While there are trade unions North and South that may disagree on this definition of opposition to 
various degrees and for various reasons, what they must have in order to be good citizens of the 
international labour movement is a commitment to the above definition of ‘social democracy’. 
Indeed, as Robert O’Brien has argued, the ICFTU sees itself as being on a mission to defend
127 See Southall (1995), ch. 8.
128 Weir (1986a).
129 This resolution was made at the 16th World Congress of the ICFTU, held in Brussels in June 1996; see 
O’Brien (2000), p. 542.
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‘social democratic’ forms of industrial relations against ‘neoliberal’ and ‘authoritarian’ ones, 
which, importantly, are defined not by the content of their politics in the first instance, but ‘the 
degree to which autonomous or independent worker organisations are allowed to operate in the 
economic and political arenas of a particular country’.130 O’Brien endorses this view, and further 
asserts that at present ‘[t]he international labour movement faces a severe challenge because its 
favoured form of regulation, social democratic, is being squeezed by a pincer movement by the 
neoliberal and authoritarian models’.131 However, this assertion only reproduces the ICFTU’s 
own interpretation of the problematic. For the real ‘pincer movement’ in the post-Cold War 
liberal world is against the peasant-worker in the periphery and the unprotected worker in the 
centre; this squeeze is performed by liberalisation, the ICFTU’s social democracy, and the use of 
force by the security agencies of adjusting states. It is these latter forces, furthermore, that have 
brought about the ‘civilising’ of trade unionisms and ‘opposition’ political parties, and produced 
the political vacuum that is now being filled by all sorts of ‘economic’ solutions and ‘uncivil’ 
politics noted earlier.132
Of course, the counter-argument by the ICFTU and civilised affiliates would be that the 
global Social Clause will serve the interests of the semi-proletariat. Rural poverty and migration, 
they would argue, the withdrawal of children from school for work in farms and factories, the 
conscription of teenagers in militias, de facto slavery, all exist because the freedom of association 
and collective bargaining has been denied; and that the main threat to the exploited worker today 
is ‘the competition between developing states for investments’. But what is clear is that posing 
the problem in terms of the unresolved agrarian question would require a political sacrifice that 
the global labour aristocracy would not be willing to make. For this reason, the most 
‘unreasonable’ of languages is that of anti-imperialism.
Labour internationalism, in its contemporary ‘social democratic’ form, continues to be 
the social prop of imperialism, much like Lenin observed a century ago. Moreover, its location is 
not confined to central states but gains crucial satellites in the periphery, which together seek to 
constitute what Mark Rupert has falsely called a ‘counter-hegemonic’ common sense.133 It is no 
coincidence that the Social Clause has gained the endorsement of central and peripheral states. 
Most notably, whereas the AFL-CIO had confronted the US government over the establishment
130 O’Brien (2000), p. 539.
131 O’Brien (2000), p. 541.
132 The dynamics of this will be demonstrated in detail in the following chapters on Zimbabwe. Suffice it to 
note here that even ‘powerful’ peripheral trade unions, such as those of South Africa and Brazil, have 
succumbed to the squeeze; see Adler and Webster (1999) and Ramalho (1999), respectively.
133 Rupert (1995).
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of NAFTA, the two eventually came to see eye to eye, as did EU labour movements and states, 
and to collaborate on the proposal to link ‘labour standards’ to trade agreements at the Singapore 
Ministerial meeting of the WTO in 1996.134 The proposal failed (instead, international 
commitment to the ILO was reinforced), but the accommodation has continued to seek fulfilment 
elsewhere. In the same year, the ICFTU invited Michel Camdessus, IMF Director, to speak at its 
16th World Congress. And in 1997, in Davos, the WEF resolved that a new project on ‘human 
social responsibility’ was to be ‘studied’ by various personalities including, among others, 
prominent theologians and the new head of the AFL-CIO, John Sweeney.135
It is against this background of labour imperialism that peripheral trade unions have 
sought to articulate a new internationalism. In an anonymous article in the South African Labour 
Bulletin in the early 1990s, it was proposed that African trade unions should build upon a ‘non- 
aligned international solidarity’, outside the existing Northern-dominated internationals, a 
solidarity that would be faithful to the principle of accountability and that would give voice to the 
demands of African workers.136 The author argued that the priority should be to strengthen the 
non-aligned centres, like COSATU (later aligned) and OATUU, and build solidarity with union 
activists within unions affiliated to the ICFTU and WFTU, in order to pursue the following: the 
establishment of a new international democratic alliance; the free flow of information on 
international solidarity assistance; and the planning of specific campaigns reflecting the needs of 
workers internationally. Moreover, in the author’s words, ‘ [t]his approach would establish a 
position of collective strength from which the non-aligned movements could engage in a dialogue 
from “active non-alignment” towards worker-controlled internationalism’.137 The rationale 
advocated, therefore, was the building of an alternative solidarity en route to a replacement of the 
existing internationals. A similar rationale gave rise to a tri-continental meeting between 
COSATU, the Italian CGIL, and the Brazilian CUT, which proposed the necessity of an 
alternative to liberalism, but conceptualised it within the framework of ‘strategic unionism’ -  
with all its trappings.138
The anonymous article evidently caused a stir in the ICFTU, though it did spur on further 
debate. Peter Waterman, for example, responded to it, arguing that third world trade unions 
should not simply write off the existing internationals as unreconstructable monoliths. Rather, he 
argued, they should take their queue from global social movements and pursue dialogues -
134 See O’Brien (2000).
135 See van der Pijl (1998), pp. 134-35.
136 Anonymous Correspondent (1991).
137 Anonymous Correspondent (1991), p. 39, italics in original.
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‘communication internationalisms’ -  both within and without existing structures.139 This position 
echoes Southall’s own call for a more active and assertive engagement by peripheral trade unions 
in the remaining International, ‘as an aid to its democratisation and to extend the basis for greater 
reciprocity between Northern and Southern trade unions’.140 Yet, while not ruling this out, it is 
certain that the interests of the semi-proletariat would be better served by rural-urban alliances 
that keep the civil circuit at arm’s length.
* * *
Structural adjustment abandoned the model of articulated growth to ‘get the prices right’. From 
the late 1970s onwards, liberalisation swept across centre and periphery, consolidating a 
‘regionalised triadic bloc structure’ across the ultra-imperial alliance and reinforcing a 
disarticulated pattern of accumulation in the periphery, along with functional dualism. The 
national question remained alive in this period, but in an emasculated existence, as ascendant 
finance and global institutions instrumentalised it to apportion responsibility for adjustment 
nationally. Accordingly, the uncivil domain broadened to the ‘market unfriendly’, especially after 
the Cold War. For its own part, international labour responded to the restructuring of the 1970s 
without embarking on a new politics of solidarity; by the 1990s, it had arrived at a social 
democratic identity that accorded with the governance synthesis. In due course, economic and 
social crisis in the periphery combined with state repression and a shrinking civil domain to 
produce diverse forms of ‘incivility’, organised and unorganised, progressive and regressive. 
Nonetheless, the ultra-imperial alliance and its liberal project managed to remain intact under US 
auspices, by means of the latter’s security umbrella and the new financial regime.
138 See Waterman (1998), pp. 123-24.
139 Waterman (1998), chs. 5 and 7.
140 Southall (1995), p. 363.
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CHAPTER 4 
Zimbabwe and the Liberal Rendez-Vous
The previous chapters have provided an interpretation of the development dialogue in the postwar 
period. The present chapter focuses on the case of Zimbabwe, and seeks to understand its 
particular experience. In this period, Zimbabwe has obtained ‘pariah’ status twice. At the time of 
writing, it is in the midst of its second bout with the ‘international community’, related to its 
worst economic and political crisis since independence in 1980, exactly one decade after its 
adoption of structural adjustment in 1991. While Zimbabwe has particularities of its own, 
deriving from its white-settler colonial experience, it is a typical late-twentieth-century peripheral 
country whose deep historical contradictions have only been inflamed by the onset of 
liberalisation. In what follows, I will briefly review some of the conceptual approaches to 
Zimbabwe’s past and present, before outlining the basic contours of the country’s experience -  
from the formation of the settler colonial state to the liberal rendez-vous. Subsequent chapters 
will provide a detailed account of semi-proletarian politics in Zimbabwe under structural 
adjustment.
4.1 Interpreting Zimbabwe’s Past and Present
Two basic concerns among students of Zimbabwe have pertained to the nature of the 
Zimbabwean state, on the one hand, and Zimbabwean nationalism, on the other. These concerns 
find their origins in the pre-independence period, in the historical materialism of Giovanni 
Arrighi and the ‘Africanism’ of Terence Ranger. In an article written almost four decades ago, 
soon after the Rhodesian UDI, Arrighi sought to explain the divergence of the Rhodesian 
experience from the neo-colonial trends underway on much of the continent, that is, the 
relinquishing of colonial state institutions to small, deliberately nurtured, friendly African 
(petty)bourgeoisies. Focusing on inter-capitalist conflict, Arrighi concluded that Zimbabwe was 
being held hostage by white agrarian capital which insisted on extending its colonial occupation 
into the nationalist period.1 Arrighi did not make much o f African politics, but in his turn Ranger 
did, in two studies of African resistance and ‘proto-nationalism’ stretching back to the colonial
1 Arrighi (1973b).
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encounter. Here, Ranger painted a picture of unity and continuity of purpose against colonial 
oppression, feeding directly into the mass nationalism and guerrilla war of the 1970s.2
The onset of neo-colonialism in 1980 and parallel rise of an official nationalism altered 
the context of theorising about both the state and nation. Not only was neo-colonialism creating 
new contradictions that were straining the official, triumphalist nationalism, but there also 
emerged a new generation of indigenous scholars to lead the debate. The most important 
intervention at this juncture was made by Ibbo Mandaza (1986), who reconciled the two debates 
on the state and nation.3 Mandaza observed that, despite a decade of armed struggle, a negotiated 
settlement had bequeathed a typical neo-colonial state in Zimbabwe, which was ‘non- 
conventional’ only insofar as formal political power had not been ceded to an African petty- 
bourgeoisie alone but jointly with a ‘constitutionally safeguarded’ white settler element. This 
reality produced a special sub-type of neo-colonial politics. The ‘post-white settler colonial state’ 
was characterised, first, by the persisting obstruction of an African ‘national’ bourgeoisie by the 
settler presence, which in turn offered prospects of advancement only to a section of the petty- 
bourgeoisie; and second, by the petty-bourgeoisie’s own use of the settler presence as an excuse 
for developmental delays and as a means of extracting concessions for itself, while in the long run 
developing a class alliance with it, against peasants and workers. In this process of 
‘embourgeoisement’ lay also the roots of state repression against the disenfranchised.
Alongside these observations, Mandaza sought to make the case for the centrality of 
African nationalism, but not in a ‘mythologising’ fashion; he saw nationalism as janus-faced, 
powerful in its mobilisational potential but also full of tensions and contradictions. ‘African 
nationalism’, he observed, ‘is the indispensable force in the movement for national liberation; and 
yet it is also the basis for neo-colonialism by which the masses were betrayed’.4 Nonetheless, 
Mandaza emphasised the contingency of neo-colonialism, its fate being subject to the power 
struggle between ‘the masses’ and imperialism over the political orientation of the petty- 
bourgeois leadership; while the apparent ‘sell out’ of the petty-bourgeoisie, in Zimbabwe and 
elsewhere, was not a sell out at all, but a mere reflection of the divisions and weaknesses of the 
nationalist movement, on the one hand, and the preponderant power of imperialism, on the other. 
Mandaza concluded that the class struggle in the neo-colonial state manifested itself in a 
‘schizophrenic state’, one that pursued developmental objectives in response to popular 
aspirations (limited land reform, investment in rural development, education, and health), in the
2 Ranger (1967 and 1970). Other prominent figures of the early nationalism debate included John Saul and 
Basil Davidson.
3 Mandaza (1986a and 1986b); see also Sibanda (1988).
4 Mandaza (1986a), p. 8.
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same stride as it deployed the security agencies of the state in the suppression of popular 
demands. The class struggle also manifested itself in the articulation of a populist ideology of 
national homogeneity by the leadership, which the latter defended fiercely.
The significance of this interpretation is that it effectively linked the national question -  
its contradictions and authoritarian manifestations -  to the neo-colonial situation. Yet, a weak 
point in the argument was Mandaza’s elitist treatment of intra-African contradictions. By 
focusing solely on the petty-bourgeoisie that resided at the level of the state, Mandaza confined 
himself to a view of the national question ‘from above’, making references to ‘the masses’ 
casually, and shedding no light on semi-proletarian politics.5
In the 1990s, a number of further accounts of Zimbabwe’s experience have been offered, 
the most robust being Patrick Bond’s.6 The intention here has been to provide a rigorous 
conceptualisation and historical narrative of the relationship between financial power and uneven 
development in Zimbabwe, rather than to theorise the state and nation as such. Yet, the two 
themes are ever-present and, indeed, demoted at one’s own peril. Bond has sought to explain the 
process of overaccumulation and uneven development, but without specifying what is different 
about an ‘overaccumulation crisis’ in a semi-proletarianised, sectorally and socially 
disarticulated, neo-colonial state; nor how it relates subordinately to crisis in an industrialised, 
articulated (or even partly disarticulated), imperial state. The result is a lack of conceptual clarity 
on the mechanics of contemporary imperialism. With regards to the nation, Bond’s focus has 
been limited to inter-capitalist conflict, not unlike Mandaza’s, with the result again being a 
conceptual deficit on matters of ‘progressive resistance’ -  its social base, organisational state of 
affairs, alliances, and political languages.7
Another approach has come in the form of the ‘cultural turn’ in Zimbabwean studies, as 
in the social sciences generally. This has arrived as a package of several moves. On the one hand, 
it has consisted in a renewed commitment to the writing of history ‘from below’, thereby holding 
out the prospect of grappling more rigorously with matters of political agency. On the other hand, 
it has parted ways with historical materialism, claiming freedom from ‘grand theory’, and 
conceptually isolating the ‘local’. What in fact has occurred is a crude separation of moral and 
political economy. The result, in one case, is that the study of contemporary neo-colonialism is
5 Another historical materialist tradition devoted to retrieving working class consciousness ‘from below’ 
had not managed to engage with nationalism properly; see van Onselen (1976) and Phimister (1988). See 
also the review essay by Raftopoulos (1999).
6 Bond (1998).
7 This is not redeemed in more recent statements focused precisely on civil society. Bond has proceeded in 
late MDC, ‘multi-racial’ fashion to dismiss nationalism as somehow a ‘ZANU(PF) discourse’, ‘exhausted’
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reduced to the study of ‘the interpenetration of global and local cultural productions’.8 In another, 
the national debate is freed from its neo-colonial context and explored merely in its ‘regionalism’, 
made possible by trivialised dialectical tools -  ‘using the perspective of the margin to explore the 
centre’ -  that are equally employable in the study of, say, France.9 The further and gravest result 
in both cases is the delinking of authoritarian nationalism and violence from the ‘schizophrenic’ 
nature of the neo-colonial state. These phenomena now appear as ‘abnormalities’ that might 
inhere in particular political parties; while the envisioned alternative is a facile ‘pluralisation’ of 
the nation.
The concurrent debate over civil society and democratisation has raised the same issues, 
now in the added urgency of deep economic and political crisis. Here two approaches are 
discemable, one by Brian Raftopoulos, the other by Sam Moyo. Raftopoulos has made a number 
of key interventions. He has acknowledged the difficulty faced hitherto by the radical tradition in 
engaging with nationalism. He has sought to retrieve the history of urban struggles specifically, 
these having been given short shrift by an official nationalism inclined to serve the neo-colonial 
elite and its rural political needs. And he has emphasised also the importance of bridging 
organisationally and politically the rural-urban divide that semi-proletarianisation produces.10 
However, his analysis and activism have remained committed to urban-based, organised working 
class politics. Moyo, on the other hand, has sought to emphasise the significance of rural and 
informal politics in the changing political economy of the land question. He has pointed out the 
inability of formal, urban-based, donor-dependent civic organisations to tap and articulate 
systematically the rural grievances of the semi-proletariat. He has argued that their emphasis on 
liberal political rights or ‘welfarist’ development projects has tended to marginalise the more 
popular redistributive agenda. And he has warned of the consequences of not heeding rural 
grievances in Zimbabwe and the region at large.11 This debate has been most robust indeed, 
redressing both the ‘multi-racial’ and elitist deficiencies of the radical tradition, producing 
valuable empirical work, and informing Left politics throughout the difficult decade of 
liberalisation.
and in its ‘dying days’, and not the basic moral grammar of public debate and social protest in Zimbabwe’s 
neo-colonial situation; see Bond (2001) and Bond and Manyanya (2002).
8 See Sylvester (2000), p. 22.
9 See Alexander, McGregor, and Ranger (2000); quote from fn. 1, p. 3.
10 See Raftopoulos (1992, 1999a, and 2001), and Raftopoulos and Yoshikuni eds. (1999).
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4.2 Settler-State Formation in a Colonial World
Before examining the postwar period, it is worth looking at the development of 
underdevelopment that pre-dated it. ‘Southern Rhodesia’ was borne out of late-nineteenth century 
imperialism. The region was annexed by Cecil Rhodes’ British South Africa Company (BSAC) in 
a violent venture northwards, driven by anticipation of a ‘second rand’ and British sub­
continental geopolitics. By the turn of the nineteenth century, an initial speculative run had given 
way to a policy of direct investment, first in mining, then in agriculture. African society resisted 
the advance, most notably in the uprisings of 1896, but also took advantage of new opportunities 
presented by the settlers, such as their demand for food, while gradually becoming integrated into 
the sphere of commodity production, and ultimately submitting to a tightening noose whose 
primary objective was the extraction of labour. Through land alienation, taxation, and 
enforcement of pass laws, Africans were Compelled to enter the labour market, while various 
further means were devised to reduce their ability to exist as full-time petty-commodity 
producers; most notably, land alienation was accompanied by designation of African reserves in 
lands that were agro-ecologically inferior and distant from marketing infrastructure. A global 
order based on the principle of race underwrote primary accumulation at this time, as well as 
forced labour, the denial of ‘employee’ status to Africans by means of the Masters and Servants 
Ordinance (1901), and the notoriously brutal treatment of workers in mining compounds. As the 
BSAC’s London manager reckoned in 1907:
It appears to me certainly too rapid an advance in civilisation if  the laws of 
Employer’s liability are to be applied in Rhodesia to enable the relatives of 
deceased natives to obtain compensation for accidents in the mines. This is 
advanced negrophilism.12
This early period of accumulation remained in conquest mode, characterised by a ‘native policy’ 
bent on destroying autonomous African economic relations so as to release male labour for white 
mines and farms. The administration of the colony was ‘direct’, based on the philosophy of 
‘emancipating’ Africans from their ‘repugnant’ social and political institutions.13
It was not long though before Southern Rhodesia began to be seen as a peculiar colony, 
for it gained a distinguishing feature, namely European settlers, who from the 1910s onwards 
constituted themselves as an agrarian bourgeoisie. Arrighi had first argued for the ‘national
11 See Moyo (1995a, 1999,2000a, and 2001a).
12 Quoted in Phimister (1988), p. 55.
13 See Phimister (1988), van Onselen (1976), Robin Palmer (1977), Ranger (1985), and Schmidt (1990).
124
character’ of this bourgeoisie, i.e., its commitment to the development of the productive forces of 
the colony,14 in practice, this was ‘less than national’, as Ian Phimister later put it, but still ‘more 
than comprador’.15 Unlike mining capital which was neither permanently established nor 
producing for the local market, the rural bourgeoisie was firmly settled and interested in the 
expansion of the colony’s home market, along with its external markets, for its production of 
maize and tobacco. Yet, it was less than national because it continued to compromise with the 
outward orientation of mining capital and short-termism of London-based finance, by virtue of 
the constraints of disarticulated accumulation; and because its own vision of the ‘home market’ 
was largely confined to the settler element.
The existence of such divergent capitalist interests created a political dynamic that was 
absent elsewhere (except South Africa), and a development trajectory that was quite unique. 
Agrarian capital threw its weight behind an active state investment policy (against the interests of 
mining), as well as free trade (along with mining), but allied itself with white workers on matters 
of industrialisation and labour segregation (against mining). Agrarian capital had a further interest 
in preventing African competition in agriculture and, again in alliance with white labour, was 
fervently committed to territorial segregation. After World War I, agrarian capital and white 
workers steadily gained power vis-a-vis mining (as represented by the BSAC) and achieved ‘self 
government’ in 1923, against the South African designs of the BSAC. Thereafter, and until World 
War n, white self-government embarked on a series of legislative and policy changes of its own. 
While continuing to concede to transnational capital and finance, this series of changes began to 
consolidate a long transition from primary accumulation to ‘settler colonial’ capitalism and from 
‘direct’ to ‘indirect rule’.
Such a shift was sweeping across the continent in the late 1920s.16 Colonial authorities 
everywhere were seeking to resolve the ‘native question’ by reconstructing social order on terms 
tailored to the longer-term interests of capital as a whole. Having first dismissed African society 
as ‘repugnant’, they now sought to retrieve its ‘way of life’, its ‘tribes’ and ‘traditions’, and 
administer Africans through the more ‘legitimate’ medium of the chief. This, of course, remained 
the period of globally institutionalised racism, for Africans were not yet deemed ‘nationals’, 
worthy of civil rights and self-determination; nor were they even deemed unequivocally to be on 
the same civilisational coordinates as Europeans. Indeed, ‘respect’ for the African way of life 
increasingly took the form of ‘separate development’, of territorial and institutional segregation.
14 Arrighi (1973b).
15 See Phimister (1988), p. 180.
16 See Mamdani (1996); see also Channock (1985).
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In Southern Rhodesia, the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 codified white and black 
areas of settlement (including a ‘native purchase area’). And the Native Affairs (1927) and Native 
Law and Courts (1937) Acts codified the administrative and judicial authority of chiefs. African 
women assumed a special role: they were formally relegated to ‘permanent legal minority’ status 
and bound to the land by kinship relations and pass laws, in effect becoming the pillar of 
functional dualism. In turn, this was rationalised in familiar civilisational terms: ‘[t]he native 
woman of today has not the brain power or civilisation of the mothers and grandmothers of the 
present white generation’.17 African men, as wage-eamers, were the other pillar: in mines and 
farms, they remained stripped of ‘employee’ status, as per the Industrial Conciliation Acts of 
1934 and 1937, while their first trade union, the South African-based Industrial and Commercial 
Workers’ Union (ICU), was harassed and banned. The Sedition Act of 1936 complemented these 
facets of the late colonial mode of rule by prescribing the repression of growing political dissent.
As the settler colonial state defined its ‘traditionalist’ mode of rule it also responded 
vigorously to the challenge of the Depression. The state tightened its institutional grip on the 
economy, not least on the agricultural sector by bringing under its control the marketing virtually 
of the whole sector. By this means the state also turned its predatory sights on African agriculture 
to tax it and manipulate it, most notably through the Maize Control Acts of 1931 and 1934, for 
the purpose of subsidising the beleaguered white sector. Related to these developments, there was 
first a sharpening of rural differentiation, as some petty-commodity producers were managing to 
respond better than others, while some emerged as ‘master farmers’ in the Native Purchase Areas; 
second, there was an acceleration in the pace of proletarianisation due to land apportionment; and 
third, there was rising pressure on reserve land on account of both land apportionment and crisis- 
related retrenchments. The settler colonial state rounded off its ‘native policy’, therefore, by 
taking interest in the ‘development of the reserves’, not only for ‘the golden egg of subsidy’ but 
also to regulate more effectively the economic and social transformations.18
Resistance under these conditions assumed variegated forms, both of the covert type -  
e.g., desertion and theft from mines, women taking refuge in missions -  but also of the overt type 
-  such as resistance to forced removals and strike action against low wages. The ICU, the most 
important of the early organisations, never managed to become a serious force, not least because 
of the concerns on the part of the settler state that the ICU ‘conceals an insidious and dangerous 
doctrine, a thinly veneered version of “Africa for Africans’” .19 Indeed, the ICU was the first to 
seek the conscientisation of mine workers not only in the language of nationalism but also of
17 Native Commissioner quoted in Schmidt (1990), p. 627.
18 See Ranger (1985), ch. 2.
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class -  for which it was further accused of ‘communism’. Less articulate were a host of mutual 
aid, dance, and burial societies, as well as millennial movements, all of which served as 
precursors to organised peasant-worker politics.20
By World War II, the settler colonial state exhibited all the qualities of disarticulated 
accumulation. On the one hand, it still relied on gold for more than half of its national income, as 
well as on the credit facilities of the London-based Standard Chartered and Barclays banks.21 On 
the other hand, the industrialisation desires of the agrarian bourgeoisie were being thwarted by its 
own segregationism, obstruction of peasant accumulation, and maintenance of low wages. The 
colony remained an exporter of mineral and agricultural products, and importer of virtually all of 
the manufactured goods that it needed. World War I and its aftermath had given a first external 
impetus to a process of import-substitution industrialisation, but open trade with the more 
competitive industries of South Africa had served to limit the local development of secondary 
industry. Even the vigorous state interventionism and accelerated pace of proletarianisation of the 
Depression years did not provide a sufficient internal dynamic.22
The advent of World War II imparted the second external stimulus to industrialisation. 
This was again a drastic shock which reinforced the resolve of the state to manage the economy. 
At this time, the settler colonial state began to undergo significant industrialisation, which in turn 
saw the emergence of a manufacturing bourgeoisie in competition with agriculture and mining. 
The war was also a turning point for the politics of opposition worldwide, not least in Southern 
Africa. The ‘human rights’ principles on which the war had been fought -  i.e., against nazism and 
fascism -  began more loudly than ever to serve as the basis for a global questioning of the 
humanity of colonial occupation itself. Mounting anti-colonial protest in the Caribbean, Asia, and 
Africa combined at this time with the Cold War to produce the ‘development dialogue’. As we 
have seen, the British Colonial Development Act of 1940 had presaged a ‘developmental’ turn of 
some sort.
4.3 Colonial Zimbabwe in a Nationalist World
The early postwar development dialogue was conducted while the bulk of the African continent 
remained under colonial occupation. This meant that colonial authorities streamlined the 
application of the new development wisdom to suit their late colonial needs. In British Africa, the
19 Commissioner of Police quoted in van Onselen (1976), p. 212.
20 See Phimister and van Onselen (1997).
21 See Phimister and van Onselen (1997), p. 177, and Bond (1998), p. 62.
22 See Phimister (2000a).
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general strategy pursued was one of improving the efficiency of the peasant sector -  in what has 
been called the ‘second colonial occupation’ -  while nurturing friendly African bourgeoisies in 
preparation for neo-colonial transition.23 This was a lame version of the ‘modernisation’ vision of 
the time, seeking technical welfare fixes and setting out to transform neither ‘peasants into 
workers’ nor ‘tribals into nationals’. In East and Central Africa, where there existed significant 
settler elements, the strategy gained a further twist under the labels of ‘multi-racialism’ and 
‘partnership’; this now combined with stepped-up political repression and even metropolitan 
military mobilisation, as against the Mau Mau. What also occurred at this time was a re-assertion 
of white power in Southern Africa. Its epicentre was South Africa, with the rise of the National 
Party (NP) in 1948, but it carried all across the sub-continent, notably Portuguese Angola and 
Mozambique, South African-occupied Namibia, and settler colonial Southern Rhodesia. For the 
following decade or so, colonial developmentalism and ‘partnership’ kept its eyes on African 
nationalism, white supremacism, and the Cold War.24
Postwar Reshuffling
In colonial Zimbabwe the war and postwar periods witnessed the diversification of the economy 
in secondary industry and the active involvement of the state in the process. Between 1939 and 
1948, the number of factories increased from 294 to 473, expanding industrial output five-fold.25 
Food-processing, construction, clothing and textile industries sprouted, while the state facilitated 
these by making major public investments in iron-and-steel production and cotton-spinning 
plants. By the early 1950s, manufacturing was contributing as much as 15 per cent to national 
income. However, the sector was also becoming highly concentrated, as local capital was, by the 
late 1940s, being overrun by transnational capital, especially British. Meanwhile, the white 
agrarian bourgeoisie was undergoing changes of its own: in 1945-48 it expanded its tobacco 
production three-fold, as white farmers shifted land away from maize, to become the major 
foreign-exchange earners.26 This had two implications: first, the provisions of the Land 
Apportionment Act were re-invoked with urgency, thereby accelerating the ongoing process of 
removing Africans from lands designated as European; and second, in the process of agricultural 
restructuring, the agrarian bourgeoisie divested itself of whatever interest it previously had in
23 See Low and Lonsdale (1976).
24 See Birmingham and Ranger (1983).
25 See Phimister (2000b), pp. 32-33.
26 Arrighi (1973b), pp. 350-58.
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expanding the home market. In turn, interest in the expansion of the home market was being 
taken over by the manufacturing bourgeoisie.
The constraints of disarticulated accumulation remained in place, despite a series of 
internal and external stimulants that kept the economy on a generally healthy growth path. The 
consumer market expanded as the number of Africans in wage employment more than doubled 
between 1936 and 1956 to 600,000; to this was added the rapid postwar influx of European 
immigrants, taking the white population from 80,000 to 125,000 between 1945 and 1950.27 Yet, 
ISI ran into a balance of payments crunch in 1947-48, followed by the imposition of import 
controls. After 1948, the double event of a preferential trade accord with South Africa and NP- 
induced capital flight from South Africa boosted both Southern Rhodesia’s trade in manufactures 
and the pace of capital formation. The establishment of the Central African Federation in 1953 
then gave a further stimulus. Yet, these only bought time until the late 1950s when the 
contradictions of disarticulated accumulation imposed themselves once again.28
The changes to the constellation of settler capitalist interests produced new conflicts and 
alliances. Manufacturing was now on the offensive, seeking a policy framework to broaden the 
home market; this was contrary to white agrarian capital whose interest in functional dualism was 
reinforced by its new export orientation. Mining capital was also a beneficiary of functional 
dualism, but at this juncture it sided with manufacturing in fear of radical nationalist outcomes.29 
Yet, they all agreed on the expansion of white Southern Rhodesian power into colonial Zambia 
and Malawi via the Federation.30 Nationalist politics, meanwhile, arrived on the postwar scene 
with mass mobilisations by the newly-urbanised African population, manifest most notably in the 
1945 country-wide railway strike and 1948 General Strike, led in large part by the African 
National Voice Association (Voice) which was able to bridge the rural-urban divide by 
combining urban industrial action with rural resistance to the LAA. The result of inter-capitalist 
and class conflict was a series of new policy directions and compromises from the late 1940s 
onwards: the settler colonial state signed up to the new GATT, but wrote its preferential accord 
with South Africa into it by promising to form a Customs Union in due course;31 it persuaded the 
British government to relinquish colonial Zambia and Malawi for the establishment of the 
Federation; it began to nurture an African bourgeoisie in a policy turn away from ‘separate 
development’, towards ‘partnership’; and it set out on a ‘second colonial occupation’ of its own,
27 Arrighi (1973b), p. 351, and Phimister (2000b), pp. 32-33.
28 Arrighi (1973b), pp. 350-51, and Phimister (2000b), 34-42.
29 Arrighi (1973b), pp. 358-59.
30 Birmingham and Ranger (1983), p. 363.
31 Phimister (1988), pp. 257-58.
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in the form of the World Bank-supported Land Husbandry Act (1951), adding to it the policy 
emphasis of turning a sizeable amount of semi-proletarians into full-time, industrial workers, 
disconnected from the land.
The moral expression of this balance of class forces in the specificity of the settler 
colonial state might well be understood as one of ‘turning peasants into workers but not 
nationals’. It predated by a handful of years Arthur Lewis’s rigorous academic formulations 
regarding the agrarian question, but differed only in its racial explicitness. Recall Lewis’s 
reasoning that, ‘if the capitalist sector depends upon the peasants for food, it is essential to get the 
peasants to produce more, while if at the same time they can be prevented from enjoying the full 
fruit of their extra production, wages can be reduced relatively to the capitalist surplus’.32 The 
Southern Rhodesian version was articulated by Garfield Todd (before becoming Prime Minister) 
thus: ‘[w]e do not want native peasants. We want the bulk of them working in the mines and 
farms and in the European areas and we could absorb them and their families’.33
Towards Neo-colonialism: ‘Partnership'
This vision reflected the new power of manufacturing. As a ‘compromise’, however, it was by no 
means secure: agrarian capital remained resentful, as the new policy direction struck at the heart 
of its economic interests and moral vision. The policy sought the dual strategy of expanding the 
productivity of African agriculture and stabilising the African workforce; this necessarily implied 
the encouragement of competition between settlers and Africans in the agricultural and labour 
markets, which in turn implied the dismantling of the structures of separate development. It meant 
the creation of an African bourgeoisie, in Arrighi’s words, ‘both as a requirement for 
industrialisation and as an insurance against the mass of Africans’.34 Accordingly, the economic 
project required a political framework to complement it, termed ‘partnership’, which white 
agrarian capital and white workers both loathed. The totality of inter- and intra-class conflict 
produced a number of timid reforms, including: the amendment of labour legislation (Industrial 
Conciliation Act, 1959) to accommodate skilled African workers but within ‘multi-racial’ trade 
unions still dominated by whites; the amendment of the electoral system to accommodate the 
African elite and prevent it from allying with peasant-workers; and the reinforcement of the 
security apparatus (Subversive Activities Act) to suppress dissent.35 Between 1953 and 1963, the
32 Lewis (1958), p. 434.
33 Arrighi (1973b), p. 362.
34 Arrighi (1973b), p. 360.
35 See Rafitopoulos (1997).
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‘partnership’ framework was extended to colonial Zambia and Malawi within the terms of the 
Federation.
The reforms failed spectacularly, overwhelmed by the class contradictions unleashed by 
the LHA and the constraints of disarticulated accumulation. The LHA set out under the 
assumption that the ‘ecological crisis’ of the reserves was due to the ‘backward’ farming methods 
of Africans (not to their displacement onto marginal lands). The LHA thus prescribed an 
intensification in the ‘development of the reserves’, now in an amended ‘modernisation’ form, 
entailing: the reshaping of settlement patterns, the standardisation of land holdings, the 
introduction of saleable land and stock rights to a limited amount of African farmers, and various 
conservation methods, including destocking.36 It is generally agreed that the LHA did not actually 
get far off the ground but that it nonetheless aggravated virtually everyone: it threatened the 
security of the migrant workers in town and country who stood to lose their land rights; and it 
constrained the accumulation strategies of the richer peasants within the reserves who now faced 
landholding ceilings, even reductions.37 A 1958 report of the Southern Rhodesian African 
National Congress (ANC) expressed the grievance and warned against this settler colonial version 
of ‘modernisation’ thus:
[a]ny act whose effects undermine the security of our small land rights, 
dispossess us of our little wealth in the form of cattle, disperse us from our 
ancestral homes in the reserves and reduce us to the status of vagabonds and a 
source of cheap labour for the farmers, miners and industrialists -  such an act 
will turn the African people against society to the detriment of the peace and 
progress of this country.38
In the second half of the decade, both the pace of the LHA and its contradictions escalated, 
creating a countryside amenable to nationalist mobilisation. It is notable that despite the 
‘modernisation’ thrust of the LHA, the institutions of ‘indirect rule’ were not actually set aside, 
but were reinforced in new ways in the interest of social order. On the one hand, the number of 
chiefs was ‘rationalised’; on the other, their profile was raised by the establishment of larger 
consultative forums, namely the Provincial Chiefs’ Assemblies.39
The LHA was abandoned in the early 1960s, along with the whole of ‘partnership’. The 
reasons have to do as much with the rise of mass nationalism in this specific historical moment as
36 See Alexander (1993).
37 It is estimated that by the end of the decade, 30 percent of reserve producers were fanning 63 per cent of 
all cultivated land; see Phimister (1993); see also Alexander et al. (2000), ch. 3.
38 Quoted in Phimister (1993), pp. 227-28.
39 Alexander (1993), pp. 27-28.
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with the more organic tendencies of disarticulated accumulation. This latter dimension was 
broached by Phimister in his linking of the fate of the LHA to the ‘limitations of import- 
substitution industrialisation’.40 He noted that after the 1947 balance of payments crisis, industrial 
growth had resumed but faith in it had now been shaken; moreover, industrial growth was not 
managing to absorb the ‘unlimited supplies of labour’ (as per Lewis). Therefore, the initial 
compromise between manufacturing and agrarian capital was, by the mid-1950s, no longer 
driving the LHA, or partnership for that matter, but a different concern, specifically with the 
social, economic, and political crisis of the reserves, and the settler colonial state more generally. 
The disjunction between production and consumption then combined, on the one hand, with a 
drop in copper prices and Federation revenues and, on the other, with excessive importation of 
luxury goods to produce a new balance of payments crisis in 1957. Thereafter, as Bond has 
shown in detail, a confluence of tight money and capital flight led to a deflationary spiral in the 
early 1960s.41 But pace Bond, this deflation was not a ‘classic crisis of overaccumulation’ but of 
disarticulated accumulation specifically; the early 1960s were boom years in the centre. The 
point to emphasise is that, despite its industrial aspirations, the policy emphasis confronted 
neither the basic export orientation of the economy, nor the constraints of the home market 
(functional dualism) -  nor indeed the nature of the ultra-imperial monetary order which was 
unkind to ISI. The contradictions of the settler colonial state were part and parcel of the 
contradictions of global order in the nationalist period.
This applies to all dimensions of the partnership period, not least the rise of mass 
nationalism. Mass nationalism in colonial Zimbabwe may have been catalysed and given its 
cross-class specificity by the LHA, but it resonated with the nationalism of the continent as a 
whole. At this time, East and West Africa were decolonising, led by Ghana, while Southern 
Africa, led by Angola, was setting out on a protracted period of armed struggle. In colonial 
Zimbabwe, nationalism was not yet radicalised; moreover, it was disunited, as was the urban- 
based trade union movement which was providing the nationalist movement with its 
organisational resources and petty-bourgeois leadership. The perennial problems of organising 
across the rural-urban divide were being taken seriously by successive nationalist parties, as well 
as by nationalist-minded trade unionists, but not with the efficacy that had previously been 
characteristic of the Voice.
However, it operated under the terms of a new global mode of rule which was imposing 
itself on semi-proletarian politics everywhere. The Zimbabwean labour movement was subject to
40 Phimister (1993), pp. 231-32.
41 Bond (1998), pp. 75-77.
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ICFTU and AFL-CIO funding and political pressure to develop along ‘industrial’ lines -  not 
‘political’ and rural-urban. As discussed in Chapter 2, divisive funding practices affected 
adversely the course of trade unionism and its relationship to the nationalist movement.42 To this 
contributed also the escalation of political repression after 1959, ushered in by the declaration of a 
state of emergency and the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act (LOMA). At this time, nationalist 
leaders were arrested and nationalist parties banned, splintering into ZAPU and ZANU and going 
underground, only to re-emerge in the rural areas later in the decade, radicalised and armed. In 
the process, the urban-based trade union movement was subsumed in fragments under respective 
nationalist parties and further marginalised, as the epicentre of the liberation movement shifted to 
the countryside.
The economic and political crisis of the late 1950s reshuffled once again the constellation 
of class forces. The toppling of Todd by his cabinet in 1958 reflected the changing balance, 
bringing also the ‘partnership’ project to a close. As Arrighi observed, a black bourgeoisie did not 
emerge in time to defend a neo-colonial solution; instead politics polarised between a cross-class 
African nationalism (led by a disaffected black petty-bourgeoisie) and white supremacism 
(bringing together white agrarian capital, white workers, and white petty-bourgeois elements)43 
The latter camp rallied around the reactionary platform of the Rhodesian Front to win the 
elections of 1962; thereafter, the Federation also collapsed, and Zambia and Malawi embarked on 
the neo-colonial journey on their own.
Neo-colonialism Aborted: UDI
The Unilateral Declaration of Independence on 11 November 1965 marked a dramatic change of 
direction for the settler colonial state. Renamed ‘Rhodesia’, it parted ways with the general trends 
of the continent and stepped up its commitment to the white power projects of Southern Africa. 
At a time when nationalism was replacing racism as a principle of global order, Rhodesia was 
thus also bucking the new and fragile norms of ‘international society’. The response by the Non- 
Aligned Movement was swift, calling on Britain to resume its responsibilities for the 
independence of its colony. However, military action of the kind undertaken against the Mau Mau 
was ruled out, and instead partial sanctions were invoked. In 1968, the United Nations resolved to 
impose mandatory multilateral sanctions, banning economic relations with Rhodesia, including
42 See Raftopoulos (1997) and Rafitopoulos (1996).
43 Arrighi (1973b), pp. 362-64.
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the shipment of oil; but these sanctions were defective by design and intention, as we will soon 
see.
What the sanctions did manage to do, however, was to turn Rhodesia into a decidedly 
inward-looking economy by cutting out many of its basic imports, with the glaring exception of 
oil; and to galvanise previously competing fractions of white capital behind a common Rhodesian 
cause. Thus, white farmers did not insist that their foreign exchange earnings were ‘strategic’ to 
the economic well being of the country; they shifted land and labour away from tobacco and 
towards industrial crops (cotton) and food crops (maize, wheat) to supply the light manufacturing 
and food processing industries of the domestic economy; cotton production expanded by 800 per 
cent in 1965-72. Likewise, transnational capital, which initially opposed UDI, did not merely 
comply with state polices; the manufacturing sector led the economy into an industrial boom until 
1974, notching up an annual average growth rate of 9 per cent and contributing to a GDP growth 
rate of 6 per cent.44 As D.G. Clarke further observed, transnational capital (mainly British, US, 
Canadian, and South African) neither fled nor ran down its assets, but expanded the size and 
importance of its capital stock by illegal direct investment, amounting to as much as 37 per cent 
of total investment in 1966-76 45
The industrial boom owed itself to a number of enabling conditions. One was that, during 
the preceding crisis, the economy had been operating below its industrial capacity by as much as 
60 per cent, and hence was able to restore high levels of production rapidly.46 Another was the 
role of the state, which duly orchestrated all aspects of the industrial boom to become ‘one of the 
most centrally controlled capitalist economies in the world’.47 As E.S. Pangeti has shown, the 
groundwork for a ‘siege economy’ was laid on the eve of UDI, with the signing of a new 
preferential trade agreement with South Africa which affected 75 per cent of Southern Rhodesia’s 
manufactured exports to South Africa; and the Exchange Control Act which gave the state 
enhanced regulatory powers over its current and capital accounts. The trade agreement 
constituted the lifeline of the UDI economy, providing it with a market, source of investment 
capital, and transit routes; while the exchange control provisions enabled the targeting of foreign 
exchange on essential imports and the forcing of transnational firms to reinvest their profits 
locally. In turn, the liquidity that was created was directed by the state ‘to those manufacturers
44 See the contributions by Xavier M. Kadhani, Daniel B. Ndlela, and Clever Mumbengeni, in Mandaza ed. 
(1986), Pangeti (2000), and Bond (1998), ch. 5.
45 Clarke (1980), pp. 30, 35,47-48.
46 Bond (1998), p. 123.
47 Pangeti (2000), p. 69.
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who had the capacity to quickly and efficiently produce the required import substitutes’.48 These 
consisted primarily of transnational firms which both diversified their operations and enhanced 
their monopoly positions: by 1978, about 10 per cent of industrial units produced 60 per cent of 
industrial output. The state itself undertook half of the total capital invested, expanding the 
capacity of the transport, energy, posts and telecommunications sectors, among others. It also 
flouted rules governing technology transfer; and it tightly coordinated the backward and forward 
linkages, such that by 1980,44 per cent of agricultural output was used by domestic industry.49
A third enabling condition was the external one. Sanctions created a need for ISI, and ISI 
was facilitated by low profile encouragement and outright sanctions busting. The implementation 
of sanctions by the UK was slow, allowing the UDI regime to stock up on gold, after it had also 
withdrawn its foreign exchange reserves from London. The regime then defaulted on British, US, 
and World Bank debts, only to resume receiving loans from Swiss and Austrian banks and 
thereby to expand its foreign debt to nearly US$700 million by the late 1970s.50 The British naval 
blockade of the port of Beira in Mozambique, claiming to be enforcing the oil embargo, was 
being circumvented by Western oil firms (Shell, BP, Mobil, Caltex, Total) at Maputo further 
south, with the tacit consent of the British government. Moreover, the British government did not 
prevent British firms from transferring capital to their Rhodesian subsidiaries, nor did it restrict 
emigration to Rhodesia to deprive the war machine of skilled labour. Then again the combat 
capacity of the Rhodesian Air Force was expanded five-fold with covert US assistance, while the 
US Congress also acted overtly to legislate the busting of sanctions for the purpose of obtaining 
Rhodesian chrome, on ‘strategic’ grounds.51 Perhaps most crucially, the mandatory UN sanctions 
were not extended to South Africa or Portugal, thereby allowing white supremacism the room to 
manoeuvre. Compared to the first four years of sanctions by the transatlantic alliance against 
Cuba, the Rhodesian ones were not serious. On the contrary, they served as a smokescreen for 
transatlantic support for white supremacism.52
The fourth condition of the industrial boom constituted also the condition of its eventual 
demise from the mid-1970s onwards. ISI was implemented at the same time as functional dualism 
was reinforced. In other words, the industrial boom did not occur on the basis of a profound 
widening of the home market: it remained dependent on the cheap labour of blacks and the luxury 
consumption of whites. Despite state-led coordination of inter-sectoral development, the exercise
48 Pangeti (2000), p. 58.
49 See Pangeti (2000), p. 63, and Bond (1998), pp. 122-24.
50 Bond and Manyanya (2002), pp. 15-18.
51 See Thompson (1985), ch. 5.
52 See also Mandaza (1986b).
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was largely confined to the production of luxury goods, not wage goods, such that sectoral and 
social disarticulation remained effectively in place. By the mid-1970s, capital expenditure 
became excessive; between 1974 and 1978 manufacturing production declined by 27 per cent and 
capacity utilisation by 38 per cent; and these were accompanied by massive job losses. As Bond 
put it (in a virtual endorsement of de Janvry): ‘[t]he economy was cemented into a disarticulation 
of production and consumption that portended inevitable crisis at some stage’.53 This 
‘cementedness’ underlies a particular type of capitalist crisis that pertains to peripheral 
accumulation.
The fifth and final condition for the industrial boom accompanied functional dualism and 
consisted in the reinforcement of direct and indirect rule. With the abandonment of ‘partnership’ 
in the early 1960s, there was an emphatic return to the segregationism of the pre-Federation 
years, under the label of ‘community development’. This entailed the ‘retraditionalisation’ of land 
and law in the reserves, and the resurrection of ‘tribal authority’ where it had been jaded in the 
course of the LHA. A series of new pieces of legislation proceeded to re-codify tradition and 
segregation, while topping up the role of chiefs in political life by co-opting them into the 
legislature for the first time, on the grounds that they were the ‘genuine’ representatives of 
Africans. Indirect rule was thus used as a buffer against nationalist mobilisation.54 At the same 
time, direct rule was stepped up: amendments to the ICA imposed funding restrictions on trade 
unions and removed their freedom to strike; while the LOMA was invoked and labour leaders 
detained en masse.55
Liberation War and Neo-colonial Settlement
Even before the economic crisis had set in, the settler colonial state was facing a political crisis in 
the form of guerrilla war. After a long period of disorganisation and confusion following the 
crack-downs of the early 1960s, the nationalist movement re-emerged in its fractured form late in 
the decade, now with military wings -  ZIPRA for ZAPU and ZANLA for ZANU -  and a rural 
social base. The guerrilla war was effectively launched in 1972, after the parties had spent several 
years in Zambia preparing: securing external support (Soviet for ZAPU and Chinese for ZANU); 
gaining military training; establishing rural contacts and building up arms aid  ammunition; and 
opening a second front by ZANU in Tete province of Mozambique (which in 1970 had been 
secured by FRELIMO in its own war against Portugal). Despite bouts of debilitating nationalist
53 Bond (1998), p. 130.
54 See Alexander (1993), ch. 3.
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infighting in the mid-1970s, the struggle was intensified from 1976 onwards, even temporarily 
unified, gaining enhanced support externally from the Frontline states (formed in 1974) and the 
newly-liberated Mozambique (in 1975), as well as internally from the social fallout of the 
economic crisis.
As has recently been pointed out, there is consensus all around that the entry of guerrillas 
into rural communities ‘demanded an adaptation to local agendas and ideas’.56 For Ranger, this 
had originally meant that the guerrillas adopted a peasant political programme; for David Lan, it 
meant that they had inserted themselves into local ritual systems for ancestral blessing and 
protection; for Norma Kriger, it meant that they manipulated rural cleavages (of gender, age, and 
ethnicity), and relied on the systematic use of force, not lofty nationalist ideals, for mobilisation; 
while, more recently, for Alexander et a l , with reference to ZIPRA, it has meant the development 
of a largely secular ‘moral economy’ through which mobilisation was broadened and violence 
contained.57 Without delving deeply into the debates, two points ought to be stressed. The first is 
that the shift of the nationalist struggle to the countryside indeed produced a moral economy of a 
particular sort: this was between guerrillas and ‘the peasantry’, which elevated the ‘land cause’ in 
the political platform of the nationalist movement. The nationalism of the 1970s was unlike the 
nationalism of the 1950s (ANC, etc.) insofar as it now had a predominantly rural base; and unlike 
the nationalism of the 1940s (the Voice) insofar as it was now unable organisationally to bridge 
the rural-urban divide. This guerrilla-peasant relationship was to survive in the post-independence 
period in the form of a rhetorical premium for ‘the peasantry* in the national debate. As a moral 
economy, it has never been unproblematic, or inviolable, or determinate of politics in any 
‘culturalist’ sense, but nonetheless able, when accessed, to exercise unique power of judgement 
over the fate of national liberation.
The second general point, emphasised by Mandaza, is that the nationalist movement 
remained weak in crucial ways, politically and ideologically.58 First, it remained fragmented; this 
proved to be a perennial source of distrust and internecine fighting and a ready-made division to 
be exploited by common enemies, as well as by the nationalist leaderships themselves in a 
legitimacy crisis. In the course of the war, the split detracted from the movement’s military 
potential against the Rhodesian forces; after independence, it spiralled into a fierce and 
‘ethnicised’ conflict in an all-out struggle for power. Second, the movement remained 
ideologically cloudy, without a clearly articulated socialist understanding of itself or the future.
55 See Brittain and Raftopoulos (1997).
56 Alexander et a l (2000), p. 159.
57 Alexander et al (2000), ch. 7, Ranger (1985), Lan (1985), Kriger (1992).
58 Mandaza (1986b), pp. 29-33.
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This detracted from political organisation and weakened the hand of the semi-proletariat both 
during the war and in the post-independence struggle against the neo-colonial settlement.
Neo-colonialism indeed triumphed in 1979 at Lancaster House. A neo-colonial settlement 
had always been the objective of the British, US, and even South African governments, though it 
changed urgency and shades over time, especially after the inception of guerrilla war and 
(coincidentally) with the defeat of the United States in Southeast Asia. From 1976 onwards, the 
United States joined Britain in an initiative to negotiate ‘majority rule’, by which they meant a 
new version of ‘partnership’, consisting in a power sharing arrangement, and entailing, inter alia, 
over-representation for the white community in the legislature and respect for private property. 
The rationale for a more concerted engagement with the conflict was expressed thus by Secretary 
of State Henry Kissinger:
We are facing a situation now in which a so-called armed struggle is already 
taking place in Rhodesia and is beginning in Namibia. The history of these 
struggles is that they lead to escalating violence, drawing in more and more 
countries, and have the danger of foreign intervention [i.e., Soviet] and the 
probability of the radicalisation of the whole continent of Africa. For this reason, 
we want to provide a non-violent alternative to this prospect.59
In 1977, a US$1.5 million dollar ‘Zimbabwe Development Fund’ was mooted, alongside ongoing 
efforts to create a black bourgeoisie through the World Bank-funded Whitsun Foundation and 
other means.60 All the while, Rhodesian forces were crossing into the Frontline states, pounding 
their economic infrastructure, and thereby cajoling the Pan-African allies into support for the neo­
colonial proposal.61
4.4 Nationalist Zimbabwe in a Liberalising World
Independence was celebrated on 18 April 1980, in a climate of euphoria and expectation. At long 
last, Zimbabwe was embarking on a nation-building project of its own. As elsewhere, nation- 
building was setting out on a neo-colonial footing; and as elsewhere, what ‘national self- 
determination’ meant was to be a matter of struggle. In the global realm, this was a time in which 
the restructuring of ‘global development’ in the interests of transnational capital and finance was 
well underway; but it remained a bi-polar world whose two poles Zimbabwe straddled by
59 Quoted in Thompson (1985), pp. 158-49.
60 By 1980, about 200 black capitalists had acquired ownership and leaseholds of large-scale farms; see 
Moyo (1995a), p. 4. See also Bond (1998), p. 139, and Thompson (1985), pp. 23-33.
61 See Mandaza (1986b), pp. 34-37.
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professing Marxism-Leninism under conditions of monopoly capitalism. The struggle was, 
quintessential^, one between the semi-proletariat and ultra-imperialism over the political 
orientation of the petty-bourgeois leadership.62
The Neo-colonialism o f ‘Reconciliation'
Neo-colonialism was shrouded in the language of ‘reconciliation’ -  a vivid echo of postwar 
‘partnership’. As Arnold Sibanda put it, ‘this policy, which appeared on the surface as if it were a 
reconciliation of the races, was a fundamental requirement to guarantee the “reconciliation with 
capital’” .63 Its constitutional basis was the ‘willing-buyer, willing-seller’ requirement with respect 
to private property (set to expire in 1990) and the reservation of 20 parliamentary seats out of 100 
for the white constituency of 3 per cent of total (to expire in 1987). Its economic basis was among 
the most unequal in the world. Just 3 per cent of population (the whites) commanded nearly two- 
thirds of national income, while 97 per cent of the population gained the remaining one-third.64 
Agrarian capital, some 6000 mainly white farmers in the late 1970s, held 15.5 million hectares, or 
39 per cent of the land and in the prime agro-ecological regions, while one million African 
households were consigned to 16.4 million hectares, or 41.4 per cent of the land, and in marginal 
agro-ecological regions.65 Industrial and mining capital was essentially wholly owned by local 
whites and foreign interests.
Zimbabwe inherited a typical pattern of disarticulated accumulation. The UDI period had 
seen significant moves towards sectoral articulation and industrial development, but this had been 
undertaken without the widening of the home market. On the one hand, nearly half of agricultural 
output was feeding industry by independence, and industry was, next to South Africa, the most 
diversified in sub-Saharan Africa. Zimbabwe produced 7,000 different products, ranging from 
food and clothing, to fertilisers, chemicals, metal products, electrical machinery and equipment, 
and motor vehicles (assembled locally); manufacturing accounted for 25 per cent of GDP and 
earned 40 per cent of foreign exchange.66 On the other hand, the local market was a luxury 
market, effectively restricted to less than one million people, out of a total of 7 million.67 
Moreover, agriculture remained the most important sector: it may have contributed only 13 per 
cent to GDP, but 70 per cent of the population depended directly on the land, manufacturing
62 Mandaza (1986a and 1986b) and Sibanda (1988).
63 Sibanda (1988), p. 261.
64 Stoneman and Cliffe (1989), p. 42.
65 Moyo (1995a).
66 Mlambo (2000a), p. 80.
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relied upon it, it earned 40 per cent of foreign exchange, and provided one-third of formal 
employment.68
What was non-conventional about neo-colonialism in Zimbabwe was its political 
dispensation. As has been observed, formal power had not been transferred to an African petty- 
bourgeoisie alone; in the ‘post-white settler colonial state’, the black petty-bourgeoisie was to 
share power with the settlers.69 This produced a particular scenario, characterised not only by 
resentment, but also by the instrumentalisation of race by both whites and blacks in the course of 
neo-colonial transition.70 Besides using the settler presence to justify developmental delays, the 
black petty-bourgeoisie exploited it to extract concessions under monopoly capitalism; while the 
white bourgeoisie made strategic concessions by installing blacks into management positions and 
displaying them as ‘window dressing’ for monopoly capitalism. Yet other features were more 
conventional. Monopoly capitalism left little room for accumulation by the aspiring bourgeoisie 
other than through the state; while ‘sideline contradictions’, of the ‘ethnic’ variety, proliferated in 
the course of intra-petty-bourgeois conflict. As Arnold Sibanda surmised, under neo-colonialism 
‘ [t]he ethnic diversity becomes employed not to enrich the cultural heritage of the nation but to 
advance the class interests of groups or segments. The racial divisions are utilised not to entrench 
national unity but to consolidate class domination and exploitation’.71
The battle was not yet over, however. Significant class-conscious voices remained in the 
leadership, including Prime Minister Robert Mugabe’s own, enough to concern the ultra-imperial 
alliance that it still did not wield sufficient power in Zimbabwe. Indeed, the government did not 
allow imperial minds to rest; it continued to employ distinct Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, even as it 
demobilised peasants and workers and deployed security forces against them Suffice it here to 
sketch the state’s relations with capital and the incremental process of ‘civilisation’. The process 
was strewn with contradictions and half-measures. From the start, the government sought to 
reassure foreign capital by appointing whites in key cabinet posts (the Ministries of Agriculture 
and Trade/Commerce), joining the IMF and World Bank, and paying Rhodesia’s debts. It also 
drew up a new investment code which invited (but also regulated) foreign capital; it relaxed 
financial controls partially; and it invited donors, via a major conference (ZIMCORD), to 
contribute to national development. Donors, for their part, felt that Zimbabwe was
67 Stoneman and Cliffe (1989), p. 43.
68 See Weiner et al. (1985), pp. 251-52.
69 Mandaza (1986a andl986b) and Sibanda (1988).
70 In East Africa, and Uganda in particular, race was instrumentalised as well, culminating in the expulsion 
of Asians; the difference here was that the Asian community neither shared formal power nor held a 
significant stake in the economy beyond commercial interests.
71 Sibanda (1988), pp. 266-67.
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‘underborrowed’, with a debt service ratio of only 10 per cent, and so eagerly pledged aid (much 
of it tied).72 Despite such conciliatory moves, relations with capital remained tense, given the 
government’s stated ‘socialist’ agenda, and they would also sour periodically on account of the 
government’s stubborn ‘indiscipline’ -  such as in its denunciation of the US invasion of Grenada, 
its abstention in the UN vote on the Soviet shooting-down of a South Korean airliner, and its 
outspoken dissent over US policy in Southern Africa, particularly its support for UNITA in 
Angola.73 Such indiscipline was to be sanctioned by the curtailment of aid, slow growth in foreign 
direct investment, and even some disinvestment.74
Sanctions of this sort were part of a larger imperial project to ensure that an extroverted 
class alliance prevailed in Zimbabwe. Besides the government’s radical rhetoric, transnational 
capital was also concerned with the inward-orientation and protectionism of domestic industry. 
And at this juncture, industry (now represented by CZI) and government, however distrustful of 
each other, managed to discern common interests, for the government wished to place industrial 
growth at the centre of its redistributive agenda. The other sectors, mining, commerce, and 
agriculture, maintained a cautious stance towards government as well, but were inclined towards 
the more open order espoused by transnational capital. The creation of an extroverted alliance 
therefore depended significantly on the conversion of industry to an outward orientation. Such a 
campaign was spearheaded by the World Bank throughout the decade, and included the 
establishment of an export-revolving fund for the sector in 1985.75 But other, more systemic, 
means were also employed to pry open the economy. In 1982, Zimbabwe was struck by a balance 
of payments crisis -  induced by South Africa’s destabilisation campaign, the beginning of a 
three-year drought, and the world slump -  which the IMF seized as a matter of course. As Colin 
Stoneman observed, ‘within a year of joining from an “underborrowed” position, Zimbabwe was 
drawing on a stand-by arrangement and was, therefore, in the position of being dictated to in its 
economic policies’.76 The icing on the ‘reconciliation’ cake was the IMF’s rewarding of apartheid 
South Africa with a loan in the same year.
72 See Chimombe (1986) and Bond (1998), ch. 11.
73 Sibanda (1988), pp. 258-60.
74 Chimombe (1986), p. 137.
75 See Stoneman (1989).
76 Stoneman (1989), p. 41.
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Nation-building and its Contradictions
The government thus embarked on neo-colonial nation-building, inherent in which were the 
familiar contradictions: it sought ‘national planning’ in the context of monopoly capitalism, and 
industrialisation against the objective logic of the centre-periphery structure. The development 
strategy, labelled ‘growth and equity’, was proclaimed in 1981 and elaborated in subsequent 
‘national development plans’.77 The strategy was influenced by the reformism of UN agencies 
(UNCTAD and UNDP), and echoed the ‘redistribution with growth’ thinking of the 1970s which 
subordinated distributional matters to the pace and requirements of growth. The strategy did not 
conform to the new development orthodoxy insofar as it called upon industry, not agriculture, to 
lead growth, and sought to protect it from competition. It diverged, moreover, insofar as 
government reserved for itself an active developmental role, as in the coordination of agro­
industrial linkages, and repeatedly stated its intention to nationalise the means of production 
(though limited progress was made in this regard). The agrarian dimension of the strategy had 
two principal objectives, the raising of productivity and the safeguarding of national food self- 
sufficiency. Within this framework, it conducted a lawful land redistribution exercise and 
invested heavily in health, education, and infrastructure for the smallholder sector -  with the 
exception of Matabeleland, as we will see.
The contradictions of nation-building appeared as a centre-periphery game of hide-and- 
seek. The first two years experienced rapid growth, due largely to the lifting of sanctions, influx 
of aid, and good rains. The boom was accompanied by large increases in social spending, 
enactment of minimum wage legislation, and the inception of ‘accelerated resettlement’. But the 
balance of payments crisis in 1982 brought the contradictions quickly to the fore -  and 
government to the doorstep of the IMF. Over the next several months, the currency was devalued 
nearly by half, interest rates pushed upward, and maize subsidies and development resources 
curtailed. Despite government’s insistence that austerity had been ‘home grown’ (i.e., a genuine 
act of national self-determination), the events demonstrated how little control it really had over 
‘growth and equity’ in Zimbabwe. In 1984, government then fell out with the IMF. The rift was 
prompted by a budget deficit and new austerity measures demanded by the Fund. At this juncture, 
government sought to regain the initiative by rejecting the demands, paying its outstanding 
obligations to the Fund, and turning its back to it. Thereafter, it set out ‘on its own’, but not 
without exercising ‘self-discipline’; indeed, the fiscal outlays of the early boom years were not to 
be seen again, while the pace of land resettlement itself dropped dramatically. The stance was
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sustained for three years, until finance came knocking again. The country’s foreign debt since 
independence had ballooned to US$2.2 billion and its debt payments risen to 32 per cent of 
exports. Government now deemed it necessary to approach commercial banks, Standard 
Chartered and Barclays in particular.78
This option was not pre-determined, of course. At this time, government was seeking to 
improve its image more generally, and to overcome the climate of mutual distrust with capital. 
The economy had not re-entered crisis, but it was clear that dynamic growth remained unfulfilled 
under the existing pattern of accumulation. Thus, in 1986, government began dialogue with CZI, 
along with UNIDO and the World Bank, over the future of the industrial sector.79 This was a 
process that led to the long-coveted conversion of manufacturing capital to an outward 
orientation, the realignment of capitals across the sectors behind a common policy stance, and the 
incremental conversion of government itself. The new policy thrust -  though still short of 
liberalisation -  was reflected in the implementation of a series of export financing and promotion 
schemes, first in manufacturing and then in mining and agriculture.80
The warming up to capital had deeper roots in the accumulation strategies of an aspiring 
black bourgeoisie, its compradorisation, and the changing class balances that underpinned the 
nation-building project. Petty accumulation accelerated early after independence on the fringes of 
monopoly capitalism -  in petty commerce, real estate, and hospitality. This occurred alongside a 
rapid de-racialisation of the public sector, by presidential directive, to compensate for the racial 
closures of the private sector. The two moves synergised, such that, by 1983, Prime Minister 
Mugabe was publicly expressing concern over the accumulation of private wealth within the 
party’s ranks. This led in 1984 to the adoption of a ‘leadership code’ which forbade the straddling 
of public service and business.81 But the exercise was hampered from the start, for 
implementation demanded class suicide. Accumulation proceeded apace, via the state and on the 
terms of imperialism. This was the combined process of ‘corruption’, as revealed clearly in the 
Willowgate scandal in 1989; and ‘compradorisation’ which, as Bond has shown, saw a small but 
powerful clique establish itself within the financial circuit.82 The process was racially charged, as 
both blacks and whites instrumentalised race, but its result was the reinforcement of the neo­
colonial status quo.
77 See the discussion in Stoneman and Cliffe (1989), pp. 42-45.
78 See Bond (1988), p. 344-47.
79 For the Bank’s role, see Stoneman (1989).
80 See Skalnes (1995), ch. 7.
81 Sibanda (1988), pp. 262-63.
82 Bond (1998), ch. 7.
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The process of embourgeoisement did not play out only in race relations, but also in the 
realm of ‘ethnic’ relations. The nation-building project witnessed a ‘petty-bourgeois scramble’ to 
monopolise the state and bar other fractions from it;83 it did so by subordinating ethnic diversity 
to the requirements of accumulation -  with tragic consequences. Soon after independence, elite 
rivalry spiralled out of control and into a brutal crackdown by the state against ‘dissidents’ in the 
Matabeleland provinces.84 As Alexander et al. have shown, the competition between ZANU and 
ZAPU that pre-existed had never been expressed in ethnic terms during the liberation struggle. 
But following ZANU(PF)’s large electoral triumph over PF-ZAPU in February 1980, party elites 
failed to reach an accommodation; instead, they ‘scrambled’ and ‘ethnicised’. The rivalry was 
further manipulated by the South African state in the course of its regional destabilisation 
campaign; the apartheid regime armed one dissident faction, while others remained independent. 
The rivalry climaxed in 1983 when the state deployed a South Korean-trained crack unit, the Fifth 
Brigade, to rout opposition to the ruling party by means of terror tactics and mass killings -  some
6,000 people lost their lives.
Neo-colonial ‘nation-building’ did not pre-determine violence of this sort. What it did do 
is maintain the ground fertile, enabling the petty-bourgeoisie ‘to use the masses as cannon- 
fodder’, and disabling the task of national unification.85 The violence was brought finally to a 
close by the signing of the Unity Agreement in December 1987, reflecting ‘a recognition that 
neither party would proceed on a national level on their own’.86 The Agreement consummated the 
long-evaded marriage of nationalist elites and brought about the absorption of PF-ZAPU into 
ZANU(PF). But still, as an elite accommodation, national unity remained superficial: the events 
in Matabeleland were silenced in a myth of national homogeneity, leaving the masses of 
Matabeleland in ‘a feeling of alienation from the national body politic’87 -  and the ground again 
fertile for conflict of whatever sort in the future. The Unity Accords were a landmark insofar as 
the main source of opposition was absorbed into the ruling party and the ongoing process of 
embourgeoisement facilitated. The main source of contradiction -  between capital and labour -  
intensified.
83 Sibanda (1988), p. 268.
84 The events are detailed in Alexander et al. (2000).
85 Sibanda (1988), p. 265.
86 Raftopoulos (1992), pp. 59-74, quote on p. 71.
87 Alexander et al. (2000), p. 230.
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Civilising Peasant-workers
We have seen how the contradictions of nation-building played out in the realm of inter-capitalist 
relations -  between introverted, extroverted, and aspiring bourgeoisies. These contradictions 
began to be resolved by the conversion of CZI, the cooptation of the black petty-bourgeoisie, and 
the end of ZANU-ZAPU hostilities. Ultimately, they all relied upon a collective management of 
the mainline (capital-labour) contradiction, which played out in the realms of agrarian and labour 
relations.
Besides the subordination of Matabeleland, the neo-colonial state proceeded to ‘put a 
reign on its mass base’ more generally.88 This was the process of civilisation of the popular forces 
through which independence had been won, and was part and parcel of what Mandaza called the 
‘schizophrenia’ of neo-colonialism. The immediate aftermath of independence was animated by 
high expectations and new-found freedoms of civil expression. The conjuncture produced, 
however, what was described as a ‘crisis of expectations’, manifest in an outburst of wildcat 
strikes in urban areas, coal mines, and estates, and a series of high intensity land occupations in 
the countryside. The work stoppages amounted to some 200 in 1980, with some 300,000 
production hours lost, occurring in two waves, one in the week after the national elections, the 
other on the occasion of first officially-approved May Day celebrations. These were sufficient to 
cause a rapid retreat by the government on the parameters of civil expression.89 The response 
came as a mix of carrots and sticks. Government deployed the army to send strikers back to work; 
instituted a statutory minimum wage and enacted legislation vis-a-vis employment conditions; 
recognised workers’ committees and works councils but confined their purview to a limited range 
of workplace issues; organised a single trade union centre for private sector workers, the 
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU); separated them institutionally from public sector 
workers and petty-commodity producers; and imposed a client leadership on the ZCTU. Notably 
also, the inauguration of the ZCTU in February 1981 was sponsored by the ICFTU and the 
AALC (the AFL-CIO’s regional body), in a message clearly targeted at capital -  though the 
centre remained formally non-aligned throughout the decade and went on to receive funding from 
both the ICFTU and WFTU.
The state thus fragmented the semi-proletariat and corporatised the trade union 
movement, centralising it and subordinating it to the requirements of neo-colonial nation- 
building. At the same time, it proclaimed itself, in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, to be the
88 Mandaza (1986b), p. 50.
89 See Sachikonye (1986), Wood (1988), Shadur (1994), and Sachikonye (1996).
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custodian of workers’ interests in the transition to socialism. In practice, corporatisation entailed 
direct state intervention in wage determination and retrenchment procedures, which amounted to 
the short-circuiting of the labour movement. Indeed, the inability of workers to exert influence 
over distributional matters was demonstrated in the recession of 1982-84: minimum wages in 
agricultural and domestic sectors remained below the poverty datum line, while overall real 
wages remained virtually unchanged in the five years of independence.90 In 1985, the colonial 
ICA was replaced by the Labour Relations Act (LRA), without consultation with labour; in the 
event, the LRA retained some of the authoritarian aspects of the ICA, preserving the 
interventionism of the state and curbing strike action via a broad definition of ‘essential services’.
Corporatism did not rest easy, however. From the mid-1980s, the labour movement 
began to assert its independence form the state, not least in reaction to the state’s divergence from 
its stated socialist path. In 1984, the ZCTU General Council suspended corrupt members imposed 
by ZANU(PF) and embarked on a corruption ‘clean-up’, while in 1988 it elected a new and 
dynamic leadership, under Morgan Tsvangirai, with a vision to mobilise and democratise the 
movement, and to detach it from the state. The second half of the decade witnessed the 
emergence of adversarial labour relations, as well as conflict on a range of national political 
matters. Meanwhile, the demand for collective bargaining and independence posed new 
challenges to a ZCTU that remained poorly linked to the grassroots, unable to confront capital, 
financially disabled, and professing a Marxism-Leninism whose nuclear-powered champion was 
disintegrating. Moreover, the ZCTU remained confined to the formally employed, largely in the 
urban areas and commercial farms, with no organisational links to the communal lands. The 
political needs of the semi-proletariat, therefore, could only partly be represented by the ZCTU.
In the countryside, a similar process of demobilisation took place, though uncivil politics 
here were more successful in exacting policies from government, given the legitimacy that the 
liberation government derived from the countryside. As Jocelyn Alexander observed, ‘land 
redistribution was a key demand of the government’s most populous constituency and, at least 
initially, people had access to powerful patrons and the space to act outside state structures’.91 
The rural counterpart to urban wildcat strikes took the form of land occupations. These gained 
pace over the first two years of independence, creating a tense and urgent transition, and 
challenging the credibility of the new government. As Terence Ranger noted with reference to 
Makoni in 1981, there was ‘a widespread sense that government was not acting urgently enough 
and a widespread bitterness at the arrests and prosecutions of peasants who had let the cattle on
90 See Wood (1988), p. 294.
91 Alexander (1993), p. 185.
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white ranches or “trespassed” to cut grass’.92 Government responded initially by providing 
emergency aid towards reconstruction. But by 1982, it was implementing an ‘accelerated 
resettlement programme’ involving land abandoned by white farmers during the war. Excepted 
from this were the Matabeleland provinces, where communal area cattle owners clashed with 
government planning methods in a political context dominated by ZANU-ZAPU rivalry.93 In this 
case, uncivil rural politics did not elicit affirmative land policy but political repression and 
exclusion from the redistributive agenda of nation-building.
While appeasing the rest of the countryside with accelerated action, the government also 
proceeded to restructure rural institutions and consolidate its power over the countryside.94 In the 
first half-decade, government established new district councils with formal power over land 
allocation; new village and ward development committees (VIDCOs and WADCOs); district- and 
province-level committees, comprising of civil servants and chaired by administrators; and the 
office of Provincial Governor, a political appointment. Then in 1988, legislation was enacted to 
amalgamate European and African rural areas into Rural District Councils (RDCs). ‘In theory’, 
Alexander concluded, ‘government had established democratic, secular, and non-racist channels 
for popular participation in planning and policy-making from ‘village’ to provincial level’.95 
However, while the new institutions may have been democratic in form, their substance entailed a 
reaffirmation of the colonial subordination of local government to central government -  an 
adaptation of ‘indirect rule’ -  in accordance with the demands of neo-colonial nation-building. In 
practice, chiefs retained an ambiguous role in the process, until being coopted into rural 
structures: they were appointed as ex-officio members of the new councils, even if against the 
wishes of local committees; they continued to receive a salary, higher than elected leaders; and 
regained control over courts, thereby also reinforcing the late-colonial patriarchal order. In all, the 
new democratic structures were marginalised and regarded by central government ‘primarily as 
policy implementing, not formulating, agencies’.96
Government also strove to corporatise farming interests as a whole. Three farmers’ 
unions existed in 1980: the CFU (Commercial Farmers’ Union) representing the white large-scale 
sector; the ZNFU (Zimbabwe National Farmers’ Union) representing African small-scale 
commercial farmers; and the NFAZ (National Farmers’ Association of Zimbabwe) organising 
petty-commodity producers. Throughout the decade, government pressed for their merger under
92 Ranger (1985), p. 301; the friction in guerrilla-peasant relations at independence is noted in a number of 
districts -  though interpreted differently -  by Kriger (1992), Alexander (1993, 1995).
93 See Alexander (1993) and Alexander (1991), pp. 581—610.
94 See Alexander (1993, 1995)
95 Alexander (1993), p. 168.
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its auspices, achieving only partial success in 1991, when the ZNFU and NFAZ were merged into 
the ZFU (Zimbabwe Farmers’ Union), without the CFU.97 Thus, not only did government 
fragment the semi-proletariat organisationally, it also sought, through mergers, to dilute the 
expression of class and racial cleavages; notably, bourgeois farming interests remained in control 
of the new ZFU, despite its predominantly peasant membership.
Under nation-building, agrarian policy encompassed three main issue areas: rural 
development, pricing/marketing, and land redistribution, all of which were driven by the 
contradictions of neo-colonialism. The first years witnessed a large increase in expenditure in 
infrastructural development, health and education. Spending on the agricultural sector -  on 
research, extension services, roads, and marketing depots -  grew in 1980-85 at a rate of 37 per 
cent annually, faster than any other item on the budget.98 In education, whereas the colonial unit 
cost in schooling was ten times higher for white than for black children, the post-independence 
state expanded capital and recurrent expenditures, amounting to twice the amount of investment 
in productive sectors as a proportion of GNP in the first two years.99 Similarly, if  colonial infant 
mortality rates were nearly ten times higher in the black population than the white (which 
approximated industrialised country standards), health expenditure by 1982 had doubled in real 
terms, reducing black infant mortality by 30 per cent.100 Social spending amounted to 
straightforward income transfers, which ultimately proved unsustainable; the balance of payments 
crisis and austerity measures induced restraint, as did economic stagnation in the decade as 
whole.
In the realm of marketing, the government operated the inherited monopsony for 
agricultural commodities that had been serving white agrarian capital since the 1930s. Unlike in 
the colonial period, however, white farmers no longer had exclusive political influence over 
pricing policy. At first, there was a coincidence of interests between all farmers’ unions on higher 
farmgate prices. And indeed, unlike the ‘squeezing’ policies seen elsewhere on the continent, the 
new government of Zimbabwe proceeded to hike producer prices for the main commodities 
(maize, wheat, beef), so as to stimulate productivity, and reduce subsidies favourable to urban 
areas. Notably, this pricing policy, together with infrastructural development, had the effect of 
boosting peasant production, especially in maize, such that by 1985 peasants were producing 45
96 Alexander (1993), p. 173.
97 Bratton (1994), pp. 9-37.
98 Bratton (1987), pp. 174-202.
99 Chung (1988), p. 130.
100 Loewenson and Sanders (1988).
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per cent of marketed output, up from 8 per cent in 1980;101 this growth was not uniform across the 
board but highly concentrated in terms of agro-ecological region and class.102 Pricing policy then 
began a long decline in the second half of the decade, during which the government sought to 
compensate the peasant sector by infrastructural development. The latter priority, however, now 
placed commercial interests against peasant interests; and it coincided, moreover, with an 
emerging division of labour in national agriculture whereby peasant would concentrate on maize 
and cotton, while commercial farmers on the rest, including the high foreign exchange earners of 
tobacco and coffee (though still producing maize and cotton). Thus, with a more clearly outward 
orientation and with grievances against government spending on the peasant sector, the large- 
scale sector began to withdraw its support from price and marketing controls and to lobby for 
liberalisation -  which it ultimately obtained in the early 1990s against the interests of 
smallholders.103
Finally, if a temporary coincidence of interests between peasants and commercial farmers 
existed in pricing policy, in land reform there was only rivalry, which commercial farming won 
consistently. Land acquisition and resettlement began at a fast pace in the early years. Between 
1980 and 1984, a total of 2.14 million hectares were acquired, as compared to only 447,791 
hectares between 1985 and 1990, while in the first four years of independence 10,000 families 
were resettled per year, as compared to 5,000 per year thereafter.104 In all, government resettled 
58,000 families in the 1980s (though far short of the targeted 162,000) on 3 million hectares, 
comprising of formerly commercial farmland (2,780,803 hectares) purchased by the government, 
2,247 hectares of state land, and 541,770 hectares of forfeited derelict land; the large-scale 
commercial farming sector was reduced to 11 million hectares, or 29 percent of agricultural 
land.105 In this phase, the dominant method of land acquisition was ‘state-centred, market-based’, 
with the ‘willing seller’ being the landowner and the ‘willing buyer’, as well as selector of 
beneficiaries, the state.106 This interacted with the land occupation method of acquisition. 
However, the provisions of Lancaster House were respected, with only a mild qualification, the 
Land Acquisition Act of 1985, which gave the government the ‘right of first refusal’ on all land 
sales, as well as the ability to acquire derelict land without compensation.
The deceleration of land acquisition and resettlement had to do with several factors. One 
was the fiscal constraint. Lancaster House provided for ‘prompt and adequate’ compensation in
101 Bratton (1987), p. 182.
102 Cliffe (1988), pp. 4-25.
103 For the details on pricing policy, see Skalnes (1995), ch. 8.
104 See Moyo (1995a), p. 123, and Government of Zimbabwe (1999), p. 11.
105 See Moyo (1995a), chs. 3 and 4.
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foreign currency, which tied land reform to export performance; the balance of payments crisis 
had obvious consequences. The fact that the UK was providing funds (a total of US$44 million in 
the 1980s) on a matching grant basis to the government’s own outlays was necessary but not 
sufficient. A related factor was that land availability was decreasing, given that abandoned land 
was being exhausted by accelerated resettlement. Moreover, only a small portion of new land 
being acquired (19 per cent) was in prime agro-ecological regions, while 44 percent was in the 
arid Natural Regions IV and V and 37 percent in NR HI; this, in turn, was impeding agricultural 
performance in resettlement areas. The market method therefore was diminishing the opportunity 
cost of government’s own funds.107
A third factor was that the land reform debate throughout the decade was imbued with 
prejudices, propagated by the CFU, the World Bank, the Whitsun Foundation, and soon the 
government itself, about the inherent superiority of large-scale farming in terms of productivity 
and patterns o f land use. Indeed, by 1984 the land debate was being restructured in the interest of 
‘micro-level efficiency’ -  before being restructured again under ESAP in the interest of ‘macro­
level efficiency’.108 It is notable that in 1985 it was demonstrated that between two-thirds to one- 
half of prime agricultural land in the LSCF was neither cropped nor fallowed; and that peasant 
farming, when taking into account agro-ecological and infrastructural constraints, had higher total 
factor productivity than the large-scale sector, though reliant on gender exploitation.109 
Throughout the decade, landowners were in fact holding on to land speculatively, as well as in the 
interest of functional dualism which enabled the minimum wage in the LSCF to remain at half the 
poverty datum line. It was not until 1991 and the inception of ESAP that the World Bank 
acknowledged the gross underutilisation of land in the LSCF, though even then land reform was 
not incorporated into ESAP.110
The deceleration of land reform and embourgeoisement of the national elite was 
accompanied by the establishment of a ‘squatter control’ apparatus to discipline unauthorised 
land users. Squatter Control Committees had been first created in 1985 under the Ministry of 
Local Government, at a time when the official attitude towards squatters was hardening. Yet, the 
shear scale of the squatting situation, compounded by variable sympathy among local authorities 
and MPs mindful of their own legitimacy, proved beyond bureaucratic control. As Alexander has 
noted in relation to Manicaland near the end of the decade, ‘the estimated number of squatters in
106 Moyo (2001b), p. 22.
107 Moyo (2001b), p. 23-24.
108 Moyo (1995a), p. 22.
109 Weiner et al. (1985).
110 See World Bank (1991b); for a prior assessment, cast in conservationist mould, see World Bank (1986).
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the province nearly equalled the officially resettled population of 60,000, and this in the province 
with the largest resettlement program in the country’.111 In Matabeleland, the post-Unity period 
itself witnessed a resurgence of land occupations in a more secure and tolerant political climate. 
Thus, while influence on the part of the landshort and landless with respect to national land policy 
was waning, any effort by the government to subdue land self-provisioning was bound to meet 
significant obstacles. In aggregate, the peasant voice in its ‘uncivil’ form remained a force to be 
reckoned with and a pressing concern at the national level.
The mounting pressure placed on the government by unauthorised occupation of land led 
in the late 1980s to a reconsideration of squatter policy. There was increasingly recognition that 
policy needed to be homogenised, consolidated, and enforced. It was recognised also that squatter 
policy hitherto had tended to be inconsistent, often being determined by the political needs of 
existing or aspiring politicians. In 1988, the matter was taken up by the Ministry of Local 
Government, which authored and circulated a discussion paper on squatting policy.112 The paper 
acknowledged the magnitude of the problem forthrightly:
[i]t is needless to emphasise that, bearing in mind the century-long Land 
Question, the severity and centrality of the squatting problem has its own inertia.
That is, squatting generates itself as a pressing priority on the agenda before our 
national leadership. At the moment, there are about 100 squatter concentrations 
of proportions enough to merit urgent attention and these concentrations 
comprise thousands of persons who have already tasted battle with the 
authorities.113
The discussion paper was provocative in that, despite the hardening of official policy, it 
pointed to the underlying dynamics of squatting and showed sympathy to the plight of the 
landless. Among other things, the paper criticised the rationale of an eviction policy that did not 
provide viable alternatives to the landless -  hence making ‘moral nonsense of the law’ -  and 
called on government to review land policy urgently and give priority to the landless. But the 
paper also recommended that the government ‘make the Provincial and District administrative 
and security chiefs the land authority wherever squatters have to be dealt with’, thus also 
suggesting the ‘parochialisation’ of squatter control. In the event, it was the latter 
recommendation that made it into the 1992 squatter control policy.114 This provided for a 
hierarchy of national, provincial, and district squatter control committees, but ultimately granted
111 Alexander (1993), p. 261.
112 Ministry of Local Government (1988).
113 Ministry of Local Government (1988).
114 Ministry of Local Government (1992).
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the ‘land authority or owner’ the legal power to evict. In the case of rural land, the empowered 
authority became the district council; in the case of private land, the authority became the 
commercial farmer -  which here implies also the ‘privatisation’ of a national problem.
Thus, while the corollary of bourgeoisification was the reinforcement of squatter control, 
a stalemate set in. On the one hand, the semi-proletariat was losing leverage over national land 
policy; on the other, government was incapable of controlling land self-provisioning. The onset of 
structural adjustment was to bring the simmer of the stalemate to a boil of public land 
occupations.
4.5 Liberalising Zimbabwe and the Nationalist Promise
In the late 1980s, Zimbabwe embarked on gradual liberalisation of its economy, culminating in 
the implementation of a World Bank-sponsored economic structural adjustment programme 
(ESAP) in 1991. The end of the 1980s was a time of change nationally and globally. Nationally, 
capital across sectors was uniting behind a common outward orientation, while Unity negotiations 
were bringing to a close the most tragic experience of the new nation and, ultimately, facilitating 
the accumulation strategies of the national petty-bourgeoisie. The late 1980s, therefore, was a 
time of general reconciliation with capital and embourgeoisement of the national elite. This was 
also the time, however, of the erosion of corporatism and the emergence of new sources of 
oppositional politics, led mainly by the labour movement and students. In this context, 
embourgeoisement invoked a new political framework, the one-party state, which the ruling party 
strove to enshrine in the constitution. Had it succeeded, it would have amounted to a de jure 
dictatorship of the petty-bourgeoisie -  and by extension, international finance. Both the one-party 
state and liberalisation were resisted in the streets, but only the former was halted.
In the global realm, the Soviet bloc was disintegrating at this time, Japan was challenging 
ultra-imperial discipline, and liberalism was being re-launched in the governance synthesis. These 
events had fundamental implications for civil and uncivil politics in Zimbabwe. The present 
section will provide some background information on the liberal decade, while the following 
chapters will examine in more depth the politics of the semi-proletariat.
The Embourgeoisement o f National Liberation
At the end of the decade, the Zimbabwean economy was not in crisis, though crisis was lurking in 
the shadows. As Bond has argued, ‘[stagnation in the key sector of the economy -  manufacturing
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-  essentially represented a continuation of crisis tendencies which had surfaced in the mid 
1970s’.115 By decade’s end, manufacturing had registered a negligible intake of foreign capital 
and growth.116 The sector still accounted for about one quarter of GDP and one half of exports, 
and relied heavily on the primary agricultural and mining sectors whose goods it processed. The 
only notable alteration had been the entry of government into the sector by acquisition of majority 
or part ownerships, amounting to about 16 per cent, such that foreign ownership had halved to 25 
per cent, while local white capital remained strong at 50 per cent.117 But the domestic market 
remained constrained and the crisis-prone structure of disarticulated accumulation effectively in 
place.
The adoption of structural adjustment in Zimbabwe occurred in the absence of crisis; and 
it coincided with the expiry of the Lancaster House provisions pertaining to land. Imperialism had 
thus succeeded within a decade to build adequate domestic social props for the reproduction of 
neo-colonialism. The decision to embark on ESAP was most immediately tied to the conversion 
of CZI to outward orientation, as has been argued by Tor Skalnes -  but also to the 
embourgeoisement and compradorisation of the African national elite itself and the collapse of 
the socialist model worldwide. By 1988, virtually all capitals across the sectors, acting under the 
umbrella of the Zimbabwe Association of Business Organisations (ZABO), were lobbying 
government for a phased programme of trade liberalisation coupled with deregulation of prices, 
wages, and investment, and reduction in public expenditures.118 In the same year, discussions 
began between black executives in industry and government to establish an Indigenous Business 
Development Centre (IBDC) that would look out for the interests of the aspiring black 
bourgeoisie, as against those of the white CZI.119
The latter case is of further significance, for it shifted the social base of the ruling party 
away from its allies in the countryside and, in synergy with the political-moral changes in the 
global arena, transformed the meaning of ‘national liberation’. The ruling party had been 
reluctant in the early days of independence to see the growth of an African business class. The 
fact of the latter’s emergence, however, posed the threat of establishing an accumulation base 
outside the ruling party and thereby constituting an alternative African political force.120 The new 
constituency was therefore co-opted into the ruling party, in a process of ‘class formation behind
115 Bond (1998), p. 167.
116 Mlambo (2000a).
117 Riddell (1990), ch. 10.
1,8 Skalnes (1995), pp. 128-9.
119 Raftopoulos (1999b), p. 9.
120 Raftopoulos (1992), p. 69.
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closed doors’.121 In 1990, the IBDC was formed to ensure state support for blacks on preferential 
terms, in finance, land, and government contracts. It also began to lay new claims on the national 
liberation project. If liberation had once meant socialist transformation, or a more populist ‘return 
of the lost lands’, for the IBDC it meant the blackening of the ownership base of the capitalist 
economy, under the banner of ‘indigenisation’. The transformation was vehemently contested by 
the labour movement, but to no avail; this, after all, was the historical juncture in which the 
socialist project was losing legitimacy worldwide. This global political restructuring boosted the 
legitimacy claims of both existing and aspiring bourgeoisies within Zimbabwe, as elsewhere.
The events thus moved at a fast pace. In 1989, a more liberal Investment Code was 
implemented, incorporating international protocols; in 1990-91, an Open General Import License 
(OGIL) replaced the existing foreign exchange allocation system, and prices of domestically 
produced goods were decontrolled; and in 1991, ESAP was finally launched under the terms of 
the five-year Framework for Economic Reform (FER).122 Hereafter, the most prominent inter­
capitalist conflict was to become the racial one, between an aspiring black bourgeoisie demanding 
affirmative action in the course of liberalisation and local white and foreign capital condemning 
any such tinkering with the market as disruptive of ‘racial harmony’.123 This conflict played out 
largely in the debate over the land question, revived by the impending expiry of the Lancaster 
House land provisions in 1990. The IBDC viewed land as central to the mobilisation of finance 
and so, together with the newly-formed and elite-led ZFU, proposed what amounted to a ‘racial 
substitution formula for the development of capitalist farming’.124 In turn, the call resonated in the 
government’s new land policy of 1990, which now promised to acquire land not just for peasant 
but also black capitalist farming. This bifurcation in land eligibility formally pitted the landless 
and poor farmers against the ‘capable’ and ‘efficient’, those who could produce for export and 
command foreign exchange. In any case, the next few years saw little progress in land reform, as 
this was submerged within a liberal macroeconomic policy framework that emphasised 
liberalisation of agricultural markets over redistribution of assets.
Structural Adjustment
ESAP was launched under World Bank auspices. It did not initially contain a parallel agreement 
with the IMF, though the Fund was to launch a ‘rescue mission’ as early as January 1992, on
121 Raftopoulos (1999b).
122 Government of Zimbabwe (1991).
123 Raftopoulos (1999b), p. 11.
124 Moyo (1995a), p. 7.
154
account of severe ESAP- and drought-induced damages to Zimbabwe’s external balance. 
Zimbabwe’s adjustment programme was peculiar insofar as it was five years long, rather than 
three, and it sought to commercialise parastatals, rather than privatise them.125 Moreover, it 
included a ‘Social Development Fund’, one of the first to be tested worldwide. Nonetheless, it 
contained the standard ‘neoliberal’ dictums: the reduction of the budget deficit, involving the 
slimming down of the public sector and the cutting back of social services; and all-encompassing 
liberalisation of currency, prices, interest rates, trade, capital flows, and the labour market.
Over the following years, the bulk of the programme was implemented, its adverse 
effects compounded by droughts in 1991/92 and 1994/5, as well as the expiry in 1992 of the 1964 
trade agreement with South Africa (which was renewed only in 1996). Trade and prices were 
liberalised: the foreign exchange allocation system was dismantled, the exchange rate allowed to 
depreciate to increase competitiveness, tariffs lowered below GATT requirements, and subsidies 
withdrawn. The process stalled in 1992 when the trade deficit ballooned: exports declined by 17 
per cent in 1990-92 and imports doubled (not least on account of new luxury good imports). 
Liberalisation then re-accelerated in 1994, when import licensing was abolished and the currency 
devalued by 17 per cent and made fully convertible. ESAP had a stagflationary impact. Inflation 
soared to 42 per cent in 1992, after averaging 14 per cent in the prior decade, and this was dealt 
with by high interest rates (standard ‘sado-monetarism’) which smothered the economy.126 
Meanwhile, financial liberalisation exacerbated Zimbabwe’s woes; high interest rates attracted 
‘hot money’ and pushed interest rates even higher. Indeed, from 1993 onwards, as prohibitions 
against foreign dealing on the ZSE were lifted and Zimbabwe gained ‘emerging market’ status, 
the country’s money supply, interest rates, and currency were to become highly exposed to global 
financial instability, as during the Mexican crisis of 1995.127
The financial flows, and the yo-yos of the ZSE, were unrelated to the real economy. 
Attraction of foreign direct investment had been one of the proclaimed objectives of ESAP; and 
this was sought, inter alia, by the deregulation of the labour market (a liberal Labour Relations 
Act was passed in 1992 with effect on job security and wage bargaining) and the relaxation of 
measures pertaining to the remittability of dividends (by 1995, firms could remit 100 per cent of 
their net after tax profits). However, the desired investment outcomes proved beyond ESAP’s 
grasp. Investment levels remained low and declining, while significant de-industrialisation set in, 
particularly in the clothing and textile sub-sectors: one-fifth of the clothing firms registered with
125 Peter Gibbon suggests that this leniency was due to the IMF’s initial absence; see Gibbon (1995), p. 11.
126 See ZCTU (1996) and Bond (1998), ch. 12.
127 Bond (1998), ch. 8.
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CZI folded in 1991-95, while the industry operated at 65 per cent of capacity;128 and 87 textile 
firms closed down by 1994, including Cone Textiles, with 6,000 employees.129 By 1998, the 
contribution of manufacturing to GDP stood at 17 per cent, down from one-fourth.130 These 
trends elicited renewed CZI demands for the restoration of direct subsidies, while also 
accusations that government was ‘victimising’ business with tight monetary policy.131 But the 
burden of adjustment was bome by the peasant-worker. The rate of formal employment growth 
generally declined across sectors -  with the only outstanding exception being the financial sector. 
Retrenchments followed retrenchments: by 1995,20,000 workers had lost their jobs in the public 
sector and 25,000 in the private sector. Real wages declined: in 1993, real average total wages 
stood at 61.9 per cent of their 1980 level, down from 103 per cent in 1990.132 And the share of 
wages and salaries in the national income also declined: this stood at 40 per cent in 1996, down 
from 64 per cent a decade earlier, while the share of profits accruing to capital went to 60 per 
cent, up from 37 per cent.133
Agrarian policy compounded immiserisation. In the early 1990s, the state began to retreat 
from agriculture, as demanded by the CFU. Marketing boards were commercialised (or 
privatised) and converted to ‘purchasers of last resort’, while private traders were allowed to 
compete. This partly reversed the late-1980s trends, bringing higher real producer prices for some 
crops (e.g., maize and wheat), but not for others (e.g., cotton, beef). Moreover, these changes 
were accompanied by the reduction in extension services, subsidies on inputs, and credit for 
smallholders, which alongside the depreciation of the currency, had the effect of raising the costs 
of production to smallholders and eroding farm incomes.134 Significantly, this dovetailed with job 
cuts in the formal sector and the erosion of real wages. Further notable effects included the 
integration of smallholders into TNC-controlled markets for seeds -  in addition to the fertiliser 
and chemical markets which were already under TNC control;135 the extension of farming to 
marginal land, and the intensification of women’s labour in particular; the upsurge of demand for 
land, the deepening of land markets, and further social differentiation in communal areas; and the 
further undermining of local government institutions.136
128 ZCTU (1996), p. 48-54.
129 Mlambo (2000b), p. 115-16.
130 UNDP/UNCTAD (2000), p. 13.
131 Skalnes (1995), p. 144, and Bond (1998), pp. 401-2.
132 ZCTU (1996), pp. 15 and 68-69; see also Kanyenze (1996).
133 Kanyenze (1998b).
134 See ZCTU (1996), pp. 34-35, and UNDP/UNCTAD (2000), p. 14-16.
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The contribution of the smallholder sector to total sales did not increase in the 1990s (the 
share in 1998 equalled that of 1994), and it remained regionally differentiated.137 But significant 
changes took place in the structure of the sector. Central to ESAP’s plan for agriculture was the 
promotion of non-traditional export activities, specifically wildlife management, ostrich 
husbandry, and horticulture. As Moyo has shown, this has had a number of effects.138 One has 
been the reinforcement of the division of labour between smallholders and large-scale farmers; 
the latter expanded operations to non-traditional activities, while smallholders stayed put, due to 
the historical constraints (land, water, credit, and infrastructure). By mid-decade, 36 per cent of 
the LSCF (some 1,000 farmers) was engaged in horticulture (vegetables, fruits, and flowers), 
predominantly in the Mashonaland provinces; 31 per cent of LSCF had come under wildlife, 
involving the conversion of the previously underutilised and speculatively-held land; and about 
300 large-scale farmers had embraced ostrich husbandry. In the communal areas, it is estimated 
that only about 10 per cent of the households became involved in the new land uses. This has 
largely been in wildlife management, via the CAMPFIRE programme which, from the late 1980s 
onwards, was formally converting communal land to exclusive commercial exploitation. 
Horticulture and ostrich husbandry have been out of the grasp of smallholders.
A related effect, as Moyo has also shown, is that, in the process o f converting land to 
wildlife, new relationships emerged between local agrarian and transnational capital (including 
regional). The establishment of ‘conservancies’ entailed the formation of private companies 
which held and managed groups of farms in one block; this restructured, concentrated, and de­
personalised land ownership, while also consolidating lobbying power. Alongside this, there have 
emerged new land bidding patterns, both on prime lands and those historically designated as 
‘marginal’. Indeed, under the weight of ESAP, land bidding of both the civil and uncivil types 
intensified, involving agrarian capital, ‘squatters’, and other ‘stakeholders’, not least NGOs 
touting ‘indigenous knowledge’ within the framework of ‘sustainable development’. Meanwhile, 
aspiring black capital called for the ‘setting aside’ of land in the interest of ‘indigenisation’, while 
also being directly co-opted by local white and transnational capital through ‘linkages’ promoted 
by donor-funded ‘enterprise development programmes’. Just as well, ‘squatter control’ policy 
continued to be implemented, bringing about serial mass evictions.
Finally, the legal framework for land reform was also changed, though not by ESAP 
prescription. The new bifurcated land policy of 1990 was accompanied by constitutional 
amendments in 1990 and 1993 and a new Land Acquisition Act in 1992. Together, these enabled
137 UNDP/UNCTAD (2000), p. 15, and ZCTU (1996), pp. 34-35.
138 Moyo (2000a).
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the state to designate and acquire land compulsorily, but without renouncing the market method; 
changed the compensation formula, now obliging government to pay ‘fair compensation within 
reasonable time’ (rather than ‘prompt’ and ‘adequate’) and in local currency; and crafted a 
compromise on ‘non-justiciability’, which sought to deny courts the power to declare land 
acquisition unconstitutional, but which received ‘trenchant criticism’ and ultimately led the 
government to bow to the principle of legal recourse.139 In 1993, government also appointed a 
Land Tenure Commission (LTC) to study land tenure reform, which reported in 1994. 
Nonetheless, progress was inadequate. The LTC itself served as a substitute for public debate, 
consulting elitist farming interests. And land acquisition remained slow. By 1993, only 90 farms 
had been designated, the bulk of which were in the less fertile regions (71% in Natural Regions 
HI, IV, and V), while 36 of these farms became undesignated through the stipulated legal process. 
The government proceeded to allocate land to 600 peasant families displaced by the construction 
of the Osborne Dam in Makoni District and thereafter, on a leasehold basis, to black capitalist 
farmers.140 Between 1992 and 1997, some 790,000 hectares of land were acquired, bringing the 
total since independence to 3.38 million hectares.141 By this time, 400 black capitalists were 
leasing 400,000 hectares of state land, and 350 had bought their own.142 Notably, tension between 
the Zimbabwean and UK governments persisted, and worsened from 1996 onwards, as the UK 
now made funding conditional on the ‘community initiated, market assisted’ model of land 
reform.143
The tally of structural adjustment was disastrous. Sectoral and social disarticulation was 
reinforced, particularly by the onset of de-industrialisation, such that domestic purchasing power 
became even less relevant to the decisions of capital. In fact, capital appropriated larger shares of 
the national income and went on, by the cutting of social expenditures, to shift the cost of social 
reproduction to an even greater extent onto the semi-proletarian household -  women in particular. 
This occurred just as HIV/AIDS began to strike.144 Functional dualism remained firmly in place: 
the rural homestead remained the ‘production site’ for an increasingly run-down labour force, 
while social differentiation within the communal areas and landlessness intensified. The latter, 
notably, had consequences for the ability of local government institutions to regulate effectively 
the economic downturn; rural conflict and state violence proliferated. In terms of debt, the 
country’s external component increased by 40 per cent in 1990-95; by 1998, total official debt
139 Moyo (2001b), pp. 27-29.
140 Moyo, (1995a), ch. 8.
141 Government of Zimbabwe (1999a), p. 11.
142 Moyo (2001b), p. 1.
143 Moyo (2001b), p. 24-25.
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stood at 95 per cent of GDP, of which 60 per cent was external; in the same year, debt service 
was 38 per cent of export earnings (exceeded only by Burundi and Brazil).145 But we must 
remember that ‘global development’ was never the purpose of structural adjustment, and in this 
sense, structural adjustment succeeded in Zimbabwe. The liberation movement was no longer a 
threat to imperialism: it had been converted into an imperial social prop; and international finance 
was firmly in control of the Zimbabwean state. Zimbabwe could turn its back on finance, and 
seek an alternative development path, only at great cost to itself.
Nationalism Re-radicalised
But turn its back it did. How Zimbabwe managed to earn pariah status a second time will be 
shown in detail subsequently. Suffice it here to provide an overview. Policy after ESAP was tom 
by the neo-colonial contradictions that ESAP had inflamed. Upon ESAP’s expiry, government 
did not alter its export-oriented strategy, but sought to deepen it by the Export Processing Zone 
(EPZ) Act, following regional policy trends. Subsequently, a new IFI-sponsored development 
programme was drawn up, ZIMPREST, to focus on ‘unfinished business’ -  the restructuring of 
public enterprises, reform of the financial sector, even land reform (market-based and 
bifurcated).146 And like ESAP, it was launched in the language of ‘national self-determination’. 
‘Today’, wrote President Mugabe (in a foreward dated February 1998), ‘we take pride as 
Zimbabweans in the fruits of our co-operative efforts, as we, as a nation, take ownership of this 
important policy document’. By this time, however, government was already deeply contradicting 
IFI demands, on account of the announcement of unbudgeted pension disbursements to 
disaffected war veterans, in August 1997, and, subsequently, in November, the designation of 
about 40 per cent of the LSCF for compulsory acquisition. Unlike ESAP, ZIMPREST misfired.
Zimbabwe’s liberal project began to unravel from November onwards. The currency 
crashed, losing a breathtaking 74 per cent of its value in a four-hour period of trading (on 14 
November), to be restored only modestly by Reserve Bank intervention.147 This, in turn, ushered 
in a further round of price-hikes and job losses, and was accompanied by food riots and serial 
industrial action -  including unprecedented national strikes and stay-aways led by the ZCTU -  as 
well as the use of violence by the state to suppress popular demands. The political convulsions 
did not remain confined to the urban areas. In fact, as early as June 1998 the first round of a high
144 The deterioration of living standards is indicated in UNDP, Poverty Reduction Forum, and IDS (1998).
145 Zimbabwe’s Debt Crisis and its Impact on Development (1999), pp. 42-45.
146 Government of Zimbabwe (1998b).
147 Bond and Manyanya (2002), pp. 38-42.
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profile land occupation movement began. This was organised through grassroots circuits of 
dissident party leaders and war veterans, and made to coincide with an International Donors’ 
Conference on land reform hosted by the government. What all this amounted to was the most 
serious legitimacy crisis for the ruling party, both from within its ranks and from without. 
Meanwhile, the IFIs withheld funding for ZIMPREST and demanded a return to ‘the path’. But to 
no avail. In 1998, price controls were re-introduced on staple goods, and tariffs were re-imposed 
on luxury goods. Then, in August of the same year, government embarked on a military campaign 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), straining further the national budget. By the end of 
the decade, Zimbabwe had defaulted on its loans and the national situation had reached boiling 
point.
The economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe has been, and will continue to be, subject 
to heated debate. It would surely have been a less disputed matter (especially among the Left), 
had the ruling party simply persisted on ‘the path’ {i.e., liberalisation cum violence). But in the 
midst of its most serious crisis of legitimacy, and with elections just around comer, the leadership 
of the ruling party performed a political manoeuvre that deserves to be appended to Machiavelli’s 
Prince. On the one hand, it conceded to basic semi-proletarian demands on land; on the other, it 
wedged itself with force back into the rural-urban fault lines of the semi-proletariat. By 2000, the 
ruling party was re-invoking its radical liberation credentials, returning populist land reform to 
the agenda, and making it the central plank of its electoral campaign (‘land is the economy, the 
economy is land’). The following two years witnessed the compulsory acquisition of the bulk of 
the large-scale sector, reducing it to about 20 per cent of its 1980 acreage, and the re-allocation of 
land to an estimated 160,000 households, amounting to one million people (out of a population of 
13 million), on a smallholder basis (involving inheritable, non-alienable use rights). Added to this 
was a plan to accommodate small-scale black capitalists (‘master farmers’) by inviting 
applications for land on a 99-year leasehold basis -  some 51,000 applications were approved -  as 
well as members of the ruling elite. At the same time, the ruling party encouraged ruthless tactics 
against members of opposition -  not least organised labour -  on the farms, in communal areas, 
and in the towns. It is estimated that well over 100 people, mainly members of opposition, lost 
their lives in political violence in 2000-02.
The easiest way to engage with this convulsion is to reach for moral high grounds. One 
such move has served directly imperial ends -  moral grandstanding, after all, is intrinsic to 
imperialism. The liberal press and its ultra-imperial patrons seized upon the authoritarian image 
of Robert Mugabe, detaching the phenomenon from its context as a matter of course, and 
rendering the crisis as a particularly acute case of ‘bad governance’. The UK government invoked
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explicit ‘civilisational’ language. The domestic social props of imperialism sang a similar song. 
More genuinely perplexed, intellectually and politically, was the Left. And, here, two opposite 
positions emerged: one that took the side of civil society and concerned itself with ensuring free 
and fair multiparty elections, while remaining cognisant of the bourgeois nature of the ‘civil’ 
electoral platform; another that took the side of the ‘uncivil’, endorsing the radical land 
acquisition programme of the ruling party, while remaining cognisant of the latter’s democratic 
deficit. Neither claimed ideological cleanliness, yet at the crux of the dispute lay concrete 
political differences: one concerning the ability of urban-based working class movements to 
provide leadership on the agrarian question -  i.e., a dispute over the appropriate political agency 
of the semi-proletariat; the other, a difference on the possibility of civil solutions to neo­
colonialism.
To understand the limitations and potential of the agencies involved -  rural and urban, 
civil and uncivil -  it is imperative that they are historicised, placed in the global context of the 
1990s, and understood in relation to one another.
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PART II:
PEASANT-WORKERS IN ZIMBABWE UNDER STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
CHAPTERS 
Trade Union Nationalism
The ZCTU emerged from under the wing of the ruling party in the second half of the 1980s to 
become the epicentre of organised oppositional politics. This was the time in which the ZCTU 
was in its most ‘uncivil’ mode, professing Marxism-Leninism and bucking both the state and 
imperialism. But its incivility stood on weak organisational legs: it lacked solid links to the 
shopfloor; workers themselves lacked familiarity with trade union affairs in their occupational 
sectors; and both were poor. The transformation of the trade union centre into a worker-controlled 
and viable force would occur over the following years under difficult conditions: at the national 
level, ESAP was being set into motion and state violence being deployed against the 
disenfranchised; at the global level, the Soviet Union was collapsing and international trade 
unionism being reduced to the social democracy professed by the ICFTU. It is the argument here 
that the ZCTU eventually emerged as a social force to be reckoned with, but that in the process it 
underwent a significant identity change, or ‘civilisation’. This process can be traced through three 
phases: that of radical political unionism (1990-95); social democratic strategic unionism (1995— 
97); and social democratic political unionism (1998-2000). The identity change touched every 
aspect of the centre’s teachings, from its understanding of national sovereignty, to worker 
participation, to who are the ‘natural’ allies of the working class, which in the early phase 
consisted in the peasantry.
5.1 Confronting Bourgeois Nationalism, 1990-95
In a 1988 statement, the new leadership of the ZCTU highlighted the multiple problems 
confronting the movement and proposed that the centre adopts a five-year development plan.1 
The Secretary General identified a long list of urgent tasks: the improvement of the administrative 
capacity and efficiency of the national centre; the mobilisation of workers and the 
democratisation of the movement; the amalgamation of unions; the establishment of full-time 
Information/Publicity and International departments; the achievement of financial self- 
sufficiency; the establishment of a Labour College; the regaining of control of the annual May 
Day celebrations; and the revival of the labour movement’s newspaper, The Worker, which had 
been out of circulation since 1987. In all, the project of the ZCTU was one of prying itself away
1 Secretary General’s Proposals on the ZCTU Five Year Development Plan (1988).
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from the grip of the state and gaining an independent capacity and voice in the affairs of the 
nation.
The 1990 Congress of the ZCTU launched the movement into the ‘global’ world:
In the past ten years the ideals of the liberation struggle to bring economic and 
political power to the people have been increasingly shelved. Real democracy 
and strong worker/peasant representation in political leadership has been traded 
in for peace with the capitalists and a leadership that has joined the wealthy in 
spirit and in flesh.2
The Congress furthermore warned of the known dangers of structural adjustment:
The Government strategy of staking the people’s hopes on World Bank structural 
adjustment policies, on foreign investment, on privatisation and on trade 
liberalisation ignore the evidence of the devastating effects of these policies on 
working people across the globe and dooms a vast section of the society to 
permanent joblessness, hopelessness and economic insecurity. It further 
mortgages the economy to foreigners and leaves the nation economically 
powerless and without control over its future.3
The Congress proceeded to issue a number of resolutions, affirming its non-affiliation to any 
political parties, its commitment to mobilisation, gender equality, democratisation, and 
amalgamation of unions, and the imperative of gaining control of its voice by taking over May 
Day, relaunching The Worker, and establishing an Information Department.
ESAP was formally launched in 1991 and it began to pinch soon after, with 
retrenchments in the clothing, textile, leather, and agricultural sectors, and the introduction of cost 
recovery measures in schooling and health provision. By 1992, inflation was galloping at 50% 
and wiping out pay increments of 24% that had been won during the collective bargaining season. 
1992 was also the year in which the Labour Relations Act was amended. The ZCTU responded 
by protesting both the content of the amended LRA and the procedures by which it was enacted, 
pointing out that the labour movement had been effectively sidelined from the review of the LRA 
of 1985. While in 1987, in the spirit of tripartism, a tripartite committee had been composed to 
review the LRA, the set of changes agreed in that committee did not enter into the Bill that was 
eventually presented to Parliament. As in the case of the Investment Code and ESAP itself, the 
labour movement was denied a voice. Lack of consultation ‘creates a climate of adversarial 
industrial relations’, noted the ZCTU, ‘that will undermine our ability to meet the economic
2 ZCTU, Strategy Document for the 1990 Congress, p. 2.
3 ZCTU, Strategy Document for the 1990 Congress, p. 3.
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challenges we face in the 1990s....We are led to perceive the Labour Relations Amendment Act 
as a symptom of a deeper issue related to ESAP’.4 The ZCTU further protested by withdrawing 
its delegation from the 1992 ILO conference in Geneva and by holding peaceful marches in seven 
centres in the country. The government, in its turn, did not show signs of relenting. In 1992, 
President Mugabe for the first time refused to attend the May Day celebrations, in a symbolic 
denigration of the working class and its contribution to national life. And in June of the same 
year, government invoked the colonial Law and Order (Maintenance) Act to ban a march in 
Harare against ESAP and the LRA Bill and to arrest six members of the ZCTU.
The widespread mobilisation against ESAP that was being spearheaded by the ZCTU 
raised suspicions among ZANU(PF) that the labour centre was following the footsteps of its 
Zambian counterpart to form a political party -  in Zambia this had led to the removal of UNIP 
from power after almost three decades at the helm. In 1992, however, the ZCTU affirmed its 
commitment made at its 1990 Congress to remain unaffiliated to any political party and to focus 
instead on building a strong labour movement with solid roots at the shopfloor. But the ZCTU did 
not also shy away from seeking political involvement in the national dialogue and from taking the 
government to task on the broad political issues that affected workers. Tsvangirai pointed out that 
‘[o]nce the union starts calling for better living conditions for workers in terms of wages, health, 
safety or even pay increases, labour laws and economic policies, it has already entered into 
politics. There is no running away from that. The labour movement cannot therefore afford to shy 
away from politics since by its very nature it has to fight both government policies and 
employers’ actions....What the unions are fighting for is political involvement’.5 Gibson Sibanda 
re-affirmed the ZCTU’s political role; ‘[o]ur mandate is to make sure that workers are fairly 
treated, in and beyond the workplace. In this age of ESAP we have learned as unions, that we 
cannot be silent in any area affecting workers because our silence is our loss’.6
These positions hardly assuaged the fears of government. In late 1992, John Nkomo, the 
Minister of Labour, refused to attend the ZCTU’s bi-annual meeting in Chinhoyi. And in 1993, 
President Mugabe for the second consecutive year refused to attend the May Day celebrations, 
while further seeking to belittle workers: ‘The moment you turn yourself into a political party I 
will tell you I am ZANU-PF. I cannot go to May Day celebrations to be a subject of ridicule by 
school children like students at the University of Zimbabwe’.7
4 The Worker, No. 1, March 1993.
5 The Worker, No. 1, March 1993.
6 The Worker, No. 4, June 1993.
7 The Worker, No. 4, June 1993.
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Snubbing May Day and identifying workers as non-adults were part of the struggle over 
the meaning of national liberation at the time of its ‘liberalisation’. The ZCTU did not shun the 
national debate. The theme and slogan of its May Day celebration in 1991 was focused precisely 
on the same meanings: ‘Liberalisation or Liberation?’. In 1993, Tsvangirai re-affirmed the 
importance of this moral stmggle. ‘The slogan’, he argued, ‘summarised exactly what we 
understand about the Structural Adjustment Programme -  an offensive recolonisation of 
Zimbabwe, rolling back the spirit and achievement of our liberation’. And, in re-valuing the 
experiences of the besieged working class which government sought to belittle, he continued: 
‘[t]oday we know clearly what that recolonisation means. The child who has dropped out of the 
school that was built after independence knows it. The mother who cannot afford to deliver her 
second baby at the clinic where she delivered the first one knows it. The worker who has lost his 
job knows it. The unionist who met the batons of the riot police for staging a peaceful march 
knows it’.8
The nationalism of the labour centre in these early years was also anti-imperialist -  even 
if more populist in tone than Marxist-Leninist -  expressly rejecting the authority of the IFIs and 
the ‘developmental’ intentions of structural adjustment. At an international symposium of trade 
unionists in Harare in April 1993, Gibson Sibanda accused the Bank and Fund of imposing 
liberalisation on African economies while Northern countries continued to protect their own. ‘In 
international trade’, he added, ‘there is no love, there are no permanent friends, but there are 
permanent interests’.9 In the same vein, the labour centre accused the government of serving 
foreign interests. ‘Suddenly, in the middle of this’, wrote Tsvangirai in reference to the tripartite 
consultations of the late 1980s, ‘we heard from London that Zimbabwe was introducing a new 
Investment Code. Later, we realised that this was the first step towards our so called homegrown 
Economic Structural Adjustment Programme. This was in fact a classical Washington hatched 
World Bank/IMF package (even with American spelling in the government document)’.10 He 
proceeded to dispute the validity of the debt-service ‘imperative’ to which the government was 
buying into: ‘Political independence is a shallow victory when one’s own economy cannot serve 
the fundamental interests of the population. World Bank SAP’s do not build economies that serve 
the interests of African people. They build economies that pay and service debt’. ‘One of the 
fundamentals of democracy’, Tsvangirai added, ‘is the right to determine one’s own priorities. Is 
servicing the foreign debt really our economic priority in Africa?’11
8 Tsvangirai (1993).
9 The Worker, No. 3, May 1993.
10 Tsvangirai (1993).
11 Tsvangirai (1993).
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The priorities which the labour centre emphasised were structural in nature, with land 
reform occupying centre stage, along with promotion of non-farm and informal activities. As 
articulated in the critique of the 1989 Investment Code and in the Workers’ Participation and 
Development manual,12 Sibanda reiterated that land reform remained a priority, for only this 
could ensure food security in the future and higher rural incomes: ‘[ujnless subsistence 
agriculture is transformed into a thriving industry that offers rural people a promise of rising 
incomes and new opportunities, the rural-urban exodus will continue thus compounding the open 
unemployment problem in the urban areas’. ‘African governments’, he concluded, ‘should not 
measure the success of the adjustment programme by looking at their balance of payments, but 
the well-being of suffering of their people because at the end of the day that is all that matters’.13 
The labour centre furthermore made a number of recommendations to the Land Tenure 
Commission in session at the time, stressing the importance of egalitarianism in redistribution, 
the need for caution on the issue of title deeds, recognition of the predicament of farm workers, 
and the participation of trade union representatives in the Commission.14
The government continued to fend off accusations that ESAP was ‘imposed from the 
outside’, and sought to affirm its liberation credentials with reference to the land question. ‘For 
the benefit of those ambassadors or high commissioners’, Mugabe told his audience on Heroes 
Day 1993, ‘who have taken up the cause of the white farmer as their cause merely because those 
farmers are white and the rest of the people who are suffering are black, when we fought the 
struggle for liberation, we fought for the sovereign right to rule ourselves. And that right gives us 
ways and means of determining how the imbalances of the past can be corrected’.15 Both, in fact, 
the government and the labour movement employed ‘anti-imperialist’ language. The difference 
between the two was that the government’s nationalism steered clear of class analysis and relied 
on race. The voice of the labour movement was not devoid of populism, but it was much more 
attuned to class analysis. Not only did it accuse the government of making peace with capital, it 
also pointed out that black bosses were just as capable and just as guilty of exploiting workers. 
‘Black advancement started as a noble thing’, Tsvangirai recalled in mid-decade on occasion of a 
flurry of industrial action in parastatals; he went on to indicate that black managers had 
themselves become as oppressive as ‘colonial masters’.16 In the same spirit, labour leaders in the 
clothing, construction, banking, and commercial farming industries jointly condemned the
12 ZCTU (1989) and ZCTU (1993).
13 The Worker, No. 8, October 1993.
14 The Worker, No. 16, August 1994.
15 The Worker, No. 7, September 1993.
16 Reported in The Worker, No. 12, April 1994.
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indigenous employers who were evading supervision by NECs by evading registration of their 
businesses with the relevant authorities. The labour leaders further pointed out that indigenous 
employers were engaged in unfair labour practices, such as the victimisation of unionised 
workers, non-payment of deducted union fees, non-payment of deducted pensions, and payment 
of low wages.17
The early-decade victories of the labour movement must be seen in the context of the 
liberal assault on existing rights and living standards. The labour movement was firmly on the 
defensive and struggling to gain a position from which to bargain. In 1993, the average wage 
increase of 12.5% fell far below the cost of living index, while in 1994 the labour demand for a 
25% increment during collective bargaining itself appeared doomed. Meanwhile, despite the 
institutionalisation of collective bargaining, Labour Minister John Nkomo continued to intervene 
in wage-setting by issuing warnings that wage increments must not derail the economic reform 
programme and giving employers the green tight to fire striking workers. Nonetheless, in 
early1994, Post and Telecommunication (PTC) workers went on strike demanding payment of a 
12.5% increment that, after dispute, had been awarded to them by the Labour Relations Tribunal, 
but that the employer was still refusing to pay. The industrial action started as a go-slow but 
turned into a fully-fledged strike by mid-February, finally compelling the PTC to abide by the 
ruling. On a different front, the ZCTU was challenging the constitutionality of the government’s 
use of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act against the striking workers in 1992. In March 1994, 
after the PTC success, another victory was scored in this parallel front. The Supreme Court ruled 
against the government and for amendment of the Act, in a landmark ruling that opened the way 
for less inhibited political activity. In the process, the labour movement confirmed its leading role 
in the democratisation movement.
Suggesting a possible re-opening of dialogue in tight of impending elections in 1995, 
Florence Chitauro attended May Day celebrations in 1994, but without taking the platform, and 
also without stemming the momentum of the labour movement. In August 1994, the bank 
workers’ union (ZIBAWU), inspired by the PTC workers’ success and the Supreme Court ruling, 
went on a week-long strike of its own, gaining credibility among the work force in the process 
and adding 600 new members to its roster. This action was followed by construction workers and 
security guards. The tide finally compelled President Mugabe to address labour issues publicly 
for the first time since the freezing of relations. Thus, on Heroes Day 1994, Mugabe issued a call 
on employers to meet the pay demands of workers -  a move which, in any case, was widely seen 
as electioneering.
17 The Worker, No. 38, August 1996.
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Despite such victories, workers in both public and private sectors were awarded 
increments below the 25% that had been demanded by the ZCTU in May 1994. Moreover, formal 
sector job cuts continued to take a toll on working people. Between January 1991 and March 
1994, job losses amounted to 20,710.18 Significantly, the textile industry was one of the casualties 
of the early 1990s, on account of both ESAP and the expiry of the 1964 trade agreement with 
South Africa; Cone Textiles liquidated in 1994, shedding 6,000 workers (without compensation). 
Adding to the predicament of the industry, the government denied ZCTU participation in the 
negotiations with South Africa on a new trade agreement, while the South African side did 
include COSATU (which, in turn, made common cause with the ZCTU on a social clause). 
Economic prospects continued to worsen into 1995, with increases in the price of petrol (7.3%) 
and diesel (20%) in January; with the government announcing its intention to introduce a Drought 
Levy of 5% with effect from April; and with the ZCTU threatening, in turn, to carry out a 
national strike. This sequence of events was finally to bring Mugabe and the labour leaders 
together in a landmark meeting in March 1995, signalling a possible thawing of relations between 
state and labour.
5.2 Mobilisation and Democratisation
The ability of the trade unions to represent workers in national life was undermined by the 
perennial organisational problems inherent in a semi-proletarianised, migrant, and poor 
workforce. In the early 1990s, two surveys were conducted within the labour movement to assess 
the status of union organisation and to devise strategies for mobilisation and democratisation.19 
As one of the survey reports acknowledged in the outset, ‘[tjrade unions are grass-roots 
movements’, and thus, ‘[tjheir strength is derived from the confidence and support they enjoy 
from the ordinary workers who labour in the factories, mines, plantations and other enterprises’.20 
The assessment of this confidence and support confirmed the magnitude of the organisational task 
at hand. Two more evaluations of the movement were conducted in 1996 and 1997.21
Taken together, the early surveys found that workers generally lacked information on the 
unions in their sectors and the work that these carry out. Workers had a low level of
understanding of how their wages were determined and also a low level of awareness of their
legal rights and what constituted ‘unfair labour practices’. Workers who were members of
18 The Worker, No. 17, September 1994.
19 Peta et al. (1991) and Chibatwa, Peta, and Ncube (1993).
20 Peta etal., (1991), p. 11.
21 Sibanda (1996) and Mihyo and Powell (1997).
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workers committees were more aware on such matters, but workers committees were themselves 
weak. The committees often lacked constitutions, or workers were simply not aware of them, held 
general meetings infrequently, and also met infrequently with union officials. Although general 
meetings organised by the committees tended to be well attended, the question of wages, as 
expected, monopolised the agenda, but without further issues gaining sufficient hearing, and 
without workers’ concerns more generally being linked to broader macro-level issues. Worker 
representatives, furthermore, were ineffectively representing workers’ concerns to management, 
acting instead as a vehicle of information from management to workers. Gender discrimination 
was found to be total, insofar as women were absent from executive positions on the committees. 
Thus, workers representatives and committees were not playing the requisite role on matters of 
conscientisation, recruitment, democratisation, representation to management, and 
communication with unions. Meetings organised by unions themselves at branch level were less 
effective, as they were poorly attended. In this case, impediments to attendance included lack of 
notification of workers, lack of time, fear of victimisation by employers, and lack of confidence 
in the ability of unions to increase wages.
Thus the strengthening of shopfloor structures, as well as their incorporation into union 
structures, was an organisational imperative. A parallel task was the broadening of the 
membership and economic base of the movement in order to gain self-sufficiency and a self- 
sustaining mobilisational and educational effort. The precise strategy at the turn of the decade, as 
announced by the Secretary General, was two-fold, involving, on the one hand, a comprehensive 
education and mobilisation campaign with the stated aim of increasing the unionisation rate to 
50%, and, on the other hand, the administrative enforcement of subscription payments by affiliate 
unions to the national centre.22
Towards the first end, a workers’ education (APADEP) programme that had been 
ongoing since 1984 -  with the support of the Dutch FNV and the Institute of Social Studies in the 
Hague -  was honed, after 1987, to the specific needs of Zimbabwean workers. Course materials 
began to be developed by the ZCTU in 1989, and by 1990 the first edition of the home-grown 
Workers’ Participation and Education manual was produced. This became the main guide in 
seminars and instructors’ courses. Union branch officials, workers committee representatives, and 
trade union activists were recruited into the education programme in this period. An evaluation of 
the programme conducted in 1997 noted that between 1991 and 1996, 569 persons were trained, 
25% of whom were women, further noting that attendance had been lower than projected,
22 The Worker, No. 1, March 1993.
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especially that of women.23 Nonetheless, the evaluation noted that the centre and its affiliate 
network had built considerable education capacity and capacity-building potential. The 
specialised training of trade union cadres was also undertaken with a view to improve skills in 
collective bargaining, grievance handling, basic economic and legal issues, and financial 
administration. This arose as a pressing need when the movement began to distance itself from 
the state in the late 1980s. By 1992, however, only 25 para-legals had been trained in the 
movement, with 4% of these being at the shopfloor, 32% at branch level, 8% at the regional, and 
56% at the national; on the economic side, 21 cadres had been trained, most of them at national 
level.24 No such data exist for the latter half of the 1990s.
Building stronger links between the unions and the shopfloor has also entailed an active 
policy of incorporating workers committees into union structures by supporting the placement of 
union members into the committees. The 1996 survey noted that 93% of enterprises had workers 
committees, up from 90% in 1991/92, but that there unionisation of committee members was not 
yet total.25 The survey also noted that the victimisation of committee members continued to be 
extensive, rendering the unionisation of committees all the more urgent.26 Alongside the tapping 
of committees, the labour centre decentralised its organisation in 1992 by creating six regional 
offices (in Mutare, Masvingo, Bulawayo, Gweru, Chinhoyi, and Harare) and district committees 
below them to coordinate activities and to improve communication with the grassroots. The 
educational programme itself contributed to the process, by conscientising non-unionised workers 
and by building organisational capacity among affiliates and between affiliates and the centre.
Nonetheless, unions continued to find themselves in a low-membership/low-resource 
trap, hindering their educational and organisational efforts, and creating foreign dependence. 
Figures on membership are generally elusive. One of the surveys above stated that, in 1993, one- 
third of men and less than one-tenth of women were unionised, while the overall unionisation 
level stood at 41% percent of the work force.27 The latter figure is not convincing, however, as it 
would suggest that the Zimbabwean labour movement had already attained the organisational 
status of much more established movements (both in Africa and Europe). A more realistic figure 
was provided in 1993 by The Worker which reported that total membership amounted to 201,800 
workers.28 This figure was likely to be an underestimation of the real membership, however,
23 Mihyo and Powell (1997).
24 Chibatwa et al. (1993), pp. 31-32.
25 Sibanda(1996).
26 Sibanda (1996), p. 14.
27 Chibatwa et al. (1993), p. 26.
28 The Worker, No. 2, April 1993. This was confirmed in interview with Galileo Chirebvu, Head of 
Accounts Department.
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given that unions routinely under-reported their memberships in order to evade the subscription 
fees that they owed to the national centre. The real unionisation rate was likely to be around 20%. 
Despite retrenchments throughout the ESAP period, during which the unionisation numbers have 
ebbed and flowed, the unions have managed to close the decade again with a 20% real 
unionisation rate, according to the Accounts Department, with 196,200 members actually 
declared by unions, but possibly twice as many workers in reality belonging to unions.29 
Notwithstanding the realities of membership, the financial constraints associated with a declared 
membership of 196,200 were enormous. The union centre remained under-funded and dependent 
on foreign donors. In 1997, only one-third of the centre’s budget derived from subscription fees, 
while as much as two-thirds derived from donors.30
Relations between the national centre and its affiliates were not devoid of acrimony. The 
non-payment of subscription fees by affiliate unions to the national centre was a source of 
ongoing conflict. In 1992, less than one-third of the affiliates (10 of 35) were paid up, with a total 
of Z$270,000 owed to the centre. Among the non-compliant unions were those which rejected the 
increase in fees (from 5 to 15 cents per member) that had been legislated at the 1990 Congress, on 
the grounds of economic hardship. Such claims, however, were not entirely convincing to the 
national centre. While the centre appreciated that under the harsh economic climate some unions 
would face financial difficulties, which in turn it would take into consideration, it also believed 
that some unionists had ulterior motives. The dispute reached a low point when dissenting 
unionists sought the intervention of the Ministry of Labour on their behalf -  and giving the state 
the opportunity to pursue divide-and-rule policies. The labour centre responded by issuing 
ultimatums to the non-compliant unions to pay up or face suspension. The problem was not to 
have an easy resolution. By 1993, only 2 more affiliates had met their obligations, bringing the 
number to 12, while no suspensions had been carried out. In January 1994, the General Council 
convened a special meeting at which it renewed its ultimatum, giving unions three more months 
to pay up. Clearly, the non-compliance of unions, combined with the under-declaration of 
membership, was jeopardising the viability of the centre. In fact, the latter was resorting to 
borrowing funds from its donor-funded and earmarked project accounts. By 1995, the financial 
position of the centre was in trouble, with almost Z$500,000 owed to its project accounts and 
Z$78,998 owed to the AFL-CIO’s African American Labor Centre.31
29 ZCTU Subscription Roster for 1999 and interview with Galileo Chirebvu. The ZCTU was considering 
changing its methods of revenue collection so that union fees would be deducted from salaries and 
allocated directly to unions and the union centre.
30 Kudenga and Co., Chartered Accountants, Zimbabwe (1997).
31 The Worker, No. 29, October 1995.
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While under-reporting, evasion, and more genuine economic distress on the part of 
affiliates were at the crux of the financial problem, it is also true that the problem was 
compounded by the excessive number of unions in existence and the failure of the centre itself to 
promote amalgamations in allied industries. There had been well over 30 unions in existence 
throughout the decade, some of which gained recognition despite their being too small and weak 
to operate effectively. At its 1990 Congress the labour movement resolved to pursue mergers as a 
matter of urgency, yet by the close of the decade the national centre continued to be excessively 
segmented, with 38 unions on its roster. The multiplicity of unions has detracted from the ability 
of the movement to reap economies of scale across allied industries, reduce administrative costs, 
and meet obligations to the national centre -  and not least from the ability to mobilise workers in 
larger numbers and represent them more effectively. The fragmentation owed partly to the lack of 
resolve on the part of the national leadership in desisting from registering splintering and non- 
credible unions.32 It owed also to the lack of sufficient authority on the part of the centre to push 
through mergers without fear of unions going alone or, worse, defecting to the state-endorsed 
Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions (ZFTU, to be discussed).33 This also suggests that the 
patronage motive within the movement had not been eradicated.
Given such internal divisions, financial matters came to occupy the top of the centre’s 
agenda at its 1995 Congress. Besides being the ‘Beyond ESAP’ Congress, it was also dubbed the 
‘make or break’ Congress, and coincided with negotiations between the ZCTU and the large and 
well-organised civil servants’ unions, ZIMTA and PSA, for the possible affiliation of the latter 
two. The ZCTU had thus to put its house in order. The tone was set at a General Council meeting 
prior to the Congress, where it was agreed that five particularly non-complaint affiliates would be 
only be accorded observer status at the Congress. The tone was set, furthermore, with a prior 
report issued by the General Council’s on the challenges to be confronted:
Disrupted coordination and communication between the ZCTU and affiliates 
diverted attention, work and time away from more serious issues confronting 
workers and deprived the ZCTU of the financial viability needed to meet those 
serious issues. It produced uncomradely, undemocratic and unprincipled 
behaviour resulting in some persons using outside parties to resolve disputes 
before the internal, democratic organs of the ZCTU had been used or 
exhausted.34
32 See the editorial comment in The Worker, No. 27, August 1995.
33 Interview with Galileo Chirebvu.
34 The Worker, No. 29, October 1995.
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In the event, Congress resolved to increase subscriptions to 40 cents, with effect from January
1996. It was also acknowledged that no progress had been made on the issue of amalgamations; 
however, inadequate time and dialogue was spent on the issue. It was only agreed that small 
unions should be induced into mergers by making them pay a minimum of Z$500 per month to 
the national centre.35
Despite the new measures, as well as the eventual affiliation of PSA in August 1996, 
financial difficulties continued to haunt the centre throughout the remainder of the decade, hi 
March 1996, The Worker reported that 11 non-complaint affiliates were no longer being invited 
to partake in activities organised by the centre.36 hi June 1996, labour leaders convened a meeting 
in Nyanga to map out a five-year strategy on, inter alia, achieving self-sufficiency. In January
1997, dues were again increased from 40 cents to Z$1 under the pressure of inflation. And, in 
August 1997, Tsvangirai was once again threatening defaulters with expulsion, but with the 
exception of those with ‘genuine’ financial problems, including the PSA.37 With regards to 
amalgamations, the inducement mechanism proved insufficient to the task, as the centre closed 
the decade with 38 affiliates. In the context of liberalisation, more resolve would have been 
required to stem the splintering of unions and actually reverse their proliferation. One notable 
victim of the decade was the National Union of Clothing Industry (NUCI), which splintered after 
a combination of massive job losses (13,000) in the industry in 1997, loss of faith by the workers 
in the ability of NUCI to represent them, and infighting within the leadership. NUCI splintered in 
1999, giving rise to the Clothing Industry Workers Union (CIWU), which, however, was not 
recognised.
Internal divisions between the centre and its affiliates were not confined to one-way 
grievances by the centre against affiliates. Affiliates had grievances of their own, and these 
related to the perceived heavy-handed tactics of the leadership and the aloofness of the centre’s 
staff. Grievances against the leadership surfaced at the 1995 Congress, when the General Council 
sought to expand the number of vice-presidents from three to five, with a view to accommodate 
the powerful ZIMTA and PSA within the ZCTU. After heated debate, over one-third of the 
delegates (the number required to arrest a Constitutional amendment) rejected the proposal. The 
dissenting delegates went on to call on the leadership to revamp itself and become more efficient, 
rather than bloating its structures for purposes of political accommodation. At the same Congress, 
the office of First Assistant Secretary General was won by a newcomer, Isidore Zindoga (of the
35 The Worker, No. 29, October 1995.
36 The Worker, No. 33, March 1996.
37 The Worker, No. 43, February 1997, and No. 49, August 1997.
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Leather, Shoe and Allied Workers Union) beating the incumbent, Nicholas Mudzengerere, in a 
victory seen as providing a check on the ways of the leadership. Finally, grievances were again 
voiced at a meeting of labour leaders in Nyanga in June 1996, when certain among the centre’s 
staff were accused of being uncooperative, even ‘untouchable’.38
One of the major weaknesses of the movement was the gross under-representation of 
women in the membership and the leadership. This was first acknowledged in 1985, when the 
ZCTU adopted a resolution to establish a Women’s Desk, mandated with the promotion of gender 
equity within the movement. In 1986, the Women’s Desk organised a workshop with women 
representatives from each trade union to map a way forward. The delegates recommended that 
branch committees be formed and educational and training programmes be established. The 
recommendations were accepted by the General Council and 16 committees were established 
around the country soon after. In 1987, a ZCTU Women’s Council was formed from the 16 
committees, and this met for the first time in Masvingo to issue the Masvingo Declaration of 
Women’s Activities, which set the terms of reference of the Council and its programmes. Also in 
1987, a ten year education programme was initiated with funding from Norway; by 1992, some 
4,500 women from all affiliates had received training in seminars and workshops on a range of 
matters, including trade union functions, ESAP, collective bargaining, grievance handling, 
women and leadership, and fundamental rights.39
In 1992, women representatives from affiliates met in Chinhoyi to map out the further 
strategy for conscientisation and mobilisation. In the same year, the Women’s Advisory Council 
(WAC), which had been created by constitutional amendment at the 1990 Congress, was 
established as an integral part of the ZCTU’s executive with a mandate to ensure that women 
were represented at all levels of the organisation. In 1998, a Gender Perspective Team was 
established which comprised of an equal number of men and women and which was tasked with 
developing training material and accelerating gender balance. In Januaryl999, finally, the 
Education and Women’s Departments were merged, under the logic that, by this time, much of 
the gender programme had been incorporated satisfactorily into union structures.
While the centre was indeed moving in the right direction on gender issues, real progress 
on the ground was much slower. On the one hand, there existed an ongoing education and 
mobilisation programme that reached out to mobilise and sensitise the rank and file. This 
received, furthermore, an institutional boost by the formation of WAC and the Gender 
Perspective Team. On the other hand, the culture of male dominance had been hard to break. As
38 The Worker, No. 37, July 1996.
39 See Pswarai (1992).
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the 1997 evaluation concluded, ‘[ujnions generally tend to project that unions are for men. The 
culture of union organisation and mobilisation centres around the ideology of brotherhood as 
opposed to comradeship’.40 Women continued to be grossly under-represented in leadership 
structures and in the membership. By 1997, there were only two women in leadership positions at 
the union level, as president and vice-president of unions; and only one woman at the national 
level, as Third Vice-President, elected at the 1995 Congress. Furthermore, it was pointed out that 
women had not actually been receiving equal access to workshops and seminars. This had been 
the case either because the courses had often been conducted outside working hours, thereby 
overlooking the needs of working mothers and preventing women from gaining the necessary 
education to move up through the structures;41 or because they had not focused sufficiently on the 
sectors where women workers are concentrated, as in agriculture.42 Finally, by decade’s end, 
there were no statistics on women’s membership.43 The Economics Department itself had been 
slow to produce research on gender, devoting a paper to gender issues in 199844 and planning to 
include a chapter on gender in its Beyond ESAP II  study prepared for 2000. And the ZCTU- 
sponsored book, Keep on Knocking, on the history of the labour movement did not bring out the 
gender dimension sufficiently.45 The generally slow progress on the status of women in the ZCTU 
became an issue, in fact, during the affiliation negotiations with the public service associations, 
when the President of the Zimbabwe Nurses Association, which is predominantly composed of 
women, voiced concern and called for more favourable policies on women’s issues.46
Much less of an issue in the labour movement had been the ethnic dimension of 
Zimbabwean politics. Ethnic politics had been neutralised to a large extent by the fact that the 
national leadership for over a decade had comprised of a President of Ndebele origin and a 
General Secretary of Shona origin. Nonetheless, the judgement must be an ongoing one. While 
ethnic politics within the labour movement may not have held much sway since the independence 
of the labour centre from the ruling party, the question of ethnic representation did arise in 
relation to the leadership of the MDC,47 suggesting that, in times of power restructuring, issues of 
ethnicity are capable of resurfacing.
40 See Mihyo and Powell (1997), p. 28.
41 See Mutambanengwe (1997).
42 See Mihyo and Powell (1997), p. 27.
43 The problem cited here was that union rosters do not indicate full first names but only initials, thus 
making it impossible to derive a gender breakdown of the membership. There was a plan in progress to 
rectify this. Interview with Miriro Pswarai, Head of Education and Gender Department.
44 Kanyenze (1998a).
45 This was specifically noted by Miriro Pswarai, in interview.
46 The Worker, No. 34, April 1996.
47 See The Zimbabwe Mirror, 21-27 January 2000.
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Finally, it is important to round off the mobilisation/democratisation profile by indicating 
that the labour centre confronted the ongoing challenges of ESAP by adopting non-conventional 
strategies and reaching out to new constituencies. One of the new strategies was to reach out to 
youth, both employed and unemployed, and to organise youth structures within the labour 
movement so as to conscientise them and give them a voice in the working class. To this end, in 
February 1995 in Chitungwiza, a conference was organised jointly by ZCTU and ICFTU/AFRO 
on issues facing young workers. This was a follow-up conference on the World Youth Rally held 
in Kingston, Jamaica in 1992, which the ZCTU had attended. The Chitungwiza conference called 
for the creation of structures and representation at all levels and for an educational programme on 
a broad array of issues, including gender, unemployment, training opportunities, alcohol and drug 
abuse, and HIV/AIDS. Thereafter, workshops were organised nation-wide with the support of 
ICFTU/AFRO, drawing participants from affiliates and between the ages of 18 and 35 years.
Another strategy, which was of longer lineage but which began to bear fruit in the late 
1990s, was the unification of workers across public and private sectors. One approach was to 
intervene in the labour law deliberations and demand the harmonisation of private and public 
sector labour laws. The other was to go ahead and affiliate civil servants in spite of the legal 
segregation. At the union level, the first such unification occurred in 1994 when the Zimbabwe 
Construction and Allied Trade Workers’ Union (ZCATWU), whose membership had dropped 
from an all-time high o f43,000 in 1993 to 15,000 in 1995, succeeded in incorporating workers in 
the Ministry of Public Construction and National Housing.48 This was followed in August 1996, 
at the height of the public servants’ strike, by the full-scale incorporation of the PSA into the 
ZCTU, which boosted the labour movement in both numbers (47,000 PSA members in 1999) and 
confidence.
Finally, the ZCTU sought to build solidarity with the unemployed and workers in the 
informal sector, by engaging the Zimbabwe Unemployed and Retrenchees Organisation (ZURO) 
and the Informal Traders Association of Zimbabwe (ITAZ). The labour centre’s constitution 
allowed for these organisations to join as associate members and with observer status on the 
General Council. Progress in this regard had been lacking, however. The ZCTU devoted some 
funds towards organising these constituencies but found it very difficult, due to leadership 
problems and lack of consistency on the part of the latter. Moreover, with the advent of MDC and 
the reorientation of the ZCTU towards the political cause, there prospects of refocusing energies 
on organising the informal sector workers and the unemployed diminished.49
48 The Worker, No. 28, September 1995.
49 Interview with Galileo Chirebvu.
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Along with the above moves, the centre continued to build solidarity with a host of civic 
organisations, deepening and expanding the national democratisation movement that gained 
momentum in the late 1980s. Together with its internal consolidation, the external links which the 
ZCTU continued to build enabled it, by the late 1990s, to emerge as a formidable opponent of the 
ruling party. Yet, the centre continued to have no rural structures outside commercial farming; it 
was only in 1999, as we will see, that the centre engaged the rural areas, and then under the 
banner of MDC.
5.3 Appealing for National Dialogue, 1995-97
By 1995, the ZCTU’s political unionism was bearing fruit. Aside from its recruitment strategies, 
the status of the ZCTU in national life was benefiting from the growing discontent with ESAP. 
The ZCTU managed to harness the popular tide and organise, articulate, and lead the resistance to 
the state, capital, and ESAP. Despite its low level of unionisation, the centre enjoyed widespread 
legitimacy in national life as the leader and mouthpiece of opposition. In early 1995, in the midst 
of retrenchments, price rises, and an impeding Drought Levy, the ZCTU issued an ultimatum to 
the government to withdraw the Levy or face nation-wide industrial action. This resistance, 
compounded with the fear on the part of government that the labour movement was on its way to 
forming a political party, succeeded in bringing President Mugabe and the labour leaders into 
dialogue in March 1995 for the first time in the decade. The meeting signalled a thawing of 
relations, culminating in an invitation to Mugabe to be the guest of honour at the May Day 1995 
celebrations and to open the ZCTU Congress in Mutare in August, as well as to Nathan 
Shamuyarira, the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare, to adjourn the Congress.
1995 was also the year in which the ZCTU changed strategy, with the objective now 
being dialogue with the state and the IFIs. Whereas the May Day theme in 1991 had been 
‘Liberalisation or Liberation’, by 1995 it had become ‘Progress through Co-operation, 
Participation, Involvement’. In the same spirit, the 1995 Congress in Mutare was billed as the 
‘Beyond ESAP’ Congress, where the Beyond ESAP draft document was adopted and its call for 
national dialogue issued. ‘This theme’, said Sibanda to his May Day audience,
reflects our belief that for us to be effective in representing our constituencies, we 
have to be involved through participatory democracy in decision­
making....Rather than resort to ad hoc consultations that have characterised our 
relationship with government, we need a more permanent institutional framework
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through which issues of development should be discussed by government and 
representatives of civil society.50
In its turn, government reciprocated the call for reconciliation by chastising employers for 
exploiting workers under ESAP. Minister Shamuyarira condemned the state of labour relations, 
characterised by retrenchments and dismissals upon striking, and expressed his own wish for a re- 
invigoration of the tripartite spirit.51 The conciliatory mood extended into 1996 when Beyond 
ESAP was launched and presented at a national seminar in Kadoma, attended by business, 
government, and civic organisations. This further culminated in a tripartite study visit to South 
Africa in October 1996, aiming to examine the South African concept of a National Economic, 
Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC). Thereafter, a tripartite technical team was 
established to draw up the framework of such a consultative forum for Zimbabwe, to be called 
ZEDLAC, the Zimbabwe Economic Development and Labour Council. In the meantime, in April 
1996, for the first time the government invited the labour movement to join in the negotiations 
with South Africa on a new trade agreement.
Yet, the rapprochement was less profound than it might appear. Industrial conflict 
persisted into the period of dialogue. The government passed the EPZ Act in 1995, thereby 
suspending the application of the LRA in EPZs, and dealing a blow to the labour movement. This 
action was reinforced in 1996 when the government announced special regulations to govern the 
terms and conditions of employment in EPZs. The regulations allowed for long working hours, as 
well as work on Sundays, holidays, and at night at normal pay rates; allowed employers to fire 
workers at will and deny them legal representation in case of dispute; and prohibited strikes.52
Conflict persisted in the public sector as well. In fact, the biggest post-independence 
strike occurred in this period. On 19 August 1996, a walkout by nurses in Chinhoyi triggered a 
nation-wide civil servants’ strike. Festering grievances over low pay and authoritarian industrial 
relations erupted when the public sector was awarded a 6% cost of living adjustment as compared 
to the wage increments above the 22% inflation rate that had been secured in the private sector 
during collective bargaining. At the height of the strike, the PSA formally affiliated to the ZCTU. 
The civil servants resumed work on 5 September, but without the dispute having been resolved. 
Subsequently, temperatures rose again over lack of progress and distrust of the intentions of 
government. In late October, nurses and doctors renewed the job action, this time staying away 
for several weeks. The temperature rose further in mid-November, when the ZCTU, which until
50 The Worker, No. 24, May 1995.
51 The Worker, No. 25, June 1995.
52 The Worker, No. 70, July 1999.
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then had been playing an advisory and mediating role, called for a General Strike, the first in the 
post-independence period, in an attempt to put pressure on the government to resolve the dispute. 
In the event, the strike call was not heeded by workers, however, and this in turn caused 
controversy within the ZCTU. As it emerged, there had been insufficient consultation between 
the centre and its affiliates, as well as between affiliates and their memberships. The leadership of 
the ZCTU was taken to task for failing to ensure consultation, and the movement as a whole had 
once again come face to face with its weaknesses.53
In October of the same year, a new labour centre was formed, the Zimbabwe Federation 
of Trade Union (ZFTU), with the tacit endorsement of the ruling party -  though it was not 
actually registered by the government until July 1998. While it was proving at the time to be a 
‘passing nuisance’, as Tsvangirai put it, it is noteworthy that the means by which the alternative 
centre sought to legitimate itself entailed an accusation of the ZCTU as ‘donor driven’. A 
statement issued by the ZFTU claimed that the ZCTU
has been operating under funding donors, particularly the Americans who by and 
large have an influence over the activities of the centre. The ZCTU programmes 
and actions have clearly been donor driven instead of worker initiated. This has 
resulted in the ZCTU becoming an ivory tower, neglecting the aspirations of the 
workers in Zimbabwe.54
In a reversal of the direction of public criticism, the ZCTU was now the recipient of ‘foreign 
stooge’ accusations, the same accusation that the centre had meted out to government at the 
launch of ESAP. Thus, ZANU(PF), in its ZFTU guise, was striking at the heart of the 
organisational predicament that has haunted African labour movements, and using it to 
undermine the ZCTU’s legitimacy. The accusation warranted a prompt response. Tsvangirai 
retorted that
[w]e, as the ZCTU, have enjoyed solidarity from our international trade union 
fraternity. We will not apologise for this. After all, it allowed us to build our 
capacity. We have come to accept that this solidarity will not be extended in 
perpetuity, and thus, we have been working towards self-reliance since 1990. 
Although we receive this support, we have never been influenced in designing 
our policies and programmes and in executing our activities.55
53 See Behind the Strike (1996); see also The Worker, No. 42, December 1996/January 1997.
54 The Worker, No. 41, November 1996.
55 The Worker, No. 41, November 1996.
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Over the following three years, the ‘foreign stooge’ accusation came to occupy the heart of the 
ZANU(PF) critique of the ZCTU, and was extended to all the donor dependent actions 
spearheaded by the ZCTU, including the NCA and MDC.
Yet, while the ruling party sought a smoke screen for its own bourgeois project, the 
critique indeed struck a chord. For there was a distorted truth in it: not that the ZCTU was being 
‘driven’ by ‘foreign’ interests, but that it had been transformed in its collision with the 
imperialism, in both its ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ manifestations. The ZCTU did not emerge 
unscathed from its half-decade-long encounter with liberalism, or the state violence deployed 
against it, or from its long-standing dependence on Western donors. The dialogue which the 
ZCTU sought in 1995 was on terms that were much more palatable to the state, capital, organised 
metropolitan labour, and the IFIs. The dialogue was not to be on matters of direct worker control 
of production, or the democratisation of global institutions, but over a much more circumscribed 
realm of social life. The ZCTU was no longer ‘shouting from the outside’, as the Chief Economist 
put it.56
The Beyond ESAP document marked the change of strategy. It shifted the focus of the 
‘development’ problem from politics to economics, identifying the problem not as a political one 
requiring worker control, but as a technical one requiring state-level solutions. The document had 
a ‘modernist’ thrust to it, employing non-Marxist structuralist language which sought to 
emphasise the ‘structural rigidities’ of the Zimbabwean economy. This view approached the 
notion of sectoral and social disarticulation. It identified a ‘formal’ sector that was ‘enclave’ in 
nature and extroverted; and a ‘non-formal’ sector which provided labour and food commodities to 
the formal. Moreover, it called for the ‘endogenisation’ of growth by the integration of the two 
through land reform and state-led industrialisation. However, it placed among its principal 
objectives ‘the need to upgrade the performance of the economy so that it meets international 
standards of global competitiveness’,57 thereby pinning its hopes on the ‘invisible hand’ of the 
market after ‘take off. As Bond observed, ‘ [t]he ZCTU’s own failure to express the popular anti- 
ESAP outrage reflected not the “failure of the policy” but ESAP’s success in reducing all analysis 
to modernisation theory and all policy discourse to encouraging capital accumulation’.58 The 
corollary of this is that the document evaded the contradictory relationship of the peripheral 
economy to the central one, thereby letting imperialism off the hook. The ZCTU was now social 
democratic -  ‘civilised’.
56 Interview with Godfrey Kanyenze.
57 ZCTU (1996), p. 10.
58 Bond (1999), p. 4.
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Indeed, the ZCTU was warming up to the global agencies. In April 1996, a seminar was 
jointly organised by the ZCTU and the M s, in the first move by the EFIs to consult with labour. 
The seminar was attended by trade unionists from the region, including the ICFTU/AFRO 
representative, Andrew Kailembo. Trade unionists welcomed the new interest on the part of the 
IFIs in the labour movement, and especially the Bank’s interest in labour issues, as demonstrated 
by its 1995 World Development Report on ‘Workers in an Integrating World’. Kailembo 
condemned the previous exclusion of labour from the design of SAPs, which he declared 
‘economic sabotage’. Other trade unionists went much further to call for compensation from the 
IFIs. Despite the new engagement with labour, however, the IFIs remained unrepentant, claiming, 
in Westphalian spirit, that responsibility for consultation with social partners rested with 
governments. Just as well, the ZCTU pulled its punches. Godfrey Kanyenze, the Chief 
Economist, argued that ‘African governments have always danced to the tune of these western 
donors at the expense of their people at home’, but he proceeded to veer away from the subject by 
refocusing his critique on the state: ‘[o]ur governments have one problem. They want to control 
everything, leaving no room for others to say’.59
In May 1996, the debate was again evading the issue of control at the global level. The 
ZCTU, the ILO, and now together with the World Bank, were arguing against the IMF visiting 
representative for the need for government to ‘consult stakeholders’ on the second phase of 
ESAP. In a new twist, Tsvangirai was now appealing to the IMF to exercise influence over the 
government of Zimbabwe in the interest of the labour movement: ‘[tjhere is need for the IMF to 
use its influence to bring about meaningful consultations between government and all the social 
partners’.60 In the event, the IMF team leader, Jurgen Reitmaier, did not oblige: ‘I have my 
reservations in playing a more active role in pushing the government’; ‘it calls for deep intrusion’ 
into Zimbabwe’s “sovereignty”’.61 He added, however, that he had read the Beyond ESAP 
document and had found it ‘impressive’.62
This has been the ZCTU’s ‘strategic’ unionism: calling for ‘worker friendly’ economics 
without challenging political dispensations. While this has been a trend with respect to global 
issues, the strategic approach was also adopted in relation to issues of ‘worker control’ at the 
level of the workplace, manifest in the ZCTU’s response to privatisation (to be discussed). 
Suffice it to note here that the strategic approach of the ZCTU on matters of workplace and global 
democracy continued for the remainder of the decade.
59 The Worker, No. 35, May 1996.
60 The Worker, No. 36, June 1996.
61 The Worker, No. 36, June 1996.
62 The Worker, No. 36, June 1996.
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In relation to democracy at the level of the state, however, the strategic call for dialogue 
with the ruling party did not last long. While there were contradictions all along -  ongoing 
strikes, the enactment of EPZ legislation, the formation of the ZFTU -  the reconciliation was to 
meet its fate in the latter part of 1997 over the ZEDLAC concept, as well as over government’s 
decision to award war veterans unbudgeted compensation packages. With regards to ZEDLAC, 
agreement to establish it was reached after the tripartite visit to South Africa. There was, 
however, a parallel initiative in progress at the time between government and the business sector, 
in the form of the Business Forum. In the event, the President’s Office took the initiative to create 
an alternative to both ZEDLAC and the Business Forum, to be called the National Economic 
Consultative Forum (NECF), and created a national steering committee to this end. Controversy 
arose, however, when the discussions within the committee pertaining to the structure and 
composition of the NECF were not taken into consideration by the President. Whereas the 
discussions had led to an understanding that labour, business, academia, other civic organisations, 
and the state would nominate their own delegates to the forum, and that the body’s decisions 
would be binding, it emerged eventually that the President had overruled this framework in 
favour of a forum consisting of members invited by the President himself. This violated the 
principle of civic representation upon which the original idea of dialogue has been premised. The 
ZCTU wrote to the President in September 1997 indicating that the labour movement would 
withdraw from the forum unless the principle of representation was respected. The ZCTU 
received no response and proceeded to boycott the first NECF meeting in January 1998.63
Meanwhile, the country in 1997 continued to be rocked by industrial action, as living 
standards continued to erode. By 1996, the share of wages and salaries in the national income had 
declined to 40% from the 64% mark a decade earlier, while the share of profits accruing to 
owners of capital had increased to 60% from 37% over the same period, indicating beyond doubt 
that the share of the burden of ESAP has been borne by the working people.64 In 1997, as in the 
year before, strikes gripped several industries; this time they spanned construction, commercial, 
hotel and catering, clothing, commercial farming, and cement and lime, as well as railways, urban 
councils, and post and telecommunications. In all, the year saw more than 230 strikes in 16 
sectors. Most notably, farm-workers downed tools for the first time in protest over poor working 
conditions and wages which stood at less than one-sixth of the Poverty Datum Line 
(Z$359/Z$2,400), demanding a 135% increase against the 20% offered by employers. In the 
clothing industry, developments reached dramatic proportions, with the dismissal in July of
63 See the ZCTU Press Release (1998).
64 See Kanyenze (1998b).
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13,000 striking workers, of whom 11,000 were later reinstated as casuals on short-term contracts. 
And in parastatals, mass retrenchments of up to 1,200 loomed in the horizon, adding to the 2,000 
jobs already shed over the previous five years.65 These developments formed the backdrop to the 
ZCTU’s decision to stand its ground on the urgent issue of national dialogue.
That which broke the camel’s back, however, was President Mugabe’s promise in 
August, a month after the national budget was presented to Parliament, to award war veterans a 
Z$50,000 compensation package plus a Z$2,000 monthly pension. This promise sought to diffuse 
an emergent crisis between the ruling party and the lower echelons of its most crucial 
constituency, a crisis that had been precipitated by the looting of the state-sponsored War Victims 
Compensation Fund. In July 1997, during the African-African American Summit, war veterans 
demanded an audience with the President over the matter, and moved to disrupt the Summit. The 
state responded once again in a heavy-handed manner by banning strikes and re-invoking the 
colonial Law and Order (Maintenance) Act which had previously and successfully been 
challenged by the ZCTU. Despite the ban, however, President Mugabe was indeed being held to 
ransom by the constituency that had been providing government with security for two decades -  
an event that might be seen as a ‘soft coup’. The President capitulated and announced a new 
compensation package for the veterans, amounting to about Z$4,000 billion, without consulting 
Parliament. To meet the new fiscal outlay, it was announced that a 5% tax would be imposed. 
This was then presented to Parliament in November, despite objections by MPs. To make matters 
worse, it was announced that further burdens were to be placed upon workers. Besides the war 
veterans’ levy, there was also to be an increase in the electricity levy by 5%, an increase in sales 
tax by 2.5% (from 15-17%), and increase in duty on fuel by 20 cents per litre. In the same month, 
government took the first step of what turned out to be a process of re-radicalisation, by 
designating 1,471 for compulsory acquisition. And on 14 November, the Zimbabwe dollar 
crashed by 74 per cent in a four-hour period of trading. Thus, national boiling point was reached.
The new levy announcements, in particular, pit the labour movement and war veterans in 
direct confrontation and struggle over the status of each constituency in national life. The events 
coincided with the launch of Keep on Knocking, the ZCTU-sponsored book whose aim was 
precisely to recover the history and status of the labour movement. Tsvangirai seized the 
opportunity to challenge the official nationalist narrative, noting that ‘[i]t is the workers who gave 
birth to the nationalist struggle, and not the other way around’.66 These words echoed those in the 
preface to the book; ‘[t]he history of a nation-in-the-making should not be reduced to a selective
65 The Worker, No. 50, September 1997, and No. 51, October 1997.
66 The Worker, No. 53, December 1997/January 1998.
184
heroic tradition, but should be a tolerant and continuing process of questioning and re­
examination’.67 The struggle over national meanings was matched by the organisational struggle 
on the ground. Throughout September and October, the ZCTU held consultative meetings with 
workers in all regions, in the newly conceived Labour Forums, to decide what action should be 
taken. The failure of the 1996 call for a General Strike had driven home the point that full 
consultation with workers was a fundamental prerequisite for national action. Through the Labour 
Forums, a decision was finally reached to stage a country-wide strike and demonstration on 9 
December, if the government refused to withdraw the announced levies.
The government did not acquiesce to the ZCTU’s ultimatum -  or the scrutiny of the IFIs, 
which now demanded to know where the funds would come from. Thus, on 9 December the 
labour movement proceeded to bring production to a halt in all six regions, in the first nation­
wide, ZCTU-organised industrial action in the post-independence era. Workers demonstrated in 
large numbers in all major centres, including Bulawayo, Masvingo, Mutare, Gweru, and 
Marondera. Events transpired differently in Harare, however, and its adjacent town, Chitungwiza. 
An expected turn out of 250,000 persons in the capital was violently disrupted by riot police, who 
used teargas, batons, and dogs against demonstrators converging on the centre. The demonstrators 
were prevented from entering Harare.
The magnitude of the strike and the resort by the state to coercion indicated that the tide 
had finally swung. The scale of the resistance dealt a blow to the ruling party. And the national 
mood had been transformed. As The Worker reported in its special issue on the strike,
[t]he political landscape of this country will never be the same after December 9,
1997. Rampant corruption and unemployment, collapse of health services, an 
ailing economy and an unaccountable government are sure recipes for disaster.
The people have risen to blaze the way to salvation and it may just be a matter of 
time.68
Two days after the strike, the use of violence took a more strategic turn, with an assault on the 
leadership of the ZCTU. Several assailants appeared in Morgan Tsvangirai’s office on 11 
December and proceeded to beat him unconscious. Notably, the assault and the suppression of a 
peaceful demonstration internationalised the situation, with condemnations of the government 
and solidarity messages pouring in from the ICFTU, AFL-CIO, ITSs, African trade unions, and 
others.
67 Tsvangirai (1997). p. xi.
68 The Worker, Special Issue, December 1997.
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The national mood had indeed changed, and the ruling party had to face the reality. 
Realising the magnitude of the resistance, government finally moved to withdraw the war 
veterans levy, which was due to come into effect in January 1998. But in spite of the national 
budget, the government did award the war veterans the promised compensation.
The government also moved to scrap the electricity and fuel hikes, but the sales tax was 
retained. The ZCTU in its turn, enjoying a further boost of confidence, raised the stakes. The 
labour centre demanded the removal not only of the remaining sales tax, but also of Police 
Commissioner Augustine Chihuri and Home Affairs Minister Dumiso Dabengwa. The tenuous 
dialogue that had been ushered in by the Beyond ESAP project two years earlier had finally been 
laid to rest.
5.4 Changing Notions of Worker Participation
Before proceeding onto the period of renewed confrontation, it is important to assess the parallel 
transformation of the ZCTU’s notion of worker participation at the workplace under the global 
‘reality’ of privatisation. Recall that while the first phase of ESAP was to focus on stabilisation, 
trade liberalisation, and public enterprise reform, the latter project did not get far off the ground. 
The agricultural marketing boards were commercialised, but this was the only noteworthy 
change. Thus, the second phase, ZIMPREST, was to focus on the privatisation of public 
enterprises. To this was added the project of land reform, all within the evolving framework of 
indigenisation.
On the eve of ZIMPREST, the labour movement acknowledged the poor performance 
record of the parastatals, the corruption within them, the drain on the public burse, and the need 
for change. ‘If these companies are left operating based on the present system’, Tsvangirai 
argued, ‘the country’s economy will eventually be in shambles’.69 But the ZCTU’s response was 
drastically different than that contained in its critique of the liberal investment code of 1989 and 
in its Workers’ Participation Manual, when it called for public ownership of the economy and an 
accountable civil service.70 The ZCTU now understood privatisation as inevitable, and one that it 
must influence towards workers’ ends. As the Friederich-Ebert Stiftung’s (FES) Rudolf Traub- 
Merz put it, ‘trade unions must decide whether they should be onlookers or get involved with 
their own concepts in the whole exercise of privatisation’.71 In this spirit, Tsvangirai indicated
69 The Worker, No. 39, September 1996.
70 ZCTU (1989) and ZCTU (1993).
71 Reported in The Worker, No. 40, October 1996.
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that ‘[t]here is need to negotiate for better packages for those workers who will be affected during 
the process....It is also important to embark on retraining and redeployment of the victims. 
Privatisation should be accepted as a labour consumption aspect for an economic need’.72
Thus, the ZCTU, together with FES, commissioned a study on privatisation which was 
produced in 1997.73 Then, in June 1998, with the support of the Zimbabwe Enterprise 
Development project, the labour centre organised a workshop in Harare for trade union leaders on 
the topic of employee ownership. And in 1999, a regional research effort was launched, entitled 
‘The Privatisation and Commercialisation of State Entities’, and involving the ZCTU, COSATU, 
and the National Union of Namibian Workers, to assess the various country experiences with 
privatisation. The regional labour centres then held a conference in March 2000 in Harare, where 
they each presented their country case studies.74
The commissioned study of 1997 pointed out that the main problems of the privatisation 
exercise have been the absence of a comprehensive policy approach, a legal framework, and an 
independent authority to oversee it. The study advised the ZCTU to put pressure on the 
government to establish all of the above and, furthermore, to participate in the privatisation 
exercise so that employee welfare would be safeguarded. Besides ensuring that the LRA 
provisions are observed throughout the process, the study indicated that the ZCTU had a role in 
ensuring that employees benefit from privatisation via ‘employee share ownership’ schemes and 
the establishment of a National Investment Trust for the warehousing of shares. Subsequently, the 
General Council of the ZCTU adopted the concept of employee share ownership, in relation to 
both private and public enterprises, and this was reaffirmed at the workshop in 1998. This, again, 
was drastic change of identity; earlier the ZCTU had rejected ‘employee share ownership’ as a 
system of ‘petty shareholding’ that was ‘designed to confuse the class identity of the workers and 
neutralise the class struggle’.75
The Zimbabwean case study produced by the ZCTU conducted in-depth assessments of 
privatisation and commercialisation with reference to a number of enterprises. The study re­
affirmed the concerns raised above. At the close of the decade, there remained no clear 
privatisation strategy, there was no consistency in the exercise, workers were being largely 
ignored, the process was not transparent, and political interference was rife. A privatisation 
authority was finally established in February 2000, as the Privatisation Authority of Zimbabwe
72 The Worker, No. 39, September 1996.
73 Godana and Hlatshwayo (1997).
74 The Zimbabwean case study was carried out by the Economics Department of the ZCTU; see Kanyenze 
(2000).
75 ZCTU (1993), p. ix.
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(PAZ), but even this did not meet the independence criterion, for it was placed in the Office of the 
President.
Privatisation was presented as a fait accompli. One of the most telling cases was the 
commercialisation of the National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ).76 The rhetoric of reform started 
gaining momentum in 1995, when the restructuring of NRZ was authorised by government. 
Workers were not consulted in this. The restructuring plan at this time involved the separation of 
infrastructure from commercial operations: the state was to assume responsibility for the 
infrastructure, while commercial operations were to be reorganised into two companies, both 
owned by the state, one for provision of rail services and the other of repair services. Unions 
protested against their exclusion from these decisions, as the whole exercise was to have far- 
reaching implications for workers. The plan was presented to unions in a meeting with the 
Ministry, the NRZ Board, and management in February 1998, at the same time as Parliament 
passed the new Railways Bill. The unions then proceeded to make demands on the 
commercialisation process itself, calling for transparency, protection of workers, and replacement 
of inept managers. The only positive outcome of the meeting was the establishment of a NRZ 
Tripartite Restructuring Committee (TRC), with equal representation by the ministry, 
management, and labour, although even this turned out to be ineffective, for it was circumvented 
on key decisions. Then, in 1999, the restructuring plan was suddenly changed, on occasion of 
changes in the Ministry of Transport and Energy involving the appointment of a new minister and 
a new permanent secretary, as well as the expiration of the term of office of the NRZ Board that 
had been overseeing restructuring. The new strategy now called for concessioning of the NRZ 
into two vertically integrated concessions based on geographic considerations, instead of splitting 
the railways between infrastructure and commercial operations. This time, neither management 
nor workers were consulted.
Workers were marginalised elsewhere as well, and generally had to engage with the 
process to cut their losses. Unions protested the ad hoc methods of the government, their 
exclusion of workers from decision-making, and the absence of transparency. Meanwhile, heavy 
retrenchments had already been experienced; for example, 1,000 workers lost their jobs in the 
Cold Storage Company, 2,500 in the Cotton Company of Zimbabwe, and 1,300 in the Grain 
Marketing Board. In such cases, workers typically engaged with the restructuring process to 
negotiate the conditions of retrenchment. The issue of employee share ownership had been less 
visible, affecting the restructuring cases that had moved beyond commercialisation to 
privatisation.
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While there have been ‘success’ stories in privatisation, one being Dairibord and another 
the Cotton Company of Zimbabwe (COTTCO), the employee share ownership experience was 
negative. For example, COTTCO was first commercialised and then incorporated in 1994, and 
was finally listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange in December 1997. Government took over 
the debt of CMB, and thereafter COTTCO restructured operations and succeeded in turning 
around the failing financial performance of the CMB. Yet, not only were retrenchments large 
(2,500), the workers that remained did not benefit meaningfully from employee share ownership. 
Only 5% of total shares were allocated to employees, while 20% to small-scale cotton growers. 
Importantly, both small-scale growers and employees subsequently off-loaded their shares onto 
the market in order to meet current expenditures in times of economic hardship. The ZCTU study 
noted that small-scale growers were the worse off, given spiralling input prices.
5.5 Resolving for State Power, 1998-2000
The labour movement entered 1998 with heightened confidence vis-a-vis both the state and 
capital and with indignation towards the state’s scare tactics against the leadership. The new year 
began with fighting talk. Provocations were issued to the state, with such articles in The Worker 
as ‘Will Tsvangirai Run For President?’. Similarly, taunts and signals were sent to unconvinced 
employers. ‘We cannot rule out that the situation will be explosive’, warned the Chief Economist, 
as early as six months prior to collective bargaining. ‘It will be really a tough time for industry. 
The only way out is for employers to negotiate in good faith and they must make a commitment 
to pay their workers reasonably’. The President of the PSA was more apocalyptic: ‘[o]ne cannot 
rule out the possibility of industrial anarchy’. The headlines of The Worker further drove the point 
home: ‘Workers Want 50% Salary Rise or Else...’. Meanwhile, the ICFTU was exerting pressure 
of its own, calling on President Mugabe to investigate ‘the brutal attack’ on Morgan Tsvangirai.77
The situation deteriorated much earlier than expected. The new year brought with it price 
hikes in basic commodities by 17% to 42%, including that of maize-meal by 21%. This brought 
the country to a new convulsion. By mid-January, violent protests erupted in Harare and 
Chitungwiza, and these quickly spread to other city centres. Businesses closed down and shops 
were ransacked, while the government deployed the army and helicopters. The toll was 
unprecedented. Eight persons were killed and 3,000 arrested.78
76 The case is presented in Kanyenze (2000).
77 The Worker, No. 55, February 1998.
78 The Worker, No. 55, February 1998.
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In the face of public outrage, government moved to reverse the increase in the price of 
maize-meal. However, it remained intransigent on the sales tax and also on the outstanding 5% 
development (formerly drought) levy and the 15% tax on pensions that was due to come into 
effect in January 1998. Following the food riots, the General Council of the ZCTU met and 
resolved that the sales tax must be removed, and further added to the list the 5% development 
levy and the 15% pension tax. After the meeting, Gibson Sibanda called on the government to 
enter into dialogue towards a social contract, with the intention of clearly defining the sacrifices 
of each social partner rather than placing the burden of adjustment wholly on the shoulders of 
workers.79 Nevertheless, the labour leadership moved also to consult the movement once again, as 
it had prior to the December strike, on the merits of pursuing renewed mass action. Upon wide 
consultation and agreement, a new ultimatum was issued to government to withdraw the levies or 
face a job stay-away in the first week of March. As a new tactic, the stay-away aimed to bring 
production to a halt, while also avoiding a violent encounter with security forces.
Government and labour soon entered into talks but these again collapsed, and the labour 
movement proceeded to issue a nation-wide call for a stay-away. This was indeed heeded by a 
broad spectrum of the workforce, public and private, and in fact surpassed the December strike. 
The March stay-away was the largest industrial action since 1948, succeeding in closing down 
80% of industry, business, and public offices, particularly in the larger centres, but also in 
medium-sized and some smaller towns. The majority of workers who had been informed about 
the action and its issues in advance joined the action: more than half a million workers from all 
sectors. The stay-away was less successful in the rural districts and smaller towns, due to 
inadequate information and mobilisation, serving in this instance as a reminder of the continuing 
weakness of the labour movement in the countryside. Nonetheless, the urban success of the action 
demonstrated that lessons had been learned, mainly the principle of consultation. Besides reliance 
on Labour Forums, the success of the stay-away was also attributed to its non-violent format and, 
further, to its appeal to non-unionised sections of society. In all, the success of the event 
confirmed more than ever that the ZCTU enjoyed the support of a broad section of society.80
Despite the organisational success, however, the government did not relent. Thus, in 
April, the ZCTU began once again consulting with workers nation-wide on the next course of 
action. The possibility of a second stay-away was aired, but now calls were also heard for the 
ZCTU to form a political party to challenge ZANU(PF) directly at the polls. It was, of course, not 
the first time that the latter thought had crossed the minds of workers, but in the wake of two
79 The Worker, No. 56, March 1998.
80 See Staying Away To Move Forward: A Report on the National Stay-Away (1998).
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major industrial actions against an aloof government, such calls carried more weight than usual. 
Reservations, however, were quickly expressed by trade union leaders. The Second Deputy 
Secretary General, Nicholas Mudzengerere, said that it would be ‘very unfortunate’ if the ZCTU 
was derailed from its trade union agenda, while the General Secretary of the PTC Workers Union, 
Gift Chimanikire, warned of the dangers involved, invoking the recent Zambian and British 
examples of labour parties forsaking their working class constituencies. ‘Our main focus should 
be to deal with the politics of the stomach’, Chimanikire affirmed.81 In the same month, 
ZIMPREST was launched, two years after its scheduled date.
The temperature for another stay-away mounted, as collective bargaining began. The 
persisting militancy on the part of workers was placing employers on the defensive, with some 
even suggesting that businesses close down to avoid the possibility of damage to property. 
Tsvangirai himself predicted (or warned) as much: ‘[t]he collective bargaining scenario will be 
characterised by very high tension because we’re living in a hyper-inflation situation’.82 In the 
event, workers in at least 16 industrial sectors were awarded increases of 34% on average, above 
the inflation rate of 29% but near the anticipated inflation at year’s end.
Worker militancy also brought President Mugabe back to the negotiating table in early 
July, for the first time in three years. The labour leaders called on the government to stamp out 
corruption, withdraw the levies, and restructure the NECF in accordance with the originally 
agreed framework. At the same time, however, workers were warning the leadership not to back 
down on any demands.83 At the meeting the government announced that the sales tax increase 
would be withdrawn at the beginning of 1999, but remained adamant about the levies. In the same 
month, the government went ahead and registered the new labour centre, the ZFTU.
Judging the response to be disappointing, the ZCTU, by the end of July, was again 
issuing an ultimatum and planning a stay-away for early September. This time, under mounting 
pressure and aware of the organising successes of the ZCTU, government relented. On 4 
September, four days prior to the planned stay-away, a tripartite meeting was held at which 
government agreed to remove the sales tax, the development levy, and the pensions tax, and also 
agreed to restructure the NECF.
Although this marked a new victory for the ZCTU, it was once again to be overtaken by 
events. In August, the government embarked on a military campaign in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC), without consulting Parliament or tax-payers. By September, inflation had
81 The Worker, No. 57, April 1998.
82 The Worker, No. 57, April 1998.
83 The Worker, No. 60, July 1998.
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reached 34%, equal to the wage increases that had been won two months prior. In October, 
following a depreciation of the currency, fuel prices shot up by 67%, sending inflation to 45% in 
November and to 46% in December. The delay of ZIMPREST had also denied the government 
the requisite balance of payments support from the IMF and the donors who follow suit.
In early November, new riots broke out in Bulawayo, Chitungwiza, Harare, and Gweru 
over the fuel hike, amid public recognition of corruption at NOCZIM, the state-owned oil- 
procurement monopoly, and allegations of a link between the fuel hike and the DRC intervention. 
On 7 November, the ZCTU’s General Council called for a 20% cost of living adjustment and the 
suspension of the fuel hike, and resolved to stage stay-aways every Wednesday and review the 
situation every two weeks. Two stay-aways were held, on November 11 and 18, in the course of 
which a Mutare resident was shot and killed by the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) during a 
riot. A third stay-away was finally suspended after government requested to reconvene an urgent 
tripartite meeting. This did not resolve the stand-off, however, for on 27 November, the State 
President issued a decree banning stay-aways for 180 days, under the Law and Order 
(Maintenance) Act.
After three successful nation-wide industrial actions over the course of one year, the 
labour movement had discovered its strengths, but also its limitations. Besides being able to 
mobilise unionised workers, the ZCTU could claim to command the respect and support of a 
broader swathe of the nation that was not incorporated into its structures. The ZCTU certainly 
appeared to have become the leading oppositional force in Zimbabwe. But one limitation was that 
industrial action would make enormous demands on workers (who would sacrifice wages and 
face intimidation upon return to work) without effectively stemming the tide of job cuts and wage 
erosion. Another limitation, although less acknowledged, was the fact that, despite the 
groundswell of support that the centre received, it still lacked organisational grounding in the 
rural areas. Indeed, at this time, the countryside was witnessing its first high profile protest 
movement against government, outside ZCTU structures, in the form of mass land occupations. 
These were being organised by circuits of dissident local party cadres and war veterans, and 
timed to coincide with the International Donors’ Conference on land (to be discussed). In the 
event, the latter limitation did not override the first. For in light of the ineffectiveness of industrial 
action, the ZCTU began to consider seriously the option that had overshadowed Zimbabwean 
politics throughout the decade, that is, the formation of a political party and the removal of 
ZANU(PF) by the ballot.
The objective of prying open the national debate had been pursued by the ZCTU via the 
NECF strategy, by which the centre sought to by-pass Parliament, but also via electoral reform
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which sought the prying open of Parliament itself. The ZCTU was part of a broader movement, 
inclusive of human rights organisations, churches, academics, students, and opposition parties, 
whose origins were to be found in the late-1980s mobilisation against the one-party state. The 
high-point of this movement in the 1990s was the boycotting by opposition parties of the 1995 
elections in protest against the first-past-the-post system of representation, which was enabling 
the ruling party to monopolise Parliament and maintain a de facto one-party state. The broad 
social movement, however, remained loose and relatively ineffective until January 1998. At this 
juncture, it consolidated itself into the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) with a mandate 
to carry out civic education programmes and to campaign for wide-ranging constitutional 
reforms. At the time of its inception, the NCA marked a formidable consolidation of diverse civic 
organisations into a formal alliance against the ruling party. It furthermore linked all of these to 
the organisational powers of the ZCTU.
Hereafter, the removal of ZANU(PF) entailed the double project of constitutional reform 
and formation of a political party. One turbulent year after the founding of the NCA, it had 
become clear to the opposition that restoring the rule of law and removing the ruling party were 
urgent and parallel projects. Apart from the repeated use of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act 
in defiance of a 1994 Supreme Court ruling, the government in January 1999 once again 
overstepped constitutional boundaries by giving the military the green light to arrest and torture 
journalists of The Standard, a private newspaper, after they published a story alleging that there 
had been a foiled military coup against the government in protest over the DRC intervention.84 
The President sought to justify his government’s actions by labelling the private press as ‘white’ 
and ‘foreign owned’, ‘bent on ruining national unity’.85 The journalists were committing ‘treason’ 
against the state, and hence, in the words of the Permanent Secretary, were ‘subject to military 
law’.86
In late February, the task of forming a new political party to remove ZANU(PF) gained 
momentum. Over 40 civic organisations, including the ZCTU, convened a National Working 
People’s Convention to discuss the formation of a political movement. The Convention arrived at 
a proposal to mandate the ZCTU to spearhead the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), but 
also established that the civic organisations must return to their constituencies to consult on the 
proposal, receive feedback, and then reconvene a final meeting on 5 May. It was also agreed at 
the Convention that the MDC would not be an exclusively workers’ movement but that it would
84 The Standard, 10 January 1999.
85 See Rafitopoulos (1999c); quotations originally appeared in The Herald, 9 February 1999.
86 See Rafitopoulos (1999c); quotations originally appeared in Financial Gazette, 28 January 1999.
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also serve the interests of professionals, civic organisations, business, peasants, the informal 
sector, and the unemployed.87 For its own part, the ZCTU held labour forums throughout the 
country, during which the proposal received wide support. The movement received resounding 
support among the other constituencies as well and was finally launched in May. This however 
was still a ‘movement’, not a party. Forming the party was the next task. On 7 August, the ZCTU 
held an extraordinary congress at which 164 delegates from the affiliates met and voted 
unanimously in favour of the ZCTU’s role in facilitating the transformation of the MDC into a 
political party.
The events of 1998/99 had transpired at such a quick pace that the reservations expressed 
only one year earlier by top trade unionists had been drowned out by popular mobilisation and 
state repression. Only scattered sceptics remained, warning against the dangers of subordinating 
the longer-term objectives of workers to a broad array of interests whose sole point of 
convergence was the finite objective of state power. An observer close to the labour movement 
voiced precisely such scepticism in June. ‘I am alarmed’, wrote Yash Tandon, ‘at what seems to 
be an emerging consensus within the ranks of the general membership and the present leadership 
of the ZCTU’.88 While acknowledging that the ZCTU had an important role to play in politics, he 
urged for a politics of opposition. It is only in ‘oppositional mode’, he argued, that the labour 
movement could best pursue the interests of workers, pointing to the contrary experiences in 
Zambia and South Africa. Tandon further warned of the organisational weaknesses at the grass 
roots of trade unionism in Zimbabwe, the dangers of an untrained leadership taking over the 
labour movement and becoming subservient to their mentors in a post-ZANU(PF) government, 
and the ‘illusion that these “working class” ministers will be able to break with the present hold 
of the IMF and the World Bank over the economy when in power’.
The alarm was sounded, but the range of options available to the labour movement 
seemed limited at this juncture. Nor was the mood in the street patient. Nor, for that matter, had 
the leadership articulated in the public sphere a global understanding of the Zimbabwean working 
class. Over the previous few years, the centre’s contribution to the public debate had increasingly 
zeroed in on the ‘national economy’ and its ‘mismanagement’ by ZANU(PF), the result of the 
squeeze put on by liberalisation, repression, and the governance synthesis, which reduced the 
range of the ‘acceptable’ in the development dialogue. ‘The ZCTU has not really changed’, 
claimed Tsvangirai at the millennium, in a telling interpretation of his own. ‘It has always been
87 The Worker, No. 68, April/May 1999.
88 Tandon (1999b).
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social democratic in practice. The Marxism-Leninism of the 80s was rhetorical, within the 
political climate created by ZANU(PF)’.89
The party was launched at Rufaro Stadium on 11 September, with 15,000 supporters in 
triumphant spirit. Gibson Sibanda proceeded to relate the MDC project as the successor to 
previous national struggles, as the ‘third chimurenga/umvukela’, invoking even biblical 
imageries:
Our struggle in Zimbabwe has always been a struggle for the dignity and 
sovereignty of the people. We, the workers and peasants have always been in the 
leadership of that struggle. In our first chimurenga/umvukela, workers fought 
against massive exploitation in the mines, farms and industry, and peasants 
against the expropriation of their land. The nationalist and liberation movement 
that led the second chimurenga/umvukela was bom from and built on the 
struggles of workers and peasants. But after twenty years of Independence, we 
now have a ruling nationalist elite that has exploited this long history towards its 
own ends, betraying the people’s struggles. Is this the country that we fought for 
and rejoiced in 1980?.. .For how long shall we wait for the biblical Moses?90
The fact that State House is not the Promised Land continued to be demonstrated 
throughout the year as workers locked homs with capital. From the inception of ESAP to the 
millennium, real wages had collapsed by 50%,91 while employers continued to siphon off 
increases in productivity and the bulk of gross domestic income. Between 1985/90 and 1991/97, 
productivity had increased by 4.4%, while real average earnings had declined by 12.5%, and the 
share of wages and salaries in gross domestic income had declined to 39% in 1997 from 54% in 
1987. In the private sector, the lowest minimum wage (excluding domestic service) in April 1999 
was a starvation wage, as low as 21% of the Poverty Datum Line.92 The latest struggle, now in 
1999, was being waged over the 20% cost of living adjustment demanded by workers in 
November 1998, after inflation soared far beyond average salary increments for the year. By mid- 
January 1999, only half of the National Employment Councils had agreed on the 20% adjustment. 
By April, one-fourth of NECs were still refusing to pay, most notably in the textile, transport 
operating, engineering, and commercial farming sectors. In the latter, a strike was averted when 
GAPWUZ and employers agreed on a 15% adjustment.93 By the time of collective bargaining in 
July, inflation was hovering above 53%. Employers provoked further controversy when they 
sought to withdraw the 20% adjustment during bargaining. And government outdid employers
89 Interview with Morgan Tsvangirai.
90 Gibson Sibanda’s speech, The Worker, No. 72, September/October 1999.
91 The Worker, No. 70, July 1999.
92 ZCTU Economics Department (1999), p. 6.
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when in August it announced that it would raise the salaries of government ministers by a 
whopping 182%. By September, a wide range of wage bargains had been struck between workers 
and employers, from as low as 25% by the Commercial Workers Union to 65% by the 
Construction and Allied Trades Workers Union, while in some sectors negotiations were still 
pending. Strikes continued for the remainder of the year. Hospitality industry workers took their 
employers to task for several days in September, demanding a 70% wage increase, while junior 
doctors thereafter brought the health system to a halt for several weeks, as the government 
refused to improve their wages and conditions.
Nonetheless, at the turn of the millennium the State House objective gained further 
credence. The national situation deteriorated to a desperate state on account of severe foreign 
exchange shortages and a crippling fuel crisis, alongside frustration over the ruling party’s 
aloofness over constitutional reform, and all against the background of the DRC diversion. The 
resentment culminated in the stunning rejection of governments’ own draft constitution at the 
February referendum, which government had sought to win on a radical land acquisition clause, 
handing the ruling party its most crushing defeat in its twenty years at the helm.
This was a turning point for intra-ZANU(PF) politics, and national politics by extension. 
With parliamentary elections around the comer, the leadership was compelled to re-assert radical 
nationalist ideals; these were now stripped of the Marxist-Leninist mantle but nonetheless re­
kindled a popular orientation. Soon after the rejection of the draft constitution, war veterans and 
supporters embarked on a series of mass land occupations of white commercial farms. Leading 
members of government expressed their unequivocal support at this juncture, not least the 
President himself who went further to issue threats to ‘those who try to cause disunity among our 
people’: ‘death will befall them’.94 Such threats resonated among the leadership of the ex­
combatants as well, who warned of a return to war and the installation of a military government 
in the event of a ZANU(PF) defeat at the polls.95 High Court orders to evict squatters were 
ignored by the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Police, on the grounds that squatting was now a 
‘political’ issue. As the election period dragged on, land occupations proliferated, on as many as 
900 farms, while the threats against members of opposition, black and white, were indeed carried 
out. The occupations dovetailed with an electoral campaign, which saw also systematic violence, 
including beatings, rapes, killings, and the displacement of scores of villagers from their homes.
93 The Worker, No. 68, April/May 1999.
94 Daily News, 17 March 2000.
95 The Herald, 16 March 2000.
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The implementation of radical land reform was the ruling party’s means of rescuing its 
ailing legitimacy among its most important electoral constituency, the peasantry, when finally 
pushed into the comer by both the ZCTU and radical elements within the party’s own ranks. The 
manoeuvre amounted to a concession to the land cause, but also an intensified polarisation of the 
semi-proletariat along the rural-urban divide. At the June 2000 parliamentary elections, the ruling 
party managed to come out on top, though the electorate was clearly split between rural and urban 
areas. The important exception was in the Matabelaland provinces, which crossed the rural-urban 
divide to vote for MDC, in an expression of the painful grievances and unresolved contradictions 
of the post-independence period.
Before addressing the more informal and rural semi-proletarian politics of the 1990s, it is 
important to look more closely into the international trade union politics within which the ZCTU 
has participated, and which have conduced to its ‘civilisation’.
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CHAPTER 6 
Trade Union Internationalism
The end of the Cold War facilitated the embourgeoisement of the national debate by lending 
legitimacy to the aspirations of the emergent black bourgeoisie. This was the culmination of a 
decade-long process of conversion of the liberation movement into an imperial social prop. The 
end of the Cold War also facilitated the transformation of the labour movement into an 
oppositional force within ‘acceptable’ limits, as defined by the governance synthesis. This 
process entailed the systematic exclusion of the ZCTU from dialogue on national development 
policy, until it could speak with a less ‘ideological’ voice. It is worth, therefore, inquiring into the 
way the ZCTU has related to international trade union bodies and global institutions. These 
relations dovetailed with liberalisation and political repression at home to produce a trade 
unionism in Zimbabwe whose class and anti-imperialist politics had been blunted.1
6.1 Sources of Internationalism
The ZCTU’s international effort has always been secondary to the national one, and its 
international policy-making apparatus less developed. In this sense, ‘globalisation’ caught the 
ZCTU unprepared, at a time when it was prying itself away from the state. By decade’s end, the 
process of foreign-policy making remained much less public and virtually detached from rank 
and file. Policy debate remained largely confined to the General Council of the ZCTU, whose 
proceedings are confidential. Foreign policy initiatives were often left to the President and the 
General Secretary who, in turn, depended on the Economics Department for advice, though not 
invariably. The latter was not party to General Council meetings. An International Committee 
was set up in the 1990s, which included the Economics Department, but this did not get off the 
ground. Nor did the centre seek to inform its membership on pressing international issues. The 
ZCTU’s monthly newspaper, The Worker, was slow to respond to these, launching an 
international column only in 2000; for the whole of the 1990s, there was no coverage of foreign 
affairs. The procedures for making foreign policy were thus quite centralised, unlike those for 
national policy.
1 This interpretation derives partly from interviews with key trade unionists, which included Gibson 
Sibanda, Morgan Tsvangirai, Galileo Chirebvu, Collen Gwiyo, Nicholas Mudzengerere, and Godfrey 
Kanyenze; see the ‘Interviews’ section in the bibliography for further details.
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Within the ZCTU, the division of labour on international policy roughly developed as 
follows. The Economics Department sought to cultivate a global vision by publishing research on 
various issues that were of immediate relevance. For example, globalisation, the Lome 
Convention, the SADC Trade Protocol, Regional Productivity, EPZs, and Labour Standards, all 
received attention.2 Meanwhile, diplomatic relations, and often political initiatives, were pursued 
by the leadership alone. Throughout the 1990s, the Secretary General, Morgan Tsvangirai, 
oversaw regional relations, while serving as the Secretary General of SATUCC between 1994 and
1998. In turn, the President of the ZCTU, Gibson Sibanda, oversaw the centre’s continental and 
global relations, while serving on a number of international bodies -  as Vice-President of 
ICFTU/AFRO, Member of the General Council of OATUU, Member of the Governing Body of 
the ILO, and Chairperson of the Commonwealth Trade Union Council (CTUC).
The ZCTU maintained relations with trade unions in the region, the continent, and 
beyond. In the 1980s, the ZCTU followed a policy of non-alignment, along the lines of OATUU 
of which the ZCTU has been a member since its inception. In this period, the ZCTU maintained 
educational and financial relations with both the Western-based ICFTU and the Eastern-based 
WFTU, and allowed ZCTU affiliates to join individually the International Trade Secretariats 
(ITSs) of the ICFTU and the Trade Union Internationals (TUIs) of WFTU. The ZCTU has also 
been a member of SATUCC, which was formed in 1983 with the specific purpose of organising 
against apartheid. In the 1990s, the ZCTU and its regional partners embarked on the process of 
transforming SATUCC into a trade union movement with developmental aims -  alongside the 
transformation of SADC -  and set itself towards the promotion of trade union rights, democracy, 
and regional integration. The collapse of the East-West divide was followed by the shrinking of 
WFTU to insignificance and the reassertion of OATUU as a trade union body with an ‘anti- 
imperialist’ agenda. OATUU thereafter resumed its competition with the ICFTU’s African 
Regional Organisation (AFRO) for the loyalty of trade unions on the continent. The ZCTU 
responded to these changes by formally affiliating with the ICFTU in 1991, balancing OATUU 
against the ICFTU, and devoting the bulk of its energies to SATUCC’s regionalist agenda. The 
ZCTU is also a member of the Commonwealth Trade Union Council (CTUC).
The ZCTU maintains bilateral relations with national trade union centres in the North. 
These include the national centres of the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, UK, Canada, 
and USA. Bilateral relations have consisted in funding and solidarity action. The ZCTU has also
2 ZCTU (1998), Kanyenze, ZCTU Economics Department (no date), SATUCC Position on the SADC Trade 
Protocol (1997), SA TUCC Position o f Productivity (1997), ZCTU Position on Export Processing Zones
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received funding from Northern NGOs, and over the years these have included Friederich-Ebert 
Stiftung, FOS Belgium, HIVOS, OXFAM, and Christian Aid. As we have seen, in 1997 as much 
as two-thirds of the centre’s funding derived from foreign sources.
The ZCTU began in the 1990s to engage with multilateral institutions, namely the IMF, 
World Bank, and WTO. With the former two, it began to pursue a policy of dialogue towards 
‘national ownership’ of the reform programme. In relations to the WTO, the ZCTU was slow to 
respond, producing research on the proposed trade-linked Social Clause on the eve of the Third 
Ministerial Meeting in Seattle. This latter case is of particular significance, because it 
demonstrated the ongoing weakness of the foreign policy-making apparatus of the centre.
The thrust of the ZCTU’s international approach in the 1990s, above all, was a regionalist 
one. The ZCTU devoted much of its international energy to the creation of a Southern African 
regional trade union bloc, the integration of the regional economy, and the harmonisation of 
labour laws, in accordance with the changing regionalist understanding of development. Within 
SATUCC, the ZCTU joined in solidarity action against violations of human rights in the region, 
pursued successfully the adoption of a regional Social Charter, and engaged in extensive research 
on matters affecting the regional labour force. Although SATUCC has been subject to growing 
pains, it is in regional co-operation and integration that the ZCTU invested the bulk of its hopes.
A major vulnerability of the ZCTU in its international relations has been its financial 
dependence on its Northern-based donors and labour counterparts. It is fair to say that the social 
democratic turn of the centre has paved the way for a smoother engagement with its like-minded 
partners, such that the issue of ‘interference’ has diminished. Yet, even a common social 
democratic orientation did not iron out all North/South trade union differences -  evident precisely 
in the ZCTU’s desire to build a regional block with the muscle to engage in the global dialogue 
on its own behalf. It is clear that social democratic unions in the periphery can still differ with 
their metropolitan counterparts on global issues, such as on the trade-related Social Clause, and 
such differences can be smothered by relations of dependence.
Financial dependence has also affected the ZCTU’s status in the national debate. We 
have seen how government sought political mileage from this weakness and, in the midst of 
liberalisation, went so far as to label the ZCTU a ‘foreign stooge’.
(1998), Kanyenze (1999a).
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6.2 Between ICFTU and OATUU: The Post-Cold War Dilemma
The collapse of the Soviet Union, the shrinking of WFTU, and the emergence of a virtually 
unchallenged ICFTU, forced many peripheral trade unions into a period of soul-searching and, 
ultimately, political transition. Not only had a popular economic model suddenly lost legitimacy, 
the non-aligned bargaining position of peripheral trade unions in the context of two competing 
superpowers had suffered a setback. On the African continent, international trade unionism had 
gained a further twist by the concurrent democratisation of South Africa. The democratisation 
process had raised the status of the ICFTU on the continent by virtue of the crucial international 
role that the ICFTU had played in the recognition of democratic trade union forces under 
apartheid. The status of the ICFTU had reached a low point in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as 
we have seen, with the withdrawal of the AFL-CIO and its financial resources in 1969 and with 
growing hostility on the part of African trade unions to the agendas of their metropolitan 
counterparts. At this time, a continental trade unionism emerged to fill the vacuum: OATUU was 
founded in 1973, largely through OAU sponsorship, and propounded an anti-imperialist, non- 
aligned position. Nevertheless, through its role in the anti-apartheid movement, the ICFTU began 
to make a comeback.
Continental trade union politics were thus fuelled by the return of the ICFTU and the 
eventual establishment of AFRO. And they were further invigorated by the founding of SATUCC 
in 1983 as OATUU’s southern regional grouping. OATUU and SATUCC sought to check the 
influence of ICFTU; however, since their inception, both OATUU and SATUCC have also been 
plagued by financial dependence on states and international donors which, in turn, have detracted 
from their own capacity and legitimacy. In the late 1980s, the collapse of the Cold War 
complicated continental politics further, as African trade union centres flocked to the ICFTU 
while maintaining their membership in OATUU. Since then, trade union politics on the continent 
have come to be characterised by competition between OATUU and ICFTU for continental 
leadership and ideological loyalty on emerging global issues.
As a Southern African national centre, the ZCTU is a member of SATUCC, OATUU, 
ICFTU, as well as CTUC. This multi-level engagement is part of what became a strategy by the 
ZCTU to keep all options open in a period of global transition and uncertainty, to participate in all 
possible labour fora, and to maximise the possibilities for solidarity action. However, 
simultaneous membership in OATUU and ICFTU has not been unproblematic, and indeed was a 
contentious issue in the early 1990s when it presented itself.
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The decision to affiliate with the ICFTU was taken in a General Council meeting. Despite 
the gravity of the issue, affiliation was never discussed in the 1990 Congress. And as the 
proceedings of General Council meetings are confidential, there is no public record of the debate. 
The debate on ICFTU membership was evidently ‘heated’, especially since there were union 
leaders in the meeting who had had long-standing relations with, and had even held positions 
within, either one or the other of the Cold War internationals. In the event, three-fourths of the 
ZCTU affiliates came to support membership in the ICFTU. The conclusion reached was that 
Pan-Africanism and internationalism (within the remaining International) were not contradictory 
policies. It was decided that membership in both a global and a continental body was crucial. The 
former would provide an arena for dialogue and solidarity action at the global level; the latter 
would continue to voice an African position within the global dialogue.
In this period of flux, the ICFTU vigorously pursued the leadership of the ZCTU to bring 
the national centre into the International’s ranks. The ZCTU was regarded as an important player 
on account of its radicalism and prestige in the region. The ICFTU’s logic was that if the ZCTU 
could be brought into the fold, SATUCC as a whole would follow. Given furthermore 
SATUCC’s status on the continent, OATUU would eventually be overtaken. Thus, the ZCTU 
was regarded as one of the pivotal trade unions for the ICFTU’s return to the sub-region and 
beyond.
Since then, SATUCC has sought to play a mediating and reconciliatory role between 
OATUU and ICFTU (as we will see in a later section). Yet, the situation remains far from ideal: 
problems have continued within OATUU, in the OATUU-ICFTU relationship, and with the 
ZCTU’s membership in the ICFTU itself. Regarding the latter, the Secretary General of the 
ZCTU noted dissatisfaction on matters pertaining to the domination of the labour agenda by 
Northern trade union interests. Issues such as the Social Clause at the WTO are ‘uncomfortable’, 
he admitted, while at the moment ‘there exists no labour forum in which to articulate Southern 
issues of development’. With regards to OATUU, the Secretary General noted its drawbacks in 
the development dialogue. OATUU remains too dependent on states and ‘is not moving with the 
times’. Furthermore, he noted, ‘OATUU represents an African voice but not a Latin American 
and Asian one’. Ideally, ‘there should be a Northern and a Southern International, but this 
remains impossible because of dependence on Northern unions’.3
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6.3 Appealing to the IMF and the World Bank
The ZCTU rejected the logic of liberalisation in the early 1990s in no uncertain terms. On 
occasion of the announcement of the liberal Investment Code, the ZCTU protested that ‘[t]he 
moral from history and Cecil John Rhodes is that the wealth and resources of a people are 
acquired by positive seizure in the same manner as our political independence was won’.4 In mid­
decade, the centre began to engage directly with multilateral institutions, seeking dialogue with 
the IMF and World Bank in an effort to influence the direction of the second phase of structural 
adjustment, ZIMPREST. The publication of Beyond ESAP was a landmark in this regard.5 The 
document marked a change of strategy, away from ‘shouting from the outside’. On the one hand, 
Beyond ESAP proved the capacity of the centre to speak in rigorous technical language and 
furnish a wealth of evidence on the failures of ESAP; on the other hand, through this 
technicalisation of its critique, the ZCTU became party to a managerial dialogue, entailing 
fundamental concessions to the development orthodoxy. Beyond ESAP was part and parcel of the 
centre’s new ‘strategic unionism’ towards both the state and the IFIs. The change of strategy 
subsequently came to an end in relation to the state -  upon the ZCTU’s withdrawal from the 
National Economic Consultative Forum (NECF) in January 1998 and the renewal of 
confrontational politics -  but the policy continued in relation to the IFIs.
The Beyond ESAP document succeeded in gaining rhetorical recognition from the IFIs. 
The IMF, for example, offered token acknowledgement of Beyond ESAP as ‘impressive’, while 
remaining typically aloof towards the notion of ‘national dialogue’, for which Beyond ESAP also 
appealed.6 The Bank engaged more actively in the national debate, but with the specific objective 
of cultivating consent for further liberalisation. Indeed, there was little evidence of the Beyond 
ESAP critique in ZIMPREST. The second phase of structural adjustment consisted in a re­
affirmation of the liberal paradigm, with special emphasis now on privatisation and ‘community 
initiated, market assisted’ land reform, while tapping explicitly into the ‘indigenisation’ language 
of the black bourgeoisie.
Notably, the Bank launched the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative 
(SAPRI) in 1995 in a number of countries, including Zimbabwe, in response to the ‘Fifty Years is 
Enough’ campaign. This initiative aimed to involve civil society in the evaluation of ESAP. The 
resulting evaluation was critical, and it led to the carefully worded response by the Resident
3 Interview with Morgan Tsvangirai..
4 ZCTU (1989), pp. 3-4.
5 ZCTU (1996).
6 The Worker, No. 36, June 1996.
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Representative that ‘[t]he reforms under ESAP could certainly not be regarded as a roaring 
success’ and that ‘getting the prices right’ is ‘a necessary but not sufficient condition’ for 
development.7 He went on to express the need to ‘buy in’ civil society to the reform programme 
for the purpose of achieving national commitment. Subsequently, the ZCTU objected to the 
Bank’s definition of ‘dialogue’, arguing that ‘[tjhis takes the programme as a given, a fixed 
element’; ‘to achieve real national ownership of the programme implies starting from scratch, and 
not presupposing the existing programme is acceptable to all parties, and in particular, civil 
society groups’; ‘what civil society groups want is total participation, at all levels, in the 
formulation of the programmes’.8 However, the ZCTU’s invocation of the principle of national 
self-determination still fell far short of a critique of imperialism; it continued to gravitate to a 
developmentalist vision.9
6.4 Equivocating over the Social Clause at the WTO
The ZCTU’s engagement with the WTO came about in response to the call for a trade-related 
Social Clause at the level of the WTO. The Economics Department rejected this proposal on the 
eve of the Third Ministerial Meeting in Seattle.10 The rationale for the rejection was that such a 
Social Clause would make third world workers even more vulnerable to Northern industrial and 
labour interests, given that the WTO is institutionally unbalanced in favour of Northern states 
who can act unilaterally against their much weaker Southern counterparts. The alternative 
suggestion was to rely on the regional Social Charter -  in place since April 1999 -  which is 
subject to regional tripartite supervision.
While the Economics Department rejected the Social Clause on valid procedural grounds, 
it accepted its logic, in its regionalised application, as a valid response to the functional dualism 
that is characteristic of peripheral accumulation. In effect, the response disconnected wages, 
conditions of employment, and child labour from sectoral and social disarticulation. This was a 
missed opportunity to voice a specifically semi-proletarian perspective on the labour standards 
debate, which is otherwise dominated by a Eurocentric definition of ‘the worker’. It is notable 
that both the Beyond ESAP document and earlier statements, such as the Workers ’ Participation 
and Development manual, had provided a different insight into the problem. The manual, for
7 Allen (1999), pp. 4-5.
8 Kanyenze, ZCTU Economics Department (1999b).
9 It is noteworthy that the ZCTU went on to join international NGO forums and workshops concerned with 
the reform of the global financial architecture. In 1999, it attended two such workshops in Washington, DC, 
organised by OXFAM and the Overseas Development Council.
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example, had specifically addressed itself to the connection between inequitable land distribution 
and the pressure on wages: ‘as long as the land issue remains unresolved, these problems will 
persist’.11
The case is of further significance because it revealed the ongoing weakness of the 
ZCTU’s foreign policy-making apparatus. The ZCTU President attended a Preparatory Meeting 
of the ICFTU prior to Seattle without consulting the Economics Department, and during these 
high level talks the President supported the Social Clause. Thus, despite the position of the 
Economics Department, the ZCTU officially supported the ICFTU agenda, and meaningful 
dialogue within either labour centre did not take place. Moreover, the case demonstrated how the 
lack of preparation, co-ordination, and adequate dialogue at the regional level can undermine the 
democratisation of international trade unionism as a whole. Just prior to the Seattle meeting, the 
ZCTU Economics Department participated in a regional workshop in Johannesburg, in October 
1999, organised by regional trade unions and OXFAM and attended by regional and continental 
trade unionists and a number of regional civic organisations. SATUCC trade unionists (though 
not representing SATUCC officially), OATUU, and the civic organisations issued a joint 
statement rejecting the inclusion of new issues, and particularly the Social Clause, at the Seattle 
meeting.12 The SATUCC representatives further affirmed this position and called on SATUCC to 
prepare adequately and issue a joint statement of its own.13 These dissenting voices, however, did 
not influence official positions and, in turn, an official call for substantive dialogue within the 
ICFTU was not made. Indeed, something of the opposite occurred: there was an annoyed reaction 
within the ICFTU upon hearing of this lack of discipline among rogue trade unionists in Southern 
Africa.
6.5 The SATUCC Experience: A Regionalist Internationalism?
While the ZCTU has sought to participate in all possible labour fora, it has devoted the bulk of its 
international effort to the development of a strong regional trade union block. The ZCTU and its 
regional partners have come to see the development of an economically integrated and politically 
cohesive Southern African sub-continent as the best hope for workers and Southern Africans as a 
whole. As a SATUCC statement put it,
10 See Kanyenze (1999a).
11 ZCTU (1993), pp. 36-38.
12 Statement o f African Civil Society on the Third Ministerial Conference o f WTO (1999).
13 Statement o f SATUCC Trade Unionists and Social Movement Activists on the Seattle Ministerial (1999).
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workers and other concerned citizens of Southern Africa understand that in the 
current competitive global economy, with strong regional blocks such as NAFTA 
and the EU, developing alternatives to global liberalisation and creating 
sustainable, appropriate development strategies depends upon our countries 
working together as a regional block. The formation of such a block in Southern 
Africa would build upon deeply rooted political, economic, labour market and 
other links between our peoples and countries.14
SATUCC has thus come to express what might be called a ‘regionalist’ internationalism. The 
regional body has laid emphasis on the common history of Southern Africans, the regional 
dimension of economic and social problems, the necessity of a common development vision, and 
the need to articulate and gain recognition for this vision in the development dialogue.
Alongside the recasting of SADC as a ‘development community’ in the post-apartheid 
era, SATUCC has assumed new aims, with regional integration and the protection of the worker 
being the pillars of its new vision. SATUCC has sought to impress upon member states the 
imperative of prioritising the regional good systematically and of counteracting the centrifugal 
forces of the region. To be sure, the forces of fragmentation have been powerful. The region is 
characterised by gross disparities in industrial development, with South Africa at the regional 
centre, while the countries are further located in a liberal order whose priority is national 
restructuring in global, not regional, terms. The power of these forces is manifest in the nature of 
Southern African responses in the 1990s. As SATUCC has pointed out, states have continued to 
engage with global agencies and northern states largely on bilateral terms, rather than 
multilaterally, and they have continued to think and act in the ‘national interest’.15 The 
implementation of structural adjustment is the obvious case in point. Regional states have 
implemented national policies of adjustment to the global economy, and these have typically 
submerged and contradicted the regional agenda, particularly with regards to investment, 
industrialisation, and labour market reform strategies. Similarly, the establishment of EPZs has 
aggravated interstate competition for investments and has also exerted downward pressure on 
wages and conditions of employment. Meanwhile, bilateral trade relations and commitments have 
continued to take primacy over regional ones. Most dramatically, South Africa moved to enter 
into a free trade agreement with the EU, while the SADC Trade Protocol complied with the WTO 
commitments of member states. The regional labour movement sought in the 1990s to counter all 
these forces of fragmentation and to foster a regional consciousness.
14 SATUCC Statement (1996).
15 SATUCC Statement (1996).
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The regional body also sought to impress upon the member states of SADC the 
importance of tripartite decision-making at the regional level. The primary site of labour 
participation in SADC has been the tripartite Employment and Labour Sector (ELS). The ELS 
was established in 1996, after its predecessor, the Southern African Labour Commission, was 
dissolved. The Sector is concerned with issues of employment creation and social protection, 
implementation of labour standards, and harmonisation of labour legislation. Within this forum, 
SATUCC has spearheaded the regional Code on HIV/AIDS and Employment, which was adopted 
by Heads of State in August 1997, and has further spearheaded the regional Social Charter, which 
was adopted in April 1999. At the same time, SATUCC has engaged the ELS on the problems of 
EPZs and on issues of regional productivity, while also working towards the harmonisation of 
health, safety, and environment policies.
However, the notion of ‘social dialogue’ in the region has been superficial. The first 
annual ELS conference in Lilongwe in 1996 was denounced by the labour movement for not 
living up to the spirit of regional tripartism. SATUCC noted that the structure of the dialogue was 
weighted in favour of governments, whose officials merely reported to the other social partners 
rather than inviting inputs from them. Labour leaders furthermore participated as part of country 
delegations and became subsumed by government representatives. Important issues were referred 
to national tripartite structures for discussion, under the false assumption that these are functional 
and embody the tripartite spirit throughout the region.16 In 1997, progress was noted, in the form 
of an agreement in principle that SATUCC would attend and participate in all SADC forums.17 
Nonetheless, participation continued to be impeded by lack of resources on the part of SATUCC 
(to be elaborated below). Furthermore, the commitment to participation proved to be vacuous on 
matters of the highest importance such as the Trade Protocol, from whose deliberations the labour 
movement was excluded. Finally, it is important to note that the notion of ‘social dialogue’ at the 
regional level has not overcome the problems that were encountered at national levels, such as in 
Zimbabwe. The dialogue has been such that the liberal project imposes the agenda for discussion, 
leaving room for debate mainly on issues of implementation. As a commentator argued, 
‘participation will also carry dangers of co-optation and pseudo participation if the real decisions 
are taken in other bodies [i.e., the IFIs]’. ‘Social dialogue becomes important in order to manage 
the opening of markets and to adjust and respond at the national level’.18
16 SATUCC, Annual Report, 1996/97, and Minutes of SATUCC Strategic Planning Meeting, 14 July 1996.
17 Secretary General’s Report, SATUCC Executive Council, 26 July 1997, Gaborone, Botswana.
18 Torres (1997).
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Trade union participation in the regional dialogue, therefore, must be seen in this context 
of a dominant liberal agenda, the exclusionary and repressive practices of states, and the lack of 
resources to participate effectively. Regional trade unionism must also be seen outside of the 
conferences and board rooms, however. Trade unions have often been at the forefront of 
democratisation struggles, and the regional body has engaged in solidarity action in this regard 
throughout the decade. Besides the labour movement in Zimbabwe, the Malawian and Swazi 
labour movements in particular have come under severe repression in the 1990s. In both these 
cases, SATUCC mobilised regional support and sent high-level delegations to demand release of 
political prisoners and the respect of civic freedoms.
Another realm in which the labour movement has contributed in a significant way has 
been that of research and advocacy on emerging global issues with relevance to Southern African 
workers. Research is either conducted in institutes that are associated with national labour 
centres, as in South Africa and Namibia; or in departments within the labour centres, as in 
Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Mozambique; or in conjunction with other relevant local and 
international NGOs and IGOs. One of the most important research projects has been on EPZs. 
SATUCC has sought to educate governments on the hazards of EPZs with respect to 
environment, labour conditions, adverse regional competition, and the poor long-term 
development vision of the strategy. Research was begun in 1996 and a resource pack was 
produced to promote discussion in national and local workshops. A policy position on EPZs was 
also presented at the ELS Annual Conference in April 1996. The regional labour movement has 
also conducted research on the WTO, the Lome Convention and SADC-EU relations, the 
regional labour market, privatisation, and structural adjustment. On the latter, the ZCTU’s Beyond 
ESAP has been promoted as a model or pilot, and has been discussed widely in regional fora. 
However, the one issue of relevance to Southern Africans that SATUCC has not addressed is that 
of land reform. This remains a crucial weakness in the vision of regional trade unionism, and is 
further reflected in its advocacy for a regional Social Charter.
In its broader international relations and vision, SATUCC has sought to engage with 
donors and other organisations as ‘a body independent of all international bodies’, although it has 
not proclaimed to be an international labour federation but a ‘coordinating council’. In its 
continental politics specifically, SATUCC has had to carve out a diplomatic role for itself. At its 
5 th Delegates Conference in 1994, SATUCC noted that all its members are OATUU members but 
not all are ICFTU members and, in the event, SATUCC resolved to ‘harmonise’ relations 
between OATUU and ICFTU-AFRO, while also resolving ‘to strengthen OATUU and contribute
208
to the development and clarification of its policies and role’.19 Relations between OATUU and 
ICFTU-AFRO continued to deteriorate, however, putting pressure on SATUCC to enhance its 
diplomatic effort.20
Beyond the continental level, the meaning of regionalist internationalism has been in the 
process of definition, as SATUCC has staked out positions on old and new trade union issues. 
The issue of labour standards has been one such issue, and in this case, regionalism has 
manifested veritable meanings. In the first instance, the adoption of a regional Social Charter has 
consisted in the regional institutionalisation of the prevailing global social democratic trade union 
values. This suggests that SATUCC has played the role of advocate of global norms at the 
regional level. This it has done also in relation to the Social Clause at the WTO as well as the 
national struggles against human rights violations within the states of the region. In the second 
instance, dissident Southern African trade unionists have given a different meaning to the 
regionalist internationalism by articulating a ‘third world’ difference in trade union circles 
precisely on the issue of labour standards.
Finally, it is noteworthy that one of SATUCC’s stated aims has been to become ‘the 
communications hub of an international trade union network’ in order to ‘promote the sharing of 
successful organisational and campaigning ideas and practices of union organisations’.21 
Although the idea of an international trade union hub is far removed from existing SATUCC 
realities, it demonstrates the desire to de-centre contemporary international trade unionism from 
its metropolitan base and to begin to articulate a ‘Southern’ voice on an independent and 
sustainable basis.22
That such a hub is not currently viable is evident in the troubled history of SATUCC in 
the 1990s and the enormous growing pains that is has had to endure. In 1994, as South Africa and 
SADC were launching a new beginning, SATUCC identified the challenges it confronted. It cited 
lack of co-ordination between its affiliates; lack of information about each other’s problems; lack 
of research co-ordination; lack of integrated educational and women’s programmes; lack of an 
international policy framework; problems of communication; and financial insolvency.23 The 
context of these problems can be elaborated to take account of state repression in the region, 
regional imbalances in trade union membership and capacity, near total financial dependence, and
19 SATUCC 5th Delegates Congress, Johannesburg, South Africa, November 1994.
20 Secretary General’s Report, SATUCC Executive Council, 26 July 1997, Gaborone, Botswana.
21 SATUCC Proposal for Support of a Strategic Agenda for Trade Union Cooperation in Southern Africa, 
1999-2001.
22 The recurring irony here is that the proposal for support for this strategic agenda was submitted to 
Northern-based donors.
23 SATUCC 5th Delegates Congress, Johannesburg, November 1994.
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inadequate checks and balances within SATUCC structures. The capacity and substance of 
internal communication and of participation in regional dialogues have suffered accordingly.
In mid-1992, the SATUCC offices in Lilongwe were closed down by the Government of 
Malawi in a crack-down against the labour movement there. Chakufwa Chihana, the Secretary 
General of both the Malawi Congress of Trade Unions and SATUCC, was imprisoned after 
campaigning for human and trade union rights and entering politics with the opposition. In 
August 1993, Morgan Tsvangirai was elected Acting Secretary General of SATUCC and was 
confirmed in 1994. However, ad hoc administrative arrangements in Zambia and Malawi, 
administrative confusion, and logistical problems debilitated communication and undermined 
SATUCC operations until 1996 when a new office was established in Gaborone and a full-time 
Trade Union Co-ordinator appointed. State repression, more generally, resulted in the focusing of 
the energies of labour centres on national politics and away from international institution-building 
efforts, as we have seen in Zimbabwe.
Regional imbalances in industrial development have combined with imbalances in 
membership and organisational capacity among the national trade union centres to produce fertile 
ground for conflict, competition, suspicion, and disunity among SATUCC affiliates. COSATU 
alone accounts for 45 per cent of SATUCC’s total membership and is better organised and better 
equipped to engage in research and debate on regional and global issues. Smaller national centres 
have sought to benefit from COSATU’s capacity, but they have also been marginalised by it. 
SATUCC as a whole has succeeded in moving ahead on issues of common concern, such as the 
Code on HIV/AIDS, EPZs, and the Social Charter; on other crucial issues, such as migrant labour 
and the growing protectionism in South Africa, national centres in the regional periphery have 
been less able to have their differential needs recognised.
The financial insolvency of SATUCC has been one of its greatest organisational 
impediments. In the period of administrative transition from Lilongwe to Gaborone, donors 
became reluctant to fund an organisation in disarray. In 1993, the ICFTU, LO-Norway, and the 
AFL-CIO’s AALC provided funding, but also expressed concern over reporting irregularities and 
SATUCC’s bilateral funding relations.24 Funding from ICFTU was subsequently ‘severely cut’.25 
In the same year, only one SATUCC affiliate, OTTU of Tanzania, paid its annual contribution, 
while the Zambian national centre for its own part provided office space.26 By 1994, significant
24 Minutes of the SATUCC Finance and Administrative Committee Meeting, 14 May 1994, Lilongwe, 
Malawi.
25 Record of Discussions held at SATUCC Sub-Office, Kitwe, Zambia, April 14,1994.
26 SATUCC, Annual Progress Report, 1993.
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debts were owed and SATUCC moved to sell office assets.27 In the same year, the South African 
NACTU affiliated to SATUCC and paid its fees, but this was the only income deriving from 
affiliation fees and accounted for less than one per cent of SATUCC’s total income. In the 
following two years, no affiliate contributions were made. In June 1996 a Donors Conference was 
arranged in Geneva to coincide with the ILO meetings. The issue of the failure of affiliates to 
contribute was raised by donors, along with other issues concerning lack of co-ordination and 
clarity in organisational strategy.28 In the following years, funds were received mainly from the 
Dutch FNV, the Finnish SASK, and LO-Norway, as well as from USAID, AALC, Friedrich- 
Ebert Stiftung, and CTUC. National affiliates continued to contribute a minuscule amount -  about 
two per cent of SATUCC’s total expenditure.29
Financial constraints have often paralysed SATUCC activities. In 1998, for example, the 
Executive Council of SATUCC cancelled its February meeting and met only once for the whole 
year in August. Also, few of the planned activities were carried out in this period. Furthermore, 
SATUCC affiliates struggled to attend the ELS meeting in April in Mauritius due to funding 
delays as well as denial of funding by national governments for labour delegates. In the event, the 
regional labour movement was under-represented.30 While donors have blamed delays of 
disbursements on SATUCC for failing to report effectively and regularly, SATUCC also 
expressed objection to the ways donors would relate to SATUCC which, according to the 
Secretary General, ‘border on total disrespect for the regional body’.31
Financial constraints and administrative dislocation have also impeded progress in co­
ordination and mobilisation on the gender front. At the 5th Delegates Conference in 1994, 
SATUCC resolved to employ a full-time gender co-ordinator, with responsibility to co-ordinate 
meetings, research, and educational programmes, but this did not materialise. The whole of the 
period between 1992 and 1997 was extremely difficult. The SATUCC Women’s Committee, 
which had been established in 1988, itself did not manage to hold any formal meetings in this 
period. Between 1994 and 1996 a platform for networking in the region was organised by 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, in the form of the Annual Southern African Trade Union Women’s 
Forum, and this was the only way of maintaining contact in the absence of viable SATUCC 
structures. In November 1997, the SATUCC 3rd Women’s Conference was finally held in
27 Minutes of the SATUCC Finance and Administrative Committee Meeting, 14 May 1994, Lilongwe, 
Malawi.
28 Minutes of SATUCC Strategic Planning Meeting, 14 July 1996.
29 SATUCC National Congress Resolutions, 6* National Congress, 26-27 November 1998.
30 Secretary General’s Report to SATUCC Executive Council Meeting, 25 August 1998, Johannesburg, 
South Africa.
31 Secretary General’s Report, SATUCC Executive Council, 26 July 1997, Gaborone, Botswana.
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Durban, at which a new Women’s Committee was elected and a Programme of Action produced 
for the period of 1998-2001.32
Finally, the combination of differential national agendas, mistrust, and administrative 
dislocation has revealed inadequacies in the checks and balances in SATUCC institutions, which, 
in turn, have exacerbated suspicion and mistrust. There have been internal complaints over the 
procedures used to appoint SATUCC staff, the supervision of staff, and the handling of funds. 
There have also been conflicts among executive members over such matters, as well as over the 
overall performance of SATUCC. Such disputes were serious enough to culminate in the 
resignation of the Secretary General in 1998, and since then, the position has remained vacant. In 
the words of the now former Secretary General, SATUCC is ‘limping’.33
SATUCC, therefore, has been in a process of reconciling vast differences against 
financial and organisational obstacles, while also confronting liberalisation and state repression. 
The meaning of SATUCC’s regionalist internationalism has emerged on a number of issues, and 
has been contested on others, while the ground has been laid for the further development of a 
Southern African trade union voice. That which is amply clear is that SATUCC as a whole has 
the research capacity to articulate rigorous global visions. It is also clear, however, that the 
regional partners have not yet articulated a specifically semi-proletarian voice; and that such a 
voice would be a challenge to the internationalism of the ICFTU.
32 SATUCC Women’s Committee Report (1997).
33 Interview with Morgan Tsvangirai.
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CHAPTER 7 
Rural Peasant-worker Nationalism
The ZCTU’s radical critique of ESAP in the early 1990s acknowledged peasant-worker 
mobilisation across the rural-urban divide as a fundamental class project. Thus, in its workers’ 
manual of 1993, whose purpose was to conscientise workers on the history and specificity of the 
labour movement, the ZCTU affirmed:
‘[t]he natural alliance in Zimbabwe is between peasants and workers, not 
between peasants and big landowners’: ‘[pjeasant households grow the food of 
the people, rear children and look after old aged workers. Workers share their 
wages with their parent relatives and spend their holidays planting and reaping 
together. In real life the workers are united with the peasants in many ways. This 
is unity in action without unity in organisation. This should not be so’.
The ZCTU concluded: ‘The workers’ struggle to end exploitation will not succeed without an 
organised conscious peasant class’.1
The ZCTU did not realise this alliance; it did not develop rural structures of its own 
outside commercial farming, nor did it manage to affiliate the ZFU. On the contrary, as the ZCTU 
gravitated to the ‘reason’ of the governance synthesis, the rural-urban political gap widened. The 
labour centre finally embarked on a rural campaign in 1999, but by this time it was in the name of 
the cross-class and increasingly ‘multi-racial’ alliance of the MDC. The ZFU, for its part, 
remained in the hands of elitist farming interests; and ZANU(PF), the self-proclaimed custodian 
of peasant interests, normalised its relationship with capital and adopted the ‘indigenisation’ 
project of the black bourgeoisie. The rural grievances of the semi-proletariat therefore remained 
in uncivil terrain.
Meanwhile, local government structures remained a patchwork of institutions, from 
traditional and elected authorities, to local party structures, to village and ward development 
committees. ‘This profusion of overlapping and incongruent local organisational structures, each 
with its own boundaries and drawing on different sources of legitimacy, has...created weak and 
disparate local institutions’, the Land Tenure Commission concluded in 1994.2 Rural politics 
continued to be conducted through this complex set of structures, seeking to exercise pressure on 
the ruling party, as well as gain economic and political protection from whichever authority 
would afford it.
1 ZCTU (1993), p. 44.
2 Land Tenure Commission (1994), p. 26.
213
7.1 Land Occupations under Structural Adjustment
By the end of the 1980s, a stalemate had emerged on the land question, whereby, on the one hand, 
the landless and landshort had lost the leverage they once had over land policy, and, on the other, 
government was incapable of controlling, through its squatter control apparatus, land self­
provisioning. The onset of structural adjustment undermined local government further, due to the 
intensification of demand for land by the poor (rural and urban) and by white and black capitalists 
seeking to enter non-traditional land-based product markets. Low profile but intense land 
occupations characterised this period, along with deepening land markets and rural violence.
Macro-level ‘Squatting The National Picture
A number of new squatting trends emerged under structural adjustment which complicated the 
task of squatter control. One was that squatting spread from large-scale commercial farming areas 
to other land tenure regimes, such that the bulk of officially recognised squatters were now in 
communal areas and state lands, and not in the LSCF sector. Table 6.1 indicates that 33.3 percent 
of squatters were in communal areas, a near equal amount in state lands, and only 10 percent in 
the LSCF; 12 percent were now in resettlement areas.
Table 6.1: Squatter Situation by Land Tenure in Mashonaland West and East
Land Tenure Category Number of Squatter H/h’s % of Total Squatters
Communal Areas 3,520 33.3
Resettlement Areas 1,268 12.0
LSCF 1,440 13.6
State land:
Parks 283 2.7
ADA NA
Others 3,000 28.4
Urban 1,057 10.0
Total 10,568 100.0
Source: Moyo (no date).
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A second trend was the deepening of land sales and rental markets in communal and 
resettlement areas. Land in these areas has legally belonged to the state, while in communal areas, 
specifically, land entitlements have customarily been administered by chiefs in the first instance. 
Over the 1990s, the deepening of land markets saw land being increasingly allocated by payment 
of fees, or political obligation, to local MPs, ruling party members, chiefs, headmen, village 
heads, and spirit mediums. Land markets therefore further undermined the conventional 
framework of land administration and adjudication, and worked to the economic and political 
detriment of the poor. Moyo noted that in the communal area of Chegutu District (Mashonaland 
West) 82 families were reported to have paid for land covering their homesteads and fields; and 
reflecting the oligopolistic conditions, the sellers amounted to a total of nine persons, all among 
local authorities.3 Thus, the market solution was being embraced by those who were in the 
position to both implement it and benefit from it. On the other hand, it has been noted elsewhere, 
with reference to Shamva, that by far the majority of communal and resettlement area farmers did 
not find the sale of arable and grazing land acceptable, with the main reasons given being that the 
land is properly ‘owned communally’ and that it is ‘a gift of nature’.4
In this context, land sales have also precipitated conflicts between ‘the community’ and 
‘the foreigners’, the latter being of different ethnic/linguistic background, or from other regions or 
countries. Furthermore, land sales have given rise to the erosion of legitimacy of local authorities 
in the eyes of pre-existing villagers. A 1988 study conducted by AGRITEX noted complaints on 
the part of villagers against kraalheads, as well as calls for the trimming of customary powers.5 
Finally, the emergence of land markets also gave rise to increasing competition among local 
authorities and between local authorities and central government. Thus, Moyo notes, ‘local chiefs, 
headmen, party chiefs, members of parliament and other people not only compete with central 
government politicians and bureaucrats over land control, they also compete amongst themselves 
for the political and economic capital to be gained from the control over allocating land rights’.6
Another trend was that the ‘contested settlers’ were relying on customary authorities for 
security. Unlike squatters who were not confirmed by customary authorities, the contested settlers 
had the prospect of becoming integrated into local structures and eligible for government 
services, such as drought support and agricultural extension. Moreover, they had a chance of 
gaining political protection by customary authorities against the threat of eviction by central
3 Moyo (no date).
4 See Moyo, Matondi, and Marongwe (1998), pp. 167-70.
5 Zishiri (1998), pp. 16-17. AGRITEX is the Department of Agricultural, Technical, and Extension 
Services, in the Ministry of Lands and Agriculture.
6 Moyo (no date).
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government (as represented by the Rural District Council). Moyo has noted that peasants would 
take advantage of internecine struggles and the splintering of the ruling party’s power system to 
gain a measure of ‘informal solace’.7 However, it is also true that they would fall victim to the 
same struggles and power system. As we will soon see, in spite of fees paid and obligations 
undertaken, protection was never guaranteed, for Rural District Councils did not abandon the 
given eviction policy, and continued to pursue it with variable results.
Beyond contested settlement, there were a number of other notable ‘everyday’ forms of 
unauthorised land use. Squatters included communal area farmers who were short of grazing 
areas and who encroached on game reserves, and state and other lands;8 women tasked with
f
gathering woodfuel and water for the household, or planting gardens on river banks;9 gold- 
panners, either from local communal areas or from beyond, mainly male and often of diverse 
ethnic and regional origins; and households of retrenched mine and farm workers without links 
(or severed links) with communal areas, often ‘foreigners’, staking out plots of land in a variety 
of locations.10 Unauthorised land users also included ‘bushboarders’: children of squatters living 
far from educational facilities and who would build huts around school premises to reside during 
their studies; and ‘destitutes’, along urban centres and growth points, including street kids and 
‘mentally handicapped’.11
The changing political economy of land, in conjunction with deteriorating living 
standards, generated a highly volatile situation in the countryside. The legitimacy of the ruling 
party and its liberation promise suffered accordingly. While the semi-proletariat may not have 
been able to discern the wider national and global processes which altered their location in the 
land question, they experienced structural adjustment immediately, in terms of the erosion of land 
rights and security -  precisely the goods they had mandated the ruling party to protect and 
expand.
Micro-level ‘SquattingOverview o f Shamva District
A district-level approach to land politics may illuminate further the rural political economy. The 
next two sections provide case studies of land occupations in Shamva District, with reference to 
gold panning and contested settlement. The studies are based on interviews conducted with the
7 Moyo (no date).
8 See Moyo et al. (1998).
9 See Wekwete (1998), ch. 1; see also Moyo (1995b), pp. 13-31.
10 See Moyo (no date).
11 Zishiri (1998), pp. 4-5.
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assistance of an interpreter in August and September 1999 in Shamva with a total of 25 squatters, 
comprising gold panners in Pote Valley and contested settlers in Madziwa Communal Land. 
Interviews were also conducted with grassroots, district, and provincial authorities, public health 
authorities, representatives of commercial farmers in the district, ZANU(PF) in the province, and 
with ZimRights in Harare.12
Suffice it here to provide an overview of Shamva under structural adjustment. A 
comprehensive study of the Shamva economy under ESAP found that liberalisation was 
experienced differentially in the district and that the gap between rich and poor had widened.13 
Access to new export markets had been limited to large-scale farmers.14 Thus, 89% of communal 
area farmers continued to concentrate on maize; resettlement farmers with access to irrigation 
managed to engage more in horticulture; and commercial farmers embraced a much broader 
range of products, such as soyabeans (21%), wheat (58%), cotton (94.7%), and horticulture 
(74%), and maize (90%).15 The deregulation of marketing improved prices to smallholders, 
though not resolutely, while the price of farming inputs (fertiliser and tools) and basic foodstuffs 
increased; the result was a general deterioration in the cost of living, as well as the bankruptcy of 
some smallholders’ groups.16 The productivity of smallholders’ land also deteriorated, due to 
population pressure, the limited size of the plots (5.6 acres in CAs and 9.8 acres in RAs), the high 
cost of fertilisers, soil erosion, and the loss of draught power during the 1991-92 and 1993-94 
droughts.17 Farm income among smallholders accounted for 45% of total income, with 
remittances, pensions, and other off-farm income from self-employment, wage labour, and small 
business activities accounting for the rest.18 However, remittances from urban-based family 
members declined during ESAP, due to inflation and retrenchments, to such an extent in fact that 
in some cases there was even a reversal of remittances, now from rural to urban family members, 
in the form of maize.19
With the crisis of social reproduction, smallholders were resorting to the over­
exploitation of the natural environment. Cultivation was being extended to marginal lands, such
as river banks and grazing areas; wood-fuel was increasingly becoming the only source of energy, 
with women travelling five to six kilometres to collect firewood; and men were turning to gold
12 See the ‘Interviews’ section in the bibliography for further details; see also the Appendix for the 
questionnaire used.
13 Masuko ed. (1998).
14 Moyo et al. (1998), pp. 161-66.
15 Moyo et al. (1998), and Matanda and Jeche (1998), pp. 220-39.
16 Matanda and Jeche (1998), Wekwete (1998), p. 35, and Amaiz (1998).
17 Wekwete (1998).
18 Matshe (1998), p. 62.
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panning. The pressure on the environment was thus severe, accentuating deforestation, soil 
erosion, and the siltation of rivers. Conflicts over the illegal use of land proliferated between 
communal area farmers and squatters, as well as between squatters and local government, the 
latter taking on the task of squatter control as a form of environmental management.20 The 
absence of representative channels of expression in local government compounded the plight of 
the smallholders,21 leaving few options but to carry on with illegal activity and avoid detection.
What follows is a case study of the political economy of squatting in Shamva, with 
reference to gold panning and contested settlement.
7.2 The Gold Panning Solution in Pote Valley
Gold panning activity is ubiquitous in Shamva, this district being one of the earliest gold mining 
sites in Mashonaland. In 1999, both legal and illegal panning activities were being pursued, 
alongside industrial mining. Legal claims and mills existed throughout the district on a variety of 
tenure regimes. Since the Mines and Minerals Act would give precedence to prospectors over the 
rights of property owners, any prospector could be granted permission to prospect, register a 
claim, hire labour, build a settlement, and exploit the mineral resources, while always occupying 
property belonging to someone else. Claim-holders were typically based in provincial towns or 
Harare, and were required to inform their respective property owners of the location of the claim 
and the whereabouts of the labour force. In reality, however, legal claims were not only exploited 
by a registered labour force; not every mill serviced permit-holders; and there was poor 
communication between claim holders and property owners. The further reality was that 
individuals and households would descend upon Shamva in pursuit of a living, establish panning 
activities in non-registered areas or poach from legal claims, and sell their gold to local claim- 
holders or other town-based buyers who would visit the area periodically. The institutions 
designed to prevent illegal panning were, to the tentative benefit of panners, ineffective in their 
task: there was limited monitoring of panning activity by the Ministry itself -  a task which, in any 
case, would have been a Herculean one, given the scattered nature of panning in remote and 
hidden sites. Moreover, according to commercial farmers who sought to monitor the situation 
themselves, access to the records of the Ministry to establish which were and were not legitimate 
claims, and who were and were not legitimate panners, was cumbersome, and the process of
19 Wekwete (1998), pp. 46-47.
20 Wekwete (1998), pp. 29-44.
21 See Masuko (1998), pp. 318-19.
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eviction by a landowner through the Ministry and the courts was equally cumbersome and costly. 
There was a case in Shamva in which a commercial farmer (with the means of commercial 
farmers) found it easier to buy someone’s mining claim and shut down operations, rather than 
pursue eviction through the Ministry and the courts.22
Panners would organise their survival strategy in a number of ways. In one case, on 
Lion’s Den Estate, a large white-owned commercial farm, both legal and illegal panners were at 
work. The legal panners worked on a claim registered to a Harare-based merchant, who visited 
the site twice per week. The labour force consisted of 17 Malawian men, who, along with their 
families, resided legally on the farm, near the claim. The claim also had a mill, which, however, 
according to the farm-owner, was servicing the panning activities not only of the legal panners 
but also of a plethora of other non-permit-holding panners on his farm. While the farmer sought 
to monitor the situation, he complained that he received no cooperation from the Mining 
Commissioner in Harare in establishing which claims were legal, and he also received no 
information from the claim-owner regarding the number of employees. The illegal panners lived 
separately from the legal ones and ‘pinched’ ore from the legal claim. Of the illegal panners 
interviewed, one was a communal farmer from Murewa, Mashonaland East. His wife and four 
children remained in Murewa to tend the farm and livestock while he panned for cash, the only 
source of income for the household. He had been panning for seven years. Another panner was 
from Shamva and was accompanied by his wife and three children on the site; his parents’ plot in 
the communal lands was already too small to be subdivided further, leaving panning as the only 
source of survival for the household. In this case, the children were enrolled in a nearby school, 
for which they were paying fees, and the family had in the past accessed the hospital in Shamva, 
for which they had also paid and which is one hour away by bus. Both panners were in their mid­
twenties, and had attended six and seven years of school, respectively.
A second case was near Pote River. Here there existed a legal claim, again on 
commercial farmland, with several dozen households residing within the limits of the claim. 
However, because the productivity of the legal claim was poor, the panners panned illegally on 
the shaft-ridden banks of Pote River. All interviewed were men, whose families lived with them 
on the claims. The men were all in their late twenties and had anywhere from one to six children, 
while half had finished Form 4 (i.e., 11 years of schooling). One-third were from Mashonaland 
Central, while the rest came from as far away as Mashonaland East, Manicaland, Matabeleland
22 Interview with French Guy; the absence of monitoring and the ‘difficulty’ of eviction was also noted by 
the Malcolm Vowles, Regional Executive Officer, Commercial Farmers’ Union, and Mr. Bruk-Jackson, 
owner of Lion’s Den Estate.
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South, and Mozambique. All had been panning for the most part of the decade, with one having 
inherited the trade from his parents -  suggesting an intergenerational dimension to panning -  who 
themselves had finally abandoned panning upon purchasing land in communal areas. The large 
majority were retrenched mine and farm workers. The panners paid rent to their claim-owner 
either in gold or by devoting one day’s work to him per week. During peak agricultural seasons, 
the men sold their labour to commercial farmers, who would round them up and take them away 
in lorries. The panners’ wives typically supplemented the household income by selling fruit and 
vegetables at the bus terminus at Wadzanai township in Shamva. The children that attended 
school did so on commercial farms, by permission of the farmers, where they paid fees. The 
households used Shamva hospital where they also paid fees, and which is twenty minutes away 
by bus.
A third case is closely connected to the above. This is the case of panners working on the 
same river, while living in the compound of John White Farm, a large commercial farm, owned 
by a black farmer and leased out to another black farmer who also owned two more farms in the 
valley. In this case, the panners and their families sold their labour to the farmer in return for 
permission to reside in the compound, while their cash income derived mainly from panning, as 
well as agricultural labour on this and other farms. None was on contract. Both men and women 
were interviewed in the compound in the presence of a manager. The men were in their late 
twenties and were retrenched workers. About half had their families living with them in the 
compound, while the families of others lived away in the communal lands, in Shamva and other 
provinces. The men had between eight and eleven years of schooling. The women interviewed 
had between two and four years. One woman was 36 years of age, had two children, and her 
husband was a panner. Both she and her husband also provided labour to the farmer. Their 
children were withdrawn from school, and their access to Shamva hospital was difficult due to the 
fees. Another woman was 41 years of age, had recently lost her husband, and was caring for 
seven children, while also selling her labour to the farmer. She could not afford to pay school fees 
for her children, nor hospital fees.
Shamva district experienced a cholera outbreak between February and May 1999, with 
217 cases reported. Squatters from the mining claims accounted for 94 of these cases, and on the 
compound of John White Farm three children died. Squatters are the most susceptible to such 
outbreaks, as they have poor sanitation facilities and unsafe water, whether on mining claims or 
on the compound. Also, they are among the poorest and cannot afford hospital care or 
transportation to hospital; their children are often not immunised. Moreover, as squatters, they are 
not sufficiently integrated into local structures and are the last to be the beneficiaries of
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preventative health services. Shamva hospital at one time had operated a Farm Health Scheme, 
focusing on immunisation and conscientisation on matters of hygiene, but the fleet had been 
grounded due to economic constraints. Thus, squatters are best understood as objects of health 
crisis management. In the case of the cholera outbreak, chlorine tablets and sprays were 
distributed, and the patients were treated in Shamva hospital and on site. Beyond the epidemic, 
there are longer-term afflictions. Malnutrition of children under five is common, due not only to 
low access to food but also to poorly cooked food, which in turn is due to the practice of child-to- 
child care, parents leaving children to the care of children while away at work. Tuberculosis is 
recurrent, as squatters’ homes, often made of pole and dagga, are overcrowded and poorly lit, and 
generally unsuitable for habitation. Prostitution and sexually transmitted diseases, including 
HIV/AIDS, are also widespread in squatter communities.23
The case of the cholera outbreak on John White Farm compound is especially indicative 
of the ‘breakdown’ of health service provision -  or, to use Charles van Onselen’s more precise 
term, ‘the economics of death’.24 This was not the first outbreak on the compound. A prior one 
had been experienced in 1993, and since then, no improvement of sanitation facilities and water 
accessibility had been undertaken by the farmer; the workers continued to build facilities for 
themselves, with whatever meagre resources were available to them. The matter was, in fact, 
urgent, as another outbreak was expected to occur by the health authorities in the forthcoming wet 
season. According to the farm owner, responsibility for the welfare of the labour force now rested 
with the person who leased the farm, as the labour force was transferred to the lessee with the 
farm. However, there was no ‘incentive’ for the lessee to improve sanitation, given the abundance 
in the supply of labour; to the farmer, the workers were dispensable. The only mechanism was in 
fact a ‘stick’ that could have been wielded by the local health authorities. According to the Public 
Health Act, the health authorities could obtain a court injunction to see to it that the farmer 
removed the causes of the health risk by building adequate water and sanitation facilities. Despite 
the experience of a cholera outbreak on the compound, and another one on the way, no such 
action had been taken by the authorities, which in turn cited the lack of resources and inadequate 
staff.
The case of squatters on John White Farm is also one of ‘interlocking markets’ -  the 
modern-day term for ‘human bondage’. The squatters would provide labour to pay rent to reside 
on the farm to provide labour. They were not able to accumulate to escape their condition. Should 
they have wished to organise and protest, their replacement may well have been instantaneous,
23 Interviews with Shamva District Nursing Officer and Shamva District Environmental Health Officer.
24 See van Onselen (1976), ch. 2.
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given the nature of the Southern African labour pool. When this was brought to the attention of 
the (white) Chairperson of the Pote Valley Farmers’ Association, he frowned upon the practice. 
‘Our blacks’, he said in tone befitting a slave-owner, ‘are on contract’.
Despite the advantages of the regional labour market to the farmers, they were frustrated 
by the squatting problem on their properties. They complained about the poaching of wood-fuel, 
siltation of rivers, uncontrolled traffic through their land, prostitution, and theft. These were all 
blamed on the squatters. The squatters did not find wrong in any of these, of course, but they 
resented the fact that they were labelled as thieves. ‘Everything is blamed on the squatters. But 
we are not thieves. The farm-workers are the ones who steal maize. We only buy it from them’.
Besides the ‘black market’, the farmers were frustrated more generally with the constant 
violation of private property. There was in fact an initiative by the regional office of the 
Commercial Farmers’ Union to find a solution to the problem, though there were a range of views 
among the farmers that had to be reconciled. The Regional Executive Officer noted that some 
farmers were ‘too radical’, calling for a ‘Law and Order’ type of regime with an effective and 
systematic eviction apparatus. However, this solution, he said, was ‘too idealistic’, and other 
more pragmatic ones had to be found, such as the provision of mine-shaft refilling equipment. 
Another farmer had a more final solution: ‘they should just be killed’.
The predicament of squatters was compounded by the absence of channels of political 
representation. Some expressed their wish to vote in the forthcoming national elections 
(originally scheduled for April 2000), although only half of the panners interviewed were 
registered to vote. The reason for the latter was mainly that they lacked information about when 
and where registration took place. Yet others were registered but saw no point in voting.
Elections for local government were a more involved matter. Squatters from surrounding 
districts were not eligible to vote in Shamva, since they were not registered with Chaminuka 
Rural District Council. The option of returning to their own districts to vote was not realistic, but 
nor was it reasonable, since they no longer lived there. The panners also did not have access to 
organised local meetings, such as VIDCOs and WARDCOs. In short, they were unorganised and 
unrepresented. Moreover, there was no effort on the part of local government to remedy this 
situation. On the one hand, to do so would have implied a legitimation of their status; on the 
other, there was an interest by the ruling party to keeping them away from the ballot box. The 
Provincial Administrator and Information Officer of ZANU(PF), when asked whether there had 
been any ‘outreach’ voter-registration programmes for the squatters, responded thus: ‘No. When 
you go to them you will see, they just run away. Anyway, most of them are Mozambicans’.
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Had the squatters been able to articulate their grievances formally, these would have 
coalesced around the following themes. The demand for resettlement land was pervasive. The 
panners on Pote River were the most uninhibited in their indictment of the government’s 
resettlement promise. They expressed the view that panners were being passed over by the 
government, which ‘is only concerned about the effects of panning’, not the landlessness of the 
panners themselves. Panners were being excluded from the process. Being completely landless, 
with most having been engaged in panning for the greater part of the decade, they felt that they 
should be considered for resettlement before communal people; ‘the needy must be considered 
first’. But it is not only that the criteria for eligibility did not favour them, it is also that the 
procedures for applying for resettlement land were skewed against them. Councillors in their own 
communal homes who, along with chiefs and the RDC, administered the selection process, often 
required fees and often also favoured their own relatives. And in Shamva, where many of the 
panners have been residing for years, they were excluded by virtue of being ‘non-resident’, while 
non-Zimbabweans had even less of a claim. The panners on John White farm were of the similar 
view, though expressed more cautiously, that ‘there is no proper communication’ in the 
resettlement process, a problem which ‘is made worse because there are too many who want 
land’.
Access to land, however, was not an end in itself. A secure livelihood and future was 
more precisely the coveted end, with land of one’s own being understood as the main pillar of this 
security. Beyond access to land, farming would have to be viable; access to credit and extension 
services, such as provision of fertilisers, would be important in securing survival on the land. 
Alongside farming, the panners expressed that access to a secure cash income from employment 
would remain crucial; this constituted a second pillar of survival. The Pote River panners agreed 
that they were likely to continue to pan even if they had land, because neither farming nor 
panning alone could provide security. Similarly, panners on John White farm expressed the view 
that the government should implement employment creation policies so as to provide more 
sources of income in the countryside. In the absence of other sources of income, the Pote River 
panners expressed the view that panning should be legalised and monitored more effectively, so 
that panners would not be required to pay rent to claim-holders and would not be subjected to the 
constant threat of eviction, arrest, and physical violence by farmers and local authorities.
A third pillar of security was understood to be the household’s access to education for the 
children and to health services. Access to education and health services was hindered by both the 
physical distance that one would have to travel to schools and clinics and the fees that one would 
have to pay. While the panners whose children lived at their communal homes with their mothers
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and grandparents complained mainly about school fees, the panners whose children lived in the 
settlements complained about both the travel distance and fees. This suggests that access to land 
serves as a conduit (albeit a limited one) to other sources of security, such as social infrastructure. 
It serves also to improve one’s access to the procedures for obtaining fee exemptions, via the 
assistance of local authorities. Those households that were not integrated into local structures 
were the most socially distant from such procedures. Landless panners on Pote River, John White 
farm, and Lion’s Den Estate all reported that in the past they had paid fees at local clinics, despite 
filling out social welfare forms. In the case of the two women interviewed on John White farm, 
they both reported that they had in fact withdrawn their children from school due to their inability 
to pay fees. The gap between needs and realities was larger still: other panners on John White 
farm expressed the need for pre-school facilities so that children would not be left to care for 
themselves while their parents are at work. They also expressed the view that adequate water and 
sanitation facilities were needed, though, in the presence of a farm manager, they did not indicate 
whose responsibility this project might be.
It is important to indicate the differential experience of landlessness and squatting among 
women, inasmuch as can be revealed from the two interviews on John White farm. The first 
woman, the single mother of seven, had no relations on communal lands, as both her parents had 
died when she was very young. In fact, she had never known where her communal home might 
have been. Since her husband’s death, the household had lost his panning income. Now she cared 
for the household on her own, while her children, withdrawn from school, also worked on farms 
in the district to gain cash. Thus, she and her household were without access to communal land; 
without access to relations of her own on communal land; without access to her husband’s 
relations, since the family of a deceased husband does not normally feel obligations towards the 
widow; and without access to local political structures through which to be considered for fee 
exemptions and resettlement land (which she indicated that she wanted). The only ‘source of 
security’ was her income from farm-work. She expressed that she wanted to vote but that she was 
not registered, as ‘the registration committee never comes here’. But, she added, even if she were 
to register, ‘there is no choice’.
The second woman, the married mother of two, whose children were also withdrawn 
from school, was the only interviewee to state that she did not want resettlement land. Puzzling 
though this might be, it seemed to reveal an alienation of different magnitude, namely, lack of 
faith in anything beyond the ‘security’ of the compound. It appeared as if no other institution, 
whether local or national, was, or had ever been, a trustworthy or relevant factor in the daily 
struggle for security; anything beyond the certainty of the compound was a risk. Faced with
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equally untrustworthy interviewers, she stated cautiously that she wanted to vote, but that she was 
not registered ‘due to ill health’ at the time of registration. When asked about responsibility for 
the cholera outbreak, she responded in similarly cautious terms, that, simply, ‘it comes from the 
water’.
None of the squatters/panners was integrated into the local political structures. As is the 
case with social infrastructure, legal access to land is what brings political infrastructure within 
reach. Many expressed their frustration that their complaints to councillors and local authorities 
fell on deaf ears, as panners did not constitute an electoral constituency to be courted by aspiring 
local politicians. There were no community meetings to attend, such as those in communal areas. 
And the District Administrator (DA) did not consider complaints that did not rise through the 
communal area structures. In the panners’ words, ‘there are no politics here’. Pote River panners 
said that the only time they met was at funerals. Information about national politics was also 
scarce. Only two panners had heard about the constitutional review exercise that was being 
conducted by government at the time; however, they did not know where the meetings were, or 
what the difference was between the government’s Constitutional Commission and the opposition 
NCA. Nonetheless, they were all too conscious of being excluded from politics and also of being 
denied the means to be more conscious: ‘we are oppressed because no-one here is educated 
enough to know what’s going on’.
Despite the lack of adequate information, and despite their exclusion from local and 
national infrastructure, the panners, to a significant extent, shared an understanding of their 
situation, inasmuch as can be distilled from the responses that they were willing to give. On the 
failure of the resettlement promise, the government and local politicians enjoyed pride of place in 
the panners’ invective. The two women were less forthcoming in their responses to two male 
interviewers, but their differential experience was evident in the ‘social death’ of the first and the 
‘risk-averse’ tactics of the second, in a social context devoid of security and governed by relative 
male privilege.
The most unimpeded and articulate in their condemnations of their moral order were the 
panners on Pote River, who worked in groups and without foremen. They denounced the 
government in the most unequivocal terms for failing to deliver on its promises. Although they 
felt exploited by claim-holders and commercial farmers, it was with the government that they felt 
they had a ‘contract’, not with anyone else: not with local politicians, not with farmers, not with 
farmers’ unions, and not with a ‘world bank’. It was the government that they had mandated to 
deliver meaningful liberation. Addressing himself to this failed contract, one panner remarked:
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‘The price of everything has gone up. We can’t buy food. Where is the land, the schools and the 
hospitals that they promise. Instead they give us structural adjustment. Is this freedomV
7.3 Contested Settlement and Eviction in Madziwa Communal Land
Besides panning, illegal land purchase was another ‘solution’ common in Shamva. In search of 
security, access to social services, and political protection, landless would seek and gain access to 
marginal land with the consent of grassroots authorities. In Madziwa communal land, the largest 
in the district, with 9 wards and 52 villages, land self-provisioning had a long history which pre­
dated the ESAP crisis but which had also been accentuated by it. This communal land has been 
the site of a large ‘contested settlement’, and the site also of its violent eviction. The settlement 
was located in Mwoyowamira, an expansive grazing area of 2,189 hectares south of Madziwa 
town. What follows is an account of a process that begins with contested settlement, culminates 
in eviction, and is followed by contested re-settlement. Eviction here turned out to be not merely 
a method of environmental management in the context of inadequate land reform: it was also a 
triumph of ‘legal’ villagers over ‘illegal’ ones in a context of local patronage politics; and a 
disjunction between local and central government on matters of resettlement policy and 
responsibility.
Squatting in Mwoyowamira began in the early 1980s. It emerged as a problem in the 
district in 1985 when complaints by legal villagers against settlers were first voiced to the (pre­
amalgamated) Chaminuka District Council.25 The grazing area was jointly used by eight villages, 
four from Chidembo (ward 9), two from Nyamaropa (ward 10), and two from Mutumba (ward 7). 
Land was allocated unsystematically to incoming settlers by Chiefs, a councillor, and two 
kraalheads from the nearby communal lands. These two councillors became the spokespersons of 
the settlers, along with two more kraalheads that emerged among the settlers in the grazing area. 
There is evidence, as we will see, that in the Mwoyomamira case the land allocations went 
beyond the grassroots authorities to gain Council approval in both official and unofficial ways. 
There is also evidence, which was eventually presented to the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), 
that the communal-land kraalheads and the councillor collected fees from some of the settlers.
Even though the number of settlers grew steadily in the years that followed the first 
complaint, the first registration exercise and head-count was only conducted by the RDC in 1994. 
This found that most of the settlers were retrenched workers from farms that had been bought by
25 The official facts of this case are in correspondences and reports in the Mwoyowmira eviction file held in 
Chaminuka Rural District Council, Chikanda, Shamva (see bibliography).
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the government, as well as from mines in the area, like the Trojan Nickel Mine; a smaller amount 
were communal farmers from Shamva who faced land shortages. One hundred and fifty-six 
families were registered at this time, and of these, 47 were Mozambican, 15 Malawian, one 
Zambian, 82 Zimbabwean from other districts, and 11 Zimbabwean from Shamva. A second 
registration was carried out in 1996, and found that the number of families had swelled from 156 
to 235; and by the time of the eviction in November 1996, a total of 361 families were resident in 
Mwoyowamira, of which 113 were Mozambican, 19 Malawian, 2 Zambian, 180 Zimbabwean 
from other districts, and 47 from Shamva. It thus appears that the majority was settled between 
1994 and 1995, under the worsening economic conditions.
The RDC vigorously denied that the settlers had received its approval, claiming that the 
kraalheads had defrauded the settlers. However, the evidence pointed in the direction of the RDC 
as well. Settlers received seed packs, fertiliser, and grain loans from government. AGRITEX land 
extension officers pegged the drainage system in the area, and also assisted the settlers in 
registering with the Grain Marketing Board and Cotton Company of Zimbabwe as local farmers. 
The DA demarcated wards. The Council began to collect development levies in 1989. The settlers 
contributed to the building of a school. And a number of them were issued National Identity cards 
that reflected their new district, which could only have been done with the consent of the 
Council.26 The then Chief Benson Mutumba himself stated that he had approved the settlements 
with the knowledge of the Council.27
A brief look into the life stories of some of the evictees will help to elaborate the 
Mwoyowamira profile. One family interviewed consisted of a Zimbabwean mother, a father of 
Mozambican origin who had acquired Zimbabwean citizenship, and their six children. They had 
come to Mwoyowamira in 1990, after the father had been retrenched from Trojan Nickel Mine. 
Though a citizen, the father did not have ties of his own to Zimbabwe’s communal lands from 
which to seek resettlement, and his wife could not make claims on her own kin. They had thus 
sought land in Mwoyowamira, which they were finally allocated by a kraalhead, without a fee. 
They did not pay development levies, but they stated that the DA had confirmed them and that 
they had voted for local councillors. A second male household-head interviewed had also been 
retrenched from Trojan Nickel Mine and had come to Mwoyowamira in the late 1980s. He stated 
that the DA had come to his village, along with the kraalhead that had allocated him land, and 
demarcated the village.
26 See Zimbabwe Human Rights Update, 3 December 1996; Chimhini (1996), Mugabe (1996), District 
Development Fund (1996).
27 ZimRights News, July 1997.
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A third male household-head had come to Mwoyowamira from Murewa in 1986, with his 
wife and six children, in search of land. He had been allocated seven acres of land by a kraalhead 
for no fee, and had gone through the formal process of transferring his residency to Shamva, with 
a letter from his former DA to the new one. He paid development levies, received extension 
services and drought relief, and voted for a local councillor. In his case, one of the two chiefs, 
Chief Nyamaropa, was not involved in his settlement, and therefore never recognised him as a 
legitimate settler; this was to be an important factor in his eviction.
A fourth interviewee, a widowed woman with six children, stated that she and her 
husband had annexed land on their own in 1980 in the grazing area; their original home was in a 
near-by village in Chidembo area, but they were facing land shortage. They were not settled by 
any of the local authorities, and they remained registered in Chidembo.
Given the substantial involvement of the Council in the settlement process over a whole 
decade what reason could there have been for pursuing the eviction? In fact, despite its official 
and unofficial approvals over the years, the Council was simultaneously taking slow steps 
towards eviction, suggesting a lack of coherence in local land policy. At the time of the first 
complaints lodged in 1985, the Council resolved that the ward councillors would deal with this 
problem themselves. The problem persisted, however, and meetings were subsequently convened 
in August 1987 between the Council Chairman, the councillors, and the settlers. In November 
1987, the Council Chairman informed the Council that, despite the meetings, the majority of the 
settlers refused to move, and recommended that force be used. The Council first took 
responsibility for the matter in 1988, when it issued formal notices to the settlers to vacate the 
land. In a show of resistance, the acknowledgment of receipt of the notice was signed by only 16 
of the settlers, while the rest refused and some threw the notices at the doorstep of the councillor 
at night. At this juncture, ‘[t]he Council failed to enforce the eviction because it was in deficit and 
had no funds’.28
The official justification for eviction was two-fold. First, there was growing conflict over 
natural resources between the settlers and villagers. Mwoyowamira was traditionally used by 711 
families from eight villages, which now were in competition with the settlers. The natural 
resources, trees, animals, and soils, were under pressure, while the livestock of the villagers was 
being deprived of adequate grazing. It has been reported that the villagers were resorting to 
renting grazing land in nearby farms and Farming Cooperatives and paying up to Z$2,000 to 
graze 50 cattle for a period of 8 months.29 In fact, in 1988, following the failure of the Council to
28 Chaminuka Rural District Council, Mwoyowamira Squatters Report (no date).
29 This is reported in Moyo (no date), where he also refers to the Mwoyowamira case.
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act, the villagers resolved to take matters into their own hands, proposing that the grazing area be 
fenced and forming committees to look into this project.
The second justification concerned the unsuitability of the land for cultivation and the 
larger environmental effects that this was causing. The settlers were indeed tilling the land, which 
was exacerbating erosion and causing the siltation of Mupfurudzi dam several kilometres away. 
This, in turn, was affecting the Mupfurudzi Fishing Company Project, a company owned by the 
community around the dam and run on a CAMPFIRE basis, involving about 350 shareholders. 
Moreover, siltation of the dam was said to be affecting irrigation schemes downstream and 
Madziwa Nickel Mine whose population of 3,748 was being supplied by the dam. As the DA’s 
Office put it, ‘[t]he number of squatters involved is far less than the number of people being 
disadvantaged. The benefits of squatting are far outweighed by the disadvantages being caused’.30
A third justification, mentioned only in an internal Council report, concerned the 
designation of Mwoyowamira for a grazing scheme, as well the foreign funding that had been 
secured for this purpose. As the report put it, ‘[f]unding for the Grazing Scheme and land 
rehabilitation have been sourced and one of the Giant Donors [the European Union] felt it 
unnecessary to contribute for the cause unless the illegal settlers are removed away’.31 An 
alignment of such local and foreign interests was putting pressure on the Council to act. The 
events transpired as follows.
In December 1992, a Special Council meeting was held with people who had purchased 
land. They produced receipts signed by the sellers and amounting to Z$6,180. The matter was 
turned over to the ZRP and the Magistrate, but the latter refused to prosecute, without providing 
an explanation, hi 1993, the settlers appealed to the Head Office of the Ministry of Local 
Government that they were no longer receiving crop and fertiliser packs and free tillage. In 
January 1994, the now amalgamated Chaminuka Rural District Council resolved to evict 
squatters by force and allocated $6,000 for this task.
Responding to the appeals of the settlers, Head Office took a stand on the matter for the 
first time, advising the Council, via the PA, not to proceed with the eviction process. At this 
stage, the Council noted that it ‘realised the sensitivity of the eviction’ but also that ‘pressure was 
mounting from the legal local residents who wanted the squatters evicted’.32 In April 1994, 
therefore, the Council wrote to the Minister of Local Government asking for authority to evict. 
The Ministry this time did not respond.
30 Office of the District Administrator to the Provincial Administrator (1996).
31 Chaminuka Rural District Council, Squatter Report and Update (no date).
32 Office of the District Administrator to the Provincial Administrator (1996).
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In the 1996 fiscal year, the RDC once again budgeted to evict the squatters, setting the 
date for June 1996. Meanwhile, the Council also sought legal advice from a Harare-based practice 
to ensure the legality of an eviction that lacked ministerial approval. The solicitors replied 
affirmatively, referring to the Communal Lands Act No. 20/1982 to declare that occupation of 
communal land for residential and agricultural purposes without the consent of the RDC is illegal 
and that the squatters were liable to fine, imprisonment, and eviction. They recommended that the 
matter be pursued via the ZRP and the district Magistrate Court. They further recommended that, 
in the case that the ZRP and Public Prosecutor refused to cooperate, as they had done in the past, 
the matter could be taken to the High Court, from which the Council could obtain a summons for 
eviction.33
By this time, the number of households in Mwoyowamira had swelled to the 360 mark; 
and the Council was equipped with a confirmation of its right to evict. A meeting was thus called 
at Dora Bridge on 9 April to inform the settlers of their impeding eviction. The meeting was 
attended by 200 settlers. The official entourage consisted of Nicholas Goche, the local Member of 
Parliament (MP) and Deputy Foreign Minister, who made a public appearance on the matter for 
the first time, along with the DA, the District CEO, the ZRP, AGRITEX, the Department of 
Natural Resources, a Resettlement Officer, and four councillors, among others.34 The DA spoke 
first. He ‘started by saying that he was pleased that they had come in great numbers but however 
was disappointed by the show of disrespect to the councillors and chiefs by some of the 
squatters’. The DA went on to tell the settlers that ‘they had been cheated by those who illegally 
allocated them land’. And he added that ‘that noone was above the law in Zimbabwe’. Finally, he 
affirmed that ‘[t]he government at local level was represented by the council which is the local 
authority’, and that ‘[t]he council has designated Mwoyowamira area as a grazing area’. ‘Besides 
this the land is not suitable for tilling as the Mupfurudzi dam downstream is silting very fast 
because of this new illegal settlement in the catchment area’.
Referring to the alternatives at the disposal of the settlers, ‘[t]he District Administrator 
told the gathering that the government was not responsible for resettling squatters but genuine 
landless people who appear on the council waiting list’. ‘Those who had genuinely transferred to 
Shamva but were settled on the grazing land should consult with the council or whoever allocated 
them that land’. ‘Those who have acquired citizenship should start looking for alternate land in 
the communal area of Shamva or any other district in Zimbabwe’. The DA also ‘reminded those 
aliens who had acquired Zimbabwean citizenship of the conditions of the oath of loyalty they
33 Musimbe (1996).
34 Minutes of the District Squatter Control Committee Held at Dora Bridge with The Squatters (1996).
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signed. They promised that they would observe and abide by the laws of Zimbabwe. Thus 
refusing to vacate from the grazing area was tantamount to disobeying the laws of the country. 
This citizenship can also be withdrawn’.
There are several notable moves here. First, the DA labelled the squatting problem in 
Shamva as a ‘district’ problem, not a national one, thereby absolving the central government of 
responsibility. The Council was elevated to moral and legal authority, while the chiefs were 
accorded honourable mention, their authority apparently having been disputed. Second, the DA 
distinguished between ‘genuine’ landless and the ‘ungenuine’. The former were the ones that 
were ‘genuinely transferred to Shamva but were settled on the grazing area’. Herein lies an 
admission and contradiction of a legal transfer transpiring but leading to illegal settlement. Third, 
the DA referred to a new category, ‘those aliens who had acquired Zimbabwean citizenship’ but 
whose citizenship could be revoked upon violation of the law, implying that they still had not 
achieved full Zimbabwean nationality -  they remained a step removed from the ‘more genuine’ 
nationals. Finally, all these gradations of status were rendered meaningless in light of the fact that 
all the settlers, whether or not legally transferred or foreign, were denied a meaningful voice in 
the matter.
Complaints were voiced in vain by the settlers about having paid for land and of having 
had no legal recourse. Then Nicholas Goche spoke last; the minutes note:
[t]he Member of Parliament told the meeting that he was re-affirming what had 
already been said by the District Administrator. He said the problem of squatters 
is not a new subject in the country. Recently in parliament there was debate on 
Nyaminyami squatters who have been evicted. The debate was not condemning 
eviction of squatters but the procedure and timing. He reiterated that the council 
was the land authority and that no one was above the law. The land belonged to 
government and was not for sale. He challenged those who sold land to speak out 
[!]. He finally told the meeting that there was no alternative to vacation as this 
land was grazing land.
The eviction date was set for 31 July 1996.
Following Dora Bridge, the settlers sought the assistance of the District Development 
Fund, which was sympathetic and which communicated with the PA  The settlers also sought the 
assistance of ZANU(PF) Head Office in Harare and the Ministry of Local Government. A 
communication between the DA’s Office and the PA states that the settlers ‘claimed that they had 
been advised not to move’, reflecting ongoing politics between the Ministry and the Council, and
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possibly the MP.35 In another internal report, the Council reaffirmed its stance, and, moreover, 
stated its ‘position with regard to other allegations’, possibly pertaining to ‘parochialism’, 
‘tribalism’, or ‘nepotism’:
[t]he Squatter Eviction process by Chaminuka Rural District Council is no 
exception or different from other eviction exercises hence should not be viewed 
as having political, regional or any other isms. Council is only acting in 
adherence to existing national laws executed within the delimitation of Council 
powers to preserve land and natural resources, our common heritage.36
Finally, the settlers also sought the assistance of ZimRights. ZimRights appealed to the 
Minister of Local Government on 19 April, emphasising the existing evidence that the settlers 
had indeed been formalised by the Council. ZimRights received no response and appealed again 
on 26 May. Evidently, the Ministry was not making any decisive moves either in relation to 
ZimRights or the Council. Thus, the Council proceeded to take the matter to High Court and 
obtained a summons on 23 September.
In November 1996, the squatters ‘were returned to their original homes’, as the 
succeeding DA put it in defending his predecessor. The nature of the eviction reveals the less 
visible political currents. The post-eviction interviewees in the Madziwa area, all recounted, in 
separate unstructured interviewing sessions, the same story. The eviction took several days. The 
DA was present in some instances. Armed police officers were also present, but were in small 
numbers; they were not the ones who carried out the evictions. The evictions were carried out by 
the legal villagers themselves, who set fire on houses around the clock. The Council arranged also 
for bulldozers to raze the houses to the ground. Two interviewees stated that their houses were 
burned after midnight. One stated that the villagers moved his furniture outside the house before 
setting it on fire. Some of the livestock was burnt in the pens; other livestock was ‘sold’ to the 
police and villagers. The District Development Fund provided lorries to transport the settlers. The 
lorry drivers demanded payment from the settlers, either in cash or kind {i.e. livestock). The 
settlers that were taken on the lorries were then left on the Bindura-Mt. Darwin road, some fifteen 
kilometres away, where they were to spend the entire wet season. Seven evictees are reported to 
have died of exposure-related diseases (cold and malaria).37
The way that the Council organised the eviction and the willing and prominent role 
assumed by the villagers reveals the resentment and tension that had built up and had indeed
35 Office of the District Administrator to the Provincial Administrator (1996).
36 Chaminuka Rural Dstrict Counctil, Mwoyowamira Squatters Report (no date), emphasis added.
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become available as political capital to be gained by local authorities and the local MP. Some 
interviewees believed that the villagers had been organised and hired by the MP, but, they 
admitted, this was speculation. Another interviewee stated that the villagers that set the house on 
fire were the ones that had wanted the land for grazing. What is readily apparent is that the 
Council found an inexpensive way to carry out the eviction of 360 families, which would have 
otherwise required an army. This, in fact, was not an unknown method of eviction. A ZimRights 
Legal Officer stated that, while the proper procedure called for a messenger of court to employ 
the ZRP, and while the use of locals was not sanctioned by the courts, the use of locals was 
known to have occurred elsewhere under the squatter control policy.38
All the interviewees stated that both the MP and the ZANU(PF) provincial office were of 
‘no use’. ‘How could we appeal to them? They were the evictors’. ‘If they were on our side’, 
another said, ‘they would have found resettlement for us’. The ZANU(PF) provincial office 
confirmed their own valuation of the settlers. When asked to suggest whether others, beyond the 
DA and Council staff, could be usefully interviewed, the response was straightforward: ‘No. 
Those are the ones that matter’. The councillors themselves were ZANU(PF), though there were 
conflicts between them. While the kraalhead-cwm-councillor that represented the settlers sought 
to defend them, the Council Chairman (the chief councillor) was vigorously pushing for their 
eviction. The same councillor who defended the settlers was also at loggerheads with Chief 
Nyamaropa. In the case of one of the interviewees, mentioned earlier, Chief Nyamaropa had not 
approved of his settlement, and the Chief was defied by the councillor who went ahead and 
settled them. When eviction time came, the evictors came from Nyamaropa.
The role of the Chiefs in Mutumba area is also noteworthy. The former Chief, Benson 
Mutumba, had approved of the settlers and had stated, as mentioned above, that he had done so 
with the knowledge of the Council. The succeeding Chief, Marufu Mandaza Mutumba, however, 
resented his loss of power vis-a-vis the Council, and resented also that the kraalhead/councillor 
that defended the settlers circumvented him and dealt directly with the Council. The Chiefs aid 
stated that the kraalhead/councillor had never been approved by the new Chief and was not one of 
the Chiefs 86 headmen. The Chief has been quoted as follows: ‘I am not interested with the 
evictions because the people who were forced off the land settled there without my knowledge. 
The truth about this problem is that the district council has taken over all chiefs’ judicial powers, 
including the hiring and eviction of people vis-a-vis land’. For him, disinterest in the eviction was
37 These testimonies are also reported in Zimbabwe Human Rights Update, 3 December 1996, and 
ZimRights News, July 1997.
38 Interview with Peter Maregere.
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a political statement about the loss of his power. He continued: ‘Council is giving people land and 
when that goes against land use plans from the top, they start accusing chiefs of having created 
that problem’.39 Meanwhile, the former Chief stated that he ‘deplored the loss of life, land, 
livestock and human dignity which resulted from the evictions’; ‘such inhumanity by a council on 
its people could only be perpetrated during the colonial regimes’.40
In the context of mutual recriminations, the settlers were defended by no one. The 
Assistant DA absolved the Council of responsibility, with the argument, ‘why should Chaminuka 
Rural District Council be responsible for the resettlement of someone from Guruve?’ When asked 
about the non-Zimbabweans, and how they might have been ‘returned to their original homes’, he 
responded that they had not been, indicating that Zimbabwe has obligations under the ‘Geneva 
Convention’.
It is safe to assume that in the wake of the eviction most of the contested settlers in 
Madziwa communal land were evictees from Mwoyowamira. It is also safe to assume that 
contested re-settlement in the area was the only solution available to most, as the majority of 
them had in the past been retrenched mine and farm workers without ties in communal lands, and 
as one-third had their origins in neighbouring countries. Moreover, under the force of eviction, 
many found not only that they had to enter a land market, but that they had to do so on terms that 
were most unfavourable to them. The post-eviction situation was thus one characterised by 
ongoing insecurity and social tension.
Of the eight contested re-settlers interviewed in the Madziwa area, only three stated that 
they had paid a fee for the new land that they now occupied. The rest said that they had not. 
However, under the insecurity of the situation, it is quite possible that they wished not to reveal 
the extent of their illegality. The following stories of six of these households will suffice as a 
profile of the contested re-settlers of Madziwa.
One household, the one with the father of Mozambican origin, was allocated a plot of 
land in a near-by village by a local kraalhead without a fee. This plot, however, had been too 
small and could only produce two bags of maize. Thus, survival remained difficult, with only ad 
hoc sources of revenue on commercial farms and elsewhere. They could not afford to send their 
children to school. They had, however, received assistance at the local clinic free of charge. In the 
past, they had received partial drought relief: the husband had been eligible on the basis of old 
age, but the wife had not qualified. They were soon to begin to pay development levies of Z$40 to 
the Council, but they felt that their tenure was not secure enough, nor their land adequate for
39 Quoted in ZimRights News, July 1997.
40 ZimRights News, July 1997.
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subsistence. The household head attended VIDCO meetings. These, however, were useless to 
them; the issues on the agenda did not address the particular plight of the ‘foreigners’. When 
asked his opinion about the lack of land redistribution in the country, the father responded: ‘the 
government says there is no land, but I doubt that this is true’. He added that, since the eviction, 
he had resolved never to vote again.
A second settler, the one who had legally transferred his papers from Murewa to Shamva, 
could not return to Murewa to seek land, as his legal ties there had been severed upon transfer. 
He, his wife, and six children did not find land via local kraalheads, but were offered land to lease 
by a local villager. They were paying Z$1,500 per year. They paid development levies, though 
they had no land of their own; they paid school fees; they did not pay hospital fees. They were not 
registered to vote, and had not heard about the constitutional review exercise.
A third settler, the widowed mother of six, stated that she could not access land in her 
former home in Chidembo, but that she had been allocated land by a kraalhead in a different area 
without a fee. Her husband, a policeman, had passed away not long before the eviction. The 
family had received pension money (Z$40,000) from the ZRP, but this was all spent on the 
building of a new home on their new plot. She would sometimes attend VIDCOs, but not often, 
because they were of no use to her either. She was aware of the constitutional review process. She 
was not registered to vote. ‘There is no point in voting’, she said; ‘nothing has changed’.
A fourth settler, member of a three-generation household with three children, stated that, 
upon eviction, they sought land in a nearby village from a villager. The villager had asked for 
money, but the settler refused to pay. He stated that they were given land anyway. The exact 
nature of the tenure arrangement was not readily apparent, though it was clear that relations were 
tense. The household sold maize and also wove straw mats for sale. They paid school fees and 
they did not pay hospital fees. They had previously paid Council levies, but had stopped paying 
because they were not receiving any benefits. Their relations with the local villagers were also 
poor. He stated that they were not receiving fertiliser and seed, because the locals were 
deliberately excluding them. He said the locals were relatives of Nicholas Goche, and they 
regarded the ‘foreigners’ as ‘bad’ people, because they had crossed swords with their patron and 
son. He had stopped going to local meetings. He said he had applied for resettlement, but their 
names had been removed from the list. He was not registered, but wanted to vote; he had heard of 
the Constitutional Commission, but had not attended any meetings.
A fifth settler, an aged and retired widower who lived alone, stated that a kraalhead had 
felt pity for him and had allocated land to him, on which he managed to put a pole-and-dagga 
home. He had been in Mwoyowamira since 1987. On the day of his eviction, he managed to save
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some of his livestock, while the rest was lost. He did not feel that his new neighbours were 
pleased with his presence. His children worked in Harare and remitted money to him. He had no 
other sources of revenue. When asked about resettlement, he said he had no tools and was too old 
to work the land. When asked about responsibility for the lack of resettlement, he hurriedly 
produced ZANU(PF) membership papers, revealing concern about the true identity of his 
interviewers.
A sixth settler, an aged man of Malawian origin who lived with his wife, stated that he 
had paid Z$150 for his new land. His children worked in town, and they remitted money to their 
parents. He stated that he voted, attended local meetings, and paid a Council development levy of 
Z$40.
What the Mwoyowamira and post-Mwoyowamira episodes indicate is that contested 
settlement may have provide ‘informal solace’, but it was also a temporary and highly insecure 
one. The settlers may have gained political protection for some time, but this was not guaranteed, 
and they could, in the long run, become pawns of larger power struggles. They were often treated 
as ‘foreigners’, as ‘unvirtuous’, as ‘bad people’, and experienced exclusion from community 
decision-making mechanisms. Their particular concerns -  their lack of secure tenure 
arrangements and their more limited material resources, in terms of farm sizes, tools, and 
livestock -  differed from the established villagers, and these concerns did not enter the local 
agenda. And their ‘foreigness’ certainly precludes access to political patrons who might have 
been able to channel resources their way. They too lived a ‘social death’. Their status as 
‘squatters’ was deeply resented and vehemently contested. One of the settlers, expressing the 
consciousness of many more, responded resolutely to such claims: ‘They say we are squatters. We 
are not 'squatters ’. We are Zimbabweans/’
7.4 The ZCTU’s Engagement with the Rural Peasant-worker
The condition of semi-proletarianisation does not lend itself to unionisation and the cultivation of 
a unitary peasant-worker identity. The above case studies indicate that explosive grievances 
animate the countryside, but they are neither organised in a coherent peasant-worker identity nor 
vented through formal channels of expression. At a basic level, a common experience does exist, 
understood in terms of the broken promises of national liberation, but beyond that, the rural semi- 
proletariat is highly fragmented.
The organisational task was undertaken for the first time by the ZCTU in 1999. The 
ZCTU at this time was at the forefront of oppositional politics, and well-placed to enter into
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dialogue with the diversity of workers, to mobilise, and to articulate a unitary class vision 
nationally and internationally. The centre’s outreach to the poorest and most unorganised 
households in the rural areas thus marked the most significant development in its politics.
The ZCTU began to establish local structures in each of its six regions in April 1999. It 
was becoming clearer by this time that the ZCTU was going to challenge ZANU(PF) at the polls. 
It was therefore also becoming clear that a rural outreach programme was urgently needed to 
strike at the rural base of the ruling party. Local structures were established in growth points, with 
the objective of inviting ‘key’ persons -  community leaders and teachers -  to discuss national 
problems. Throughout, the organising approach sought to emphasise the peaceful nature of the 
movement, in a context still overshadowed by the violence of the liberation war and ongoing fear 
of contravening the ruling party. The Head of the Organising Department of the ZCTU, where the 
mobilisation programme was headquartered, stressed the importance of this new politics in the 
countryside. ‘ZANU(PF) does not know how to mobilise’, he said, ‘they use fear, as they did 
during the war when they mobilised peasants by pointing guns at them’.41
With the actual launch of MDC, the organisational effort in the countryside gained 
momentum. Local structures continued to be established and linked to a hierarchy of MDC 
structures, from the national level, to the provincial, district, branch, and cell. The branch level 
was central in organising meetings and mobilising members, and furthermore spearheading the 
formation of cells in the communal lands. Both branches and cells were structured on the same 
format, consisting of a chairperson, vice chairs, an information and publicity officer, a treasurer, a 
women’s coordinator, and a youth coordinator. By December 1999 in Shamva, 11 cells had been 
set up, with a goal of 20. By February 2000, Tsvangirai claimed that the MDC had managed to 
spread its reach over 60% of the country.42
One of the main organisational problems, according to branch leaders in Shamva, was the 
fear-instilling tactics of ZANU(PF). Intimidation of MDC sympathisers and members was 
routine, as was the deployment of the CIO at MDC meetings. At an MDC rally in Shamva in 
early December 1999, the reluctance of people gathered in Wadzanai township to hear MDC 
leaders speak was palpable; ZANU(PF) had a strong presence of its own at the rally. Eventually, 
the meeting got off the ground at a town hall, though concern about the ZANU(PF) presence 
persisted. The issue of intimidation was discussed at the meeting itself, where the MDC officers 
urged the audience to report all instances of intimidation to the local officers of MDC who would 
pursue them with the police. A second notable organisational obstacle manifested itself in early
41 Interview with James Makore, Head of Organising Department.
42 Zimbabwe Independent, 4 February 2000.
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February 2000 when the Shamva District Chairperson of the MDC was brought before a Shamva 
magistrate on charges of contravening the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, by uttering 
statements in public that were ‘likely to bring the head of State to hatred or contempt’.43 At the 
height of the pre-election land crisis, the situation in the district deteriorated leading to the death 
of an MDC supporter in Madziwa.
The rural outreach was a landmark in the history of the ZCTU. The question, however, as 
to whether a working class identity was being cultivated by ZCTU/MDC is answerable in the 
negative. The MDC speakers at the Shamva rally emphasised that the MDC is a ‘workers’ party’. 
But the allusion to workers’ solidarity remained rhetorical, as the notion of ‘the worker’ was 
articulated in terms other than those pertaining to their relation to employers and landowners -  as 
had been articulated in the Workers' Participation and Development manual earlier in the decade. 
Rather the concept of ‘work’ was associated with ‘suffering’. ‘Even if  you are working for 
yourself or your family, you are still working -  and suffering’. Speaker after speaker made this 
connection. The Women’s Coordinator appealed to women in similar terms: ‘during the war, 
women cooked for fighters but received no compensation. Today women are selling in the 
[informal] market, and suffering. Women are suffering the most’. If suffering was the prominent 
theme in the rally, the source of suffering was identified as ZANU(PF) and its misrule: 
corruption, the DRC, ESAP, unemployment, elites taking land for themselves, manipulating the 
constitutional review process. ‘Unless we remove ZANU(PF) leaders’, the Provincial Chair 
asserted, ‘we will continue to suffer’.
The implication of such an appeal was that political participation of workers in the sphere 
of production was not made an issue. The issue was framed in terms of reclaiming the state from 
elected officials who were enriching themselves at the expense of ‘the people’. The ‘exploiters’ 
were not employers and landowners but those who inhabited public office. The message of the 
MDC/ZCTU rural outreach was clearly a populist one. To be sure, it was a message that had the 
potential of striking a chord among many of the rural poor who, as in the case of the squatters, 
felt that the once revolutionary leadership had failed them. However, the ZCTU was not taking on 
the task of organising and articulating the disparate grievances of the rural poor on the basis of 
their exclusion from the means of production; in this sense, the solidarity being cultivated was 
tailored to the finite project of entering State House.
What is more, the local structures that were being built were to be formally disassociated 
from the ZCTU as the MDC grew organisationally independent. The hierarchy of organisations
43 The Daily News, 4 February 2000.
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from the cell to the national level were to belong to MDC in due course.44 Although it was 
understood that a ZCTU-MDC partnership would continue for some time in one way or another, 
it was clear that the ZCTU’s direct access to rural households would attenuate and eventually be 
severed. In this sense, the national centre missed its chance to build an enduring relationship with 
the countryside.
The implications extend further. This would have been the first large-scale effort by a 
Southern African trade union centre to establish roots of its own in a rural domain and to claim 
legitimacy as an oppositional force with a rural base and agenda. The ZCTU had been the nucleus 
of oppositional politics throughout ESAP, but it had by no means incorporated the rural 
constituency, nor had it led the debate on a most pressing national issue, that of land reform. 
Especially in the final years of the decade, the centre’s contribution to the land debate was being 
cast in term of ‘bad governance’, singling out the stalling of government in the aftermath of the 
1998 International Donor’s Conference. Importantly, the centre did not issue an independent 
assessment of the proposed World Bank model of ‘community initiated and market assisted’ 
reform. This lack of depth with regards to rural issues proved crucial in the run-up to the 
elections, as the ruling party reached for the moral high ground on land. The implications extend 
to the international realm as well. As a civic organisation with a rural and urban social base, the 
ZCTU would have had unique insight, legitimacy, and research capacity to articulate the 
connections between land and labour in international politics. That such an insight went missing 
was evident in the ZCTU’s contribution to the regional and global debates over ‘social charters’, 
in which the problem of ‘labour standards’ was de-linked from land reform.
7.5 The Return of High Profile Land Occupations
The stalemate that characterised the state-peasant relationship from the late 1980s came undone 
in the second half of the 1990s. This period was ushered in by a mass land designation exercise 
undertaken by government in November 1997 under the Land Acquisition Act (1992), and was 
followed first by public land occupations on occasion of the International Donors’ Conference of 
September 1998, and then again, in a more sustained manner, in the aftermath of the 
constitutional referendum of February 2000. The new period of high profile land politics, 
however, was not precipitated directly by the squatting situation. Labour relations, as we have 
seen, continued to be highly adversarial in the second half of the decade, despite an attempted 
rapprochement. Besides the sustained mobilisation by ZCTU, civil servants themselves staged a
44 Interview with Morgan Tsvangirai.
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nation-wide strike in 1996, the largest in the post-independence period, and this from a sector that 
was relatively ‘trusted’ by the state. Meanwhile, industrial action was undertaken in several other 
industries, and this continued into 1997 when more than 230 strikes were held in 16 sectors -  
including commercial farming, where farm workers downed tools for the first time. In the midst 
of this burgeoning legitimacy crisis, war veterans themselves fell out with the higher echelons of 
the ruling party in July 1997, most immediately over the looting of the state-sponsored War 
Victims Compensation Fund. The war vets demanded that the state compensate them from the 
national budget, while, in effect, holding the government hostage by threatening to withdraw 
security. In the event, President Mugabe conceded to the fiscal outlay. This was followed by the 
initial step of what turned out to be a re-radicalisation of the land cause, though at this stage it 
remained driven ambiguously by both popular and black bourgeois interests. In November 1997, 
the government designated 1471 farms for compulsory acquisition.
The new designations amounted to 5 million hectares of land, or about 40% of the lands 
in the large-scale commercial farming sector. The lands designated were understood to be 
derelict, underutilised, in multiple ownership, held by absentee owners, or contiguous to 
communal areas, and were spread across agro-ecological regions (2.2 million hectares in NR n,
1.1 million in NR HI, and 1.7 in NR IV and V). The designations gave renewed impetus to the 
land debate. The government produced a policy framework for a ‘second phase’ of the land 
reform programme (LRRP-2) -  the first phase having been that of 1980-97 -  which was released 
in June 1998.45 The government also commissioned a study in 1998, whose terms of reference 
had already been discussed and agreed before the designations; this study was designed to move 
beyond the Land Tenure Commission (which had reported in 1994) and to produce a 
comprehensive land policy framework paper for discussion with civic organisations and for 
eventual adoption by government.46 These moves signalled to civic organisations and donors the 
government’s intentions to implement an orderly reform.
The designation also drew bilateral and multilateral donors into the fray. In the 1990s, 
alongside the promotion of structural adjustment, there was already an emerging interest among 
donors in land reform. In 1991, the World Bank accepted for the first time that there was 
underutilised land in Zimbabwe and that there was ‘poverty reduction’ merit in land reform, 
although a land reform programme was not incorporated into structural adjustment.47 In 1993, 
Bank staff produced a working paper that was to form the theoretical background to the Bank’s
45 Government of Zimbabwe (1998a).
46 The drafting team was led by Issa G. Shiyji and first reported in November 1998; an abbreviated 
discussion paper was later produced; see Government of Zimbabwe (1999a).
47 See World Bank (1991b).
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new land reform policy world-wide, known as ‘community-initiated, market-assisted’ (CIMA).48 
Then in 1996, the British ODA conducted a feasibility study of its own in Zimbabwe and 
recommended land reform on the CIMA basis. The British government went on to rally support 
among donors towards this end, thereby also steering land acquisition away from the more 
resolute provisions of the Land Acquisition Act (in terms of compulsory acquisition and partial 
compensation linked to improvements on the land).49 The new designations therefore jolted the 
liberal consensus and forced the position of donors. International appeals for a consultative and 
accountable reform joined the ongoing domestic ones, a process which culminated in the 
scheduling of an International Donor’s Conference for September 1998, hosted by the auspices of 
the government.
The scheduling of the conference, in turn, jolted land politics in the rural areas. Indeed, 
the conference was mediated by the largest high-profile land reform demonstration in the post­
independence period. In June 1998, three months prior to the conference, villagers from Svosve 
in Marondera, Mashonaland East, began to move onto commercial farms in the area with the tacit 
or explicit support of traditional leaders, local ZANU(PF) leaders, and the War Veterans 
Association.50 These occupations received unprecedented media coverage, attracted national 
politicians to the scene, including Vice President Simon Muzenda, and had a demonstration effect 
around the country. Following Marondera, occupations spread to Guruve, Makonde, Macheke, 
Hurungwe, Odzi, and elsewhere. From June onwards, thousands of peasants left their homes to 
occupy dozens of farms. As Rachael Knight put it, ‘land invasion followed land invasion, 
becoming almost a national movement’.51
It is clear that the occupations were initiated form within the ruling party -  that is, 
grassroots circuits of local leaders and war veterans -  and were also treated to sympathetic 
reception at the higher echelons. As President Mugabe exclaimed at the time, ‘Why should we 
use teargas? Why should be use force on our people who are hungry for land?’52 It is also likely 
that the invasions were manipulated by the government to put pressure on donors to commit 
funds; during the conference in September, donor representatives were organised and brought to
48 Recall that in 1993 the Bank went on to publish its own theoretical justification for land reform; see 
Binswanger, Deininger, and Feder (1993). Significantly, the long absence of a land policy framework at the 
Bank was justified by the Bank in Harare in terms of the ‘polarised’ and ‘prohibitive’ climate of the Cold 
War, not the Bank’s role in it; interview with Rogier van den Brink, Senior Economist/Deputy Resident 
Representative, World Bank Resident Mission in Zimbabwe.
49 See Moyo (2000a), ch. 3.
50 See Knight (1998).
51 Knight (1998), p. 4.
52 Quoted in Knight (1998), p. 16; the quote originally appeared in The Herald, 26 June 1998.
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Svosve ‘in a motorcade of white minivans’ to speak to the villagers themselves.53 However, what 
is also clear is that the invasions gave expression to a local-central government cleavage and the 
local frustration with central government’s handling of reform. Importantly, protest was being 
pursued under the umbrella of the local ZANU(PF) leadership in order to avoid the kind of 
repressive response form the central government that would otherwise have been meted out to an 
‘opposition’ group.54 The invasions also gained a strategic approach over time, targeting 
properties of persons of influence, such as among the CFU and the black elite. Moreover, the 
invasions got out of control, insofar as the government was concerned, since, by August, riot 
police were driving villagers off the farms, and President Mugabe was warning that ‘Government 
will be forced to take action against such people. We admit that we have been slow in 
implementing the programme but I must tell you resettlement of the land hungry is 
forthcoming’.55
The conference elicited commitments from donors to co-fund with government an 
‘inception’, or trial, phase of acquisition and redistribution, so long as the principle of 
transparency was upheld and it met poverty alleviation criteria. It was also agreed at the 
conference that government would ‘test’ the World Bank’s model of reform, the ‘community- 
initiated, market-assisted approach’. Subsequently, the Inception Phase Framework Plan (IPFP) 
was prepared, deriving from the LRRP-2 and from consultation with civic organisations, to chart 
a 24-month programme of action for the resettlement of 77,000 families on one million hectares, 
and this was approved by government in April 1999.56 The IPFP incorporated the agreement to 
include CIMA, among state-led methods, while the Bank reciprocated in July by appraising the 
project towards the commitment of funds.57 Typically, the Bank was positioning itself so as to 
steer the land reform programme in its own direction.
In the meantime, however, the government’s own approach was getting bogged down. In 
November 1998, the government de-listed 624 farms of the original 1471 and issued notices for 
compulsory acquisition to 841 of the farms. Of these, 85 were not contested by their owners, 
while the filing of the remaining became mired in administrative error and confusion. Thus, by 
March 1999, government had acquired only 27 farms at market value and in cash at a cost of 
Z$79 million (Z$38=US$1), and these were to provide the starting point of the inception phase.58
53 Knight (1998).
54 See Knight (1998), p. 26.
55 Quoted in Knight (1998); the quote originally appeared in The Herald, 20 August 1998.
56 Government of Zimbabwe (1999b).
57 World Bank (1999).
58 Moyo (2000c), p. 4.
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Over the course of the following months, the inception phase was to continue at a snail’s 
pace, until it ultimately derailed. Neither the government nor the donors provided their share of 
funding (agreed at 40% each). By February 2000, government had provided no more than 15% of 
its planned spending, while donors had only made initial disbursements towards technical 
support. Now reaching for the moral high ground on ‘poverty alleviation’, donors expressed 
concern over the government’s commitment to ‘good governance’ and ‘the poor’, noting 
specifically the government’s ongoing commercial farm scheme through which it leased 
previously-purchased farms to black commercial farmers.59
For its own part, government continued to alienate civil society with heavy-handed 
tactics. The last two years of the decade, saw national politics reach boiling point with food riots, 
a national strike, and two stay-aways in protest against run-away inflation, government crack­
downs, and the DRC campaign. In 1999, the ZCTU opted for removal of ZANU(PF) by the 
ballot, seeking electoral reform via the NCA and ultimately forming MDC to contest the 
parliamentary elections (originally scheduled for April 2000). These events precipitated the 
demise of the inception phase of the land reform programme. Witnessing its legitimacy 
evaporate, government sought refuge in the land cause. It repositioned land at the centre of the 
constitutional question -  it inserted in its own draft constitution provisions enabling compulsory 
acquisition and assigning responsibility for compensation to the former colonial power -  as well 
as its electoral campaign, with the slogan ‘land is the economy, the economy is land’. The draft 
constitution was then struck down at the referendum in February 2000. While the inception phase 
framework plan had not yet been officially replaced, the ‘spirit’ of the Donors Conference had 
obviously gone amiss. The inception phase was then superseded by renewed rural mobilisation 
and land occupations, led by war veterans.
There is ongoing debate over the nature of the revived land occupations movement and 
its political language. On the one hand, there have been condemnations of the movement as an 
‘assault on the state’, and of its political language as an ‘exhausted’, or even a ‘new’, 
nationalism.60 On the other hand, there are those -  present author included -  that see continuity in 
the nationalism; and the ‘assault on the state’ as an assault on the neo-colonial state specifically, 
which holds out the prospect for the national democratic revolution that Zimbabwe never had.61 
This debate will certainly continue. But at this stage, it should suffice to outline the features of the 
changing political economy.
59 See Moyo (2001b).
60 Raftopoulos (2001), Alexander (2001), and Bond and Manyanya (2002).
61 Moyo (2001a).
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Following the constitutional referendum, war veterans in Masvingo Province occupied 
white farms in retaliation against what they saw as political involvement by white farmers in the 
NCA campaign against the draft constitution. Government enthusiastically endorsed the initiative, 
which then quickly spread to Manicaland, Mashonaland, and, at a slower pace, in Matabeleland.62 
Occupations peaked around election time in June; it is estimated that they reached between 685 
and 900 farms, with Mashonaland at the epicentre. It is further estimated that about 300 of these 
occupations were marked by violence, including rape, torture, and killings.63 Farms occupied 
were owned mainly by whites, as well as, to a much lesser degree, by members of the political 
elite and other black capitalists. It is generally agreed that, by and large, war veterans provided 
leadership to the movement through the hierarchy of national, provincial, and district committees 
of the National Liberation War Veterans Association -  while another group of war veterans, 
under the Liberators’ Platform for Peace and Development, distanced themselves from the 
movement. It is also clear that agencies of the state, including the CIO and defence forces, 
provided logistical support.
The occupations, however, evolved in a complex way, driven by regional and local 
particularities, such that dismissal of the movement as a merely ‘orchestrated’ affair is 
unfounded. While violence was meted out to those who failed to be convinced by the land 
campaign, or who stood to lose from it, including farm workers, local communities participated 
actively (sometimes farm workers themselves) in the occupations, at times even without war 
veteran leadership; traditional leaders and individual MPs also assumed leadership roles, and in 
some cases sought to ‘formalise’ their status by appealing to war veterans. There were also 
instances of antagonism between local initiatives and the higher echelons of the war veterans’ 
command structure. Land occupations also changed over time in terms of their social base, as 
urbanites and petty-bourgeois elements entered the fray, and the type of land targeted -  the 
movement expanded from underutilised land to productive land which fit other criteria, such as 
multiple ownership, foreign ownership, and contiguity to communal areas. Finally, there were 
also ‘opportunistic’ elements, claiming to be war veterans, who jumped on the bandwagon to 
extort money from farmers or poach wildlife and natural resources -  which indicated also the loss 
of control of the movement by war veterans and the ruling party.64
Throughout the process, government gazetted legislation which contravened the norms of 
‘international society’ and assaulted the neo-colonial status quo. In April 2000, government went
62 On Matabeleland, see Alexander and McGregor (2000).
63 Moyo (200Id).
64 See Moyo (2001a).
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ahead with constitutional reforms pertaining to land, by inserting into the constitution provisions 
for compulsory acquisition with compensation limited to improvements on the land and explicitly 
relegating any other responsibility for compensation to the UK. Thereafter, by presidential 
decrees, under the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act -  government proceeded to 
amend the 1992 Land Acquisition Act several times, thereby eliminating the requirement of 
designation (which legally complicated acquisition), spelled out compensation procedures 
(staggered payment in cash, bonds or other securities over a five-year period), and removed 
several other legal and procedural obstacles pertaining to the notification of acquisition and 
contestation of land. In effect, it sought to remove land reform from the jurisdiction of the courts. 
With the same logic, it passed the Rural Land Occupiers (Protection from Eviction) Act in July 
2001, by which occupiers would be afforded legal protection from eviction. These legislative 
changes were conducted through repeated confrontation with the High Court and Supreme 
Court.65
Land acquisition entered high gear after the June parliamentary elections, which the 
ruling party narrowly won; at this juncture, war veterans increased the stakes and denounced the 
slow pace of government action on land. In turn, government resolved to implement the ‘second 
phase’ of land reform and resettlement that had been abandoned, but now on an accelerated pace, 
code named ‘fast track’ -  whose precedent had been the ‘accelerated’ resettlement programme of 
the early 1980s. Under the revived LRRP-2, the initial figure for acquisition was 5 million 
hectares; this, however, was soon increased drastically. By late 2001, government had acquired 9 
million hectares of land, some 4,800 farms, and had re-allocated 7.3 million to 160,000 
smallholder families, amounting one million people, on the A 1 model (involving inheritable, non- 
alienable use rights); the rest of the land was allocated to 51,000 small- and medium-scale 
indigenous commercial farmers on a 99-year leasehold basis.66 There are also indications that 
some land was allocated to members of the political elite. Yet, the popular orientation is 
indisputable: the resettlement numbers are more than double those of the first seventeen years of 
independence. To be sure, redistribution has not been ideal: evidence suggests that farm workers 
were displaced in large numbers (estimated at 30,000 families); reportedly, they accounted for 
only 1.7 per cent of resettled households. Women were also denied proper recognition; while 
female-headed households constitute about 35 per cent of all households in the country, they 
accounted only 16 per cent of resettled households.67
65 See UNDP (2002), pp. 24-32.
66 UNDP (2002), pp. 10-15.
67 UNDP (2002), pp. 35-37.
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Alongside large-scale redistribution, government did not relent on its persecution of 
opposition, including organised labour. Especially on the eve of the Presidential elections of 
March 2002, government proceeded to enact draconian measures -  namely the Public Order and 
Security Act, in replacement of the colonial Law and Order (Maintenance) Act -  against civil 
expression; this period also saw political violence take another 30 lives. Moreover, government 
manipulated the electoral process by various means, thereby securing the return of President 
Mugabe to another term at the helm. Thereafter, government began to take steps to disband the 
opposition, which included the promotion of ZFTU at the expense of the ZCTU.
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CONCLUSION
CHAPTER 8 
‘Waiting for the Barbarians’
This thesis has provided an account of the political economy of civilisation, the process through 
which good citizenship is defined and enforced on a global scale. It has also indicated the 
conditions for the expansion of the civil domain: this, by necessity, is a global process; it requires 
the resolution of the agrarian question; and it is a matter of social struggle. In these concluding 
pages, I summarise the basic arguments before offering some thoughts on the future of 
Zimbabwe, the meaning of international solidarity, and the nature of a post-liberal civilisation.
8.1 Summary of Arguments
Contemporary democratic theory will continue to obscure the process of social change as long as 
it fails to theorise (a) the underlining tendencies of a structurally heterogeneous capitalist 
economy and (b) the global sources of civility and incivility. Global capitalism continues to 
operate in accordance with the laws of motion of the centre-periphery structure. The main 
alteration has consisted in the partial disarticulation of the central states and their re-articulation 
into a ‘regionalised triadic bloc structure’. Thus, we may still speak of a periphery: this is 
sectorally and socially disarticulated; it reproduces semi-proletarianisation on a grand scale; and 
is exceptionally prone to economic, social, and political crisis. Disarticulated accumulation has 
been defended by the definition and enforcement of a ‘property friendly’ civil domain until the 
1970s, and a ‘market friendly’ one thereafter. Both have derived from the changing class balances 
within the ultra-imperial alliance and the course of the Cold War; they amount to global modes of 
rule, which interact with ‘local’ social relations in veriable ways.
The obfuscation of the centre-periphery dynamics in the postwar period has been abetted 
by a body of ‘development theory’ which has conceived of development as a process of imitation 
-  the ‘universal’ being claimed by the centre itself -  rather than transformation of global social 
relations, and the centre-periphery relationship in particular. As such, from its inception, 
development theory has sought to manage the agrarian question without undermining extroverted 
class alliances across the centre-periphery axis. Indeed, the purpose of ‘development theory’ has 
not been ‘development’ at all, but the management of the centre-periphery relationship itself, 
from the initial concerns of ‘turning peasants into workers’ by social engineering, to the ‘rural 
development’ turn of the 1970s concerned with subsidising functional dualism on a global scale,
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to the period of liberalisation concerned with displacing the 1970s crisis and consolidating 
politically the disarticulated pattern of accumulation.
The outstanding cases of industrialisation and sustained growth in the periphery, notably 
East Asia, are to be understood as cases in which the constraints of the centre-periphery 
relationship have been relaxed for geopolitical ends, or overcome. The evidence of this is to be 
found as much in the extensive assistance provided to the developmentalist states of the region 
during the Cold War, as in the assault on these same developmentalist states in the aftermath of 
the Cold War. It is also to be found in the withholding of such assistance to the rest of the 
periphery, where the Cold War was successfully managed by a combination of military and less 
drastic economic means. The case of Zimbabwe provides ample evidence of the development of 
underdevelopment. Its most impressive growth rates were recorded in the UDI period, when the 
state effectively delinked from the international law of value while continuing to receive overt 
and covert support from white supremacist allies. With the onset of neo-colonialism, any politics 
that sought delinking, whether bourgeois or working class, were systematically sanctioned, while 
disarticulated class alliances were actively nurtured (the violent process which I have termed 
‘civilisation’). In Zimbabwe, this process operated with such success that the decision to embark 
on structural adjustment was taken in the absence of a balance of payments crisis. There may 
certainly be more cases in the future of sustained accumulation in the periphery (in Zimbabwe or 
elsewhere), but these will have to be explained again as instances in which the powerful 
tendencies of the centre-periphery structure have been overcome, not as evidence that these 
tendencies do not exist.
This brings us to the final point, the importance of a politics that seeks to broaden the 
civil domain and alter the pattern of accumulation in the periphery in the first instance. The civil 
domain, by definition, cannot be broadened by civil society. The onus lies on progressive uncivil 
politics in the periphery, as well as on international solidarity with such politics in the centre. I 
will elaborate on international solidarity below. Suffice it here to note that the most important 
economic and political phenomena of the postwar period occurred under pressure from uncivil 
politics, especially in the course of the Cold War; these would include the abolition of formal 
imperialism; European reconstruction and integration; the restructuring of East Asian economies 
in the course of the Chinese revolution; the transformation of feudal-like relations in Latin 
America on account of the Cuban revolution; and the defeat of white-minority rule in Southern 
Africa after armed struggle. In the current, post-Cold War period, it is progressive uncivil politics 
once again, and rural movements in particular, that are challenging the shrunken civil domain of 
the governance synthesis and seeking to obtain historical movement.
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8.2 Zimbabwe’s Future
The future is never entirely predictable, of course, but we can still outline the basic features of the 
present and the conditions of social change. That which is clear at present is that there has been 
an initial widening of the home market in Zimbabwe through large-scale redistribution of land. 
This means that there will be a new process of accumulation and new social contradictions. It also 
means that land tenure will remain in a state of flux, on account of both the ‘communalisation’ of 
the large-scale farming sector (in formal terms) and the likely persistence of the commoditisation 
of communal land (both formally and informally). Below, I outline in schematic terms three 
scenarios for Zimbabwe; these are not mutually exclusive in their entirety, but they assist us in 
identifying key political-economic processes.
The first scenario is that of a human catastrophe in Zimbabwe. At the time of writing, 
Southern Africa is in the midst of severe drought, which has placed a large part of the sub­
continental population in danger of starvation (as many as 12 million people) and the cash- 
strapped states of the region at the mercy of the ‘international community’. This applies as much 
to ‘rogue’ Zimbabwe, as to the states that have been doing ‘the right thing’. Thus far, donor 
agencies, central states, and multilateral institutions have responded slowly to the call for 
‘humanitarian assistance’; some (most prominently USAID and the IMF) have sought to 
instrumentalise Zimbabwe’s unfolding famine so as to exact property- and market-friendly 
concessions. This scenario synergises most ominously with the AIDS pandemic (national 
HIV/AIDS rates in the region range between 20 and 30 per cent), as weakened populations 
succumb to the virus, or as destitute women resort to prostitution and acquire the virus; both 
AIDS and the food crisis have now been declared national disasters. The catastrophic scenario 
has raised fears in some quarters of a ‘complex emergency’. While criminality will certainly 
increase, civil war is unlikely as long as the state retains the monopoly of violence and no 
external interference occurs, whether overt or covert.
The second scenario is that of ‘neo-colonisation’, following on the heels of the initial 
attack on the neo-colonial state. There is a real possibility that the rural households that have been 
allocated land will not be able to pursue sustainable farming, given the lack of infrastructure for 
petty-commodity production and social reproduction more generally in the ‘fast-tracked’ lands; 
drought and famine are themselves undermining the land reform. The land that has been allocated 
may be alienated quite rapidly and re-concentrate in the hands of larger-scale capitalists. This 
would entail a re-shrinking of the home market, to the extent that it could cancel out the prospect
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of ‘accumulation from below’. It would also herald the emergence of a powerful black agrarian 
bourgeoisie in a more or less direct replacement of the white agrarian bourgeoisie. The neo­
colonisation scenario would then see the black bourgeoisie find its place in a disarticulated 
pattern of accumulation and reproduce functional dualism in its extreme forms. Importantly, such 
a turn of events is being actively encouraged by the donor community by the withholding of 
funds for land reform; at present, Zimbabwe’s shift towards introverted accumulation is under 
international sanctions. In the political sphere, neo-colonisation would find two bourgeois parties 
competing in parliament (ZANU(PF) and MDC), propagating two bourgeois nationalisms (one 
black and one ‘multi-racial’), and arguing over who can better manage the economy. It is possible 
that, in the medium term, the members of the capitalist class will ‘bury the hatchet’ and begin a 
new ‘reconciliation’, given that the basic inter-capitalist conflict of the 1990s has largely been 
resolved through land redistribution; how such a reconciliation will play out in an MDC- 
controlled Matabeleland is as dangerous and unpredictable as ever. Finally, neo-colonisation 
would set out once again on the civilisation of opposition under both the state and international 
labour, though possibly with each patronising its own trade union centre (the ZFTU and ZCTU, 
respectively). Likewise, the rural areas would be demobilised, either through ruling party 
structures, or through chiefs (whose jurisdiction could be extended to the new resettlement areas). 
This would mean a highly fractured semi-proletariat; and it would also see the security agencies 
of the state continue to be deployed against the disenfranchised.
The third scenario is that of ‘accumulation from below’. This depends on the political 
strength of the semi-proletariat vis-a-vis the forces of imperialism. This scenario would see the 
semi-proletariat compel (a) the state to remain engaged in the economy, to continue to control 
current and capital accounts, and to coordinate inter-sectoral relations for a dynamic pattern of 
articulated accumulation, delinked from international prices; and (b) the donor community to re­
engage with the land reform process over an extended period of time to ensure that the requisite 
economic and social infrastructure in the fast-tracked lands are established. It is clear that the 
donor community, and the World Bank’s model of land reform in particular, have been shaken by 
the eruption of the land question in Zimbabwe, and some donors (like the UNDP) are looking for 
ways to re-engage.1 The key issues in any rapprochement between Zimbabwe and the donors 
would be Zimbabwe’s debt and its model of development. The ruling party at present is staunchly 
resisting any return to liberalisation; while the IMF is refusing to re-engage on any other terms. In 
this scenario, Zimbabwe could seek to split the donor community and continue to occupy a tense
1 The sending of a fact-finding mission in late 2001, whose interim report was cited in the previous chapter, 
has been part of a process aiming to re-establish informed policy dialogue.
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status between civility and incivility in the development order, unless this order itself begins to 
move beyond liberalism. The desirability of the ‘accumulation from below’ scenario lies in both 
its economic and political potential. With a broader economic base and with a state nurturing 
introverted accumulation, Zimbabwe could very well realise a national democratic revolution, in 
which the private sector would be pried open, accumulation through the state and corruption 
would recede, landlordism would dissipate, and class differences would become more clearly 
expressed within Zimbabwean nationalism. It ought to be noted that this third scenario would still 
exhibit violent tendencies, quite possibly of the ‘schizophrenic’ type witnessed in the 1980s; 
certainly, the ruling party would continue to pursue its own divide-and-rule tactics vis-a-vis the 
semi-proletariat.
The onus is on the semi-proletariat and its agencies; as before, neo-colonisation would be 
a reflection of the organisational weakness and divisions of the semi-proletariat and the 
preponderant power of imperialism. The semi-proletariat must resist the divide-and-rule tactics of 
the state by seeking to form rural-urban alliances while always keeping civil society at bay. This 
objective requires a significant identity change on the part of both the ZCTU and the war 
veterans’ association. The ZCTU has now seen the consequences of forming a political party 
instead of consolidating a peasant-worker alliance; and it is now also being undermined by the 
ZFTU. The ZCTU would have to begin to withdraw from its cross-class alliances and devote 
itself once again to trade union activity; it would also have to reassess its relationship to the rural 
areas by (a) unionising the new rural proletariat and (b) seeking alliances with rural movements; 
moreover, it would have to distance itself from the social democracy of the ICFTU (and the ‘good 
governance’ doctrine generally). For their own part, the war veterans would have to decide how 
to relate to a mobilised countryside that is now facing famine. Under the worst of circumstances, 
the rural movements must resist demobilisation from the higher echelons of the ruling party, 
while the war veterans must now consider cultivating class alliances beyond ZANU(PF), 
nationally, regionally, and internationally; this process must bring about formally organised 
political movements with democratic structures that can sustain political struggle over the long 
term. The ideal situation in the foreseeable future might consist in a strategic alliance between a 
re-radicalised ZCTU and a war veterans association that is willing to consolidate the rural semi­
proletariat, rein in opportunistic violence, and resist the embourgeoisement of the ruling party.
252
8.3 On International Solidarity
The onus for bringing about peripheral accumulation is on international labour as well. Peripheral 
accumulation requires solidarity of a different kind, which the ICFTU has not been inclined to 
provide. We have seen that the tripartite model of industrial relations which the ICFTU defends 
has been crafted to the needs of securely employed workers located mainly in the industrial 
centres. This means not only that it is inappropriate for the insecure workers of the centres, but 
also that it is Eurocentric in its essence, by virtue of separating out ‘industrial relations’ from 
‘agrarian relations’ and thereby eliding the agrarian question. The semi-proletariat -  the bulk of 
the world’s labour force -  straddles these two domains, and has grievances that arise from both 
the workplace (wages, conditions of employment) and the family farm (land shortage, security of 
tenure). These grievances do not see the light of day under tripartism. International solidarity 
requires, first, that ‘the worker’ is re-defined in a more universal way; and, second, that tripartism 
is abolished.
The latter requirement entails the supersession of ‘social democratic’ internationalism. 
The meaning of social democracy may have changed over the last century, reaching its apogee 
within the central economies in the nationalist period, but it has always actively sought the 
disarticulation of the periphery and has fed off its underdevelopment. The social democracy of 
the post-1970s crisis has assumed markedly new fundamentals: it abandoned the substantive 
issues of the past (for example, the principle of full employment) and it largely embraced 
procedural democracy (as reflected in the basic ILO conventions, which together comprise the 
‘social clause’). The crisis of the 1970s could have acted as a stimulus towards international 
solidarity against imperialism, but under the leadership of organised metropolitan labour, it led to 
a new labour imperialism wedded to liberal democracy. The new liberal convictions were potent 
enough for the ICFTU to take a firm stance on apartheid, but were not prepared to see to the 
transformation of apartheid-era patterns of accumulation; indeed, soon after the end of apartheid, 
South Africa embarked on liberalisation. Thereafter, the social democratic vision of the ICFTU 
proved benign enough to international capital to be taken on board by the ultra-imperial alliance 
(notably, in the course of the ‘social clause’ debate at the WTO). We have yet to see a social 
democratic vision that is not imperialist.
In the periphery, the meaning of social democracy remains obscure. It has not produced 
any discernible tradition; neither neo-colonial nation-building, nor specific expressions of it, like 
Peronism, fit comfortably into the category. In the 1990s, peripheral social democrats have 
generally been coopted into the ICFTU’s project. To be sure, on the issue of the social clause, a
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difference between North and South has been expressed, but this has amounted to a rejection of 
the ICFTU orthodoxy rather than the formulation of a substantive peripheral alternative. In this 
regard, those who still wish to claim a place for social democracy in the periphery must articulate 
a vision that reflects the semi-proletarianised reality of the peripheral labour force. To be sure, 
modernisation theories, such as articulated by the ZCTU in the mid-1990s, do not confront the 
power relations of the global political economy.
Herein lies the importance of uncivil rural movements today. Through direct action they 
pose fundamental challenges to the closures of tripartism and social democracy, and are therefore 
the primary source of the expansion of the civil domain. This, of course, is not to be idealised in 
any way. Uncivil politics, whether of the ‘everyday’ or well-organised variety, have their costs in 
terms of insecurity and loss of life. Moreover, they have suffered defeat after defeat, as the civil 
domain has proceeded to shrink rather than expand with the onset of the governance synthesis. 
Yet, as we have seen, uncivil politics cannot be underestimated either, for the major events of the 
postwar period cannot be understood in the absence of uncivil agency. In the present juncture, 
uncivil politics are once again knocking on the door, unsettling the ultra-imperial closures, 
expanding and consolidating their positions, challenging civil society to take note, even sweeping 
civil society aside -  as in Zimbabwe.
International solidarity would consist in the nurturing of rural-urban alliances that 
challenge the logic of disarticulated accumulation in the first instance. Such a political re­
orientation would require a fundamental transformation of metropolitan trade unionisms, but also 
peripheral ones, like those of the ZCTU and SATUCC, which have sought a niche in the social 
democratic world. A re-orientation of this sort remains more plausible in the periphery, given that 
the survival of social democratic trade unions can be at stake when they fail to take note of the 
realities of semi-proletarianisation (Zimbabwe being a case in point). In the event that new 
peripheral trade unionisms emerge in response to the uncivil challenge, they will enter into direct 
conflict with the centrally-based international trade unionism of the day. And in such an event, 
the splitting of the International along the centre-periphery axis should be seriously considered, if 
only as a stepping stone to a more universalist internationalism in the future. The organisational 
unity of the working class is not an institutional requirement but a political project.
8.4 Beyond Liberalism
Despite claims of a ‘post-Washington consensus’, the global order is still dominated by a liberal 
consensus, whose foundation is the ultra-imperial alliance. The consensus, however, is on much
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shakier ground today: a quarter-century of liberalisation has been inflaming the deep 
contradictions of the global economy and inducing diverse oppositional politics, from militant 
rural movements in the periphery and ‘anti-globalisation’ protests at the centre, to 
fundamentalisms and neo-fascisms. It is no surprise that the ultra-imperial alliance is increasingly 
resorting to its military power to maintain its position, while also seeking a substitute for the Cold 
War system by invoking new ‘evils’ and new crusades, as against ‘terror’.
Thus far, the ‘war on terror’ has served well to brigade the alliance partners into line, and 
is likely to continue to do so. At a time when the US economy is operating with an expanding 
trade deficit, the US leadership will continue to seek to discipline its partners by stressing their 
military dependence, even increasing their insecurity by rattling sabres against the new ‘evils’ -  
placing North Korea in the ‘axis of evil’, for example, destabilised the delicate diplomacy of the 
Korean peninsula and reminded Japan of its security dependence. If, in the 1990s, the US-led 
alliance thrived on the chaos of the new financial regime, it is possible that it will now thrive also 
on the ‘security chaos’ of ‘terrorism’.
The ‘war on terror’ has also had palpable disciplinary effects on social protest by 
squeezing all violence around the world into the category of ‘terrorism’. Thus, in its second 
meeting (2002), the new World Social Forum, designed as a counter-point to the World 
Economic Forum, renounced armed struggle.2 What we are in fact witnessing is a further 
specification of the meaning of ‘incivility’ in light of the proliferation of social protest and civil 
strife. In the postwar period, the ‘uncivil’ domain expanded under ultra-imperial auspices from 
the ‘property unfriendly’ to the ‘market unfriendly’; the latter was honed in the ‘governance 
synthesis’ of the 1990s. The new category of ‘terror’ is now serving to complement the 
governance synthesis by formulating a concerted policy (morally and militarily) towards the 
militant incivilities that it produces.
It has been suggested that the way out of the present impasse lies in the consolidation of 
the European Union and its assertion against the United States; entailed in this argument is the 
belief that a strong EU would temper the unilateral excesses of the United States and also the 
virulent liberalism of the Dollar-Wall Street regime.3 In other words, it is suggested that the way 
to a post-liberal order is through a new inter-imperial rivalry. It is by no means clear, however, 
that a European re-assertion will not simply lead to a new ultra-imperial accommodation. And it 
is certainly clear that any social democratic compromise that emanates from the EU will not be
2 See http://www.fonimsocialmundial.org.br.
3 Gowan (1999).
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prepared to dissolve the centre-periphery relationship. The only hope resides in social struggle 
that places the agrarian question at the centre of the agenda.
Without the ability to specify the post-liberal civilisation with any certainty -  ‘the owl of 
Miverva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk’4 -  we may sketch its essential 
features. This civilisation will be neither ‘post-Westphalian’ nor ‘post-national’, even if a post­
liberal transition succeeds in consolidating and democratising the institutions of global 
government. To this day, the state remains a fundamental juridical pillar of global government, 
and although it co-exists with the EU and international law-making bodies like the WTO, it is far 
from being eclipsed by them. We may recall that the rise of global government has stood on the 
back of the nation-state, allocating responsibility for adjustment nationally and deepening its 
multilateral corollary (by means of ‘surveillance’ decisions). It did not dare sweep the principle of 
national self-determination aside just two decades after decolonisation; instead, it 
instrumentalised national self-determination by emasculating its ends and means.
Any post-liberal transition will have to continue to weave the national question into its 
fabric. More than this, any attempt to dislodge the national question from the moral centre of 
global civilisation must be staunchly resisted, as this would constitute a fundamental triumph of 
imperialism. We have seen that essential to the legitimation of imperialism is its ability to claim 
universality and, accordingly, to render development and underdevelopment in the periphery in 
terms of successful ‘imitation’ or a stubborn ‘failure to imitate’ -  the latter being typically 
attributed to ‘local’ social and political ‘traits’. Under imperialism, the meaning o f ‘development’ 
may have changed over time, but its Eurocentrism has not; as Amin astutely observes, it 
continues ‘to consort with its damned soul: ineradicable racism’.5 So long as imperialism exists, 
therefore, the national question must remain alive.
4 Hegel (1952), p. 13
5 Amin (1989), p. 77.
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APPENDIX: FIELDWORK QUESTIONNAIRE
I. Profile of Respondents
1. Household: Male-headed 
Individual: Male2 .
3.
4.
5.
6 .
7.
8 .
Female-headed Size
Female
Previous location of work/residence:
Occupational status:
Communal area farmers:
Retrenched mine workers: 
Retrenched farm workers:_
Retired mine workers:___
Retired farm workers:____
Ex-combatants:_________
Other:
Assets owned: 
Livestock:_ 
Equipment:
Sources of income:_ 
Nationality:______
Age_
Education (years completed):
Ethnicity:
II. Profile of Land
1. Who owns the land? State:
2. What kind of land is it?
Arable:
Grazing_
Wildlife:.
Other:
CA: LSCF:
HI. Nature of Demands
1. What kind of land is sought and for what uses?
Farming:___________
Grazing:____________
Residence:
Gold Panning:
Woodfuel:___
Game:_______
Other:
2. What kind of tenure is sought?
Communal:_________
Individual title:__________
3. What other resources and services do you expect from government?
Health provision:_______________
School:________________________
Sanitation facilities:_____________
Agricutlural extension:___________
Credit:_________________________
4. What response is sought from government by the occupation of land?
No response is sought:___________
Resettlment:______ If so, where:___________
Formalised tenure in situ:_________________
Other:_________________
5. What response is anticipated?
Recognition of demands:______________
Dialogue towards solution:_____________
Eviction:____________________________
Arrest:______________________________
Physical violence:_____________________
No response is anticipated:_____________
Other:_______________________________
IV. Politics, Institutions and Representation
1. In your opinion, why has resettlement or secure tenure not been achieved?
2. Who do you hold responsible for failure to secure tenure/resettlement?
3. Do you participate in local meetings?
4. To what extent has the occupation of land been organised collectively?
5. Are local representatives and institutions being accessed?
6. Are you registered to vote in the national elections next year?
7. Have you attended constitutional review meetings? If so, which (CC or NCA)?
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